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'VOICES OF FRICKLEY': THE STRUGGLES OF THE MINERS 
AT A YORKSHIRE COLLIERY, 1984-1993 
James Edwin Nightingale 
In this study the author focuses on the actIvItles of the National Uniol1" of 
Mineworkers at Frickley Colliery during ten years of industrial conflict prior to the 
pit's closure in November 1993. While the initial part of this period, the 1984-85 
miners' strike, has been well documented by scholars, the conflict in the following 
years has received scant attention. Following the miners' defeat, the NUM members 
at Frickley played an important part in sustaining the tradition of niilitant trade 
unionism in the Yorkshire coalfield at a time of general retreat for the British labour 
movement. Other studies have concentrated mainly on the activities of union leaders 
and management figures when chronicling the confrontation in the coalfields."In 
contrast, a substantial part of the present author's account is based on the oral 
testimonies of pit level activists, thus aspects of the conflict that have been otherwise 
ignored or overlooked are brought to light. At the core of the study is the contention 
that the labour movement had become disabled by the defeatist notion of 'new 
realism'. Moreover, it is illustrated how the NUM leadership in Yorkshire, 
conventionally portrayed as being militant, was often instrumental in suffocating the 
resistance of the NUM rank and file as they challenged the authoritarian working 
practices being imposed by the management of the industry . 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Friday 26 November 1993, the miners at Frickley Colliery in the Yorkshire 
coalfield worked their final shift at the pit. Frickley was the latest on a list of pits that 
had closed in the pre"10us decade as the British coal industry was reduced to a 
shadow of its former self Two days earlier, of the 357 men who took part in a 
pit-head ballot, just 27 had voted to oppose the plans to close the pit. 1 
The very size of the vote at Frickley gives the impression that those responsible 
for shutting pits, the Conservative government and the management of the coal 
industry, had things their own way during this period - but such a view would be 
mistaken. Britain's coal miners had formed one of the country's most powerful trade 
unions, the National Union of Mineworkers, and in the ten years prior to Frickley 
closing, its members had been involved in an almost continual struggle. From March 
1984 to March 1985, the government had to confront the miners in Europe's longest 
mass strike - the Big Strike, as Frickley miners often preferred to call it. 2 During its 
course, the Frickley miners, previously regarded as a 'moderate' workforce, gained a 
militant reputation because of their aggressive stand. Even though the miners' strike 
was eventually beaten, at many pits their spirit was not entirely broken and a 
guerrilla war of attrition against the imposition of new working practices took place. 
The NUM memhers at Frickley Colliery - the 'Frickley Fighters' as they duhhed 
themselves - were in the forefront of this action, a beacon of resistance as the labour 
movement ret.reat.ed. The 'Voices of Frickley' is an account of those ten years of 
struggle. 
Certainly the Big Strike has been extensively documented, and being the most 
important industrial confrontation in Britain since the General Strike of 1926, rightly 
so. Unfortunately, there has been little written about the strike's aftermath. And in 
what has been written, too onen the focus has been on the changes in mining 
communities rather than the struggles of the miners at the point of production, the 
place where they had their greatest collective power. Thus Waddington et al. 's Split 
at the Seams included interviews with miners, but also 'their families, trade union 
otlicials, local politicians, police officers, social workers, health workers, school 
teachers and the local clergy'. 3 Similarly with a sociological study of four W ~st 
Yorkshire mining localities by Dennis Warwick and Gary Littlejohn from 1981 to 
1989. In their 1986 survey they collected data from 123 women and just 31 men --
and few of these had been active participants in the strike.4 
Hemsworth and South Elmsall f.xpress, 2 December 1993. .f 
2 This was by no means a unique concept amongst miners. Robert Roberts, for 
instance, uses the same term to refer to the 1972 national miners' strike. See R: 
. Roberts, 'The Big Strike', in 1. MacFarlane (ed.) l,-~ssaysfrom the Yorkshire 
Coa(field, (Sheffield, 1979). 
3 D. Waddington, M. Wykes, and C. Critcher, Split at the Seams? (Milton Keynes, 
1990), p.l. 
4 D. Warwick and G. Littlejohn, Coal, Capital and Culture: A Sociological 
Analysis (?f Mining Communities in West Yorkshire, (London, 1992), pp.83-87. 
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Even two of the later and most valuable texts which do focus on the .miners' 
struggle, Jonathan and Ruth Winterton's Coal Crisis and Conflict,5 and Andrew 1. 
Richards' Miners on Sfrik.e,6 each devote only one chapter to the strike's aftermath. 
Moreover, both have shortcomings in what they do discuss. 
Considering that the Wintertons collected much of their data by interviewing a 
'key activist' from each pit in Yorkshire, there is little in their account of the 
resistance at grass-roots level in the Big Strike: the barricade building, the stone 
throwing and the collecting of strike funds, the leaflet writing and the campaigning, 
or the intensity and range of debate amongst ordinary miners, be it at work or the 
social club, the branch meeting or the picket line. This is partly because there is little 
oral testimony presented, but perhaps also because too many of their respondents 
had one foot in the lower levels of the NUM bureaucracy. . 
Although Richards' book is packed with oral testimonies, his respondents are also 
from the same layer, predominantly pit-level union officials. Indeed there is little 
acknowledgement that a bureaucracy existed in the miners union, or that there may 
have been any conflict of interests between the leadership of the union and the 
rank-and-file membership. 
In 1972, Raphael Samuel described what he saw as a common feature of much of 
the literature on coal mining trade unionism: 'They are for the most part bureaucratic 
works in which the miner is treated as 'synonymous with his Union, and the Union 
itself identified with the activities of the area officials.,7 It is an apt description of 
many later works too. 
In the present writer's view, the concept of bureaucracy is an important one when 
discussing trade union issues. When Alex Callinicos and Mike Simons8 analysed the 
1984-85 strike, unlike most other observers,9 they came to the conclusion that the 
miners' defeat had not been inevitable. Certainly the miners had been forced to fight 
in far from ideal conditions, and for sure the state repression they faced was beyond 
that experienced by most workers in struggle. But these were of nothing compared 
to the weaknesses in the working class movement. For Callinicos and Simons, ,the 
fundamental reason why the miners lost in 1984-85 was because they were betrayed 
by the leaders of the trade union movement; and furthermore, leading fIgures within 
the NUM itself could not be absolved of all responsibility for the defeat, having 
blocked action which was required for the miners to win. It is the present writer's 
contention that not only were CaIlinicos and Simons correct in their judgement in_ 
1985, but that their analysis holds true for what happened in the years that followed. 
Callinicos and Simons do not argue that it was the personal failings of trade union 
leaders that led them to betray the miners in 1984-85. Miners had been betrayed 
5 1. Winterton and R. Winterton, Coal, Crisis and COJ!f!ict: 171e 1984-85 lvlincrs ' 
Strike in Yorkshire, (Manchester, 1989). 
6 A. J. Richards, lvliners On Strike: Class Solidarity and Division in Britain, 
. (Oxford, 1996). . 
7 RSamuel, 'Forword', in D. Douglass, Pit L!fe in County Durham: Rank and File 
Movements and Workers' Control, History Workshop pamphlet No.6, 1972, p.i. 
8 A. Callinicos and M. Simons, The Great Strike, (London, 1985). 
9 See, for instance, A. 1. Taylor, 'Militancy is not enough', Labour History . 
Review, VoI.55, No.3, Winter 1990. 
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before - by the Triple Alliance in April 1921, and then after the TUC had left them to 
fight alone aaer calling ofT the General Strike in 1926. And the same pattern was 
evident during the guerrilla war in the pits after the Big Strike, and yet again in the 
campaign to stop the final pit closure programme in 1992/93 
Callinicos and Simons point out that such behaviour is actually a result of the 
trade union leadership constituting a particular social grouping within modem 
capitalist society. Though unions are the basic defence organisations of workers 
against the employing class, their aim is limited to lessening the extent of capitalist 
exploitation rather than to actually abolishing it. As a consequence, every industrial 
dispute ultimately ends with a compromise, albeit in favour of one of the two sides 
depending on their relative strengths at the time. Someone, though, has to negotiate 
this settlement and so full-time trade union officials have evolved, based in a union 
office, far removed from the everyday pressures of the workplace. Importantly, the 
earnings and conditions of the workers' representatives are not determined by the 
compromises they reach. Indeed, union officials begin to expect the same kind of 
salaries and expense accounts as the management representatives with whom they 
negotiate lO. A study of trade union officials in the early 1990s found that 60 per cent 
of union general secretaries earned salaries of more than £60,000 a year. 1 1 All of 
these factors place the union officials in a privileged position in comparison with 
their members and help to transform them into a conservative bureaucracy for whom 
negotiation and compromise are seen as the very basis of trade unionism. 12 It is for 
this reason that union officials have been referred to as 'managers of discontent'. 13 
CaUinicos and Simons were by no means the originators of this notion of a trade 
union bureaucracy. In their History of Trade Unionism, written in 1894, Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb had noticed that British trade unions wcre dominated by a 
bureaucracy as early as the 1850s.14 In 1911, the Italian sociologist Robert Michels 
wrote of the emergence of a conservative layer of full-time officials in the German 
labour movement. 15 
Because the miners were one of the first groups of workers to organise, they have 
long had to endure bureaucracy. David Douglass has written of the how the leaders 
of the Durham Miners Association in the late nineteenth century developed a 
particular character: 
Once elected, they thought their role was to inflict upon the members their own 
moderation, and lead rather than serve. The members found they were being 
policed by men to whom they were paying wages. The officials became more and 
more preoccupied with arbitration and conciliation as the cure for all ills, and 
more and more impatient oflocal action which ran up against it. 16 
10 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.239-240 . 
• ,11 1. Kelly and E. Reery, Workingfor the Union, (Cambridge, 1994), p.65. 
12 €allinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.239-240. 
13 D. Watson, Managers of Discontent: Trade Union Officers and Industrial 
Relations Managers, (London, 1988). 
14 S. and B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, (London, 1920), p.203. 
15 R. Michels, Political Parties, (Glencoe, 1949). 
]6 D. Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', in R Samuel (ed.) Miners, Quarrymen and 
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What characterises the trade union bureaucracy in general is vacillation. It is 
pressured by the need to gain control of disputes on the one hand, while on the other 
pressed by their members to achieve better pay and conditions. 
CalJincos and Simons' stance is not without its critics. One writer, Peter Gibbon, 
is especially scathing of their position, arguing that: 
This analysis's most obvious characteristic is its sheer dogmatism. For 
'bureaucracy' was probably less evident in the running of the 1984-5 NUM strike 
than either any other major strike in recent times, or even any other recent N UM 
strike 17 
But an intense emotional attachment to the miners' struggle has blinded manv 
left-wing theorists to the weaknesses within the "vorkers' movement. It is usually 
stressed that it is right-wing officials who 'sell out' and these ean be replaced by 
good, fighting left wingers. Dut clearly what is at issue is that if the NUM was 
already leLl-dominated, how could there have been any question of ally betrayal of 
rank-and-file interests during the period we are concerned with? What is not 
recognised is that bureaucratic thinking inevitably creeps upon people who for 
prolonged periods act as guardians of the union apparatus and mediators between 
capital and labour, and this can happen despite sections of the bureaucracy being 
formally to the left of most workers. 18 
The habits of bureaucratic thinking even crept in at pit level. Though NUM 
branch officials differed from the upper union leadership in that they were paid by 
the Coal Board and that like ordinary miners they would lose their jobs if pits closed, 
they did tend to spend much of their time in the union office on the pit surface, away 
from the job. The bureaucratisation of workplace union representatives had been in 
evidence in the coal industry since nationalisation and beyond, but in the late 1970s 
the proces~ was deliherately fo~tered in all indu~tries hy the I,abour government. 
Subsequently, by the early 1980s there were twice as many full-time workplace 
representatives in British industry as there were full-time trade union officials. 19 One 
study, despite its authors being critical of the 'bureaucratic thesis', found 'the 
"professionalism" of workplace trade unionism is more advanced in mining than is 
usual' .20 Certainly there was a far-reaching network of formal procedures for 
Salt workers, (London, ] 977), p.255; see also D. Douglass, Pit Life in Coun~Jl 
Durham: Rank and File Movements and Workers' Control, History Workshop 
pamphlet No.6, 1972. 
17 P. Gibbon, 'The miners' strike of 1984-5', j;,'coflomy and Socie(v, VoU 7, No.2, 
1988, p.158. 
JS Cf T. Cliff and D. Gluckstein, Marxism and the Trade { Inion Slrux,!!,le: The 
General Strike (~f 1926, (London, 1986), p.29. 
19 D. Beecham, 'How far has shop-floor organisation been weakened?', 
international Socialism Journal, No.23, 1984, pp.99-1 00. 
20 C. Edwards and E. Beery, 'The incorporation of workplace trade unionism? 
Some evidence from the mining industry', ,)~{)ci{)I()KY, Vol. 19, No.3, August 1985, 
p.349. 
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collective bargaining and consultation in the mining industry, and there was a highly 
elTcctive conciliation machinclY. Aflcr the equalisation of wages throughout the 
coalfields in 1966, only 6 per cent of disputes involved stoppages. 21 
But if the theory of trade union bureaucracy explains the tendency for trade union 
leaders to sell their members short, it is not the sole explanation for their behaviour 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1970s, trade union leaders had been far more 
militant, but the defeats of the 1980s shaped their attitudes. Under the banner of 
'new realism' many of them now came to the conclusion that it was impossible for 
the unions ever to fight and win, and that strikes should be avoided at all cost. It was 
a self-fulfilling prophecy - union leaders did their utmost to stop workers from 
fighting, consequently workers did not win. 22 
Even so, in the wake of the miners' defeat there was still resistance in the pits 
despite the onset of new realism. Of course it could be argued that this is what 
should be expected from miners anyway - historically, were they not the most 
militant group of workers in Britain? Social theorists have long debated why miners 
were prone to taking strike action. 23 A common explanation has been that this was a 
result of them living in isolated, close-knit communities; as Bernard Newman, a 
researcher for the Ministry oflnformation, noted during the Second World War: 
Their villages are occupied only by miners, save for the few local tradesmen .. 
The community feels itself socially ostracised, a race apart ... Here is to be found 
part of the answer to the question asked so frequently; why does the miner strike 
in war-time?24 
In 1954, Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel reached a similar conclusion after 
examining the strike records in eleven countries. 25 They argued that a 
'consciousness of kind' developed in mining communities, which involved a strong 
awareness of shared grievances and a close attachment to worker solidarity. The 
Frickley miners seemed to fit with this generalisation, indeed as late as 1978 mining 
accounted for 75 per cent of all male employment in the neighbourhood near the 
pit. 26 But such a model does little to explain why workers who are not part of an 
21 S. Leman and J. Winterton, 'New technology and the restructuring of pit-level 
industrial relations in the British coal industry', New Technology, Work and 
Employment, VoI.6, No.1, 1991, p.58; 1. Lloyd, Understanding the Miners' 
Strike, (London, 1985), p. 7. 
22 A. Callinicos, .)'ocialists in the Trade Unions, (London, 1995), pp. 10-12. 
23 For a good introduction to the debate see Richards, op. cit., chapter one; also R. 
A. Saimdry, 'The Impact (~f Economic Restructuring upon Industrial Relations 
in the Coalmining Industry', (MA dissertation, University of Leeds, 1988). 
24 'Cited in D. Gilhert, 'Imagined communities and mining communities', I,ahour 
HisfOly Review, Vo1.60, No.2, Autumn 1995, pA8. 
25 C. Kerr and A. Siegel, 'The interindustry propensity to strike - an international 
comparison', in A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A. M. Ross (eds), Industrial 
Conflict, (New York, 1954). 
26 Wakefield Metropolitan District Council Planning Department, Elmsall District _ 
Plan, (Wakefield, 1977). 
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'isolated mass', such as white collar workers, have been in the forefront of industrial 
action in recent times.27 
Other accounts have noted factors such as payment systems,28 wage 
differentials,29 the working environment in the pits30 and migration to coalfields31 as 
reasons for militancy, or lack of it, amongst miners. What appears to be problematic 
though, is that each time a factor is put forward it always seems possible to point to 
the same conditions existing where mjlitancy was not always evident, such as in the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield. 
In truth, the reasons for militancy are complex. Factors such as the strategies of 
the employers, mass unemployment, historical traditions, the degree of class 
consciousness, the quality of workers' organisation and leadership, all playa part. 
Furthermore, militancy is not a static entity within a workforce; and the example of 
Frickley Colliery shows this, with militancy ebbing and flowing throughout the 
period we are concerned with. While there were high votes for action on many 
occasions, on others there were calls for the heads of leading militants. There were 
times when the network of rank-and-file militants acted independently of the upper 
NUM officials and others when lack of confidence and demoralisation meant they 
had to work closely with the leaders. 
One major problem in researching the events in a single locality is that it is 
difficult to make generalisations on what is found. Nevertheless, there have been 
numerous successful examples of this method. For example, Huw Beynon's book 
Working/or Ford32 described what it was like working at Ford's Halewood plant on 
Merseyside during the late 1960s, when strikes by car workers had a high profile. 
Much of Beynon's study was told in the words of the workers themselves. In Strike 
at Pilkingtons33 Tony Lane and Kenneth Roberts presented a picture of an industrial 
dispute at a large glass factory in St Helens in 1970, again by piecing together the 
viewpoints of some of the participants. Regarding mining, Coal is Our Life,34 by 
Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter, an early-1950s study of coal miners in 
Featherstone, has been cited as 'the classic social scientific account of a coal-mining 
community. ,35 More recently, there has been Peter Gibbon and David Steyne's oral 
history Thurcroft, A Village and the Miners' Strike. 36 
For the present \\'Titer Frickley Colliery deserves our attentions not for any 
generalisations that can be made about the nature of industrial relations in the coal 
27 Saundry, op. cit., pp.46-47. 
28 Gibbon, op. cit., pp.174-176. 
29 A. R. Griffin, TheMinerso/Nottinghamshire, 1914-1944, (London, 1962); H. 
Francis, 'NVM United: a team in disarray', Marxism Today, April 1985. 
30 M. Pitt, The World on Our Backr;, (London, 1979), pp.29 and 84. 
31 W. Ashworth, The History 0/ the British Coal Industry. Volume 5, 1946-82: 7he 
"Nationalised Industry, (Oxford, 1986). 
32 H. Beynon, Working/or Ford, (Harmondsworth, 1973). 
33 T. Lane and K. Roberts, Strike at Pilkingtons, (London, 1971). 
34 N. Dennis, F. Henriques and C. Slaughter, Coal is Our Life, (London, 1956). 
35 Warwick and Littlejohn, op. cit., p.23. 
36 P. Gibbon and D. Steyne, Ihurcroft: A Village and the Miners' Strike, 
(Nottingham, 1986). 
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industry but as a matter of interest in its own right. Not only has the present writer 
not attempted to give a generalised view of the 'average pit' in the period in 
question, similarly when collecting oral evidence he has not attempted to capture 
the experiences of the 'average miner'. The informants in this study have not been 
selected at random from the Frickley workforce, rather they are from a particular 
layer: rank-and-file union activists. There is a good reason for this approach. Class 
consciousness does not develop evenly in an individual workplace; there are some 
people who come to the fore, who take more responsibility and have more influence 
than their workmates. The nature and quality of the leadership these activists offer 
can make the difference between a favourable outcome or outright defeat for the 
workers involved.37 In the Frickley context, these men were the agitators, the leaflet 
writers, the pickets, the fund collectors, the stone throwers, the men who fought in 
hand-to-hand combat with the police and who spent time in prison for their cause. 
The oral' evidence in the present study was gathered by conducting in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews.38 A strategy referred to as 'snowballing,39 was 
employed. Some of the activists were already known to the author, and these 
recommended former workmates who also might be willing to give their accounts 
of events. The earliest interviews, in the autumn of 1995, were actually held with the 
former branch officials and branch committee men who still manned the Frickley 
NUM office at the Westfield Resource Centre in South Elmsall. In all, fifteen 
activists were eventually interviewed. Although a small number of activists who 
were approached preferred not to be interviewed, it was mainly the problem of the 
time needed for the lone researcher to transcribe the tape recordings that limited the 
number of interviewees (indeed, one particular recording was almost ten hours long 
and took well over a month to transcribe!). In the event, this number was perhaps a 
respectable sample of Frickley activists considering that Edwards and Heery noted 
an average of only 35.4 NUM members actively involved in formal branch life at the 
pits they surveyed in the 1980s.40 
But the main problem with the oral history approach is that because the past is 
being recalled through the perspective of the present, this brings into question the 
accuracy and the recall of facts; thus it can be aq,TUed that oral evidence lacks 
validity, it is not always a true picture of what is being studied.41 Critics of oral 
history contrast it with what they see as the greater reliability of contemporary 
documentary evidence. But there are failings even in those sources; for instance, 
newspaper reports are notoriously casual in their standards of accuracy.42 Also, as 
Trevor Lummis has noted, 'it is worth reminding ourselves that such sources also 
have their biases and distortions . . . Documents are produced by institutions 
37 Cf R. Hyman, Strikes, (Aylesbury, ] 984), pp.60-61. 
38 Full transcripts of the interviews will be placed in the University of Sheflield 
library. 
39 M. Haralambos and M. Holborn, Sociology: Themes and Penpectives, third 
edition, (London, 1990), p.725. 
40 C. Edwards and E. Heery, Management Control and Union Power: A Study of 
Labour Relations in Coal-Mining, (Oxford,] 989), pp.120-] 21. 
41 P. McNeill, Research Method." (London, 1990), p.89. 
42 A. Giddens, Sociology, (Cambridge, ] 989), pp.676-678. 
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(villainous or otherwise) for their own purposes and historical study is rarely one of 
them.'43 Furthermore, 'history does not happen in documents. Human activity 
happens as lived experience before being set down by some individual (often on 
behalf of an organisation) and is to that extent retrospective and second-hand. ,44 
But if the present oral recollections are to realise their full potential, they need to 
be freed from the narrow 'interpretivist' perspective that limits research solely to the 
micro level. The oral evidence ofFrickley NUM activists between 1984 and 1993, to 
be frank, would be meaningless without being located within the wider economic, 
social, political and historical context. Frickley Colliery did not exist within a 
vacuum. Energy policy, legal restrictions on trade unionism, policing methods, high 
unemployment, 'new realist' ideas within the labour movement, and so on and so 
forth, all shaped and determined the activities of these people. By using secondary 
data alongside oral evidence, the disadvantages of one approach can be 
complemented by the advantages of another. 45 
And yet, despite possible drawbacks with the oral history technique, there 
remains one great advantage: it is a method that enables researchers to take into 
account those aspects of history that otherwise would not have been documented. 46 
(In the present study there was a problem in that the two organisations under 
scrutiny were no longer capable of providing any information about activity in the 
pits. British Coal no longer existed~ while the NUM informed the present writer that 
it no longer had an industrial relations department which could handle requests about 
its former branches.) Rarely has the authentic voice of workers in struggle been 
heard. For all the claims about democratic freedoms by the upholders of capitalist 
society, power is far from equal. Class divisions are dominant. Working people are 
both exploited and oppressed, and any workers who are forthright enough to tell of 
their struggles are vulnerable to victimisation from their employers. Earlier studies of 
the miners' struggles in the 1980s have acknowledged this by hiding or disguising 
the identities of their informants. But the great, though unfortunate, advantage that 
the present writer had was that his research took place after the decimation of the 
coal industry, therefore his respondents were no longer employed by the 
organisation they had challenged for so long. The activists at Frickley no longer had 
to be guarded in describing any illicit activities they were involved in. At last, what 
really happened could be told. 
43 T. Lummis, Listening to History, (London, 1985), pp.ll-12. 
44 L . . 13 ummtS, op. CIt., p. . 
45 Cf Giddens, op. cit., pp.682-683. 
46 S. Humphries, Ihe Handbook of Oral History: Recording Life Stories, (London, 
1984), pp.1-4. 
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CHAPTER ONE: FRICKLEY AND THE MINERS' UNION 
The forgotten history 
Frickley Colliery was sited on the outskirts of t.l-te adjoining small West Yorkshire 
towns of South Elmsall and South Kirkby. Until the 18.70& d'.cse had been nothing 
more than two small and separate villages with around 500 inhab.itants residing in 
each. The introduction of coal mining was to change this. By the 1980s some 22,000 
people lived in the South ElmsalllSouth Kirkby district. 
The first of these hitherto rural communities to undergo change was actually 
South Kirkby, with the sinking of two mine shafts in 1874.1 The influx of men 
seeking work at the colliery saw South Kirkby grow to a population of 2,916 and 
even South Elmsall, one mite away, had doubled in size by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Not tong afterwards a massive house building programme was 
required when- a new pit was opened on the FrickIey Park estate. This new pit, which 
began development in 1903, not only had the largest pit shaft in Europe, but, by the 
time the Bamsley seam was reached in late May 1905, was the deepest in Britain at 
661 feet. So great was the attraction to the two pits that the area gained the 
nickname 'EI Dorado'. By 1913 the village of South Kirkby had expanded to house 
a population of 7,086 inhabitants and South Elmsall had grown to 5,760. Frickley 
Colliery was employing 2,,500 workers by this time.2 
Both South Kirkby and Frickley collieries experienced industrial unrest from the 
outset. South Kirkby was brought to a. halt by a six months' long strike within only 
two years. of starting production. This was followed by another strike in 1893 and 
then by a seventeen-week lockout in 1894.3 
Frickley did not have to wait as long for conflict to appear; indeed, there was 
even a strike by the men sinking the mine in November 1903. A lot of hostility was 
directed towards the butty system that was then in operation. Instead of miners being 
paid directly by management they were paid by a 'butty', a man contracted to ensure 
a certain amount of work was camed out. Miners were resentful because they were 
never quite sure just how much the butty's contract was worth and how much pay 
he was keeping from them. 4 
Significantly, a number of men had joined the Yorkshire Miners' Association by 
the beginning of 1906 and began agitating for union recognition. But the Carlton 
Main Colliery Company, which owned Frickley, was determined to resist union 
representation. Any miner found to be a YMA member was dismissed instantly. This 
measure, though, failed to stamp out the resolve of the clandestine movement and in 
November 1906 there was an open attempt to establish a YMA branch at rrickley. 
Management's response, in keeping with its hard-line approach, was to sack all 
those involved. As a protest against the sacking:;, and because of general discontent, 
P. Rusiecki, The Plough and the Pick: nle Industrial Trails/ormation (1 Two 
Yorhhire Village,v, (Wakefield, 1986), pp.49-53. 
2 Ibid., pp.64-74. 
3 Ibid., p.58. 
4 A. Wilkinson, A History of South Kirkhy, (Wakefield, 1979), p.115; Westfield 
Local History Group, South / ... 'lmsall in the Making, (South Elmsall, 1991), 
pp.21-29. 
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the pit was brought to a halt in April 1907. The dispute was regarded as a test case 
by both the union and the pit's owners. The stIike dragged on until early 1908, but 
by then~ mainly due to the strikebrea..lcip.g activities of the moderate rival to the 
Y~ the Amalgamated Society of Miners, it began to fizzle out. After a year there 
were only 4Q men still on strike. A handful of men actually stayed out until 1910. 
Nevertheless, though the strike was beaten, the action had not proved tutile. At one 
point in the dispute, the whole of the Yorkshire coalfield had been on the verge of 
coming out with Flickley and, because of this threat, Frickley's owners conceded 
the right to YMA membership at the pit. Thereafter, the YMA recruited openly at 
the colliery, and on such a scale that the rival ASM branch was forced to dissolved 
itself in December 1910.5 
The Frickley miners were involved in the national miners' strikes of 1911, 1912, 
1919 and 1921, and again in the lockout to reduce miners' wages in 1926. The 
lockout began on 30 April and, despite the TUC calling off the General Strike, lasted 
until December. Frickley appears to have been exceedingly solid. By November one 
in six of all Yorkshire's miners had accepted the wage cuts and returned to work, 
but of Frickley's 3,000 workforce only 20 had gone back. On 1 November a hostile 
crowd of between two and four thousand greeted strikebreakers as they emerged 
from the pit. 6 
The lockout eventually proved successful and for the following decade trade 
unionism in general was on the defensive. It would be January 1935 before any more 
industrial action occurred at Frickley, when the miners successfully prevented 
management showing favouritism when selecting men to be re-employed after 
lay-offs. This was the first purely local strike at the colliery in nearly thirty years. 7 
What is usually termed 'Prickley Colliery' was actually the site of two pits after 
1917 with the opening of South Elmsall Colliery. In later years the older pit would 
be referred to as 'the Big Pit' by the miners, and the newer pit 'the Little Pit' or 
'Cudworth' because the Cudworth seam was mined from it. South Elmsall Colliery 
produced coal until the 1926 lockout but did not resume production again until a 
year into the Second World War.8 
The Second World War, a time supposedly of national unity, was barely a month 
old when a dispute broke out at Frickley over rent subsidies for enlisted miners. 
Dissatisfaction expressed itself in other ways too. Absenteeism, for instance, was 
almost a Frickley tradition and at 21.9 per cent was amongst the highest in 
Yorkshire in the war years. During Easter 1944 Frickley miners played their part in a 
wave of strikes which erupted in South Wales and Yorkshire and which succeeded in 
restoring pay differentials. 9 
Following the war, and then the nationalisation of the mining industry in 1947, 
there appears to have been no noteworthy pit-level conflict at Frickley. Although 
there w~re probably numerous issues that arose~ they appear to have been dwarfed .. 
5 C. Baylies: The History of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1993), pp.288-294; 
Rusiecki, op. cit., pp.83-84. 
6 Rusiecki, op. cit., p.116. 
7 Ibid., p.128. 
8 Westfield Local History Group, op. cit., p.35. 
9 Rusiecki, op. cit., pp.153-156. 
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particularly from the late 1960s, by the more general conflict between the union and 
the National Coal Board. 
One historian, Hywel Francis, has argued that of all the industrial workers in 
Britain, 'the miners appear to have the greatest sense of their own history ... ' 10 And 
yet few of the younger activists who were to man the picket lines of the 1980s 
appear to have known much about the early struggles at their pit. Jeff Johnson, for 
instance, had just turned 28 years of age at the beginning of the 1984-85 strike; he 
had worked at the pit since 1975 and his response was typical. He had 'no idea 
whatsoever' about the early strikes at the pit or the 1926 lockout: 
The older-end knew about it because they were kids when it happened. It weren't 
uncommon to work down the pit with a bloke who was 65, waiting for his 
retirement, and they knew about these things. 11 
Robert Walker, who had started at the pit as a 16-year old in 1977, had been told 
'bits and bobs' about the earlier struggles, but that was all. 12 Gary Hurst was 25 in 
early 1984 and had also 'heard little bits'. But he had 'never got interested or 
concerned about owt that went off a long time ago.' 13 
Of course not all the activists at Frickley Colliery were young men in the early 
1980s. The older generation of activists such as Johnny Stones, who had worked at 
the pit since 1954, were obviously a direct, living link to the past. But even he was 
not aware of any of the very early struggles at the pit, ' . . . other than 1921, and 
then, obviously, 1926, because my father and my uncles were involved in that 
particular dispute.' 14 
If the details of the early years at Frickley were largely forgotten, nevertheless, 
developments in the lifetimes of the younger activists would generate a new tradition 
of militancy, a tradition that would be put through its sternest test from the 
mid-1980s as the very existence of a large-scale coal industry in Britain was 
questioned. 
Decline 
In 19l3, the peak year of coal production in Britain, there were as many as 3,024 
pits, employing 1,127,900 miners, who between them produced 287 million tons of 
coal. In the following years the industry began to decline, and to such an extent that 
by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 the number of pits had almost 
halved and more than one third of the workforce had been lost. 15 The process did 
not end with the nationalisation of the coal industry in 1947. In the two decades 
afterwards, the number of pits in Britain fell from 980 to as little as 3] 7 in ] 968. It 
was the older, low producing coalfields such as Scotland, Northumberland, Durham 
10 H. Fr~nci~, 'The law, oral tradition and the mining community', Journal of Law 
and SOCiety, Vol.12, No.3, p.267. 
11 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author, 5 September 1995. 
12 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author, 21 November 1995. 
13 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author, ] 0 and 17 October 1985. 
14 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author, 12, 13 and 14 September 1995. 
15 V. Allen, The Militancy ~fthe British Miners, (Shipley, ]981), p.l3. 
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and South Wales that mainly took the brunt. According to Vic Allen, there was a 
logic to these closures: 'production was being concentrated in the relatively new 
thick-seemed coalfields in which advanced mechanisation could be applied.' 
Moreover, fewer pits with a smaller manpower could maintain the previous level of 
output. 16 
It was also at this time that oil, which had been an alternative source of fuel since 
the 1920s, increasingly displaced coal. Other major factors which aided the decline 
of coal production included the shin to natural gas from manufactured gas, the end 
of steam-powered trains on the railways, nuclear power generation, and the Clean 
Air Act of 1956 which led to a massive reduction in domestic coal consumption. 17 
Closures were not limited to the peripheral coalfields. Between 1961 and J 971, in 
the part of the West Riding that in the 1970s became West Yorkshire, the number of 
miners fell from 40,000 to 27,000. One of the pits to close was Upton Colliery in 
1964, barely two miles from Frickley and the second newest pit in the country at the 
time. Three years later nearby Hemsworth Colliery closed. Frickley itself saw its 
workforce reduced from 2,710 to 2,020 during the 1960s. In 1971 there were 
rumours, later squashed, that the pit would be exhausted by the 1980s. 18 
The Panels 
l1uring the 1950s the leaders of the NUM offered no resistance at all to closures. 
Their hope was for the election of a Labour government. But with the election of 
the Wilson administration in 1964, it soon became apparent that the NUM leaders' 
erstwhile allies had betrayed them, closing one pit almost every week between 1965 
and 1969 - and yet again there was no action taken to prevent this. 19 
During this period, the NUM was dominated by a right-wing leadership. Of the 
twenty NUM Areas, only Scotland, South Wales and Kent were strongholds of the 
left. Nevertheless, miners did take industrial action to defend their interests. In the 
first ten years after nationalisation, 70.5 per cent of all industrial disputes in Britain 
occurred in coal mining. Scotland, South Wales and Yorkshire were particularly 
militant. Though these coalfields had just over half the pits, they were responsible 
for over 85 per cent of all stoppages. 20 
The most confrontational and best organised miners were in Yorkshire, where 
there were large unofficial strikes in 1955 and 1961. 21 Central to their organisation 
was the Panel system. 'Panels' were aggregates of representatives - normally the 
branch delegate, frequently the branch secretary and in some instances another 
branch committee member or official - from each of the NUM branches in a district. 
16 Ibid., p.42. 
17 S. McCabe, P. Wallington, J. Alderson, L. Gostin and C. Mason, the Police, 
PuhJic Order, and Civil Liberties: Legacies of the Miners' Strike, (London, 
1988), p.19. 
18 . k: . Ruslec I, op. CIt., p.174. 
19 A. Burton, the Miners, (London, 1976), p.172; Callinicos and Simons, Ihe 
Great Strike, p.20. 
20 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.21-22. 
21 A. J. Taylor, the Politics of the Yorkshire !I/finers, (Beckenham, 1984), 
pp.176-178. 
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From 1967 there were four Panels: North YorkslUre, South Yorkshire, Barnsley and 
Doncaster, corresponding to the NCB's divisions, or Areas, in the coalfield. They 
were not, in fact, part of the official structure of the union, but intended as places 
where NUM executive members could report back to the branches. David Douglass, 
an active participant in the Doncaster Panel during the 1980s, suggests that the 
Panels became junior miners' councils which would discuss matters of mutual 
concern and would formulate joint action. 22 
In October ] 969 there was an explosion of anger over the low pay of surface 
workers that resulted in a two-week unofficial strike of up to ] 30,000 miners. The 
stoppage was marked by the use of flying pickets. Another similar dispute erupted in 
1970 involving 103,000 rruners in Yorkshire, Scotland and South Wales. 23 'The 
importance of these strikes,' Andrew Taylor notes, 'was that they were organised by 
the branch leadership via the Panel system. ,24 
A new generation of left-wing activists in Yorkshire had been steeled by the 
unofficial action since the 1950s. Prominent among these young activists was the 
NUM delegate from Woolley Colliery near Barnsley, Arthur Scargill. In 1967 
Scargill organised the Barnsley Miners' Forum, a monthly ginger group of branch lay 
officials, which played an important role in the 1969 and 1970 unofficial strikes and 
in opposing the right-wing leadership of the Yorkshire NUM.25 
Two historic victories 
A unifYing influence had been the signing of the National Power Loading Agreement 
in 1966, which ended piece-work and secured the equalisation of wages throughout 
the coal industry.26 A consequence of tlUs was that on 9 January 1972 the miners 
began their first national strike since 1926, as they sought a pay increase above the 
Conservative government's pay lirruts. It was leadership at the rank-and-file level, 
rather than the official leadership, which led the strike. Picketing hit British 
capitalism heavily. Near the close of the strike there were 12 power stations closed 
and 1,400,000 workers laid off Thus the miners eventually won a historic victory. 
The rruners' victory was a reflection of the highest level of general working class 
militancy for over two generations. They received invaluable assistance from other 
workers who refused to cross their picket lines and especially from the thousands of 
engineering workers who helped picket, and thus close, the Saltley coke depot in 
Birmingham, in what became a crucial turning point in the dispute. 27 
22 D. Douglass, 'The Doncaster Panel, 1969-84', in R. Samuel, B. Bloomfield and 
G. Boanas. (eds), 771e Enemy Within: Pit Villages and the f!vliners' ,)'trike (if 
1984-5, (London, 1986), p.52. 
23 Allen, op. cit., pp.156-164; Taylor, op. cit., p.309. 
24 Taylor, op. cit., p.309. 
25 Allen, op. cit., pp.139-140; Taylor op. cit., p.88. 
26 Burton, op. cit., p.172. 
27 T. Cliff, 'Patterns of mass strikes', International Socialism Journal, No.29, 
1985, pp.38-42; National Union of Mineworkers, A Century a/Struggle: 
Britain's Miners in Pictures 1889-1989, (Sheffield, 1989), pp.92-96; C. Harman, 
The Fire Last Time: 1968 and A/ter, (London, ]988), ch.12. 
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In February 1974 the government decided to take another stand against an NUM 
wage demand, and so the miners struck once again. Prime minister Edward Heath's 
response was to call a general election. This time, however, the strike was firmly 
controlled by the official leadership, who were desperate not to do anything which 
would embarrass the Labour Party in the polls. Consequently, picket lines were 
limited to six pickets. The left's role was also different in this dispute. Since 1972 it 
had wrested control of the official union machinery in Yorkshire. Scargill, now the 
Yorkshire NUM president, again adopted a militant stance but, unlike previously, did 
little to encourage rank-and-file initiative. Nevertheless, the miners won once again. 
Heath lost the election and the new Labour administration conceded much of what 
the NOM sought. 28 The important point was that the miners had finally exorcised 
the memory of 1926 and shown they were now a force to be reckoned with. 
After the 1974 strike, a tripartite committee was set up involving the new 
Labour government, the NCB and the NUM. The result, in October 1974, was the 
'Plan for Coal', which promised greater investment and extra coal output in the 
future. NUM president Joe Gormley and the right-wing majority on the national 
executive were happy with this but were worried that miners might be restless if their 
earnings dwindled under Labour's wage controls. The solution was an incentive 
scheme.29 This dovetailed with the industrial relations strategy advocated in a 
little-known report by Wilfred Miron, the former chairman of the NCB's East 
Midlands Division just before the ] 974 strike. Miron contended that moderate 
elements in the NUM had been weakened with the introduction of the NPLA and 
that it would be necessary to revert to some kind of local or district incentive 
scheme.30 
But the left saw the danger and argued that the miners' union would be seriously 
weakened: miner would be set against miner, pit against pit, and coalfield against 
coalfield. The membership heeded these warnings and in November 1974 voted by 
61 per cent against the proposed scheme. This did not satisfy Gormley who 
instituted another ballot over the scheme in October 1977. Again the miners voted 
against. However, the right-wing dominated NEC once more ignored the ballot 
result and permitted Areas to negotiate their own local incentive schemes. Once the 
Nottinghamshire leaders had done so, there was a stampede to sign them elsewhere. 
These incentive schemes, as both the left and Miron had predicted, were to have a 
profound impact as the NUM faced up to its most serious challenge after the election 
of the Conservatives in May 1979.31 Now under the leadership of Margaret 
Thatcher, the Tories had learnt from their defeats at the hands of workers in the 
early 1970s. 
28 Allen, op. cit., pp.240-252; Taylor, op. cit., p.252. 
29 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.31-33; M. Crick, Scar&rill and the Miners, 
(Harmondsworth, 1985), pp.71-72. 
30 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, pp.l1-12; Yorkshire Miner, 
August 1987. 
31 B. 1. McCormack, Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979), 
pp.229-230; J. McIlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today, (second edition, 
Manchester, ] 995), p.151. 
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Tbatchel'ism 
Three elements have been identified in the Conservatives' strategy towards the 
unions, Firstly, there was to be no intervention to prevent riSiJlg unemployment, thus 
industry could be restructured and the unions weakened. Secondly, there was to be a 
programme of legal restrictions that were intended to make effective strike action 
difticult. Finally, a new climate was to be encouraged by means of an ideological 
offensive which stressed individualism as opposed to collectivism, a unity of interest 
between workers and their employers, and visible evidence that the government was 
determined to defeat strikes.32 
With the new government seeking to increase the profits of the nationalised 
industries and limit public spending, there was almost certain to be a clash with 
public sector unions. And it was with such a confrontation in mind that Nicholas 
Ridley, a leading right-wing Conservative MP, had prepared a secret report which 
was leaked in The Economist of27 May 1978. Ridley argued that any future battles 
should be on ground chosen by the government. As the most likely battlefield was 
the coal industry, there would need to be a build up coal stocks and contingency 
plans for the importation of coal. Ridley suggested that a Tory government should 
introduce dual coal and oil-firing power stations at the earliest and encourage 
coal-haulage firms to hire non-union lorry drivers who would show little respect for 
picket lines. He advocated cutting off welfare payments to strikers' families and 
proposed that there should be a large, mobile squad of police to counter picketing. 33 
In the following years this stratebl)' was employed with uncanny precision. 
The Thatcher government favoured the salami tactic to frontal assault, picking 
off and beating isolated groups of workers one at a time. The first major clash was at 
Dritish Leyland in November 1979, followed by a bitter strike at British Steel at the 
beginning of 1980. In 1981 it was the turn of civil servants, and the following year 
workers in the health service and then train drivers. The TUC, obviously aware of 
the strategy to weaken trade unionism, did nothing in response. 34 
There was one major exception to this pattern of defeats however. On 10 
.February ] 981 the government announced that twenty-three pits would have to 
close immediately, and possibly fifty close overall, if financial targets were to be met. 
A strike broke out in South Wales and soon miners from that coalfield picketed out 
other areas. The government, realising that it had misjudged the situation, decided to 
retreat and temporarily withdrew the closure programme. 35 
A turning point in British industrial relations came with Thatcher's landslide 
election victory in June 1983. Politically, at least, the government appeared to be 
exceedingly successful. This was especially evident at the 1983 TUC conference 
with the emergence of 'new realism', when Len Murray, the TUC general secretary, 
declared that .unions now had to take a conciliatory rather than confi'ontational 
approach to the government. However, under pressure from economists who 
thought .workers' wages were still far too high, the government went openly onto 
32 A. 1. Taytor, Trade Unions and Politics, (Basingstoke, 1989), p.154. 
33 P. Dorey, The Conservative Party and the Trade lJnions, (London, ]995), 
p.130; McCabe et aI., op. cit., p.20. 
34 CalIinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.36-37. 
35 Crick, op. cit., pp.86-88. 
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the offensive against the unions. In late 1983 the government successfully used the 
] 980 Employment Act to defeat the National Graphical Association in the Stockport 
Messenger dispute, and then banned the civil service unions at the GCHQ 
communications network in Cheltenham.36 And by then, two new appointments had 
signalled the Tories' intentions to finally tackle the NUM. Peter Walker, a veteran of 
the confrontations with the miners in the 1970s, was made Secretary of State for 
Energy. Then Ian MacGregor, a man with a reputation for confronting trade 
unionism in the United States, and more recently at British Steel and British Leyland, 
was named chairman of the Coal Board.37 
Combative tradition 
Just how well suited to mount resistance were the miners at Frickley Colliery when 
the government finally decided to confront the NUM? As we have seen, Frickley 
miners certainly had a militant past but by the 1980s this legacy was largely forgotten 
or ignored. In the years from the Second World War until the Big Strike, it was 
other Doncaster Area pits such as Armthorpe and Hatfield which gained reputations 
for militancy. Steve Gant, one of a new generation of militant activists at the pit 
prior to the Big Strike, characterises Frickley in this period as being 'an ordinary 
run-of-the-mill pit, a moderate pit, before the strike. Not politically forward. ,38 Jeff 
Johnson agrees; Frickley NUM: 
... didn't particularly have any policies. Any disputes that we had had nothing 
to do with national, although we supported the union in various different ballots 
before the strike and with good percentages. But things were basically on a local 
level. The only things that we were waiting for and listening about were what was 
happening at Kirkby pit, which again was a moderate pit.:w 
Ian Oxley, an electrician and a self-professed moderate, recalls that Frickley 
miners tended to be 'left wing' in that they wanted better 'benefits for ordinary 
working people.' But, he says: 
What you've got remember is that the NUM, like a lot oftrade unions, does come 
with a lot of right-wing ideas that don't die out quickly. When I started work at 
Frickley pit there were no Irish men and blacks. Unless your dad or a relation had 
a job at Frickley you couldn't get a job at the pit. So miners were traditionally 
racist, and certainly homophobic - certainly thirty years ago wouldn't have 
tolerated an homosexual openly being at the pit. If a person had any connection 
with sexual child abuse he would have been hounded out of the pit. 40 
36 Callinicos .and Simons, op. cit., pp.38-39; D.Marsh, The New Politics of British 
Trade Unionism, (Basingstoke, 1992), pp.240-241. 
37 G. Goodman, The Miners' Strike. (London, 1985), pp.27-28; I. MacGregor, The 
Enemies Within, (London, 1986), pp.17 and 116. 
38 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author, 20 and 26 September 1996. 
39 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
40 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 17 October 1995. 
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But if Frickley did not have a militant reputation in a formal sense immediately 
prior to the 1984-85 strike, what seems to have been prevalent was what Peter 
Gibbon, 41 amongst others, has referred to as 'pit politics', a combative tradition of 
pit-level bargaining over wages and working arrangements that developed in the 
1940s and 1950s when a substantial portion of miners' earning were dependent on 
local bargaining. This was a tradition under which the withdrawal of labour was 
used as a precondition for negotiation and conciliation rather than as a last resort. 
The better organised NUM branches would have had the better wages and 
conditions, and a high degree of participation in branch adivities. Although 'pit 
politics' was dealt a severe blow with the abolition of piece-work, in some places, 
according to Gibbon, it survived, notably in a number of Doncaster pits where a high 
degree of sectional solidarity was sustained over custom and practice regulation. 42 
It is perhaps with this in mind that Johnny Stones, the Frickley NUM branch 
delegate at Frickley Colliery from 1964 until the pit closed, describes Frickley as 'a 
fairly militant pit' in comparison to most others throughout Yorkshire prior to the 
Big Strike: 
There were definitely disputes in the late '70s and into the early '80s ... I would 
say that the biggest percentage, if not the whole lot, were wildcats; no pre-strike 
meetings or anything. It was just the men walking out. 43 
The NUM played little, if any, part in initiating these disputes. According to Ray 
Riley: 
... there was a lot of spontaneity and class consciousness at the rank-and-file 
level. Virtually every strike that I can think of was initiated at rank-and-file level. 
A lot of the disputes that arose were over contracts and the productivity bonus 
scheme. Management would set targets that were virtually impossible to achieve, 
and if the targets were so rugh then obviously it rut the men in their pockets . . . 
the men were prepared to come out because they saw it as a powerful weapon.44 
Branch officials 
The NUM organisation at Frickley, as at other pits, was based around the workplace 
branch. A closed shop existed throughout the industry.45 There were around twelve 
representatives who were elected bi-annually and formed the branch committee. 
Unlike in many other industries where there are shop stewards, the branch 
representatives were not elected by the section they represented but by a slate 
system, in which the whole of the branch's membership would vote. Ray Riley was a 
critic of the sys.tem because its basis was a popularity poll: 
41 Gibbon, 'The miners' strike of 1984-5', p.152. 
42 G"bb " lon, op. CIt., pp.152-153. 
43 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
44 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author, 21 September and 3 October 1995. 
45 Edwards and Heery, 'The incorporation of workplace trade unionism?', p.347. 
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... it wasn't how good a socialist you were, or how good a rank-and-file member 
you were in some cases - although you can't dismiss that entirely because good 
rank-and-file people did get elected onto the branch committee - but sometimes it 
was a question of how many pints you could down in the local club on a weekend 
... Popularity doesn't necessarily mean that someone's right for the job.46 
The oddity of the slate system was that an electrician, for instance, could be elected 
to be the electricians' representative without a single electrician actually voting for 
him. Most bizarre was that even men approaching 6S-years of age could vote for 
whom they thought should be the youth representative! 
Four of the branch representatives, the president, the secretary, the delegate and 
the treasurer, were full-time officials who spent their time in the 'union box' on the 
pit surface, dealing with members' problems, and, as such, straddled the divide 
between the ordinary membership and the professional bureaucracy at the union's 
Area headquarters in Barnsley. Steve Gant recalls who the four Frickley NUM 
officials were for much of the time prior to the Big Strike: 
Keith Proverbs was the president. AlfWalker was the treasurer. Warren Needham 
was the secretary, and Johnny Stones was the delegate. They were all 
middle-aged. They'd been on for years. They were immovable - or so we 
thought.47 
Ian Oxley, a member of the branch committee for a period in the early 1980s, 
admired the way branch president Keith Proverbs operated: 
He wasn't an intellectual bloke, but he was a brilliant bluffer - he would have 
made a brilliant poker player. And we'd got a very weak manager called 
'No-neck', Don Clay. Again, a nice enough bloke. But in that period I would say 
that we ran the pit a lot because Keith Proverbs could run rings round Don Clay, 
in the respect that he was a humane person, and if a person had done something 
wrong where he deserved to be sacked, i.e. he had sabotaged something at the pit 
for spite over some grievance and it had got out of hand, Keith would go in and 
make the manager feel like he was a rotten person to even think of sacking such a 
nice young lad, a good lad for the pit, and so on and so forth. While there was a 
lot of pressure to increase the tonnage at the pit, Don Clay was very flexible in his 
payment arrangements - at that time the bonus scheme wasn't particularly 
productive - he would pay men overtime and things like that, find ways round the 
scheme. In that period, financially, Frickley did very well. They made a profit, the 
men were ge~ting reasonable wages, and the union wasn't being jumped on - the 
union and Don Clay were working together. But it wasn't an equal partnership. I 
would pave to say that at that period Keith Proverbs ,·vas probabJy more on top 
than the ma!lager. 48 
46 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
47 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
48 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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This, however, was not a universal view of the situation. It was becoming obvious 
to some activists that the bureaucratisation of the miners' lay representatives was 
intended to clamp down on rank-and-file militancy. Gary Hinchliffe, another young 
militant in the early 1980s, argues that the Frickley branch leadership at that time 
would do everything within their power to keep the pit at work. He cannot recollect 
one dispute prior to around 1982-83 where both the pits at Frickley came out 
together: 
Keith Proverbs, he saw his job as keeping production rUlliling. His job was to 
keep men in work and at work - not at any cost - but he'd had a successful week 
if he could get through the week by solving all the disputes and the men not 
losing a shift. I never heard him once advocate going on strike over anything. His 
first job every morning was to go in the control room and see how production 
was going. Then he would go and see the colliery manager, Mr Clay, and they 
would sit and discuss the pit's problems. This had probably gone on since 1972 
and 1974. There was a new way of thinking between management and the union 
at each colliery. They needed as much coal as they could produce; it was a joint 
operation. The management in those days saw that the best means of hitting 
production targets at a pit was to have the union on your side.49 
In Lawrence Gert.ig's view, prior to the 1984-85 strike: 
The NUM had a cosy relationship with management, so any compromise could be 
reached. But it was worded in such a way that it would be: 'Yes lads, we've done 
/" it for you. It's great stuff You can go back down the pit now lads.' There would 
be some times that you would have a feeling, 'Hold on a minute, there's 
something not quite right with this.' We'd won half the battle but we hadn't won 
it all. 50 
Allegiances 
Despite Frickley having a militant reputation in its early years, there appears to have 
been little evidence of the syndicalist or revolutionary socialist influences that had 
formed the bedrock of the industrial militancy elsewhere in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Paul Rusiecki, in his history of South Elmsal1 and South Kirkby, 
even argues that 'political extremism' was 'essentially alien to the area' and never 
had much of a hold, unlike in other parts of south Yorkshire. Indeed from 1926 
onwards, because of the almost universal hatred of the Conservative Party in the 
area, it was the Labour Party which dominated the allegiances of local miners, and 
to such an extent that in 1951 the Labour Member of Parliament for Hemsworth, 
whose constituency included South Elmsall and South Kirkby, attained the highest 
• majority of any constituency in Britain. 51 
49 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author, II, 17, 26 November and 3 
December 1995. 
50 Lawrence Gertig, interviewed by the author, 7 December 1995. 
51 Rusiecki, op. cit., pp.132-133. 
19 
Frickley and the miners' union 
The loyalty to Labour ran deep at Frickley. Paul Symonds, a young Frickley 
miner in the early 19808, remembers that one of his workmates was a Labour 
councillor: 'Nobby Bolton. He had quite a bit of influence on me. He was a likeable 
fellow ... I think that was the closest I ever came to joining the Labour Party, while 
I worked with him.' He also recalls the hostility shown to another of his workmates 
who dared to criticise Labour: 
I was talking to this workman, Gary Hinchliffe, and he was explaining to me the 
difference between the Socialist Workers Party and the Labour Party. We got into 
a bit of a discussion and Gary was explaining to me all the betrayals by the 
Labour Party. And he was virtually set upon by the other miners. They were 
saying, 'Don't say that about our government and our party.' It was real loyalty 
towards mainstream Labour. I would say that right-wing Labour politics 
dominated. But that was always tinged with a real pull towards 
union-organisation militancy. 52 
There was more than just a personal political loyalty to the Labour Party 
involved. Frickley NUM actually had a direct link to the party, as Vic France, a 
Frickley electrician, explains: 
I used to be the chair of the local Labour Party, and the delegate to the district 
and the constituency . . . there were a lot of miners who were delegates to the 
Hemsworth constituency at that time. We were allowed one delegate to the 
constituency for every fifty members, to a maximum of ten. Because Frickley was 
affiliated to the constituency then, we were allowed to send delegates. And 
obviously there were a lot of other delegates on the same basis. At the time 
Hemsworth constituency was a mining force. 53 
Debates 
In some NUM branches the political affairs of the day were regularly discussed at 
branch meetings; but this was not customary at Frickley says Johnny Stones: 
. . . unless it was directly arising from correspondence that we received from 
Area or national and/or anything that occurred at Area Council arising from my 
delegate's report from Area Council. 54 
Even so, major issues would still be discussed down the pit. Miners, according to 
Gary Hurst, would discuss: 
what you lIsed to see on the television, things that affected liS, and even things 
that didn't directly affect us, tax cuts for the rich and things like that, they all got 
52 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author, 31 March and 25 November 1996, and 
2 February 1997. 
~! Vic France, interviewed by the author, 8 November 1996. 
Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
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discussed down the pit ... in the gate when you were having your snap, on the 
paddy [underground train] going to the job; anywhere like that. 55 
Particularly important were workers such as fitters and electricians who moved 
around to do their jobs and so could spread information around the pit: 'If there was 
owt to be talked about, we generally got to know,' says Gary Hurst. 56 
Of course, with most of the Frickley workforce living within the locality, the pit 
wasn't the only place where important issues of the day were discussed. 'In the 
circles that I use to mix in at the time, we used to talk politics,' recollects Ray Riley: 
'People use to take part in sorts of debates - there were like debating societies within 
certain drinking establishments in South Elmsall. ,57 It was in such an environment 
that a generation of young left-wing activists would emerge at Frickley. 
The emerging left at Fricldey 
Whatever the strength of the NUM at Frickley Colliery, by the early 1980s it appears 
to have become increasingly apparent to some rank-and-file miners at the pit that 
sectional strength alone was no longer enough. An understanding of affairs outside 
the pit, and indeed outside the industry, was needed in the face of the threats to 
effective trade unionism from the government. One of the first of a new layer of 
socialist miners at Frickley was Steve Gant, a supporter of the Socialist Workers 
Party: 
I'd been taking Socialist Worker since about 1980. I was selling The Collier - that 
was about '80/81 - then I moved on to sell Socialist Worker when The Collier 
collapsed. The Collier used to sell especially well, to say that it iterated the 
politics of the Socialist Workers Party. I used to sell bunches of twenty, 
something like that. They went like hot cakes - though there was a feeling around 
at that time for those to sell. 58 
Crucially, this activity brought him into contact with other miners with socialist 
convictions at the pit: 
George Gornell was one of the first lads who I came across, when we were going 
on marches against unemployment and things like that up and down the country. 
We were only young 'uns, but George was a bit established; he could talk at 
meetings. And we just took our lead off George. There was a group around 
George who were active at branch meetings and who were turning up to register 
their vote. There was about a dozen/fifteen of us, who were round about The 
Collier and taking Socialist Worker - rank-and-file militants. George was 
influenced by the Communist Party. He wasn't an active member of the CP, Ijust 
think that he got his ideas from that strain. But he was a pretty good speaker. He 
was always challenging Keith Proverbs. We didn't have the confidence at that 
55 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
56 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
57 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
58 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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time to challenge Proverbs, but George did. And Keith backed off a little bit with 
George because he couldn't shout him down Proverbs had a habit of shouting 
people down, especially the young lads - but George had a bit of credibility and 
could stand up to him. Keith hated him. It was superb because it gave us a lot of 
confidence. And eventually we started challenging him and trying to swing the 
vote against him, and making him work for a change. 59 
Frickley Nlftv1 held a general branch meeting every week. There could be 
anything between twenty and fifty members in attendance, depending on the issues 
on the agenda. If there was something that the left saw as important, they would 
muster all their supporters, perhaps between twenty and thirty miners, to put an 
alternative to the established NUM activists. 'Some things we used to win,' recalls 
Steve Gant: 
or we used to make it harder than it had been for Keith and the branch officials to 
shove things through. It wasn't an easy ride for them; it wasn't done and dusted 
in a ten-minute meeting any longer. We started to challenge them and go deeper 
into questions. We wanted some answers. 60 
The NUM national and Area leaderships would frequently ask branches to 
organise for specific labour movement causes, but these were often ignored by 
branch leaders who were only concerned with coal industry affairs. The militant left 
at Frickley, though, were soon in a position to start pushing for these initiatives, as 
Steve Gant explains: 
We used to shove things through such as taking buses to demonstrations and so 
on. They couldn't really oppose these. We used to make it really hard for them to 
oppose things. But if we had not been there, there would probably have been no 
buses even mentioned. It would just have been read out in the minutes and slipped 
to the bottom of the pile. The People's March for Jobs, CND, a Right to Work 
demo in Bradford, and Liverpool. Everywhere there was a demonstration we'd 
try to get a bus, and 8 times out of 10 succeed in getting somebody down on a 
demonstration. 61 
King Arthur's men 
In December ] 981 Arthur Scargill was elected president of the NUM with an 
unprecedented 70.3 per cent of the membership's vote. 138,803 miners had voted 
for the militant from Yorkshire. 62 Scargill gave voice to their feelings about the Coal 
Board and the inadequacies of the union's previous leadership, as Paul Symonds 
testifies: 
59 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
GO Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
61 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
62 R. Undy and R. Martin, Ballots and Union Democracy, (Oxford, 1984), p.l 01; 
Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.19. 
22 
Frickley and the miners' union 
... amongst the men that T worked with, Gormley was universally hated. He was 
somebody who sold the miners short at every opportunity. So people were uneasy 
about this consensus that was going off, and once the incentive scheme was 
introduced, that really did put people into a combative mood. It put that 
consensus under real strain. Because it wasn't about just getting a few more tons 
of coal out and shaking hands with the manager. Management were now seen as 
people who were basically trying to rob money offyou.63 
ScargiU promised to be different from the right wing - he would not sell out. It 
was a quality which Scargiil's enemies never fully recognised, nor understood it as 
the basis of the devotion of thousands ofNUM members. One Frickley miner, Gary 
Hurst, summed up the desire for Scargill's leadership thus: 'I think at the time he 
was haited as the best thing since sliced bread. It was about time that we had a leader 
with some guts ... That's what I felt: "We might get something done now.",64. 
John Picken, no doubt like many other NUM branch committee men in the 
Yorkshire coalfield, felt really proud when Scargill got elected: 'I knew one thing: he 
would fight; he would fight - not for his gains - for his members' gains. He would 
fight to the last. And he proved it. ,65 
The election of Scargill was a tremendous boost for those who wished to 
challenge the domination of Frickley NUM by moderates. As Ray Riley explains, 
now there was a chance to build up a strong rank-and-file organisation: 
. . . and with Scargill as the focal point of that organisation. There was hope for 
the future that we could achieve quite a few results and make demands. of our 
own that the government and the Coal Board would have to accept. So yes, it 
was a good time for rank-and-file militants. It gave confidence, plus, if you look 
at the overall view of Scargill's election - and I'm not just talking about Frickley 
here, I think it says a lot about the political thinking within the NUM at the time -
he was overwhelmingly elected, a massive majority, and people were aware of his ' 
socialist left-wing credentials and his militant past. 66 
The move to the left at Frickley was expressed in the eJections to positions on the 
branch committee at thIS time. There were already a couple of left wingers on the 
branch committee, 'Geoff Siddons and Dave Wilson,' recalls Gary Hinchliffe: 
The first new left winger that we got on was Steve Tulley. He got elected onto 
the committee before the strike. I would say that he was the first out-and-out left 
winger ... In fact, I think that if the strike hadn't have been that year, Dave 
Wilson would've got the president's job the next time. He pushed Keith Proverbs 
very close. And Sider [Geoff Siddons] had already gone onto the secretary's job 
be.cause the other secretary~ Needham, had retired. And then Alf Walker got 
knocked - he was the right-wing treasurer - and we got Dicky Nailor on, a left 
63 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
64 Gary Hurst, Interviewed by the author. 
65 John Picken, interviewed by the author, 28 and 29 September 1995. 
66 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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winger. So trungs were moving left just before the strike. And I trunk that was all 
to do with the incentive scheme; these people were prepared to stand up and 
arbrue over their money; not take it.67 
Frickley Colliery, then, on the eve of the 1984-85 strike, could be described as 
having a NUM branch leadership inclined towards co-operation with management, 
alongside a workforce that had enough sectional confidence to challenge 
management. However, through tackling the incentive scheme, through opposition 
to the anti-union policies of the Conservative government, and with the rise to the 
leadersrup of the miners' union a man who personified the aspirations of the 
rank-and-file membersrup, a new generation of Frickley miners were being 
radicalised. But the ideas these new militants were expressing would soon be put to 
the -test as it became increasingly clear that the government finally intended to face 
the miners. 
67 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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Opening shots 
Many observers had been expecting a full-scale confrontation between the NUl\1 
and the Thatcher government from the moment that Scargill replaced Gormley - the 
new NUM president had stood on a platform of attaining good wages for miners 
and opposing industrial contraction, whereas Gonnley had considered there was 
little the union could do to control the size of the industry. I Instead, three strike 
ballots, in January and October 1982, and March 1983, went against 
recommendations for action over pay and closures. After the last ballot failed, many 
militant miners began to argue that miners who were unaffected by pit closures 
should not be allowed to vote other miners out of jobs. 2 
Ii was the miners in Nottinghamshire and the Midlands who, because of good 
bonus payments, were consistently voting against taking strike action. Nevertheless, 
the incentive scheme not only tended to make some miners acquiescent, it also, 
through the tightening up on productivity and discipline, brought about an increase 
in small-scale, unofficial stoppages, particularly in Yorkshire - as we saw in the 
previous chapter with Frickley. The most explosive incident in Yorkshire occurred 
in September 1983 when the whole of the Barnsley Area was shut down for a week 
by flying pickets after a miner from Dodworth was sacked for hitting an ovennan. It 
was only after the intervention of Jack Taylor, the man who had replaced Scargill as 
the Yorkshire NUM president, that the strike was called off.1 
In May that year, a major' report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
recommended that the coal industry should tailor output to the needs of the 
market. 4 In line with this, on taking his new post Ian MacGregor began arguing that 
the NCB was producing too much coal at too great a cost. MacGregor's 
confrontational stance towards the miners was made even more plain when he 
quickly stated that 5.2 per cent was the Coal Board's final offer in the latest pay 
round. A special NUM delegate conference - with the recent ballot setbacks in mind 
- responded by calling for an overtime ban.5 The ban began on the last day of 
October, with the intention of cutting production, reducing the growing stockpiles 
of coal, and returning unity between the coalfields by reducing the disparity between 
incentive payments.6 
With the ban solid, the NCB retaliated. Pit managers changed shift times and 
meal breaks to minimise the effect on output. In some pits, miners were sent home 
on Monday mornings because safety work was not being carried out over the 
weekend. Frickley branch delegate Johnny Stones reflects on what was happening: 
1 . Richards, Aliners On Strike, pp.75-76; C. G. Hanson, Taming the Trade Unions, 
(Basingstoke, 1991), p.71. 
2 Callinicos and Simons, The Great Strike, pp.42-43. 
3 Ibid., p.45. 
4 McCabe, et. at. The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, pp.20-21. 
5 Crick, Scar gill and the Miners, p.97. 
6 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.45. 
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You had got a situation where it was escalating off the spin-off that came from 
the overtime ban. For example, South Kirkby were down to three and four days 
production worklng: men were being sent home as a result of the overtime ban 
because the surface washer needed cleaning up and maintenance work doing 
before they attempted to wind coal out of the colliery. Therefore the majority of 
underground workers, other than safety and continuous shift workers, were sent 
home Mondays and sometimes Tuesdays, and definitely Fridays, when the 
winders operated a strict five-day working. That was one example. There was a 
dispute at the Manvers complex involving Kilnhurst, Wath, Manvers and 
Bamburgh. There was a dispute at EdIington in regards to overtime and bad face 
working conditions and a management crackdown at that particular colliery. 
There was privatisation of washeries at Prince of Wales. So, in essence, there 
were about four or five bush-fires in the January/February period leading up to 
the start of the dispute, which was triggered off obviously by the Cortonwood 
closure. 7 
On February 20 a strike began at Goldthorpe in the Doncaster Area following the 
pit's merger with Highgate Colliery. On the same day the dispute at Manvers led to 
flying pickets successfully calling for support at all the other pits in South 
Yorkshire. 8 
A fruitful visit 
Miners at Frickley got in on the escalating action too. On Thursday 1 March the 
colliery's 1,800 men walked out on all three shifts in protest at the visit to the pit of 
the junior minister for energy, Giles Shaw. The Hemsworth and South Elmsall 
Express told how the minister was given: 
a hostile reception when he arrived at the colliery to in sped progress on the £42 
million improvements at the complex. The miners were in an angry mood and the 
Minister was jeered and had sandwiches and fruit thrown at him ... A crowd of 
about 200 gathered to meet Mr Shaw when he emerged from his underground 
inspection . . . NUM branch secretary at the colliery, Mr Geoff Siddons, said 
later that the demonstration was 'spontaneous and not orchestrated by the 
NUM.,9 
Robert Walker recalls something which particularly angered the miners that day 
over the visit: 
I remember going into the canteen and all we usually got was pies and beans. 
We goes in and there were all these salmon sandwiches; big trays of them. We 
asked for a salmon sandwich, but it was only for them bastards. Everybody was 
7 Johnny Stones~ interviewed by the author. 
8 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and CO'?fiict, p.6S. 
9 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 8 March 1984. 
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saying, 'We're not having fucking this!' T can remember as they were going 
down the pit, people were bubbling over it. 10 
Gary Hinchliffe recollects that the walkout actually began in the Big Pit as the 
night shift were heading home: 
I think they'd been told that there would be a paddy coming in for them but it , 
would be late. It would mean that they would be late riding out of the pit. So 
they decided to set off walking. And as it turned out, they made the right 
decision. Because by the time that they'd reached the pit bottom, this paddy was 
still sat there, waiting for this government minister. And when they looked, it had 
got a brand new car on, with padded seats - we sat on wooden benches, six to a 
box. Some men decided that it was time to empty their bladders, and that they 
nee.ded to do their number two's. So they peed and shit all over it, made their 
way to the pit bottom and rode out of the pit. The day shift were already in the 
pit bottom; they realised that they'd have to walk in because nobody knew when 
this minister was coming down. So they ended up going home. I I 
Later that day, Vic France arrived at the pit for the afternoon shift: 
He was already down the pit when I got there. There was a great crowd gathered 
outside waiting to meet him. There was a barrier between where the union box 
was and where the gantry for going down the pit was, to stop wagons from 
going through. I was at the front of the barrier. When they came. out, people 
were throwing their oranges and their· snap. at them. They got right up to the 
barrier and some guy spit at them from behind me. It was a real green 'un - it hit 
an- undennanager, and of course the first person that he looked at was me. It 
wasn't me, it was another blUy. It was definitely spontaneous, I don't think it was 
planned. I think that everybody thought it was a provocation, inviting this guy up 
under the circumstances.12 
According to Ray Riley, 'the beauty of that particular strike' was the spontaneity: 
'but also there were people who were involved in the welcoming party who were 
actually non-militant. There were faces there who I recognised didn't playa big part 
in NUM politics. ' 13 
Cortonwood 
There were two options open to the NUM as tempers escalated. They could either 
utilise the rank-and-file militancy that was developing in order to initiate a national 
strike or they could restrain it. Initially, at least,. it was the latter course that was 
adopted in Yorkshire. At the end of February 1984 the Yorkshire Area Council 
10 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
II Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
12 Vic France, interviewed by the author. 
13 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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decided not to take action beyond the overtime ban. However, the Coal Board again 
dictated events by announcing the closure of Cortonwood ColIielY. 14 
Miners were more hostile towards pit closures in the early 1980s than they had 
been twenty or thirty years earlier because unemployment levels were now 
extremely high and there wa& little alternative employment in the coalfields. In the 
twelve months to March 1984, 23 pits and 21,000 mining jobs had disappeared 
without anything approaching a concerted fight back. But with Cortonwood being 
the first pit with reserves to dose since the signing of the 'Plan for Coal', things 
were clearly different; for many NUM members this was nothing other than a 
calculated act of provocation on the part of the Coal Board. 15 The NUM contended 
that Britain's coal reserves should be retained as an important source of energy for 
the future, that nuclear power was both a costly and dangerous alternative, and that 
oil reserves off the British coast were limited. Moreover, in the long term, pit 
closures made little sense as re-opening a coal mine is difficult and costly. 16 
What particularly upset the Yorkshire NUM leadership about the closure of 
Cortonwood was that the NCB were completely ignoring the usual procedure of 
talking to them about the pit's closure - in effect, a sign to the Area officials that 
they were no longer necessary for the functioning of the industry. Though the onset 
of spring meant that the best time for a coal strike had passed, and despite the huge 
stockpiles of coal, it was coming to the point where the NUM would have little 
option but to put up a fight. The union's predicament was summed up later by 
David Douglass, a member of Yorkshire NUM executive~ 'the whole thing was 
premature actio~ because we wanted the overtime ban to continue really until the , 
following Christmas. ' 17 
With the changing development~ on, Monday 5 March the Yorkshire Area 
Council voted to instruct branches to stop work from the last shift on the following 
Friday, in line with the decision of a ballot of Yorkshire miners in January 1981 
which declared that industrial action would be taken to stop the closure of pits for 
any reason other than exhaustion. The next day, the NCB declared that output was 
to be reduced by 4 million tons to 97.4 million tons in the following financial year. 
Two days later the NUM executive voted by 21 to 3 to support the strikes in 
Yorkshire and Scotland and to endorse action by any other Area under Rule 41, 
which permitted Areas to call strike action without a ballot. The battle had begun. IS 
A quick strike 
Many Frickley miners were confident of a relatively quick victory once the strike 
was under way, as Robert Walker reflects: 
14 Callinicos and Simons, op-. cit., p.46 . 
. , 15 Crick, op. cit., p.98. 
16 B. Towers, 'Posing larger questions: the miners' strike of 1984-85', Industrial 
Relations J(mrnal, Vol. 16, No.2, Summer 1985, p.l1; A. Glyn, 1he Economic 
Case Against Pit Closures, (Sheffield, 1984). 
17 Douglass, 'The Doncaster Panel", p.54. 
18 CaIIinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.12-I4;Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., 
pp.66-70; Hanson, op. cit., p.71. 
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It was funny because people were getting excited; saving their coal: 'It looks like 
it might be a long one this, about six weeks.' 1 remember I was on nights on the 
tail gate rip - you didn't have to work Fridays then if you worked all the other 
shifts - they were saying, 'You want to come tomorrow Bopper, it's going to be 
a long one this. It's going to be at least six weeks.' Everybody thought it was 
going to be a six- or seven-week strike; that we'd beat them. I8 
The older miners would tease the younger ones about their ability to last the 
ordeal of a strike, as Gary Hutsby, at just 17 years of age, one of the youngest 
workers at Frickley Colliery in March 1984, remembers: 
Obviously, as the strike drew nearer, more people talked about it. The general 
mood was that there was going to be a strike. I can remember a few from the 
older-end saying, 'This is going to be a fight, it's going to be important for the 
industry and the union.' But I can remember them saying that it was all these 
young tuns - and pointing at me - and saying that we were going to be the weak 
link in the chain. It was funny though, because the nearer to the strike we got, the 
more of the older-end started throwing onto the sick. 19 
Johnny Stones, the branch delegate, was a veteran of previous confrontations and 
because of his standing within the Yorkshire NUM wasn't as naive as the younger 
miners about the prospects for the battIe ahead: 
I knew what the stocks were on the ground - and there were over 30 million tons 
- and I knew that it was March and that we'd got summer in front of us. So it 
was going to be long in the respect that coal burning wasn't going to be affected 
dramatically until the winter months, which was six months al1ead. 20 
No matter how short the strike was expected to be, preparations still had to be 
made as the men worked their final shifts, as Gary Hinchliffe remembers: 
Some men's coal hadn't come. So straight away, from day one, they'd got no 
coal. So they were pinching saw-blades to saw wood. Now this deputy was 
coming round, and we had a brand new saw. He says, 'Where's the saw?' We 
says, 'We don't know. We haven't seen it.' And this lad, who I know very well, 
he'd got the saw-blade stuck down his pants, and he'd got the arm of the 
bow-saw in his donkey jacket, folded up. He'd got to smuggle this out of the 
pit. 21 
Stokes are commonly presented in the mass media as being the work of bullying 
.. union bosses and something that most workers oppose because they lose money. 
18 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
19 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author, 20 and 21 November, and 18 December 
1996. , 
20 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
21 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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But to many participants, strikes are often a time of enthusiasm and expectation. 
They are a break ITom the tedium and aimlessness of everyday life and the 
regimentation of the workplace. Gary Hinchliffe remembers on the final day, 'it was 
jovial. Everybody was laughing and joking. And we were discussing what's going 
off' Steve Gant was working on the afternoon shift that day and recalls that he and 
his workmates were so eager to go on strike that they joined the strike early: 
I was working with Gaz Hughes down on 28s. We were due to come out of the 
pit at qualter-past seven, but as soon as we got to know that we were going to 
be on strike, we knocked off at four 0' clock and came out. So we had an extra 
three hours on top of that year, me and Gaz and a few others who came out of 
the pit. So that was the feeling: 'We are out. Come on it's Friday, let's go.' It 
was a good feeling. I had been waiting for it. It could not come soon enough, to 
have another go at them.22 
A similar enthusiasm for strike action seems to have been evident the day after, 
Saturday 10 March 1984, when Frickley miners met at the Miners' Institute in 
Moorthorpe. Jeff Johnson recalls how: 'There was a feeling like a holiday 
atmosphere. We are going to get some time off and get some decorating done and 
we'll be back and we'll have a secure future. ,23 Johnny Stones remembers there was 
no opposition to the strike at the meeting: 
When I gave my reports and we took a show of hands, I don't think that 
anybody was in opposition. Obviously it wasn't the fuII membership because you 
couldn't gct thc fuJI membership in. But of those at the meeting - and there were 
several hundred there, inside and outside the Miners - it was unanimous. 24 
The domino affect 
There may have been no noticeable opposition to the strike witnessed at Frickley 
that Saturday, but the development of the strike in Yorkshire was no foregone 
conclusion as there were different levels of enthusiasm throughout the coalfield. In 
most of the Doncaster and Barnsley pits the situation was much the same as at 
Frickley. In South Yorkshire most branches were almost unanimous but at Manton a 
vote of no-confidence in the Area officials was passed. At another, Brookhouse, 
there was resentment expressed over being picketed out. In North Yorkshire five of 
the fifteen pits had substantial minorities against the strike, two of which passed 
resolutions demanding a national ballot. 25 
There was even greater uncertainty in other coalfields. In Scotland, for instance, 
five b~anch meetings solidly backed the strike but there was doubt at the rest. There 
were problems in South Wales too with 18 of the 28 pits voting not to support the 
strike. As a result the media was full of reports suggesting that nation-v-tide action 
~vould be abortive. Nevertheless, on Monday 12 March, pickets managed to turn 
22 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
23 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
24 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
25 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.69. 
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~hings round and went on to shut down all bar one Scottish pit and all but three pits 
III South Wales. Despite the uncertainty, a national miners' strike over pit closures 
was finally in progress. 27 
A different culture? 
Unlike in the strikes in the 1970s, the immediate task in 1984 was to picket other 
miners out rather than going to targets such as power stations. The main problem 
would be getting support from Nottinghamshire. But many writers have argued that 
such a stfateb~ was doomed to failure because of the peculiarities of that coalfield. 
A common suggestion is that Notts miners had always been 'moderate'; especially 
since the formation of the company 'Spencer union' following the 1926 lockout. 
And there appears to be good evidence to back this up. For instance, not a single 
day was lost through strike action in north Notts between 1926 and 1945. One pit, 
Thoresby, is reputed to have not lost a single day's production between its opening 
in 1928 and the national miners' strike of 1972.28 In the four years to 1982 the 
average tonnage lost in Nottinghamshire due to stoppages was one quarter that for 
the industry as a whole and one tenth of that for the South Yorkshire and Doncaster 
Areas.29 
Some scholars have looked at economic and social conditions in the coalfield to 
explain Notts miners' moderation. Jonathan and Ruth Winterton, for instance, have 
argued that Notts miners were moderate because the relatively late development of 
the coalfield meant that 'a historical sense of mining community' was virtually 
absent. In addition, easy mining conditions led to a sectional approach to pay 
bargaining and an acccptance of the myths that good bonuses could be earned and 
that Notts pits would be spared from threats of closure.30 Looking at the same 
issue, Peter Gibbon argues that Notts had been the home of the burty system and. 
long-waH mining, whereby miners were paid on a piece-rate basis for individual set 
tasks, hence a highly individualistic and incentive-orientated attitude survived. 
Because Notts miners saw management as having a legitimate role, in providing the 
conditions for miners to earn money, they were not going to challenge 
management's 'right to manage,.31 
Now while it is true that the vast majority of Nottinghamshire miners did 
continue to work throughout the dispute, nevertheless there is much in both of these 
viewpoints that will not suffice because they are based on a rigid deterministic view 
of Notts miners. Firstly, as we saw with the early days of Frickley, the lack of a 
'historical sense of mining community' did not lead to permanent acquiescence or 
hostility to strike action; and neithcr did the operation of the butty system. 
Secondly, though most Notts miners may have earned good incentive payments and 
felt little threat from any closure policy, many Yorkshire pits were in quite the same 
predica.ment but nevertheless demonstrated solidarity with their fellow NUM 
!!lembers elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both the Wintertons and 
27 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.15. 
28 Gibbon, 'The miners' strike of 1984-5', P .174. 
29 Coal News, February 1987. 
30 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p.75. 
31 GObb . lon, op. CIt., pp.174-176. 
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Gibbon put little emphasis on the part played by the local leadership in Notts in 
undermining the pickets' efforts. 
Crossing the border 
Crucially, there was one major problem with putting Rule 41 into practice: officially, 
the onus was on the individual Area leaderships to spread the strike. But what if 
these Area leaderships stoked up opposition to the action? On 8 March, four days 
before the strike began, Ray Chadburn, the Notts Area president, had announced 
that he would not call his members out on strike in the absence of a secret ballot. A 
day later, the Notts Area executive demanded a national ballot. 3l These early 
declarations were the foundations of the later principled opposition to the strike by 
many Notts miners. 
The Frickley miners were expecting to head for Nottinghamshire immediately to 
counter such proclamations, but they were informed that the Yorkshire NUM 
leadership had arranged a deal with the Notts NUM leaders. This 'caused a furore,' 
says Gary Hinchliffe. 'We were told that we'd to keep out of Nottingham; they were 
balloting their members.'32 Hence the Frickley miners, like those at most other 
Yorkshire pits, did not actually go picketing on the very first day of the strike, 
Monday ] 2 March. 
Earlier that same day, though, a wave of 250 miners, mainly from Rossington, 
Armthorpe and Hatfield had tired of waiting and headed for Harworth Colliery, just 
over the county border. Alarmed by this, the Notts Area officials contacted the 
Yorkshire Area leadership. But the Yorkshire leaders failed in their bid to restrain 
picketing. And as the success of the first wave of pickets became common 
knowledge throughout the Yorkshire coalfield, miners wcre heading for Notts 
whether they received official blessing or not.:n Steve Gant, from Frickley, 
remembers that 'a team of four of us went down' to Harworth: 
. . . as soon as we knew that the lads from Armthorpe had been going down 
unofficially, we thought: 'Well, what's good enough for Armthorpe is good 
enough for us,' because we a6rreed with it, we thought that the union was holding 
back on it. 34 
In order to regain control of the dispute, the Yorkshire NUM Council sanctioned 
picketing. By the second day of the strike pickets from Yorkshire were at every pit 
in Lancashire and Nottinghamshire, and despite the increased police efforts to stop 
them, successfully shut down half the Lancashire coalfield and a third ofNotts.35 
The National Coal Board showed they had little faith in theories about Notts 
miners being traditionally hostile to strike action when as early as Tuesday 13 March 
they applied for a High Court injunction ordering the Yorkshire NUM to withdraw 
31 Richards, op. cit., p.176. 
32 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
33 M. Adeney and J. Lloyd, The Miners' Strike 1 984-5, Loss Without Limit, 
(London, ] 986), pp.47-48; Cal1inicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.47-48. 
34 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
35 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.50; Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.81. 
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pickets. They received help from another source too. That same day the following 
letter was sent by Henry Richardson, the Nous Area general secretary, to Notts 
branch officials: 
We abhor the situation that is now arising in the Area. TheYorkshire pickets are 
in the Area unotlicially, as the Yorkshire leaders have undertaken to keep them 
out of the Area until the Notts Ballot has taken place ... We have instructed our 
members not to cross picket lines, but the type of action taking place is not 
picketing, but purely blockading ... what is taking place now ... will be 
counterproductive. No union can sustain a strike under these circumstances. 37 
With such leadership, is there any wonder there was hostility to the strike amongst 
rank-and-file miners in Nottinghamshire! If such instructions had been issued in 
Yorkshire, even there the strike would have failed. 
That night, the Frickley miners went picketing for the first time. The main 
contingent were directed to Gedling, others to Blidworth or Hucknall. Steve Gant 
was among those at Gedling: 
There were a lot crossed the picket line at Gedling that first night. One lad pulled 
a knife at some of the pickets, 'I'm going through.' Fair enough, he went through 
... I would say that on that first night maybe 60 per cent worked. But we turned 
about 40 per cent back - we did get a bit of support. But it was a poor showing 
as regards picket numbers. I can remember that I phoned Geoff Siddons up, .the 
branch secretary then, and told him that we needed more men on the ground at 
Gedling in the morning. They sent a full bus down. We stopped halfway through 
the day shift to picket. It was the same response. It was on the border. Some men 
were working, some were behind it. 38 
Gary Hinchliffe was among four or five cars of Frickley miners directed to 
Hucknall: 
No NUM men came from Hucknall pit, there wasn't a union man to be seen. 
Some of their activists came and stood with us, and told us who was who. In fact 
me and lip [Paul Symonds] had a walk round the pit looking for the toilets with 
one of them. And then they started coming up, and this is when the animosity 
started, some of the men wanted to go into work. It was alien, it was something 
that you never thought was going to happen. They wanted to go into work. One 
just drove straight through without stopping, and they started kicking the car. 39 
Just after this~ the police on the scene cleared the strikers off the road and 
imposed a limit of six pickets who would be allowed to talk to the local miners. 
'That seemed fair enough to us,' says Paul Symonds: 
37 Cited in Richards, op. cit., p.6. 
38 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
39 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author, 
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I managed to get to be one of these six pickets - they were mainly older guys, 
branch officials, men like that - T think it was because T had been persistent 
enough to stay in the middle of the road. The miners started turning up for work, 
they obviously knew that there was going to be a picket line on, they'd put their 
snap up and their flasks up. They'd obviously left the house determined to go to 
work, and they were determined to cross a picket line. But T just remember 
leaning on cars and arguing: 'Don't believe owt that you read in the papers.' 
They'd demonised Scargill down there to enough, and basically when you said to 
blokes, 'Well, what do you do down the pit?' They would say. 'I work in the 
headings.' We'd say, 'Well I work in the headings as well.' We'd got common 
cause. And on that basis, we turned most of the night shift back, without any 
violence. I was a bit chuffed with it all. I thought: 'Fuck me, we've got them 
now. We've got them by the balls. If this is happening at every other pit in Notts 
where they've got pickets, then we've got them. ,39 
However, the following morning, Paul Symonds went to the Miners' Institute to 
find out the latest news. It was not good: 
I talked to someone who went to Hucknall and they said that all the day shift had 
worked! I couldn't believe it after the response of the night shift. But what had 
happened was, the police, rather than allowing us to have six pickets and stop 
vehicles and talk to them, by the day shift had changed tactics. They wouldn't 
allow us to have six pickets. They had set cordons up across the main road in 
front of the pit, and as the men were arriving for work in buses and in vans and 
things, the police were there waving them straight into the pit yard. So there was 
never any opportunity for us to talk to them - they were just being driven straight 
past us. I know about this because we went straight back down and that's what 
was happening . . . And of course, once that happened, that's when the 
cat-calling starts, 'Scabs'. There's not much else that you can do to a coach full 
of men that are driving past you but shout abuse at it. So I think that was a 
set-back. And obviously for us, it was one lesson that we'd got to learn.40 
Tragedy at Ollerton. 
The contingent of Frickley miners heading for Gedling Colliery on the evening of 
Wednesday 14 March only got as far Clumber Park, just over the Notts border, 
when they were ordered to return home by the police. Two coaches of miners 
turned back, the men on the third decided to walk. 41 'It was seven miles to 
Ollerton,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
We saw a sign: 'Thoresby/Ollerton'. So we knew there were pits nearby, so we 
set off to walk to them - there were fifty-odd of us. Some men who'd come 
down-in cars passed us and they were then going down to Ollerton, driving back 
39 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
40 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
41 M. Jones, Killed on the Picket Line: Ihe Story of David Gareth Jones, (London, 
1985), p.25. 
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up, picking another four men up, driving back - up and down, up and down. Me 
and .lip got in this car with this kid42 
When Gary Hinchliffe's group were dropped off in Ollerton they found a big 
crowd of pickets outside the pit gates and a similar sized crowd congregated on the 
opposite side of the road: 
... men were coming out of this snicket and running across the road with their 
snap into the pit through the picket lines. These women were clapping and 
cheering. One of the pickets said, 'You wouldn't believe what's been going off 
tonight. All the village has turned out to boo us and have a go at us for coming 
here picketing.' But there were a lot of Ollerton men who were coming over the 
road from the pub, standing with us for ten or fifteen minutes and then going 
back over the road for a drink. 43 
Later in the evening, a gang of local men returning from a football match arrived 
at the pit gates in a coach and started chanting football songs. The pickets shouted 
back. Soon, the exchanges turned ugly and a big-scale fight ensued on the nearby 
pub's car park. Eventually though, the police herded the football fans away and a 
temporary lull followed. After the local pubs closed and the streets cleared, a further 
disturbance occurred which ended in one of the most tragic incidents in the whole 
strike. 'After about ten minutes,' Gary Hinchliffe recalls: 
somebody said, 'Hey up, they're scratching our cars.' These football supporters 
had come back and they were scratching down the side of the cars. So the 
pickets chased after them, but as they chased after them, the lads from allerton 
ran through a housing estate and threw house-bricks and the lot. One of the 
pickets went down. He got hit in the chest with a house-brick. They called him 
David Jones - he died. 44 
David Jones worked at Ackton Hall Colliery near Featherstone, but as he lived in 
South Kirkby he had decided to picket with his friends who worked at Frick]ey. One 
of them was Tony Short: 
We were chasing scabs who were smashing cars up. There were about ten of 
them popped up behind these hedges and they were throwing wall bricks. I saw 
him go down. I didn't see one hit him, but the other lads did, Mark Bradley and 
them. We carried on running after these kids, then came back. They said, 
'They've taken Dave to the hospital.' We didn't think owt of it because 
throughout our lives we had been in and out of the nick and hospital. About three 
hours later, I went up to this cop - which I didn't want to do - and asked, 'Where 
have they taken the injured?' He said, 'Why?' I said that my mate has been 
42 Gary Hinchlifie, interviewed by the author. 
43 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
44 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author; see also P. Wilsher, D. Macintyre and 
M. Jones, Strike: Thatcher, Scargill and the Miners, (London, 1985), pp.60-61. 
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injured. He said, 'What do they call him?' As soon as I said, 'Dave Jones,' he 
said, 'Right, come with me.' He took me through the back of Ollerton pit yard, 
through the police cordon. He said, 'We've got a lad called Dave who's dead.' 
That's just how he said it. He said, 'We want you to come and identifY the 
body.,45 
Enquiries 
David Jones died at eleven minutes past midnight on Thursday 15 March 1984. The 
official investigation into his death caused much consternation amongst the Frickley 
miners. In his book, David Jones's father, Mark Jones, has told of how the police 
paid little attention to the brick throwing incident, concentrating only on what 
happened e~rlier.46 Robert Walker remembers the line of enquiry put forward when 
two ofiicers from the Nottingham em paid him a visit: 
They were like this: 'He wasn't hit by a wall-brick or a truncheon.' I said, 'Well 
I've heard he was hit by a wall-brick.' 'Ab, well, it was the crush.' I said, 
'Fucking hell, he's been to more football matches than enough, and you're saying 
that he was crushed.' I said, 'I know a bloke who says he was hit by a 
wall-brick.' 'No he wasn't.' They were like sweeping it under the carpet. Then 
they asked me my weight, my size - stuff like that. I asked them to fuck off out of 
the house, 'I've not invited you in.' So they went out and I heard nowt else. I 
hadn't seen anything anyway.47 
Other Frickley activists tell of similar visits. In total the police acquired 270 
statements in both Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire as evidence at the inquest into 
the fatality. David Jones's friends who had been with him throughout the evening 
were never called. The end result was that the police appeared to have found little 
out, and the person who may have thrown a brick was never brought forward. An 
open verdict was given.48 
The death of David Jones had a profound influence on many of the younger 
Frickley pickets. 'It wasn't a game anymore,' reflects Jeff Johnson: 'You can't just 
kill people in the middle of a street full of bobbies, and the bobbies turn round and 
say "We didn't see owt." They did. They knew what happened.' David Jones's 
death 'totally changed my life,' says Tony Short: 
He'd lived across the backs from me. Everything that I'd done in my life up until 
then I had done with him: boozing, shagging, fighting, the pit. I knew his wife, 
his two kids, everything. But after that, it totally changed . . . A lot of us knew 
him. We weren't exactly angels, but that made us worse. We were determined 
then that we would never miss a day picketing - and we didn't. I think that I 
missed about six days in the whole year . . . But that hardened a lot of people. 
And it fetched a lot of people out who I thought were wankers, who stopped 
45 Tony Short, interviewed by the author, 16 and 17 October 1996. 
46 Jones, op. cit., p.41. 
47 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
48 Jones, op. cit., pp.38-43. 
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with us for twelve months. We used to call them 'our little crew,' and they were 
brilliant. 4 9 
Beating the blockade 
In the shadow of David Jones's death, the leaders of the NUM in Yorkshire and 
Nottinghamshire met and struck a deal under which the Notts miners would come 
out on strike while their Area ballot was put into operation and the Yorkshire 
miners would refrain from picketing. As the strike entered its second week, the 
results of the various Area ballots were announced. The results were a bitter blow to 
the fight against pit closures. In North Derbyshire the vote to strike was lost by a 
mere 16 votes; in Lancashire 60 per cent had voted against taking action; in the 
Midlands it was two-thirds. But in the most important coalfield still working, 
Nottingham-shire, just 26 per cent of NUM members had voted to strike. 50 Paul 
Symonds argues that once the ballot result had been announced: 
... it sort of copper-fastened all the scabbing in Nottingham. They could claim 
that they had a right to work now, through democratic means. And we did talk to 
some Notts miners who were strikers, who were drawn into the ballot, and did 
argue to get the strike vote out. But they had bound themselves to the result of 
the ballot. So even people in Notts who were happy to be out on strike, and 
weren't happy with the ballot result, felt duty bound to work, to follow their 
union's instructions about a democratic ballot. And so overnight our task at 
getting Notts out became ten times harder.51 
In the meantime, the government had transferred up to 8,000 extra police into 
Nottinghamshire and announced that there would be a new interpretation on the 
laws on picketing. The police would now use their powers to stop vehicles on roads 
and tell miners to turn round. Those who disobeyed would be deemed to be 
obstructing the police in the course of their duties - a criminal offence. During the 
first six months of the dispute as many as 164,508 'presumed pickets' would be 
prevented from entering Nottinghamshire. Pickets no longer had any right to stop 
cars and explain their case. 52 
After Nottinghamshire police advised coach companies not to accept bookings 
from the NUM, the union's branches were forced to ferry their members in cars. 
And yet John Picken, who was involved in the Frickley strike centre, recalls that this 
actually worked to the NUM's advantage: 
. . . because of the cost of a coach, it was easier to send cars. A car could get 
through~ You could send ten cars with four people in a car, but you'd a 
fifty-seater coach. For one car there was a small payment for petrol and £1 a 
49 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
50 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.57-58. 
51 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
52 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.56-57; R. East, H. Power and P. Thomas, 
'The death of mass picketing', Journal C!i Law and SOCiety, Vo1.12, No.3, Winter 
1985, p.308. 
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person to picket. When we came to think about a bus, a bus was a lot more. We 
knew that once a bus was stopped all the pickets were got hold of. Send six 
buses down, six buses are stopped, nobody gets through. Send sixty cars down, 
and you go down little side roads. If you got a car through you could put a 
picket line on. 54 
Despite the increased police presence, a small number of flying pickets did 
manage to get into Nottinghamshire on the second Monday of the strike and 
succeeded in picketing out a quarter of the Notts coalfield. 55 
As well as the road-blocks, the police employed spotter aircraft and helicopters. 
In the vicinity of the pits there were dog patrols and stationed in army barracks was 
a reserve of3,000 riot-trained police. There were frequent reports of police officers 
smashing the windscreens of pickets' cars and of pickets being dragged out of cars 
and searched on the roadside. 56 Ian Oxley recalls that all of this demoralised many 
of the flying pickets, 'they could see that you were braying your head against a brick 
wall.' However, he argues that if pickets were persistent, as his car load were, they 
could get through the blockade: 
I never ever failed to get to a pit, even ifit wasn't the one I was sent to ... if you 
gave the police a line, they had to accept it. If we were in Nottingham, I used to 
know where all the garden centres were, and I used to just say I was going to 
that garden centre. If you refused to go back they had to give way ... But a lot 
of pickets were just getting their cars filled with petrol, driving to the first 
checkpoint and going home. It was a waste of money, a waste of resources, and 
it wasn't effective. 57 
According to Jeff Johnson, too many of the pickets at tIlls stage 'were stm 
law-abiding people. They still did as they were told by the bobbies.' But soon the 
blockade started to be breached more frequently: 
. . . we got our own maps and we found back roads. We quickly learnt where 
the road-blocks were and ways round them. As the strike went on, the police 
obviously realised we were still getting through and brought more reinforcements 
in and more and more road-blocks. We used to drive through Clumber Park, 
down the fire-breaks, and we used to take tools in the boot. We used to take 
gates off hinges. And if we couldn't get the gates off - because they were all 
locked - we used to saw them up, smash them. We used to go through this big 
country house. The road was closed down. There was a big lock and chain on the 
big steer gates. But we used to just take the gates off the hinges, get the cars 
through, put the gates back on. Nobody knew we'd been.58 
54 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
55 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.60. 
56 C. Lloyd, 'A national police force', in B. Fine and R. Millar (eds), Policing the 
Miners' Strike, (London, 1985), p.65. 
57 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
58 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
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The pickets' initiative became the key to getting past the road-blocks. 'It all got 
quite exciting now,' remembers Paul Symonds, 'because what happened was you 
played a cat and mouse game with the police. That was your first task of the day: 
"How are we going to get through the road-blocks today?" And there were some 
ingenious methods thought up. ,59 Robert Walker remembers some of these: 
One time, there was a bag of artex in the boot and the cops asked what it was 
for. We'd told them we were going artexing. They said, 'Righto.' I said, 'We 
want to leave that in all the time.' There was one bag of artex and we were going 
all the way to Nottingham! . . . If they saw a full car, that was it, they'd be 
straight over. I've been in car boots. I've been in the back of vans with sacks. 
We've filled vans with coal so that it looked like there was something in the van, 
and I've got in the back with them. We tried all sorts. 60 
He remembers one occasion when his group of pickets met with a lot of difficulty 
getting past the road-blocks; but other miners had found a more unorthodox route: 
There was like a path that went over the tips, and all these cars were coming 
over. We thought they were scabs; we were shouting 'Scabs' at them. There was 
a national park just at the other side, and all they'd done was paid about 25p a 
car, got in there because all the coppers were blocking the roads off It was 
somebody who worked at the pit who tipped them off: 'If you go in there, the 
road takes you straight into the pit yard. ,61 
Another way to beat the blockade was for pickets to stay pennanentiy billeted in 
Nottinghamshire, as Tony Short remembers: 
There was me and three others staying in this caravan in a sympathetic bloke's 
yard. We would stop there all week and then come home on Friday, so that we 
didn't have the hassle of trying to get through the barriers. You could get as far 
as the Al and the MI8, then you started seeing them, so that's why we started 
going down there on Sunday tea time and stopping while the following Friday 
morning. It was usually those who were single and had no commitments. Mind 
you, you got pretty well paid - you got £8 a day, which wasn't bad ... We 
stopped down there for a few months. We got arrested a couple oftimes. Then it 
wasn't so much us wanting to leave as that it was getting harder for those who 
we were stopping with. Don't forget that they were in a village where there were 
about a nundred who weren't working and 1,100 who were. 62 
Some twelve per cent of all arrests during the strike were at road-blocks. But 
even the rnotorways could be a focus of the struggle. Miners who were frustrated at 
59 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
60 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
61 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
62 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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not being able to continue their journey would frequently drive slowly on the 
motorways to hold up the traffic flow - an idea copied from a French lorry drivers' 
dispute. Steve Gant was involved in one such episode: 
We were going down the AI, and we were that pissed off with not getting 
anywhere that it was just something else to do to put our point over. What had 
happened was that we had about twenty cars and we decided to block the A 1 off. 
We were going at about ten-miles-an-hour, hoping to hold the traffic up right 
back to Scotch Comer. Wagons were stood behind us. Eventually the front cars 
pulled up. We were one of the front cars. We just stopped them on the A 1. The 
police were shooting up and down on the hard-shoulder. We blocked that off, 
they couldn't do owt. Then we just decided to have our snap. Somebody shouted 
'Snap time'. That was it. We just left the cars for twenty minutes and sat on the 
grass, with tailbacks behind us.63 
The miners were under no illusion that there would be much progress in the dispute 
using this method. 'It was just something to boost the lads. It was a bit of an 
up-lift,' adds Steve Gant. 
Organisation 
In 1972 the four Yorkshire Panels had developed their own strike organisation. By 
contrast, during the 1984-85 strike the Panels' role was limited to putting into 
effect the picketing strategy worked out at the Strike Co-ordinating Committee 
(SCC) based at the Area headquarters in Bamsley.64 The level of spying activity 
against the miners was on such a scale that every NUM branch secretary is known 
to have had his phone tapped by the authorities. 65 Being aware of this possibility, 
the SCC issued a sealed envelope to an official from each branch specifYing the next 
day's target. Such a system, though, offered little opportunity for pickets to have 
any influence on the union's strategy. Indeed throughout the dispute, with the 
exception of three Yorkshire collieries, Royston Drift, Highgate and Maltby, there 
were no elected strike committees based on strike activists. Instead, the branch 
committees elected prior to the strike retained responsibility for affairs. 66 
Jonathan and Ruth Winterton have pointed out that although local officials were 
generally committed to the strike, they were 'often too preoccupied with strike 
administration to participate in picketing. '67 This appears to have been the case at 
Frickley. '1 made it my way to go picketing,' recalls Johnny Stones, 'and the branch 
treasurer did. The branch president and the secretary didn't .. .' 68 Nevertheless, 
there was still a strong commitment to picketing within the branch. John Picken, a 
member of the branch committee at the time, says that: 
63 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
64 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.82. 
65 S. Milne, The Enemy Within: MI5, Maxwell and the Scargill Affair, (London, 
1994), p.280. . 
66 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.95. 
67 Ibid., p.95. 
68 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
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For Frickley to have two hundred men who went picketing all the way through 
the strike was brilliant. I think the manpower may have been 1,600 men at the pit 
and t..ltere must have been something like 1,000 went picketing at some time.69 
For Steve Gant, the part played by the branch treasurer, Dicky Nailor, was 
crucial in keeping picketing numbers high: 
Dicky wasn't as official as a lot of other treasurers were at other branches. 
Dicky's main thing was to get the pickets out, whereas a lot of branches that I 
know of were really tight with the purse strings, they wanted to account for this 
and account for that. Some said that Dicky was lax with the money. And 
eventually, as it turned out, there was a lot of money that was unaccounted for -
I wouldn't say 'taken', but 'unaccounted for' ... His filing system was crap to be 
honest ... Dicky's idea was: 'Give the lads the money and let them get off.' We 
were never without petrol money or picketing money. And with the amount of 
pickets that were going, it must have cost a fortune. We were a rich branch at 
that time.70 We'd got loads in the coffers.71 
A 'bit of truncheon' 
When the flying pickets did actually beat the blockade of Nottinghamshire, the 
treatment they received on the picket lines under the new policing policy was hardly 
favourable. 'Once you got into the second, third and fourth weeks of the strike, 
there was real hostility towards the pickets then,' recollects Gary Hinchliffe: 
There was no mistaking who's side they were on. If you stepped out of the line, 
they'd have you. If you called anybody abusive lanh'1lage, called them 'Scabs' or 
questioned their parentage, you'd be arrested. It just depended which police 
force was there. Some were more tolerant than others. The London Met were by 
far the worst. n 
Soon though, the pickets' passivity and respect for the law began to breakdown. 
Jeff Johnson recalls how at the beginning of the strike: 
... if bobbies said, 'Don't cross that line', we didn't cross it. If they said we 
weren't allowed in the canteens, we didn't go in the canteens. But as the lads got 
frustrated with watching cars going by, and buses, they wanted to get in. They 
had no contact. And that's when the pushing and shoving started. for me as an 
individual: you pushed and shoved back~ it was a bit light-hearted. But it wasn't 
69 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
70 NUM branches were entitled to retain 8 per cent of subscription income to the 
national union, see B. Aston, T. Morris, and P. Willman, 'Still balancing the 
books: the NUM and the 1984-85 strike', Industrial Relations Journal, Vol.21, 
No.3, Autumn 1990, p.177. 
71 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
72 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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long, maybe two or three days, or perhaps a week after the start of the strike, 
that things got nasty. You got fed up of having fingers in your eyes, punched in 
the balls and having your toes stamped on, and the occasional bit of truncheon. 
So after a while, you knew you were going to get it, so you gave it back. And 
after a month, you knew you were going to get it and so you gave it out first.73 
The police's tactics soon became obvious - mass arrests of miners, usually on 
minor public order offences, on a scale never witnessed before in Britain during an 
industrial dispute. At the close of the strike as many as 4,314 miners had been 
charged with breach of the peace, while a further 2,322 were charged with 
obstructing the highway. Two-thirds of all offences during the dispute were for one 
or the other of these two offences. 74 By the sixth week, as many as 1,000 miners 
had already been arrested at police check-points or on the picket lines.75 As many 
Frickley miners found out, the mass arrests had one main function: to reduce the 
numbers going picketing. Once arrested, magistrates would impose strict bail 
conditions on miners, such as curfews and restricted access to certain parts of the 
country, for 'crimes' which in normal times would only warrant small fines. 
Fabricated charges and police brutality were a constant threat to the striking 
activists, as Jeff Johnson found out - on the first of the three occasions he was 
detained during the strike - after driving through a police road-block: 
... they put us on a Met police bus. And the Met bobbies said that it was only a 
traffic offence and said, 'Slip off the bus, we're only after pickets, and go and 
stand in that cornfield.' But we knew what they were up to. If we'd have got off 
the bus and gone in the cornfield they'd have followed us and beat us up and just 
left us there. And so we got locked up and they charged us with attempted 
murder; which hung over our heads for seven or eight months. And we actually 
went to court over it quite a few times, but the last time was in the Crown Court 
in Nottingham itself and it was a woman judge and she threw it out. It was an 
absolute farce. But we were back at work at that time and anybody who was 
under threat or found guilty of an act during the strike was immediately sacked. 
So we kept it very quiet. 76 
The call for a ballot 
Right-wing writers such as Wilsher et al. have argued that the failure to win the 
Notts miners over to the strike was a consequence of the NUM's refusal to hold a 
national ballot.77 Frickley activist Ian Oxley expresses the same opinion: 
. . . a lot of people that did scab would have not worked if there had been a 
ballot. Clearly the ones who were determined to scab would have been isolated. 
73 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
74 P. Hillyard and 1. Percy-Smith, 'Miner offences that cry out for an amnesty', The 
Guardian, 18 March 1985. 
75 M. Walker and S. Millar, A State of Siege, (London, 1984), p.11. 
76 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
77 Wilsher et al., op. cit., p. 107. 
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But it gave them something to work on. Because all they called for throughout 
the strike, along with the Labour Party, along with the TUe, is a ballot. So 
personally I think it was a tactical blunder by Arthur Scarglll. I'm not saying it 
was Arthur's decision, but Arthur was the president, he must take overall 
responsibility. I think we could have won it?8 
But Ian Oxley's was a minority voice amongst the Frickley activists. Experience 
had taught militants that the NUM had not gained its strength through its ability to 
hold ballots but through solidarity in action, through miners reacting to injustice by 
voting with their feet. As Ray Riley explains: 
The most democratic form of decision making is being stood arguing with your 
workmates about why you should support a particular line. They talked about the 
democracy of a ballot but, in effect, a national ballot, on certain issues, is not 
democratic. The most democratic form of organising a strike, or asking people if 
t.hey want to come out on strike, was surely arguing it out amongst yourselves, 
lIstening to both sides of the arbrument and then agreeing on a particular sort of 
action. I never once considered the ballot as an option. People who were arguing 
for a ballot were just looking for a way out.79 
Many strikers pointed to the earlier ballot of the Yorkshire miners, in January 
1981. This was a sufficient mandate in Johnny Stones' opinion: 
Now that ballot was that if any colliery within the British Isles was threatened 
with closure by the NCB for any reason other than exhaustion, then we would 
come out on strike if the call was made for support from any Area in the llritish 
coalfield. That was in 1981 - it was under three years since that decision was 
taken . . . and as far as I was concerned that policy had not been overturned by 
any annual conferences, and as such that was my mandate from 1981 ... If we'd 
~ave had a ballot, we would have had a full media propaganda campaign against 
It. And it would have been an unfair ballot in regards to that; because one opinion 
Would have been voiced throughout the media.80 
In Paul Symonds' view the reaction would have been little different even if the 
tni ' 
ners had balloted and then voted to strike: 
... if we'd won the ballot, there was no way that the government were going 
to say, 'Oh well, it's all right now.' They would have still organised scabbing. In 
every strike where there has been a ballot, I've never heard it where the 
gove~ent or political commentators have said, 'Look, you've got to obey this b~l1ot.' They still encouraged scabbing. To them it's not an issue. There was a bl~ stress' on the ballot and I don't think that it was accidental. You ended up 
WIth 160,000 miners on strike over pit closures, and what was the main debate? 
---------------------78 ' 
79 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
80 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
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Over whether there should have been a ballot or not! While people were sat 
round talking about whether there should have been a ballot or not, they should 
have been talking about whether pits should be closing or not. And that was 
setting a false agenda. That's the role that the ballot played. And a lot of people 
succumbed to that. 81 
The whole ballot issue came to a head at an 1\~1 executive meeting on 12 April, 
where Arthur Scargill skilfully manoeuvred the proceedings so that instead of a 
ballot the union would organise a special delegate conference. The right wing in the 
union were beaten. At the delegate conference 17 days later, the calls for a ballot 
were rejected and the strike - in which the great majority of Britain's miners were 
now participating - was declared official. 82 
There was of course the problem of Notts still working; and especially so when 
Notts right winge~s succeeded in mounting a counter campaign. On May Dayan 
estimated 7,000 non-striking Notts miners, who had been given the day off by the 
Coal Board, demonstrated outside their Area headquarters in protest against Henry 
Richardson and Ray Chadburn for threatening to discipline Notts officials who 
blatantly encouraged scabbing. 83 The strength of the demonstration showed that the 
government had won a crucial battle: Notts miners were now accustomed to 
crossing picket lines and production in the coalfield would continue to undermine 
the strike for the remainder of its course. The initial enthusiasm that had carried the 
strike forward, that had given thousands of young Yorkshire miners their first ever 
experience on a picket line, had been blunted somewhat in failing to get any sizeable 
support in Notts. Gary Hinchliffe, for one, remembers being: 
dejected with it all. All I could see was that the strike was going to fizzle out in 
three or four weeks. We weren't getting any bigger response from the Areas that 
were working and we would have no alternative but to call it off. 84 
But this did not happen. Instead a new focal point would command the strikers' 
attention. 
81 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
82 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.62-64; Crick, op. cit., pp.105- 106. 
83 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.70. 
84 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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A change of direction 
With the miners having been forced to begin their strike in the spring, when the 
demand for electricity was not as great as it had been in the depths of winter, 
electricity cuts looked out of the question for months to come, especially with 24 
million tonnes of coal stocked at power stations. Faced with this, and the lack of 
support from Notts miners, some NUM activists were starting to realise that if they 
were to win quickly they would have to hit other industries directly - as in the strikes 
in the 1970s. One of these was Paul Symonds, who by early May 1984, through his 
participation in the strike, had become involved with the Socialist Workers Party: 
They held rank-and-file miners' meetings. They were small, but they did attract 
militants from other pits. At Frickley we always got ten or a dozen miners along 
to them, maybe more sometimes, and similar numbers were true from other pits. 
And obviously we were starting to question the strategy of the union. By now 
they'd thrown a ring of steel around Nottingham. So we'd accepted that we were 
going to have to win this without Nottingham. I think that the union was running 
out of ideas in terms of what to do. l 
What the small grouping of miners around the SWP heard at one meeting had an 
important bearing on what would happen next. Paul Symonds recalls how: 
... there had been a report in the Financial Times [26 March 1984] saying that 
although the power stations were well stocked, and the pit heads were well 
stocked, the steelworks had little or no stockpiling, and that the effect of 
picketing on steelworks would bring the car industry to a halt. We knew that we 
needed to open a second front up. And the idea of having thousands and 
thousands of car workers laid off just made me feel good . . . The Socialist 
Workers Party convinced a few of us that rather than going into Notts we should 
go to Scunthorpe steelworks. Whether the steelworks were starting to come to 
the attention of people like Scargill at this stage, I'm not sure. But we were 
definitely the ones who got the ball rolling in terms of steel. 2 
Though the argument over steel was taken up by other activists, there was a snag. 
Rather than relying on mass picketing to stop the movement of coal, the NUM 
leadership looked to the Triple Alliance, an agreement between the leaders of the rail 
unions, the steelworkers and the miners. The Alliance met on 29 March and 
promised to stop all coal movements. But within 24 hours, Bill Sirs, the right-wing 
general secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, had done an 
about-turn, ar!:,lUing that the priority was to keep steel production going so as to 
safeguard steelworkers' jobs and that furnaces would collapse if deprived of coking 
coal. At the beginning of April, the presidents of the three main left-wing Areas of 
the Nillv1 gave in to this blackmail, neglecting that a miners' victory inevitably 
1 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
2 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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meant that other workers would have to be laid off3 'Effectively,' says Paul 
Symonds: 
that meant during the strike giving as much coal to those steelworks as they 
wanted. So you had Mick McGahey in Scotland, Communist Party member, 
giving as much coal to Ravenscraig as they wanted. You had Jack Taylor in 
Yorkshire, a left-wing leader, supposedly, he'd done a deal with Scunthorpe, to 
allow them to have as much coal - and he thought it must have been some sort of 
propaganda thing deliberately having 'Coal from Cortonwood' there. And Emlyn 
Williams in Wales did the same trick with Llanwern. And so you'd got this ideal 
opportunity, where we could stop steel, get thousands of carworkers laid off, 
open up a split for the government, and we had our own Area barons making sure 
that wasn't going to come about. And then on top of that you had Scargil1 then 
arguing the case to stop steel. 4 
In early May miners clashed with police outside Ravenscraig, but the Scottish 
NUM leadership responded on 11 May by allowing three times more coal into the 
plant than was actually needed to keep the furnaces going. 5 
Scunthorpe 
The Yorkshire leadership's policy of dispensations to the steelworks at Scunthorpe 
was soon under pressure from the rank and file, as Steve Gant recalls when Sammy 
Thompson addressed a strike meeting at the Mill Lane Club in South Kirkby: 
I'd got an open letter to Scargill on me. It was issued from Socialist Worker. It 
argued that it was a mistake to make dispensations to steel. The argument was: if 
you stop British Steel, two weeks later you stop Leyland and Jaguar, because 
stockpiles were week to week. I remember that Sammy had got the meeting 
behind him, justifying these dispensations to the steelworks. Basically, the Area 
officials didn't want steelworks to shut because there would be a knock back into 
their Area with pits closing. I rubbished Sammy. I heckled him, and he had a go 
back at me. As the meeting was ending, I stood up and I said, 'I've got an open 
letter here to Scargill, disagreeing with the dispensations to steel. Anybody 
who's interested in signing it, come and see me at the back of the room.' Sammy 
was still talking. A lot of the lads weren't listening to him. They just got up, 
formed a queue and signed this paper - which Sammy didn't like one bit. He was 
talking to people who weren't listening, who just wanted to sign this petition. 
They realised that we had to do something, and fairly quickly. 6 
The next step was to head for the Scunthorpe stee1works. 'We organised it 
ol:frselves,' says Steve Gant: 
3 Cal1inicos and Simons, The Great Strike, pp.86-87; Wilsher et aI., Strike, 
pp.89-90. 
4 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
5 Ca11inicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.90-92. 
6 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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There were about five or six car loads of lads. We said, 'Keep it quiet. We'll get 
our petrol in the morning. But instead of going to the destination that they say, 
we'll go to Scunthorpe. We'll see what the crack is there.' It wasn't a picket. It 
was to leaflet. It was to give steelworkers leaflets on our case, arguing the 
rank-and-file stand, on why we thought it would be beneficial for them to support 
the miners. it mentioned how the steelworks were going to shut, and that the way 
to stop the steelworks from closing was to join the strike, and we would win 
together.? 
Although the pickets did not stop the steelworks, 'We didn't get a bad response,' 
recalls Paul Symonds: 'people were wondering what we were doing there, to be 
honest.' He says that it was only now, when trains full of coal started arriving, that 
they realised what the dispensations actually entailed: 
... chalked in big letters on the side of the wagons is: 'This coal is from 
Cortonwood.' And there were train loads of it . . . And as far as we were 
concerned, that shifted the argument. People started talking about steel. Steel 
became a part of the pickets' vocabulary, which it hadn't been up until then.s 
The officials' wrath 
In an oral history of the miners' strike in Thurcroft, Pat Fortune, the Thurcroft 
branch president, explains why Y orksrure NUM branch officials accepted sending 
coal from Cortonwood to the steelworks: 'We thought that publicity-wise it would 
be a good move. "We're striking for Cortonwood and they've got to use their coal 
to keep the steel going."'9 The Frickley activists who had ventured to Scunthorpe 
soon felt the wrath of those who adhered to such a viewpoint; as Steve Gant 
recollects: 
A mandate came straight from Barnsley the next day. We got a bollocking off our 
own branch officials for acting off our own backs: 'You don't know what you are 
on with,' and all this. We had a major argument about that. David Douglass, who 
was the delegate at Hatfield, knocked a little brochure up against us! He knew 
that we were SWP miners. He slated us off; he slated the SWP off. He had a go at 
every party, Militant as well: 'Don't take any notice of these men.' And he 
distributed this all the way through the coalfield. They were that scared of us 
pu1ling the lads to the steelworks against their policy. And so they came with the 
underhand, dirty tactics. It hit the news straight away, you see. We made it hit the 
news. As soon as we got back, it was on Calendar News that Yorkshire miners 
- were outside the Anchor steelworks at Scunthorpe. But we were leafleting. But 
our next move was going to be that. But we got knocked back straight away. 
They weren't going to let us, the rank: and ftle, run that show, so they slagged us 
off. Even though we had a small minority of lads who knew that we were right 
7 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
8 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
9 Gibbon and Steyne, 1hurcr~ft: A Village and the Miners' Strike, p.59. 
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about steel, they got their way in the end; which was bad, because we'd let a 
golden opportunity slip by there, at the steelworks. They had more power than us. 
Even though the rank and file were pretty strong, we didn't have the power to 
overrule the officials, like we did in later days. 10 
Orgreave begins 
The campaign against the dispensations began to intensify when British Steel 
management, aware of how convoys of lorries had broken through miners' picket 
lines at Ravenscraig, mobilised a similar operation at Scunthorpe. From 23 May coal 
stocks were transported to the site from the Orgreave coking plant near 
Rotherham. 11 Tony Short was one of a group of four Frickley miners who traced the 
movements of the first convoys: 
- We thought we were secret undercover agents. We were out for about sixteen 
hours following this great big convoy of thirty-odd wagons. We'd followed them 
all the way from Scunthorpe, all the way to Orgreave, had a do with the bobbies 
outside. Gant thought I'd been stabbed - I was covered in blood. It was the 
closest I'd ever been to stopping them. There was about a hundred of us there, 
we were on the side of wagons dragging drivers out. The cops didn't have a 
clue. 12 
Eventually the pressure on the Yorkshire leadership paid off and they finally gave 
their blessing to picket Orgreave. But even then the hope was to keep the picketing 
low-key, as Gary Hurst testifies: 
Tony Jenkinson was deploying and I was a big friend of Tony's, and on the Friday 
night he said to me, 'Are you going in the morning?' I said, 'In the morning? 
Where? Picketing is only from Monday to Friday.' He said, 'No, we've got one in 
the morning. We're not sending a lot. There's not going to be a mass picket, but 
we're going to stop some wagons going into Orgreave. But don't tell everybody 
because we don't want mass pickets there.' I said, 'Aye, all right then, I'll go.' 
Anyway, I went that morning, Saturday morning, and there were only a couple of 
hundred, if that, there at Orgreave. 13 
On Sunday 27 May Arthur Scargill addressed a rally ofFrickley and South Kirkby 
miners and called for the coking plant to be mass picketed. Jack Taylor, who shared 
the platform, was pressured into action. On Tuesday 29 May, every Yorkshire picket 
was instructed to go to Orgreave. Scargill, with a megaphone, took personal charge 
and directed the push against the police lines. There followed a succession of 
charges by mounted police and foot police anned with truncheons and dogs. A total 
of 83 miners were arrested in the worst violence seen in an industrial dispute since 
the First World War. But an open rift was now noticeable between Scargill and the 
10 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
11 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.l 00. 
12 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
13 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
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Yorkshire officials, and the following m0ming the pickets received instructions to go 
to Nottinghamshire. Scargill, however, was amongst a smaIl group of pickets who 
headed for Orgreave and was arrested. 14 Paul Symonds recalls the reaction amongst 
the Frickley pickets when they realised where they were being directed: 
People were just fuming. I had a big stand-up row in the Miners: 'What the fuck 
are we going to Nottingham for when Scargill' s been on the telly asking us to go 
to Orgreave? Why aren't we going to OrgreaveT A lot of US were saying, 'We're 
going to Orgreave, you can bollocks.' There was a feal big argument. And as a 
compromise the union officials said to us, 'Look, go to where you are sent to, 
and there is nowt to stop you calling at Orgreave on your way horne. We'll not 
say owt. > So that's what we did, because there was all this threat about the union 
withdrawing support from us. But that showed me that there was something 
seriousfy going wrong. You had the national president corning on TV, making 
threats about how many pickets were going to go there, and then Yorkshire Area 
isn't sending you to Orgreave. You realised that the Area leaders are not singing 
off the same hymn sheet as Scargill. IS 
On 12 June though, the Area officials were forced to make another about-turn 
after talks between the union and the NCB collapsed. Two days later it was 
announced that dispensations to the steel industry were to end. 16 
The death of mass picketing? 
Monday 18 June saw the final mass picket of Orgreave. 17 Between 5/10,000 pickets 
were directed to the plant. After the lorries had gone through and the pickets had 
thinned out, there was a police attack that was even more vicious than that of a few 
weeks earlier. Police riot squads and cavalry ran amok. Many miners including 
Arthur Scargill were hospitalised. Many more were arrested and charged with riot. 
The NUM then announced that the operation to shut down Orgreave was over. 
According to the Wintertons, Orgreave demonstrated the failure of mass 
picketing as a tactic. It played into the government's hands, they argue. Instead the 
NUM should have been campaigning in the wider trade union movement for 
support. Moreover, it is argued, the pickets were no match for the forces ofthe state' 
who were now more prepared than they had been at the time of SaltIey.18 The 
Wintertons' ar!:,Yllment also dovetails with what opponents of the strike have had to 
say about Orgreave since. For instance, David Hart, one of Margaret Thatcher and 
Ian MacGregor's key advisers at the time, has claimed that Orgreavc was a 'set-up 
by us . . . it was a battle ground of our choosing on grounds of our choosing.' 19 
Even many 'Orgreave veterans' have conceded this point and accept they were 
14 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.101-107. 
1,5 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
16 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.l] O. 
17 For a more detailed description from the miners~ perspective, see B.Jackson and 
T. Wardle, The Battlefor Or greave, (London, 1986). 
18 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p .165. 
19 Cited in Milne, The Enemy Within, p.270. 
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directed by the police towards the plant on the final day in order to be routed by 
superior and unbeatable forces. 'The police just opened their arms and said, "Come 
in, come in,'" argues Johnny Stones, 'You were directed to parking spots, and being 
marshalled into areas that they'd confine you to.'20 John Picken's impression of 
what was happening at Orgreave is much the same: 
In the times I'd been picketing at the beginning of the strike, there was always the 
police up front, always shoving and everything. I could not believe what I saw ... 
I was driving my car and there were four other lads with me, and this bobby says, 
'Now then sir, if you're going to park will you park down there?' I thought: 
'We've won, it's over. We've won the strike.' I says, 'Hey up, this is great this.' 
So I went and parked my car and there must have been several hundred people 
walking towards the bridge . . . But when I got over the bridge and looked down 
- I saw thousands and thousands of uniforms. I couldn't believe it. I just couldn't 
believe it!21 
There can be little doubt that at Orgreave the government wished to inflict a 
serious blow on the notion of mass picketing being an effective weapon in workers' 
armoury, that the ghost of Saltley was finally to be laid to rest. Now it is true that 
many miners certainly felt overwhelmed by the forces ranged against them at 
Orgreave, and certainly the police aggression on the final day was perhaps the worst 
the organised working class had faced for two generations, and for that reason alone 
it needs to be remembered and told, and pointed to as example of how the state is 
not a neutral force in capitalist society. And yet the police assault of 18 June 1984 is 
only part of the story of that day. Too often the miners are portrayed as victims in 
this battle when in fact they were close to being victors. Indeed, Seamus Milne has 
pointed out that Robert Haslam, the chairman of British Steel, was so concerned 
about the miners' attempts to blockade Orgreave and the scenes of mayhem outside, 
that he actually ordered the temporary closure of the plant - just as Saltley had 
closed twelve years earlier. Indeed much later, in The Guardian of20 June 199], the 
chief constable of the South Yorkshire police acknowledged that his force would 
have had difficulty in keeping the plant open if picketing had continued.22 
What marked Orgreave was that the miners, in the face of police provocation and 
violence, were no longer adhering to the pacifist principles that had been the norm 
of organised labour in Britain for much of the twentieth century. Frickley miner Ray 
Riley reflects on how attitudes had changed: 
... the pickets were quite prepared to have a go at the police. I think a lot of the 
people there identified Orgreave as a crucial point in the strike. So did the police, 
and so did the government. Orgreave was a awesome event - if I can call it an 
event ... There were just battles - there is no other way to describe it - running 
battles between the police and pickets . . . Whilst the Area officials seemed to 
have a major say on where you went, when you were actually there it was the 
20 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
21 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
22 Milne, op. cit., pp.270-271. 
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rank and file, the people there, who made up their own rules and made up their 
own tactics. There wasn't an official walking round giving out instruction leaflets. 
Actually at the scene of a picket it was the rank-and-file initiative that came 
through. 23 
By this point, many of the pickets had become experienced at handling police 
aggression and were not afraid to employ guerrilla action, as Jeff Johnson explains: 
If half a dozen of you were caught on your own by a van full of bobbies, they 
pasted you. On the other side of the coin, lads were sneaking through, down the 
side of the River Rother, to pumping stations, where they were pumping water 
out of the river for processing coke in the coking plant. They were taking 
_ manhole covers ofl' and throwing buckets of water directly onto the motors and 
blowing them up to shut the plant down. I saw two security blokes have their 
walkie-talkies taken off them and they were thrown in the river. This was at six 
o'clock in the morning. You read books and they make it out as being a planned, 
organised battle. But there were a hell of a lot of skirmishes beforehand. 24 
Gary Hinchliffe is one of a number of Frickley activists who argue that Orgreave 
failed because the NUM were trying to win the battle with little more than the 
regular number of pickets. The circumstances at Orgreave were not the same as at 
Saltley, he points out: 
. . . the shop stewards and the leaders of the steelworkers' unions, and the 
boilermakers' unions, and the engineers' unions [in nearby Sheffield and 
Rotherham] were not going to get their banners out and march down. It just 
wasn't going to happen. You knew that it wasn't going to happen. The only tIung 
to do was get more pickets there in such overwhelnling numbers that they would 
decide that they couldn't get their wagons out. There was no attempt to go round 
knocking on everybody's door to get more pickets. Only those who were turning 
up went to Orgreave.25 
Nevertheless, he recalls that the pickets were more than holding their own in the 
early exchanges with the police that day: 
We were pushing and pushing on the top of the hill down; and it was a hot day. 
We were in jeans - some were in shorts - pumps, T-shirts. The police had big 
plastic shields up in front of them. They'd got shoulder pads on, knee pads, all t!Je 
protective clothing, they'd uniforms and big overcoats and helmets on . . . I can 
remember a top cop shouting, 'Does anybody want relieving?, They had some 
reinforcements come - and they all put their hands up. We then launched another 
23 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
24 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
25 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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major push. We were really pushing into them. I don't think they could have 
stood it much longer.26 
Because of such pressure, the police launched a charge which is etched forever on 
the minds of those miners who witnessed it. 'Everybody was shoving and pushing 
for the wagons,' recollects Robert Walker: 
and I think that's what did it that day. Everybody's just getting ready to have a 
big push and a shove, and all of a sudden, them fuckers came running out with 
truncheons and round shields, thrashing everybody. It was just like a cavalry 
charge. It sent everybody scattering all over the place. 27 
The police 'really went for it that day,' remembers Paul Symonds: 
they were really rough-shod. It's not just in terms of them hitting us and us 
throwing bricks at them. That's not what I mean. It's all the confidence. It was 
our day and we were getting trounced. We lost it and we had a feeling that these 
fuckers were wiping the floor with us. I remember on that day, there were certain 
union officials walking round with walkie-talkies. The coppers would see them 
and just march straight up to them pull them off them. It was really in your face, 
and they were getting away with it. That's how you know that you are fucked. 
The aggression from the coppers was bad. It was just like 'open season', they 
could do what they wanted. We gave them a good run for their money, we didn't 
just stand there and let them, but on the day it was a match and they won it hands 
down - and we got a lot of casualties. 28 
The NUM's refusal to expand the mass picket of Orgreave meant that the 
government had won a crucial battle in the dispute. The experience of Orgreave 
'stopped one hell of a lot people from going picketing,' says Tony Short: 'I saw one 
kid piss himself We were under a bush and they were thrashing us with those big 
sticks, with horses on either side of us. ,29 After Orgreave, it became increasingly 
clear to activists that the struggle was now entering a new defensive phase, one in 
which holding the strike together and seeking support from the wider labour 
movement would be crucial. 
26 Gary Hinchlifie, interviewed by the author. 
27 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
28 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
29 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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Sectionalism 
According to one author, as a consequence of the support the miners received, "the 
traditional isolation of the mining communities was shattered in 1984-5.' l But right 
from the beginning of the dispute, given the miners' success in recent times, there 
was the danger the strikers would think they could rely solely on their own sectional 
strength and ignore any possible allies within the labour movement - as we can see 
from the following extract from the Hemsworth and SYouth Elmsall Express of 22 
March 1984: 
Colliers from Frickley, picketing the Leicestershire pit Ellistown, identitted a 
-group of a dozen or so men and women not connected with the NUM. When 
challenged they told NUM officials they were Young Socialists. They left when 
asked to do so by representatives of the Frickley branch of the NUM. Frickley 
miner Malcolm Clawson who was present at the time said: 'There was no 
violence and no trouble. One hundred and fifty Yorkshire and 50 Welsh miners 
met in a friendly atmosphere but the dozen or so men and women were not 
miners. They were asked to leave and did so peaceably. It is not their place to get 
involved in matters between the NCB and the NUM. ,2 
As we shall see below, this absurd level of sectionalism would break down - it 
had to if there was to be any chance of victory. 
No second front 
In truth, the level of support from the upper levels of the labour movement was 
abysmal. Right-wing union leaders tended to SpUI1l the NUM's appeals for 
assistance. For instance, in mid-March, Eric Hammond, general secretary elect of the 
electriCians' union, the EEPTU, told power station workers that 'there is no 
obligation whatsoever for any of our members to do other than to continue to carry 
out their normal duties.'3 Later, on 14 April, the general secretary of the power 
engineers' union, John Lyons, turned down an NUM request to black the movement 
of coal. 4 
In formal terms at least, the left-led trade unions were far more supportive. On 29 
March the three rail unions, the NUR, ASLEF and the TSSA, along with the 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) and the seafarers' union (NUS), 
voted to stop the movement of coal. However, the lorry drivers who took scab coal 
and iron to the steel plants were often TGWU members. The story was far better Qn 
the railways. By the end of the strike, only 40 out of a possible 300 coal trains every 
day were moving.5 FrickJey NUM activist Jeff Johnson gives us an illustration of the 
depth of this type of support: 
1 Richards, Miners On Strike, p.153. 
2 Hem.~worth and ISouth Elmsall i'.xpress, 22 March 1984. 
3 Cited in Adeney and Lloyd, The Miners' .\'trike 1984-5, pp.132-133. 
4 Callinicos and Simons, The Great Strike, p.128. 
5 Adeney and Lloyd, op. cit., pp.133-134; Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.128 
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We'd had a tip off from a signal man that these trains were going through and 
which lines they were on. And so we spray painted 'NlJM official picket line' on 
railway bridges at Moorthorpe and the top of Broad Lane. It didn't need anybody 
there, the drivers used to get out and leave the train.6 
Crucially, whatever support was offered by the trade union leaders, none of them 
were prepared to take the step of linking the miners' strike to issues affecting their 
own members' interests and in the process open up an all important second front 
against the government. Nevertheless, other fronts did open up, including two 
national dock strikes over the transportation of iron ore into the steelworks in July 
and September 1984. 'That was an exciting part of the strike,' says Ray Riley, 'when 
a powerful group of workers like the dockers came out on strike, we thought: "Yes, 
this is it, this is the opening that we need." We had visions of it spreading and 
drawing in more workers. ,7 These visions were to be dashed - both strikes collapsed 
within a short period. 
The 1 984 TUC conference in September seemed to offer the chance of increased 
support for the miners, especially as Arthur Scargill received a standing ovation and 
a General Council statement supporting the NUM was passed overwhelmingly. But 
the striking miners were to find out that the TUC's support was at a price - most of 
their efforts were based on trying to devise a formula for ending the dispute rather 
than providing the industrial action that would defeat the government. 8 John Picken 
remembers being bitterly disappointed with the type of assistance on offer: 
It broke my heart to see Willis with a bucket outside a tube station saying, 'HeIp 
the miners.' That was no good. We didn't want him to hold a bucket. We wanted 
him to tell the truth. We wanted him to come forward. We wanted him to 
threaten the governrnent.9 
A great movement of solidarity 
At the grass-roots level, though, the miners' resistance was tremendously popular. 
However, the previous ten years of defeats and mass redundancies had taken their 
toll on militant trade unionism, and few trade unionists now had the confidence to 
take industrial action on the miners' behalf without their leaders blessing. Even so, 
there were other ways to help the strikers, such as donating money and food. 
As early as April 1984 there had been a growth of miners' support groups, 
usually inspired by Labour Party activists, despite party leader Neil Kinnock's muted 
support. Gradually, yellow lapel stickers proclaiming 'Coal Not Dole' spre~d 
throughout the country. In the summer, trade union branches and workplaces began 
and ]54. 
G Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
7 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
8 C. Harman, ~1984 and the shape of things to come', international Socialism 
Journal, No.29, 1985, pp.l07-I08. 
9 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
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to twin themselves with pits. IO As a consequence, delegations of trade unionists 
hegan visiting pit villages and picket lines, and the miners in return went on 
collecting expeditions elsewhere, especially London. At Frickley, 'The major one 
was the printworkers,' recalls Johnny Stones. Also: 
One-to-one, we, or rather the women's groups, twinned with Hampstead and 
Highgate Labour Party and a lot of their collections were done in that area. We, 
as a branch, collected outside the GLC, on the Embankment. I I 
Fleet Street trade unionists collected an estimated £2 million during the dispute12 
and were regular visitors to the South Elmsall district. 'We were adopted by 
SOGAT of the Daily Express,' recalls Ian Oxley, 'which was surprising to me. You 
tended to teel, tor some reason - well I did anyway - that if it's a right-wing 
newspaper, then everybody working for it is right wing.' 13 Huge operations were 
mounted by trade unionists to send convoys of food and other essentials to the 
coalfields. Tony Short remembers the significance of one particular convoy: 
One of the few times that I've cried in my life was when all that snap came up the 
Ml, with 'They shall not starve' on the lorries. That does give you hope. But it 
didn't me as much as my mother. Now I could say, 'Mam, we are not on our 
own.,14 
Many of the Frickley activists were astounded by the generosity and level of 
support they received on collecting missions in London. Ian Oxley was one: 
I collected outside the Queen's Theatre on the South Dank. It was a brilliant 
response. I couldn't believe the generosity of the London people. Down-and-outs 
who were sleeping around the South Bank area were throwing handfuls of 
penrlies in. Workers would throw £ 1 in as they went to work in the GLC. The 
South Bank is a tourist area, and the same person - old people - would give you 
£ 1 every time they passed. And a lot of people would give a tenner or a fiver. I've 
never known such generosity . . . People would give you £50 and wouldn't 
accept a receipt. So to me the north/south divide is a load of crap. It opened my 
eyes, that southerners are just workers the same as me. They talk different, but 
they have the same values and are identical to me. I could see no difference 
between a southern worker and myself 15 
John Picken visited London on alternate weeks between June 1984 and the end 9f 
the strike: 
.10 R. Huddle, A. Philips, M. Simons and 1. Sturrock, Blood Sweat and Tears: 
Photof::,rraphsfrom the Great Miners , .)'trike 1984-1985, (London, 1985), p.47. 
11 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
12 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.l26. 
13 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
14 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
15 Ian Oxley interviewed by the author. 
55 
Digging in 
T remember one day a woman, she says, 'Are you a Yorkshire miner?' T says, 
'Yes.' She says, 'What are you collecting for?' I says, 'Actually we're collecting 
to keep the strike going, but we've also got a caravan helping us with our food 
kitchen.' She gave me five £50 notes. And I said, 'Do you want a receipt?' She 
said ,'No, if you lose we lose.' And I shouts my mates over and I says, 'There's 
£250 here, from one woman.' 16 
A similar thing happened when he went to watch the local football team, Frickley 
Athletic, playa match in the capital: 
A chap came up to me, he was from the seamen's union, and he says, 'You're a 
. miner aren't you?' 1 says, 'Yes.' He says, 'Would you like some money towards 
your funds.' I says, 'Look, to tell you the truth, I'm not collecting.' He says, 
'Well, what we usually do is give money to these kitchens.' I says, 'Oh, we've 
got a kitchen at Fricldey. I don't mind accepting for that.' And he gave me a 
cheque. I says, 'Thank you very much', and shook his hand. When I looked at the 
cheque it was for £1,000. When I got back to the GLC, my mates who were on 
the buckets said, 'Look what we've collected, we've £70 in the buckets - and 
you've gone to a football match.' I says, 'Aye, but I've got £1,000 here.' They 
wouldn't believe me. 17 
Ian Oxley was involved in a novel way of putting cash in the strikers' coffers: 
. . . one way of getting funds out of the trade union movement into the NVM's 
pockets was actually to hire Fricldey Colliery Band. They would hire the band 
and pay £800. The £800 would go to the NUM, who would only pay expenses to 
the bandsmen - we'll say for instance £8, plus the hire of the bus, which would be 
£2-300. So clearly we could end up with £400 profit by sending the band to play 
for a trade union conference. We also used to go down and play for events in 
London. While the band was playing, we . . . could always raise £200 in street 
collections on the day. We used to get paid £4 for our expenses, plus we got fed 
as part of the band, and quite often a local miners' support group would even 
provide cartons of wine. So your social life was part of the fund-raising as well. IS 
Breaking down prejudices 
In such an atmosphere, sectionalism and long-held prejudices began to be 
challenged. 'Solidarity broke issues like racism down,' arbrues Paul Symonds: 
Because you were in a struggle, it became apparent who your real enemy was. I 
remember being at the Miners [Institute] when this big van pulled up ,vith food 
and there's two Sikhs with turbans in it, and they get out and they hand out this 
food. You just looked at the faces of some of the men who were there - most of 
16 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
17 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
l~ Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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them had never seen a Sikh, never mind shook hands with one, never mind 
putting arms round them and hugging them. That's the sort of thing that solidarity 
really pulled into it. You'd got all sorts of people coming up to our clubs and 
socialising with miners, such as gay people. They didn't get beat up, called names 
or owt. They were made welcome, and it was because of that solidarity. It broke 
down one hell of a lot of barriers. 19 
The miners' struggle was also well supported in the colleges and universities, as 
Gary Hinchliffe and his mates found out when they were invited to address students: 
We went up to Lancaster and up to York. At our own union meetings there 
would only be a handful of men tum up, but you got the impression that students' 
union meetings were big social events. There would be 1,500/2,000 in these 
students' union hal1s. And they were in their various groups. The Conservative's 
Monday Club would come in, and they would sit on their tables. And then you 
would have the anarchists, Socialist Workers' students, the Labour Party. Oh, it 
was bedlam ... It was a big argument - it looked as if it was chaos to me - but by 
the time they'd finished debating amongst themselves, standing up and talking 
about things that had nowt to do with the strike, making jokes about everybody, 
they gave us a minibus ... It was their activity bus ... But to be honest, it'd done 
some miles, and it wasn't in very good condition20 
By the end of the strike, an estimated £60 million had been raised by miners' 
support groups.2l No other strike in living memory had received aid to such an 
extent. 
Coping with hardship 
A distin,b'Uishing feature of the 1984-85 miners' strike was how from its very early 
stages women played an important and active role alongside their fathers, husbands 
and sons.22 Paul Foot has described how this activity helped to break down male 
chauvinism within the mining household: 
In tradition and in fact, the miner had been the master in his home. The role of the 
miner's wife was to feed her man, bring up her children, and keep her mouth shut. 
Suddenly, in the most unlikely area, the ideas of women's liberation became 
reality. Whole communities were suddenly run by women. The strongest, most 
energetic and forceful of the support groups were made up, almost exclusively, of 
women. This led to new relationships in the community and in the home - to new 
uncertainties perhaps, but also to new respect. 23 
! 9 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
20 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
2l Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.I27. 
22 J. Stead, Never the Same Again: Women and the Miners' ,Strike 1984-85, 
(London, 1987), pp. 15 and 17; see also V. Seddon (ed.) The Cutting Eage: 
Women and the Pit Strike, (London, 1986). 
23 P. Foot, Word<iJ as Weapons, (London, 1990), p.148. 
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What happened in the South Elmsall district was perhaps typical of what 
happened throughout the coalfields of Britain. During only the second week of the 
strike the Village Families Action Group was formed in Upton, and was soon 
followed by the Frickley Ladies Action Group (FLAG) in South Elmsall and the 
Community Meals Committee at South Kirkby: 
The women of FLAG were soon distributing food parcels to single miners, from a 
base at the Miners' Institute in Moorthorpe, complemented by the meals given 
out at the Westfield Lane Social Centre. At Upton meals were provided on three 
days a week at the Welfare Hall, while at South Kirkby a marquee borrowed from 
the Boys' Brigade was being used as a food kitchen. The Frickley Kitchen Ladies 
. began serving pie and peas within a tew days of the start of the strike, and were 
soon providing 200 breakfasts and 400 dinners each day. By the end of the 
dispute the South Kirkby Meals committee had provided 124,000 meals for 
people in the village, as well as from South ElmsaIl, Hemsworth, Kinsley and 
Fitzwilliam.24 
A prolonged strike inevitably meant that the miners would have to endure much 
hardship and that life would be different from normal. Ray Riley remembers having 
little money coming in: . 
We relied on family, particularly my wife's family, who were excel1ent. You just 
got by, you didn't stop to think about where you would get your next meal fi·om. 
It's a really difficult area of the strike. On a morrung we used to go up to the food 
kitchen for breakfast sometimes, but your family wasn't allowed up - it was 
designed for miners, not their families. The idea behind this was that there would 
be oJ)e less mouth to feed at home. Then there were food parcels, but they were 
designed for single people, from what I can remember. Occasionally you got food 
vouchers for GT Smith's, a local supermarket. But largely you relied on your 
family. So if you didn't have a good family you were stuffed, basicaIIy.25 
For many miners, debt became a way oflife. But there were ways round it, as Jeff 
Johnson explains: 
You put all your bills in the hat, pulled some out and paid those that you can. 
Those that write to you and ask you for money, you write back and say, 'Look, 
this month I put you in the hat, but you didn't get pulled out. Now if you keep 
complaining, next month you'll not even go in the hat.' You knew that if the 
Electric Board, or the Gas Board even as so much as come into the village to cut 
people off, then word v,rould get round and that van wouldn't get back out. 
There would be no way that anybody could be evicted or anything. We were all in 
24 Rusiecki, The Plough and the Pick, p.207. 
25 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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the same boat and we were all standing together. We all had debts and bills to 
pay26 
I Ie tells of how the strikers' financial circumstances passed through a number of 
stages. Initially, they were used to a particular standard ofliving: 
You're used to buying food, going out for beer, socialising, buying clothes, going 
on holidays - the world's your oyster. Then over about a six week period, and 
there's nowt coming in, you see your savings go, your holiday money, your 
Christmas money. You're trying not to spend owt. Then you get to a point where 
you've still got some brass left but everything's just eking away, and you think: 
'Bloody hell, I'm not going to have anything left.' Then that day finally comes -
. so you've nowt to worry about. People were quite jovial about it: 'How much do 
you owe?' 'Five hundred, a thousand, two thousand, three thousand. There's 
nowt you can do about it. When we go back to work we'll pay our bills and until 
then they'll just have to bloody whistle. ,27 
Particularly hard hit were single miners, such as Robert Walker, who were denied 
social security payments during the dispute: 
They paid me flIck-ali at the social, so I stopped at my mam's. My mam was 
doing me one meal a day. I was getting her mass coal for the fire, and I was 
selling mass coal to get myself a few beers. I'd go up to my girl-friend's, I'd have 
some dinner up there, and when I came back from picketing I'd be up at the soup 
kitchen, have my breakfast ... So I wasn't too badly off. There were a lot of 
people worse off than me; them with kids.2R 
Fric~ley NUM were well aware that the most hard-pressed miners were likely to 
become strikebreakers in the future and so there were efforts to counter this 
possibility. 'A large body of people were involved in debt counselling,' says Ian 
Oxley: 
ringing people that were getting evicted from their houses, ringing their mortgage 
companies up and negotiating with them to suspend their payment. People were 
losing their cars ... we had to keep people on electric. Say you owed £ 150, the 
electric company would not cut you off They'd let you owe £ 150, providing you 
paid an average of £4 a week. The union then paid that £4 a week. It was the 
same with the gas.29 
For many striking activists, scraping enough money together to go for a drink 
was crucial, as Jeff Johnson recalls: 
26 Jeff' Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
27 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
28 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
29 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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You used to get paid £] a day picketing money. If you went twice you got 2 
quid, and three times 3 quid. You'd scrape and scrape. You'd go out with a fiver 
on a Sunday night - normally you'd have gone out with fifteen or twenty quid -
and you'd take some change home. People used to buy out-of-date ten-gallon 
barrels of cider and beer and drop it off at the Empire Club, take it in the back 
field, knock the top off and then it was all free from then on.30 
Money may have been tight, but the Big Strike was a period almost of celebration 
in the local social clubs, as RobeIt Walker reflects: 
It was brilliant. It was in the Empire because they kept the price of beer down to 
fifty pence. The Niggers, that was cheap - I think that was only about fifty pence . 
. On a Sunday night it was brilliant in the Empire. It used to get choc-a-block. And 
when the band got down everybody would be singing: 'We hate Thatcher!' 
'Maggie out!' People would be on their chairs singing all the picketing songs. It 
was just briIl i ant. 31 
Pilfering 
One area of the strike that was downplayed by the miners' supporters at the time 
was the question of pilfering to relieve some of the hardship. Jeff Johnson's priority 
when he went picketing was: 
. . . to always try to bring something back, such as a cabbage, or a bag of 
potatoes, carrots, apples or whatever we'd pillaged on our way about . . . If we 
went picketing at Notts pits we used to break into the pit yards and fill car boots 
full of coal or oVvt that would bum.32 
Poaching and stealing from farmers' fields were effective ways of putting food 
onto kitchen tables. After Orgreave Gary Hinchliffe became weary of travelling into 
Nottinghamshire and so volunteered to picket Drax power station which proved to 
be a good location for booty: 
We used to go and set a few snares for rabbits, and plunder farmers' fields -
because there's a lot of market gardening over there. They had their vegetable 
crops in the middle of cornfields. You couldn't see in the middle of them because' 
of the height of the com. But with walking around, up and down the lines looking 
for rabbits, we were dropping on cabbage fields, cauliflowers, carrots, lettuce, 
and potatoes. So it was a good base to help yourself to a few fresh vegetables .. 1 
remember one farmer going absolutely berserk. By the time that it got to· 
August/September, he'd a field with potatoes, but you could see that they were 
all dug up.33 
30 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
31 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
32 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
33 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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There were other necessities that could be pilfered too, as Ian Oxley explains: 
... one of my many tasks was going round to people's houses and frigging their 
electric meters. It's a mere matter of removing a link. I used to alter the electric 
so that say they were using a few electrical items in the house, the meter was 
moving slowly. I, on average, used around £60 a quarter on electric, and my bill 
for a fun year was about £120 ... Also, there were many ways of tampering with 
gas meters. If you uncoupled the unions of your gas meter, reversed it so that the 
meter was facing the wall, your meter actually went backwards. It's hard to 
believe that something as simple as that works. If people had 'blow' on their 
vacuum cleaners, they could wind the clock back on their gas meters. 34 
. A whole black economy developed in mining communities to bypass the problems 
of hardship. Men would do odd-jobs for money, some even left the striking areas 
seeking illicit employment for the duration of the dispute. Local household tips 
would be scoured by strikers and their families sieving waste for scraps of coal. But 
through such means, illicit or otherwise, the mining communities hung on. 
Commando raids 
In the wake of Orgreave, the government and the NCB, believing that the strike was 
only being held solid by the intimidation of the majority of miners by a militant 
minority, sensed that the strike could be broken if a surge back to work was 
instigated. Thus, there was a succession of police invasions of Yorkshire mining 
. villages during the summer of 1984. On 9 July there were pitched battles at 
Rossington, south of Doncaster, when word spread through the neighbourhood that 
three strikebreakers were to be brought into the local pit. And that same evening 
there was a night of street fighting at Fitzwilliam, just six miles north of South 
Elmsall~ after squads of police descended on the village pub to arrest a young 
Labour Party activist, allegedly suspected of vandalism.35 These battles not only 
showed how the police could lay siege to striking mining communities, but were also 
examples of how the miners could fight back. 
Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that when an opportunity arose for the 
active strikers to 'get their own back', they would do so in a dramatic way. On 
Thursday 9 August the lead article in The Guardian reported that: 
Police have accused the National Union of Mineworkers of organising violence 
after 'commando-style raids' on two pits and the coal board's Doncaster offices 
on Tuesday night ... about 1,000 men, according to the police, smashed canteen 
windows and damaged working miners' cars at Harworth. Another raid at' 
Silverhill left 18 cars damaged, and all the NCB office windows smashed. At 
Doncaster about 150 men drove into the grounds of the NCB area headquarters. 
According to a board spokesman they began kicking windows and throwing 
stones and bricks at the building. About £2,000 worth of damage was done. 36 
34 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
35 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.159-164. 
36 The Guardian, 9 August 1984. 
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Far from being organised by the NUM~ the raids that day were spontaneous affairs. 
Ian Oxley was one of the many Fockley miners involved and argues that the roots of 
the action lay in bow pickets were tired of being .h.oQdwinkedby the police, who 
would become surprisingly friendly if they were massively outnumbered by miners . 
on a picket line, but would become hostile as. soon as reintorcements arrived. At 
Silverhill on 7 August, there were '200 of us and six of them, ' he recalls: 
The lads decided: 'Why wait here to get OUf heads split. Let's get on with it, give 
them some hell, and get in our cars and go before the main vans' arrive.' So the 
police were in the pit car park, unloading and getting themselves organised, when 
the lads went on a bit of a riot, for want of a better word. They ran up to the pit 
'yard and they bricked the police, so the police had to scatter into their vans. And 
then they systematically pumped every car that was in the car park at the pit. 
Then we went down the street and we put every window through in the canteen, 
the general offices, the main offices. And then somebody had the sense to say, 
'Right lads, quick, come on, get in your cars and get gone.' And as we were 
going, about 100 yards away there was onc car pull cd up, and he was shouting, 
'On your way back lads, call in at Howarth' ... When we gets to Howarth - the 
same there: four bobbies, a little gate house. Well, the lads were in a right mood 
by this time and they didn't mess about. Again, we kicked the cars in, did the 
windows, did the canteen, did the little security f,'Uard windows in, chased the 
bobbies allover - because there were only four. They had to run into the pit yard 
and hide. Again, sensibly, we jumped into our cars and left. Brilliant. And somc 
idiot again was shouting, 'Let's call at Coal House in Doncaster,' this is the main 
office block. And, think on now, we'd started at twelve o'clock, it's now three 
o'clock. So we 'alltums up at Coal House in Doncaster. Think on, just at the .. 
back.of Coal House is the law courts and the main police station. It's not really 
that good an idea. But we calls there, and we are arriving in spits and spats. And, 
obviously, being so close to the main police station, they did get about fifty 
bobbies out. And they got a line of about fifty bobbies in front of the law courts. 
There~s an Irish centre at the opposite side, and I was stood there watching, and 
somebody shouted, 'Come on, let's get them bricked! Again, we pumped all the 
windows through ... we all went back to our pits and we'd be telling the tale in 
the clubs about how we'd knocked fuck out of them, for want of a better word - • 
we'd given them hell, we've hammered some bobbies, we've done the scabs' 
cars, and we'd done the offices at two pits and the Coal House. A lovely day. The 
best day I've ever had as far as creating damage and mayhem.37 
There was, though, a final twist in the story: 'We comes to picket the next day~ 
at the {lonnal time in the Miners~ four Q'clock - where are they sending us? Howarth 
'.' . and of cours.e the police were waiting for us - thousands and thousands of police. 
'('hey were obviously going to have some blood no matter what pit we went to.'38 
Fifty--nine Yorkshire miners were arrested at Harworth on the Wednesday night, 
37 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
38 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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mostly on charges of unlawful assembly and threatening behaviour. A further six 
strikers were charged in connection with the incidents of the previous night. 39 Jeff 
Johnson was one of those arrested and saw the police's retaliation at close hand: 
This bigwig from the Notts police force, I can't remember his name, came down 
and told us we were all bastards and swines and that we ought to stay in 
Y orksrure. And all these bobbies had got their truncheons out and I honestly 
believe to this day that their intention was to beat holy hell out of us in a place 
where nobody could see them. A lot of the other lads that were there with us 
were under the same impression. So it was a case of 'Get ready'. But, as it 
happened, a bus turned up full of construction workers who were working on 
these buildings and they went about their work and all the truncheons went back 
. then. Then we were made to stand for about two or three hours while they 
brought some transport and took us off to another field, where we had to be 
photographed. I'd not been charged or anything and it was in the Yorkshire Miner 
that if you are not charged for anything you do not have to have your photograph 
taken or fingerprints ... and I thought to myself: 'They're not taking my 
photograph,' and other miners were saying the same. Anyway they took the first 
lad up. He was from Askern pit. He said that he was not having his photograph 
taken. He was in a seat at the side of a table, so this bobby just got hold of a 
handful of his hair and smashed his face on the table and burst all his nose and 
mouth open. And after that we all got in the queue and had our photographs 
taken.40 
'Voice of the majority'? 
In an effort to co-ordinate strikebreaking activities, opponents of the strike from all 
the coalfields met in London in late July and early August, and eventually founded 
the National Working Miners' Committee. Behind much of this activity was David 
Hart, a property developer and special adviser to Margaret Thatcher. Prominent 
business figures, such as Sir Hector Laing of United Biscuits and Lord Taylor of 
Taylor Woodrow also rallied round with financial support for court cases against the 
NUM.41 
The activities of anti-strike miners and their message was given such prominence 
in the press that there was little surprise when anti-strike posters began to appear on 
walls and lampposts in South Elmsall and Hemsworth in the middle of AUf,'1lst, put' 
up by a shadowy organisation describing itself as 'VOM' ,42 meaning 'Voice of the 
Majority', suggests Jeff Johnson: 
They saw themselves as the majority that wanted to go back to work, and I 
suppose people like me were stopping them and we were in the minority. How 
that works out I don't know. They blitzed Ehnsall bus station and Hemsworth 
39 The Guardian, 9 August 1984. 
40 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
41 Adeney and Lloyd, op. cit., pp.163-169; Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.166; 
Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, pp.174-17S. 
42 Rusiecki, op. cit., pp.213-214. 
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market with stickers and aIJ sorts of daubings: 'We hate ScargilI' and Christ 
knows what. So we knew it was going off We knew it had been started in other 
areas. We knew it was going to happen here, and we knew who was doing it. But 
there wasn't a great deal we could do about it - apart from catch them.43 
In September YOM struck again, this time with graffiti on the side of a South Kirkby 
tip that declared in 30ft high letters 'Back to Work. VOM.'44 
When they did the lime painting on Kirkby tips, I was told the next day by a bloke 
that he thought it was somebody rabbiting. But he couldn't understand why there 
were so many pit-cap lamps - once you're a miner you can tell a pit lamp because 
of the way it bobbles about. And I said, 'Why, did you see it?' And he said, 'Aye, 
. there were about a dozen up there with cap lamps on, with spades cutting it out 
and I saw they had stone dust bags.' Stone dust is a limestone-based dust they use 
down the pit to stop explosions. So the lamps were provided by the pit, the 
equipment was provided by the pit, and I've actually been told that there were 
police at the bottom of the tips to stop anybody going up to see who was up there 
and what was going off Now I wasn't there, I didn't see it myself, but that's 
what I was told. So it was organised. Organised by specific people - none of them 
actually worked at the pit - local politicians, local community policemen and local 
businessmen. They were the people doing it.45 
There was a deep suspicion amongst many Frickley activists that strikebreaking 
was being organised in a South Elmsall club. 'They had secret meetings in the 
Pretoria to go back,' says Tony Short: 
the Pretoria was always known as a right-wing club. All those who were on the 
top money at the pit used to go in. There were one or two lads who were stood at 
the side of them in the bar and heard their wives say, 'Aye, he's going back in on 
Monday.' He probably wasn't, but you had to make sure that he wasn't. So we 
discreetly put two or three people outside where he lived, sat in a car a few 
hundred yards away.46 
Steve Gant recalls that Geoff Siddons, the Frickley NUM branch secretary, was 
involved in a skirmish in the same club: 
There were definitely rumours coming about those who drank in the lounge in the 
Pretoria, that they were on about going back and organising a bit of a crew to . 
cross the picket lines up at Frickley. There was hell on that night. I wasn't in, but 
I know that Geoff had got his coat off He was ready for battling with a couple of 
them47 
43 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
44 . k" . 214 Ruslec 1, op. CIt., p. . 
45 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
46 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
47 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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Rohert Walker remembers being stunned by what one of his work mates told him 
as fears grew about strikebreaking: 
I was once in the soup kitchen, and there was Nobby Clark, who used to be a bit 
of a militant before the strike. During the strike nobody had seen owt of him. He 
went in the soup kitchen one day~ there were a few of the lads there who we used 
to knock about with. I said, 'What's up with you?' 'I've been going to these 
back-to-work meetings,' he said, 'but the union knows about it. I'm spying on 
them.' Well, we were stunned, because nobody had heard about it. Nobody saw 
him again. We went to the union, and the union had heard nowt about it. 
Anyway, after the strike he becomes a copper, doesn't he?48 
Though Ray Riley was aware that 'there were forces at play' who were trying to 
organise miners to break the strike, he says that the strikers at Frickley: 
... didn't place too much emphasis on strikebreaking in our particular area 
because we were quite solid, September/October time we were still relatively 
solid. We were aware of the movements in the Selby coalfield to get people back 
to work. But in relation to Frickley, we were one hundred per cent solid then and 
we saw no reason why that should change. But we were woken from our 
lethargy.49 
The breach opens 
A second round of confrontation outside Yorkshire pits began in latc AU!:,lUst whcn a 
handful of scabs were forced through picket lines. On 22 August, miners occupied 
pit yards and built barricades at three Doncaster pits, Bentley, Yorkshire Main and 
Armthorpe. In mid-September there were major battles at Kiveton Park and Maltby. 
During October the police assault on the mining communities gathered pace. The 
most' noted being that at Grimethorpe, about five miles north-west of South Elmsall, 
where men, women and children searching for coal on a nearby tip were attacked by 
police kitted out in riot gear. A guerrilla war ensued in the village for the following 
two days.50 
Evidently the Coal Board hoped that the few scabs crossing the picket lines 
would act as a magnet to other miners who were dissatisfied with the strike. The 
campaign was matched by an increasing spate of arrests and violence by the police in 
a bid to remove the leading activists from the forefront of the dispute and, at the 
same time, frighten previously passive miners who were thinking of joining picket 
lines as the conflict neared their own pits. In fact, although almost 6,500 miners had 
been detained by September, the exact opposite to what the government desired 
48 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
49 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
50 Goodman, The Miners' Strike, pp.79-86; Samuel et al., The Enemy Within, 
pp.ll9-121 ~ Yorhhire Miner, November 1984. 
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tended to happen. The knowledge of a single scab entering a pit brought many 
previollsly inactive miners onto the picket lines.51 
NACODS 
The government was confident it could beat the miners so long as other unions could 
be prevented from corning to the miners' aid with sympathetic industrial action. 52 
This was boosted with the collapse of the second dock strike on 18 September. 
However, just afterwards another unexpected issue arose which promised to swing 
the balance towards the NUM. 
On 15 August the NCB informed the deputies' union, NACODS, that their 
members would be expected to go into work to supervise miners who broke the 
strike - at the time they were getting paid even though they were refusing to cross 
NUM picket lines. The issue stretched on through September into October, but the 
stakes were raised when 82 per cent of NACODS members voted in favour of strike 
action to counter the Coal Board's demands. NACODS members, being responsible 
for safety in coal mines, were in a key position and even Nottinghamshire pits would 
be forced to close if they took strike action. Recognising the danger, the NCB 
entered into negotiations with the NACODS leadership, the TUC and ACAS, the 
arbitration service. As the talks faltered, NACODS called a strike for 24 October. 
However, with less than 24 hours to go, the strike was suddenly called off because 
NACODS leaders were satisfied with the NCB's assurance that deputies would 
continue to be paid and that the existing colliery review procedure would be 
amended by the creation of an independent review body. 53 
The NACODS deal was a bitter blow for the NUl\1. Gary Hinchliffe was one of 
many striking miners who had high hopes in the deputies: 
When they got that high vote I was certain that McNestry would use it. I think 
we'd been somewhere, me, Gant and Jip [Paul Symonds], and then suddenly it 
was over. It carne on a news bulletin that the strike was over. We went down to 
the Empire. People just seemed to corne flocking in. You'd been convinced that 
the deputies were going to corne out. And then we were moaning, 'We could 
have had them. If the deputies had corne out for a month we could have beat 
them.' But it was obvious that they'd gone in for a compromise. 54 
A common argument among the strikers was that the miners should not have put 
faith in NACODS anyway, that the deputies' union had always ridden on the back of 
the NUM. Ray Riley, however, insists that the size of the vote for action made 
matters different on this occasion: 
They've always been relatively isolated, to a degree, from industrial troubles. 
Perhaps there was only one occasion when Frickley deputies threatened to corne 
51 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.171-175. 
52 Goodman, op. cit., p.l35. 
53 Cal1inicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.149-152; Goodman, op. cit., p.l44; Winterton 
and Winterton, op. cit., pp.l94-195. 
54 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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on strike in all the time I was there. But you can't ignore the fact that 80-odd per 
cenl vOled to cume out on strike. So yOu could say that argument abuut never 
trusting deputies doesn't quite wash. Local issues, local strikes at Frickley you 
couldn't trust deputies because you knew full well that they wouldn't support you 
... But there's no doubt that NACODS leadership sold their members down the 
river. 55 
Gary Hurst remembers huw significant the NACODS deal was for him at the time: .. 
. . . when they didn't back us then, that was the end for me. I think then you 
knew that we were never going to win. I think that was the final straw. How long 
had we been out? Over six months then, hadn't we? Yes, at that time, I thought: 
·That's it.' It didn't stop me going picketing or owt like that, or trying, but I think 
everybody more or less knew then. 56 
The Moses Plan 
Once the NACODS question had been sorted, the government saw the road clear for 
a sustained offensive against the NUM, confident that it could starve the miners into 
returning to work. On 25 October 1984, Mr Justice Nicholls ordered the 
sequestration of the NUM's assets for refusing to co-operate with earlier High Court 
rulings, 57 On 31 October talks between the NUM and the NCB collapsed. 
Immediately the Board initiated a fresh campaign to encourage strikebreaking by 
offering miners a £650 Christmas bonus. and holiday pay if they returned to work by 
19 November. In a bid to stress the futility of the miners' fight, Energy Secretary 
Peter Walker announced that coal stocks were enough to last out the coming 
winter. 58 
By now the NCB had developed a strate!,~ for rolling back the miners' strike: the 
Moses Plan, named after its architect, the NCB's North Derbyshire Area director 
Ken ~oses. Just as the NUM had used the domino strate!,,), to spread the strike, the 
NCll aimed to push it back from its peripheries. Management teams began 
contacting miners who lived outside the immediate vicinity of mining villages and 
those known to be hostile to the strike or suffering severe financial difficulties. Once 
a small group of miners in a locality had expressed a willingness to break the strike, 
arrangements were made for them to cross the picket lines by armoured bus.59 
Paul Symonds became aware of the Coal Board's strategy at a Socialist Worker 
meeting. He remembers it was recommended that: 
We should make our own Moses Plan, that we put a pin in a map where 
everybody lives, and make sure that somebody goes out and visits those people 
who live on the outskirts. We needed to make sure they haven't had their electric 
cut off; ask them if they want to get involved in collecting or picketing; ask them 
55 Ray Ritey, interviewed by the author. 
56 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
57 Adeney and Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 172-173; CaIIinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.184. 
58 Goodman, op. cit., pp.151-152. 
59 CalIinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.185; Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.177. 
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when was the last time they'd had a food parcel, and do they know when the next 
union meeting is? We said that we'd do that. 60 
Subsequently he brought this counter-plan to the attention of a branch meeting 
but unexpectedly ran into opposition: 
I proposed it at the meeting - and it was virulently argued against by the branch 
officials, Geoff Siddons and the others. They said that no way were we going to 
go round other people's houses, harassing them. There wasn't just me, there was 
a group of us who argued why we had to do this. We wanted to keep our pit 
solid and this is what we were going to have to do - but the people who kept the 
names and addresses of people who worked at the pit were the union officials. 
So, one, we needed access to those names and addresses, and two, we needed 
money for the cars to able to go round visiting people. And we won that in the 
meeting. We actually won it. They hated it on the top table. And that, in my 
recollection, is the first time that the top table had been overturned at Frickley. 
Frickley had always been a loyal union pit, and that meant that whatever the 
union officials said went as well ... And though they'd lost it, they still wouldn't 
give us the names and addresses and petrol money, so we were fucked anyway. 
But that would have been our strateb'Y for preventing people going back to 
work61 
Although by late October the Moses Plan had shown little sign of success in 
Yorkshire, where few miners had returned to work, in adjacent North Derbyshire a 
serious rupture was becoming apparent. In November though, it proved to be 
Yorkshire's tum. At Frickley it would lead to one of the most violent clashes of the 
strike, as the strikers used every means at their disposal to prevent any of their 
number breaking ranks. 
60 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
61 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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The rumour factory 
The first attempt to break the strike at Frickley was not made until the early hours of 
Tuesday 13 November 1984, over eight months into the dispute. According to the 
Yorkshire Post: 
... pickets used roof timbers and scaffolding from partly built bungalows ... to 
build barricades to stop the first four miners returning to work ... Police said 40 
policemen and a police horse were injured when up to 600 miners ambushed them 
from side streets close to the village centre. South Elmsall saw the worst of 
yesterday's coalfield troubles. Petrol bombs, which failed to ignite, were thrown 
at the police in riot gear, and several of their vehicles were damaged, but the 
police managed to get the four strike-breaking miners back to work. 1 
By the end of October it was apparent that the strike had become a war of 
attrition in which both sides were evenly matched and neither showed signs of 
surrender. Though the TUC had done nothing of note to assist the NUM since its 
conference, there was still a possibility that the miners could win if power workers 
refused to handle coal ITom pit-head stocks. The strike was also proving a costly 
burden to the government both in direct costs and through its effect on the wider 
economy. Even so, this was certainly not a time for over-optimism on the strikers' 
part, given the financial strain after eight months without pay. 
In the first week of November the NCB began a sustained campaign to break 
the strike, and claimed that nationally 2,100 men had crossed the picket lines for the 
first time.2 Although these were only a small fraction of those still out, the advent of 
the 'November push' was obviously intended to dent the strikers' morale. According 
to Johnny Stones, the South Elmsall district 'was a rumour factory' around this time. 
'We used to be stopping rumours day after day, 20 times a day.'3 There had been 
stories circulating about 'somebody working at Kirkby for a long time,' says Gary 
Hinchliffe, 'but there was nobody working.,4 Nevertheless, as Ian Oxley illustrates, 
evidence was mounting that the NCB would soon attempt to ferry strikebreakers 
into Frickley for the first time: 
Things had been building up for a week that there were going to be scabs up at 
Frickley. We had seen an increased police presence in the village and up at the pit. 
We kept the pit under surveillance. We used to get people to walk their dogs on 
what they call 'the curtilage' of the pit on a night time, and they would let us 
know if anything unusual was happening inside the pit. We would go onto the. pit 
site if we wanted to pinch anything, so we were aware of how many police are 
normally based at the pit. The normal amount would be three or four - and only 
on days. On nights there would be nobody there. We kept a picket there 24 hours 
Yorkshire Post, 14 November 1984. 
2 Callinicos and Simons, The Great Strike, p.188. 
3 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
4 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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a day, and the police would just drive up every now and then, chat to you, and 
go. But all of a sudden, there's three or four policemen there 24 hours a day. 
Then you see that they've got police up in the gaffers' offices. They actually used 
the personnel manager's office and that was kitted out as a rest room for the 
police. There was always a van parked up. Clearly an expense when there's no 
scabs in and no serious picketing going off - it was suspicious.5 
Gary Hinchliffe remembers one false alarm, when the strikers amassed in the 
streets waiting for the scabs' arrival: 
. . . there were people everywhere, every street comer, outside every 
newsagent's. It was just like that scene where everybody knew each other in The 
Great k:<)cape, and they all pretended that they didn't know each other.6 
On the morning of Monday 12 November, pits in the vicinity of South Elmsall 
and South Kirkby saw miners breaking the strike for the very first time. Gary Hurst 
remembers turning up at the Miners' Institute that morning expecting to be 
instructed to go to Frickley: 
But when we got to the Miners it turned out not to be Frickley but Kirkby. And 
so we all went up Kirkby, built our barricades and things like that. I don't know 
whether anybody went through at Kirkby that day, but there were a lot of police 
there. They forced us back from the main entrance and there was quite a lot of 
disturbance up there. Setting these industrial dustbins on fire and shoving them 
down.7 
Seven men were reported to have returned at South Kirkby that morrung and six 
others at Grimethorpe a few miles to the west. 8 There could be little doubt now that 
FrickJey would be the next target. 
Westfield Lane 
By Monday evening preparations were already under way to combat the police 
invasion of South Elmsall that was expected at some point during the night. One of 
the first strikers on the scene was Jeff Johnson, who had a particular role to play: 
As well as a picket I was also a 'spotter' - I had a 750 motor bike. Spotters us~d 
to turn up for picketing two hours early. There'd be half a dozen of us on 
high-powered motor bikes - the union branch knew about it - and we'd say: 'I'll 
go down the Common End and look around Broddy pit, you go to Askern, you 
go to Kirkby, you go to NostelI' - depending on how many of us there were. , . 
There'd be convoys of Maria vans. The idea then was to latch onto the convoy, 
find out where it was headed, and come back, so that our pickets could be sent 
5 Jan Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
6 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
7 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
8 Rusieckj, The Plough and the Pick, p.220. 
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there ... the more experienced of us knew that the next pit to go was Frickley, 
and that it would be Frickley the next night where it would start up. 9 
Just as in 1926, the main confrontations would take place on Westfield Lane, the 
main route to Frickley Colliery. The road starts as a tum off from Barnsley Road, the 
shopping centre of South Elmsall, and goes up a hill for about three-quarters of a 
mile. At the top of the hill the road forks. The left fork came to an end about 100 
yards ahead at the entrance to Frickley Colliery. The right turning, Broad Lane, 
continues down hill and some tlrree hundred yards laler passed the landsale entrance 
to Frickley Colliery. Immediately after this, the road crosses the Sheffield to 
YorklLeeds railway line, passes the last houses of South Elmsall and then goes into 
the countryside until about a mile and a half further on it finally reaches Common 
Road in South Kirkby, almost opposite the Old Mill Hotel. Being the alternative to 
the main route between South Kirkby and South Elmsall, the road is often referred 
to as 'the back lane'. Any police convoy to the pit could be expected to approach the 
pit from either end of the lane. 
Barricades and bricks 
Though most of the night's main action didn't occur until after midnight, there were 
some incidents late on Monday evening. Tony Short had been on the streets since 
ten o'clock after news spread that convoys of police were in the area. After visiting 
the picket line at the pit, he and a group of about fifty other miners marched down 
Westfield Lane where they came across 'two big rows of riot cops.' A scuffle 
erupted, but: 
There were too many of them and so they backed us all the way down Carlton 
Road, down to the Asda. We ended up shoving all the Asda trolleys into the 
middle of the road. They got us onto the Asda car park. I could see all their 
h~lmets bobbing as they were coming round the back of the doctors' surgeries, 
from the ginnel off Little Lane. They split us up. There were only about ten of us 
left, and they chased us through Elm Estate, over the iron bridge. And as we got 
over the iron bridge, Black Marias came through that estate there towards where 
the football fields are, so we had to run down diagonally across the field and then 
run through the dike at the bottom It was November, it was freezing! 10 
Skirmishes such as this would occur throughout the night. In the meantime, fis 
word spread throughout the locality, the number of miners on the streets increased. 
Rather than going to bed, Steve Gant had slept downstairs that night: 'I heard a 
knock on the window at about three 0' clock Tuesday morning. It was Mark 
Thompson. He'd been mooching about all night. He says, "It's definitely on. They 
are going into Frickley. There are cops all over." There had been running battles 
since about one o'clock.'ll Once informed, the strikers were asked to congregate at 
9 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
10 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
11 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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the Miners' Institute in Moorthorpe. 'There were about two or three hundred lads 
there, maybe more,' when Steve Gant arrived: 
And it was announced off the stage that we'd definitely got scabs going in that 
morning. They didn't know how many. They'd got Ginty Carr's name. Dicky 
Nailor says, 'They're up at the pit, there's police throughout the village, I've told 
you all the information, it's up to you lot now. Try to stop them!' Dicky was 
sound enough. 12 
The crowd of miners charged down Barnsley Road as far as South Elmsall 
Library and then took the right turning up Carlton Road, which joins Westfield Lane. 
'Just as we were going up the hill,' recalls Steve Gant: 
there were two or three lines of police across the road, against the Niggers club, 
with shields and all that. We spotted them, they were about a hundred yards 
away, 'Fucking hell, they are here.' They weren't there long! Somebody just said, 
'Get the bastards,' and that was it, everybody just ran at them and they just 
turned and ran off I think one got left at the back; he took a right pasting. They 
left him did the rest of them. We ended up running from there up to the top of 
Valley Street, just before the shops. 13 
This was perfect terrain for the miners. A new school and bungalows were under 
construction along the upper part of Carlton Road and round the corner into 
Westfield Lane. Over £3,000 worth of damage was caused on the site as miners 
looted scaffolding, batten boards and scrap metal to build barricades and bricks to 
hurl at the police. 14 Gary Hurst remembers the scene: 
. . . everybody was stood on that building site, the police vans are coming down 
th~ road, screaming in second gear as usual, policemen jumping out of the vans en 
masse. It was just like a scene with Roman soldiers when they all put their shields 
up to stop all the mass of arrows coming over and hitting them on the head. It 
was just like that, but with bricks. The bobbies jumped out of the vans and it was 
just as if somebody had said: 'Right, fire!' It was just bricks raining down on 
them. They didn't even try running up the banking towards us when they saw 
what they were getting; it was just straight back into the van, put it into reverse 
and out of the road. It was the same with the horses; they tried coming down with 
horses. They must've thought that there would be a bit of sympathy about hitting 
animals, but they got bricked the same. 15 
, 
Throughout the night there was wave after wave of police attempts to clear the 
road and shift the miners from their stronghold on the building site. Gary Hinchliffe 
recal1s how one particular police offensive was rebuffed: 
12 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
13 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
14 Rusiecki, op. cit., p.220. 
15 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
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1 can remember this police patrol vehicle. It pulled up to where we were 
congregated. The back doors opened as it pulled up. The van changed shape in 
front of your eyes. There must've been two to three hundred people there, all 
armed up with wall-bricks. And nobody ran. Everybody just pelted this van with 
wall-bricks. And it changed shape. And in about three seconds the doors pulled 
shut, and it drove off. 16 
Throughout the morning the battle would switch to different locations on 
Westfield Lane. For a while the epicentre was at the junction with Barnsley Road, 
when word spread amongst the pickets that the scabs were gathered in the car park 
of either the Chequers Inn or the Plough Inn. After trying to push their way through 
the police ranks, Ian Oxley says the pickets decided not to risk arrest and so reverted 
to throwing missiles: 
. . . what the lads noticed was that when the police lifted their riot shields up, 
their legs and ankles, even though they're protected, are now vulnerable. So 
basically, a group of about a dozen went down armed with little wallers, half a 
dozen threw at the faces of the policemen, the riot shields shot up, and the other 
half of the group threw their bricks at their legs. It was brilliant, where I was 
stood, just to watch them. One by one, the police were limping out of the lines. 17 
With the threatening presence of the snatch squad in the viciruty, the pickets 
retreated back to the building site. It was then that pickets decided to put a piece of 
equipment off the building site, normally used to convey tiles up to roofs, to good 
use. Ian Oxley was among those who commandeered the contraption: 
It has two wheels on it, and you can balance it on the two wheels and drive it like 
a pattering ram. They were manoeuvring it out of the school work area onto this 
piece of waste ground. Anyway, they've got it moving and they're shouting, 
'Come on, give us a hand with this.' So I went over and I got hold of it, and 
they're saying, 'Aye, we're going to send this down at the bastards.' So I'm on it, 
and we're walking nice and slowly with it, learning the balancing point of this 
piece of machinery, and I don't know who started it off, but one of the lads ... 
started giving it the old: 'Zigger zagger, zigger zagger, huh, huh, huh,' which 
sends a shiver through your spine. You just felt like you were an African Zulu 
charging into battle. Your confidence was running, you were part of a tribe, we 
were going into battIe. And my imagination is now playing wonders on me . . . 
I'm visualising the fear on the policemen's faces. I can see in my eye the ,old 
bobbies there as this battering ram's running over them, punching through them. 
So we sets off, and as we're passing people they say, 'Ob, it's a good idea,' 
and they're jumping on, and I'd say we got about fifty around us. Not everybody 
could hold it, but just touching you to be part of the battering ram. At about five 
or ten metres from the police lines I bailed out. I always liked to give myself a bit 
16 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
17 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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of a start on the younger lads when it comes to a run, because clearly, when this 
goes whizzing through the bobbies 1 expect some reaction from them. Other lads 
stayed with it for another five metres, but even they didn't steer it to the last 
second. But it did go straight for the police line, as I had envisaged, and 
everybody else had envisaged, and the police, at the very last minute, opened their 
line and pulled back, and it went straight through them. I8 
Street-fighting 
A major shill in the battle took place when the police deliberately enticed the pickets 
towards the pit, away from their stronghold on the building site. Gary Hinchliffe 
recalls what happened next: 
... as soon as we got up near the Westfield Hotel we got into a controntation. 
There were riot police coming back down the road again then. I can remember 
running down to where the allotments are - it was either Victor Street or Oxford 
Street. I remember running down there, and getting into an argument. They'd 
closed the end of the road off; they had us all pinned down the side streets then. I 
remember Tony Cork shouting at this police officer, 'If you are so good, take 
your helmet off, and your visor and everything, and come on, we'll have it out.' 
This copper started stripping otfand they set off to have a fight, and I said, 'Tony 
don't, because he'll just hold you.' Anyway, Tony set off walking towards them, 
and they all came chasing after us. And we kind of sucked them down to the 
bottom where it's dark and split up into the alleys. They got split up and we came 
round the back of them. We realised then what was happening. They were trying 
to pin us down the side streets so that they could fetch the scabs up Westfield 
Lane. II) 
But it soon became evident that the police were no match for the pickets in the 
back .streets of South Elmsall, as Ray Riley recollects: 
. . . there were just running battles - skirmishes. Stones, catapults, barricades, 
fireworks - I think a quantity of fireworks were actually stolen from the local 
fireworks factory - people setting off rockets because there were police horses 
there. It was like Northern Ireland and the pictures that you see on the television -
running battles. One thing that was amusing, I suppose not at the time but later: 
the police didn't have a clue where they were. They didn't know South Elmsa11, 
they didn't know the back streets, they didn't know the escape routes. They took 
quite a hiding did the police.20 
Eventually, the pickets forced the police to retreat out of Oxford Street and 
Victor Street and back onto Westfield Lane. Gary Hinchliffe remembers that the 
police re-grouped and formed a large circle near the recreation ground: 
18 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
19 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
20 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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But they were just getting bricked ITom everywhere. And they were getting 
frustrated. They kept wanting to break and charge. Then somebody would shout 
for them to hold their positions. And for some stupid reason they went charging 
off, through the rec' ~ into the field. Their ranks broke~ so they must've been. 
getting bricked from that side as. well as from out of Victor Street and Oxford 
Street. They got routed. They got a real battering.21 
The reason the police were being routed was that even away from their base on 
building site, the pickets were still managing to get a supply of missiles: 
Really heavy bricks were getting thrown at them. People were just coming up the 
side streets with dustbin lids full of bricks, putting them on the road, and going 
back down and getting some more. They'd got like a conveyer belt of them. 22 
Tan Oxley explains where the supply of bricks came from: 'people had got hold of 
seven-pound hammers and they were actually knocking people's walls down - and 
the people didn't mind. ,23 The people in the locality rallied round the pickets in 
other ways too, as Paul Symonds recalls: 
You had old women in night gowns coming out telling us where the police were. 
They'd be shouting out of their windows and leaving. their doors open. Everybody 
had a common enemy that morning - and it was the coppers,24 
Robert Walker recalls an odd incident where one local resident asked the pickets 
to do him a favour during the disturbances: 
I don't know who he was, he just popped out and shouted to the lads, 'Hey up. 
Do us an insurance job on my car, will you?' So we just torched it for him. We'd 
get the blame for doing it, but the bloke was happy and we were happy. We got it 
in the middle of the road and set fire to it. 25 
The pickets continued to push the police further up Westfield Lane, towards 
the pit. Gary Hurst remembers how 'there was hell on' near Broad Lane School: 
I can remember some lads sneaking round Gordon Place, climbing over the wall 
into the cricket ground, going more or less up the side of the bobbies, but behind 
the concrete wall, and then, just like a Trojan Horse-type thing, standing up and 
just pelting the bobbies with bricks and then running straight across the cricket 
field. The bobbies were finding it difficult to climb over the high concrete fencing 
21 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
22 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
23 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
24 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
25 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
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and get after them. So the lads never even got caught. They used to have these 
big searchlights. They could see them but they couldn't do owt.26 
On the opposite side of the road, in the recreation ground, mounted police 
officers also ran into difficulties when they pursued miners across the bowling green. 
'Nobody had told them that it dipped,' explains Robert Walker: 
they were going down like flies. We knew that it dipped. They just came charging 
at us across the bowling green, and as it dips down onto that putting green, they 
were just dropping. And then we were just coming back with bricks. Because 
they didn't know the crack. They were all cockneys, most of them. We knew 
where we were going. So we were egging them on to go places where we knew 
that we could hammer them. They just got hammered. 27 
He recalls that as the action got nearer to the pit: 
. . . we were knocking lampposts down and making little barricades. The coppers 
had their lights on us, but every time there was a light everybody aimed at it. It 
would go down on the floor, and then some other slack bastard would pick it up. 
They were picking all the ringleaders out, but everybody was a ringleader. All the 
Frickley men were there. All them who went picketing turned out, it was just 
unbelievable ... There were people there who you'd never seen picketing before. 
People who had never worked at the pit were there. 'We're not having these 
bastards in our village,' that was the main thing.28 
DAChf 
Perhaps the most violent episode that morning occurred when a convoy of police 
vans forced its way up Westfield Lane followed by vehicles the pickets thought 
contajned scabs. 'They weren't scabs as it turned out,' recollects Paul Symonds, 
'they were BACM [British Association of Colliery Managers] members.' BACM 
were usually let into work unchallenged. 'They shouldn't have been stupid enough to 
do it when they knew what was happening,' argues Paul Symonds: 
This is at about six or seven in the morning by now. The fighting was well under 
way ... there were two police vans in front with about five or six cars behind -
the cars weren't full. The barricades across the road weren't very good because 
we hadn't put them on the pavement. The vans came screaming up. They must've 
been told: 'Just put your foot down and go for it.' Of course, these two big police 
vans went up the pavement and just bounced straight over the barricades, ilnd 
kept going. These poor nIckers in the cars were trying to do the same - and they 
just got bricked to fuck. I do not know how anyone didn't get killed: it's a 
wonder to me because the cars got it. We thought they were scabs. I think they 
were screaming out of the cars: 'BACM!' but there was that much noise. That 
26 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
27 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
28 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
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morning, somebody had made a tray full of petrol bombs - I don't know if they 
were miners. I'd heard about them~ but I hadn't seen any explode so I didn't 
know whether we had any or not - until that car convoy came up. I iust saw this 
huge flash on the last car. Initially I thQught it was somebody inside taking 
photos. I'm running towards this car with a hrick in my hand and I sees this 
blinding flash - and that was the tirst instinct: somebody has got me on camera 
here. And then I realised that it didn't come from the back of the car; the flash 
came from under the car. And word has it that it was a petrol bomb. that got 
thrown, and it ignited on the exhaust of the car. But the car didn't catch fire. But 
the police definitely knew what was going to happen that morning when they 
took them people up. They just fucked off and left them. I think the police were 
half hoping that somebody would get killed so that they could label us. 29 . 
The bark lane 
Though Westfield Lane was the scene of the main clashes between pickets and 
police that night, there was also concern among the strikers that the scabs could be 
brought in from the South Kirkby side of Broad Lane. Jeff Johnson was part of the 
group defending this route: 
. . . there were fifty or sixty pickets on the back lane, dropping lampposts and 
telegraph posts and trying to dig that culvert up. But all the time the police were 
coming up and down and knew what we were about. Whether they'd got 
heat-seekers or what I don't know, but they knew where we were and what we 
were doing, and there was many a battle, up there. But we were camouflaged and 
they were running around with big lights and clinking and clanking with big coats 
on and shields rattling, and we could see them ... We were in and out of 
allotments, that fireworks factory, the farm that's down there, in and out of the 
woods - fetching trees from Christ knows where. Yes, there was merry hell up 
there for hours and hours and hours. 30 
Truncheoned 
Encamped at the main entrance to Frickley Colliery throughout the night was a 
group of branch committee men and older Frickley miners. Among them was John 
Picken, who says they knew little of what was happening further down the hill. 
Around daybreak though, they could see how much damage the pickets had inflicted 
on the police officers who were returning to the pit yard: 'They'd got cuts and 
bruises, in fact there were police laid out in the main yard.' He and other union men 
among this group decided to try to bring an end to the hostilities: 
Because of the violence we asked the [police 1 inspector if we could see the 
manager, to stop this stupidity. as we saw it. We couldn't control our lads when 
they could see scabs going by their own front door. We went to see the manager 
. . . There was me off the branch committee, and I think there were three branch 
officials there. We got as far as the door and the manager turned round and told 
29 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
30 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
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the inspector that he wouldn't have anything to do with us, he wouldn't see us. 
And the inspector says, '{ think your best bet is to go. You can see what has 
happened. Look at them [injured policemen]!' And there were some mad 'uns as 
well. So we went.:H 
As daylight came the miners who remained on the streets were starting to wonder 
what the latest developments were regarding the scabs entering the pit. 'It was 
getting to seven or eight in the morning and it was getting light,' remembers Gary 
Hinchliffe: 
we decided to go into the pit yard to see what was going off: had the scabs gone 
into the pit, or what? So we walked up and the 'Home Guard' as we called them, 
were there, the older-end who always picketed outside the pit, Johnny Stones and 
Chick Picken and them. I says to one of them, 'Have they gone in?' He says, 
'Aye, they've come down the back lane and gone in through the landsale. They 
haven't gone in through the front door, they've gone in through the back.' Then 
some of the other lads came up. And the police were sat. He says, 'What's been 
going off down there? They're bolloxed, these.' And I looked in the pit yard and 
the coppers were flaked out all over. They'd got their helmets off, they were off 
their police horses.32 
The battle of 13 November was not quite over yet however, because though the 
police had retreated to the pit, they were suddenly given the perfect opportunity to 
regroup and counter-attack the pickets: 
Then a group of lads must've got some bricks and gone running into the pit yard 
and thrown bricks at these police officers. Of course, they jumped back up on 
their feet and the mounted police officers jumped onto their horses. I thought: 
'O,h, you fucking, stupid idiots.' So it was a matter then of turning and running. 
We set off running and the horses came charging at us. They chased us all the 
way down Beech Street. I thought: 'Well, on a morning when we've won, to get 
beaten in the last battle.' We could've just held them in the pit yard, there was 
nowt else to do now, it was too late the scabs were in. Just for the sake of 
throwing a couple of more bricks at them, we got routed. And some lads got 
arrested. 33 
One of the arrested miners was Ray Riley, and he describes how the police took 
revenge for their earlier ordeal: 
Unfortunately they caught me - not so much caught me, I took a wrong turning 
and ran into them. There were about four of them, all in riot gear, they didn't 
have numbers on their shoulder straps, and they began punching me and kicking 
me. Obviously, against four or five riot officers, you haven't much chance of a 
31 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
32 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
33 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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fight-back, so I took a sort of cowering position up the side of this bungalow 
wall. I was thinking: 'I'll have a few punches and pretend I'm hurt.' The next 
thing I know I feIt them yanking my hair back and I thought they'd banged me 
head-first into a wall. I was - stunned is not the word - just out. I can remember 
being laid on the floor. There was no pain, I was just dazed. I can remember 
feeling something running down my head and I realised that it was blood. And 
apparently - this came out later by someone who witnessed the event - they left 
me lying there and for some reason they came back. I can remember being 
dragged - and I mean dragged, my feet were dragging along the floor - up Beech 
Street, up Poxton Grove. And they took me through the ranks of the riot police, 
and they were spitting on me and saying 'We hope you die, you bastard. Bastards, 
bastards, bastards', swearing and spitting on me. I can remember having spit on 
my face, and that rruxed with blood, it wasn't a nice teeling.34 
He was taken to the colliery management's offices, where there were already a 
couple of other Frickley pickets under arrest: 
We sat in the deputy manager's room with a couple of policemen and one in 
particular, who had a sling on his left arm, he had blond hair, he was a sergeant 
. . . and I can remember seeing a pair of legs from behind a table. Later I found 
out it was Brian Curtis, again a Frickley picket. Harold Jones was laid face down 
and I remember him saying, 'Can I move my arms boss?' He had his hands in 
handcuffs and because he was laid down they were cutting into him. Then I heard 
this voice say, 'Lie fucking down!' I didn't have a clue who he was talking to. 
Anyway, this police sergeant got up, whacked me round the chest and whacked 
me round the shoulder with a truncheon. And obviously I went to my knees, and 
he says, 'Get your fucking anns out in front of you.' So I was laid face down, 
blood oozing from my head, and then he whacked me across the anns with a 
truncheon. I must have lost consciousness, because I don't know how long went 
by, and I can remember being loaded onto a stretcher by this ambulance man. I 
can remember him kneeling down and saying, 'What have they done to you, 
cock?' I said something like: 'Truncheoned me. ,35 
Ray Riley was eventually charged with breach of the peace and 13 November 
proved to be the end of his active involvement in the strike. Harold Jones was still in 
prison at Christmas time, charged with carrying a petrol bomb. When he was 
released just afterwards, his bail conditions stipulated that he had to live 50 rrules 
away from his home. He spent much of the remainder of the strike living in exile in 
Manchester at a magistrate's house. Over the coming months the original charges 
against him were dropped. Eventually, his case came to court in December 1985, 13 
months after his arrest. He was acquitted when it was stated that the prosecution 
had no case to answer. 36 Sirrularly, Ray Riley endured six months of tonnent after 
his arrest, with the fear of the sack constantly haunting him. On 2 May 1985 
34 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
35 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
36 . ki . 226 Ruslec ,op. Clt., p. . 
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however, his case came before Pontefract magistrates' court and the charges against 
him were dismissed, because, as the Hemsworth and South F,/msall F.xpress 
reported, 'there were "grave doubts" over police evidence. ,37 The NUM activist 
then decided to take legal action against the police to compensate for his injuries. 
Much later, on 19 December 1990, the following appeared on page 5 of The Times 
under the heading' Strike damages': 
A striking miner who was falsely arrested, beaten up by police and maliciously 
prosecuted during the 1984 miners' strike was awarded £60,000 damages in the 
High Court at Leeds yesterday. Raymond Riley, now aged 32, was a face worker 
at Frickley Colliery, South Yorkshire.38 
At the time, Ray Riley's payment was the biggest award tor damages made against 
the West Yorkshire Police force and ranked as one of the highest against any police 
force in Britain.39 
Casualties 
The arrests and the serious charges against the Frickley miners were obviously a 
serious blow, but, on balance, the events of the morning of 13 November were seen 
as a massive victory by the activists. It was obvious that it was the police who had 
the majority of casualties, as Ian Oxley and others on the Frickley picket line found 
out as they taunted the injured police officers who trundled past: 
If we saw an injured policeman being helped into the control centre, which they 
had sct up in the administration office, we'd cheer and shout something like: 
'Three - nil.' 'Seven - nil.' I think we got up to about 'Thirty-eight _ nil.,40 
According to a police spokesman reported in the Hem.\worth and South Elmsall 
Express, 'about 40 police had been injured during the incident. ,4l Because police 
injury figures in the media were seen as part of the propaganda war against the 
strike, the tallies announced were not usually taken seriously by pickets. 'Even if 
they broke their finger-nail they would say that they had been injured on a picket 
line,' argues Paul Symonds. However, his wife worked at Pontefract General 
Infirmary where the police casualties were taken; this time the figures given were 
genume: 
... this was a common story amongst the staff at Ponty hospital, that coppers 
were just wasting the hospital's time coming into casualty when there was nowt 
up with them. Pam rang this bloke she knew in casualty when she got to work to 
see if anybody she knew had been injured. She said, 'Has anybody been injured 
from FrickJey?' He said, 'There's bodies laid about evef)T\vhere.' She's saying, 
37 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 9 May 1985. 
38 The Times, 19 December 1990. 
39 Northern Star, 21 February 1991. 
40 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
4J Hemsworth and ISouth Elmsall Express, 15 November 1984. 
80 
The battle of 13 November 
'Oh no.' She says, 'Who?' He says, 'There's no pickets. They are all coppers.' 
He said to her, 'At this stage, there are 43 coppers injured.' She's going, 'Oh, 
well but -' He says, 'No Pam, these are injured.' We are talking about broken 
jaws,. broken collar bones, broken legs, ankles, shins,. arms, hands. One bloke had 
a ball-bearing through his cheek and it had come out of the other side- they'd 
been tiring high-powered catapults at them.42 
The question of violence 
The general picture presented in the media of the disturbances at Frickley and other 
pits during the Coal Board's 'November push' was one of courageous strikebreakers' 
and policemen encountering mindless NUM thugs.43 But as well as this leading 
tihlUres in the labour movement were only too willing to condemn the miners' actions 
despite their mass support amongst ordinary trade unionists. Indeed, on the evening 
of B November Norman Willis delivered a major speech at a rally of miners in 
Aberavon in which he slammed the miners' methods. Although he criticised police 
aggression, he also stated that any miner who resorts to violence 'wounds the 
miners' case more than they damage their opponents' resolve.' Such acts, he said, 
'are alien to our common trade union tradition, however, not just because they are 
counter-productive but because they are wrong. ,44 
Only rarely have the views of the strikers themselves about violence on the picket 
lines been heard. Even supporters of the miners could sometimes be put on the 
defensive over the question of violence. Robert Walker remembers what happened 
when a photographer from the left-wing newspaper Socialist Worker came to South 
Elmsall in November to do a sympathetic profile of the miners: 'He had to bum half 
his pictures, didn't he? ... he was.. trying to portray the coppers as being hooligans, 
and we just knocked fuck out them. ,45 
For aU the- Frickley NUM activists, their use of force was fully justified 
considering the powerful foe they faced: the British state, with its body of armed 
I 
men and gaols, which was determined to crush the miners by any means at its 
disposal. Ray Riley, who as we have seen suffered personally at the hands of the 
police, explains that: 
... we were all involved in throwing and shoving and throwing punches - doing 
whatever it takes - because it was their side against our side ... because in a war, 
which it was in reality - it was a class war - their side, the police and what have 
you, were hell-bent on destroying our union, destroying our livelihood. And 
whatever it takes for your side to secure a victory, you take it. I've got no 
regrets. I've got no guilty conscience about anything that happened to 
42 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author . 
. 43 For a critique of the press coverage during the dispute see E. Wade, <The miners 
and the media: themes of newspaper reporting', Journal of Law and Society, 
Vol. 12, No.3, pp.273-283. 
44 Cited in P. Routledge, Scargill: the Unauthorized Biography, (London, 1994), 
p.179. 
45 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
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strikebreakers or the police during the strike. I've no guilty conscience 
whatsoever. It was a simple choice: them or us.46 
John Picken, like all ufthe other Frickley activists, saw the situation on the picket 
lines quite differently from the press. The newspapers' picture of violent miners and 
saintly policemen was, he says, 'totally rubbish', and gives examples of police 
harassment usually neglected by the newspapers: 
They were talking about violence, but when you think about the police getting 
hoW of one of our members, and because there was no room in this police car, 
they said, 'We don't take prisoners.' He'd got his arms tied behind his back. The 
policeman hit him smack across his nose - broke his nose - with his truncheon. 
We asked him to go to court but he wouldn't go. Another one had got some 
stickers and they held him, they pulled the stickers off his coat, screwed them up 
and rammed them up his nose until it bled. And he had to be hospitalised to get 
that out. Another one was beaten up by the police, taken to Pontefract, and was 
told that when he'd been stitched up he was going to get some more. He ran 
away. And he phoned me. He was frightened to go home in case he got beat up. I 
told him to get in touch with a solicitor.47 
Frickley activists point to how the police deliberately initiated the violence on the 
picket lines. The NCB, the government and the police lost the battIe with peaceful 
picketing, argues Johnny Stones. The confrontations 'had as much to do with police 
tactics as ours,' he says, 'therefore I had no qualms about the means used 
throughout. ,4K 
Gary Hinchliffe says that he was not alone in thinking that 13 November was the 
day the Frickley pickets got 'their own back': 
You got your own back for Nottingham; for Orgreave; for Scunthorpe; for 
Immingham; for Agecroft; for everywhere that you'd been to and got pushed, 
where you'd got hit over the head and just left, assaulted, arrested for nowt. This 
was my day to get my own back on them. 49 
More than that: 
. . . it was the only victory that we had in the strike, to be honest. It was the only 
day that you'd achieved something. It was the only day that you'd won - and then 
we didn't stop them going in. But we stopped them going in by the main road. 
They didn't do what they'd done in 1926: go in up Westfield Lane. They went ,in 
the back way every day. So it was the only victory that we had. And I think that 
the events of that morning, and the amount of men that went up picketing every 
46 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
47 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
48 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
49 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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day that van went in, and the anger that they voiced towards them, kept the 
numbers who went back to work to a minimum. 50 
The compromise 
Nevertheless, there was a price to pay for such dogged resistance to the forces of the 
state. The police were in a position to retaliate over their defeat on a scale the local 
miners couldn't hope to match without the physical assistance of the wider labour 
movement. The pickets needed to retreat. Johnny Stones was involved in negotiating 
a compromise to ensure this: 
... we had a meeting with the deputy chief constable of West Yorkshire ... He 
met the four branch officials in the manager's office at Frickley - the first time 
we'd been on the premises since the strike. In a nutshell, what he said was that he 
would fight us. They were his words: 'I will fight you, I will close this village 
down and nothing will come in or go out', and he intended bringing people in to 
work who wanted to work. So we came to a compromise. Obviously we had 
fallen out with the manager, and the manager at that time, Clay, was having his 
two-penn' orth, and we were arguing with him rather than with the police. What 
we said was that if he thought we would stand by and allow him to drive scabs 
through South Elmsall - down through South Kirkby, through Moorthorpe, down 
Barnsley Road and turn round at the bottom of Westfield Lane - and drive them 
up in the full view of all the community, then he was just asking for trouble, day 
in and day out, while ever he did it. The compromise was that he would bring 
them by the Old Mill at South Kirkby, down the back lane - fetch them in over the 
fields in essence - and get them in at Shann's shop, by the landsale. Therefore 
virtually bypassing the built-up areas of the communities. That was the 
compromise that we reached. They did that every day and never took them 
through South Elmsall centre. That was because we had told them that we would 
nat be able to hold the lads back, they wouldn't have stood it, they'd have been 
bricking them all the way down. 51 
With the likelihood of retaliation from the police, Frickley NUM also decided to 
suspend picketing for the following day: 
We just had the token six on the gate and they brought them in. That was the 
consensus among the branch officials and we got criticised for it. But I think if we 
hadn't done there could have been forty or fifty lads arrested and sacked. If we 
would have fought them again on Westfield Lane, I've no doubts whatsoever that 
they would have sealed South Elmsall off. They'd done it at Hatfield, they'd done 
it at Armthorpe. And reports that we received after the event were that there 
were police stood by in schools, in parking-lots at Barnsdale Bar, ready to move 
in and seal South Elmsall off There's only about four or five entry points: 
Westfield Lane, Minsthorpe, Doncaster Road, up South Kirkby, and they could 
have sealed it off on the back lane. They only needed five roads blocked and 
50 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
51 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
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they'd got South Elmsall sealed off. Buses, transport, business; they'd have all 
been stopped and only certain ones allowed through 52 
Given the possible repercussions, Steve Gant agreed with the decision to suspend 
picketing. And this was confirmed when he and another miner ventured near the 
Frickley picket line in the early hours of Wednesday morning: 
There were two or three men round the fire. We had a look round the back; no 
coppers. It was like the calm before the storm. We decided to walk back down 
past Broadway, past the factories. As we were just crossing the railway bridge, 
we could see them coming down the back lane - vans. It was like a snake. There 
must have been fifty or sixty vans - at that time in a morning! The first one was 
just going past as we were going to turn round into Broadway. They all slowed 
down; the widows are down, they were watching us. Me and Johnny nipped 
round the corner and legged it. We knew they weren't going to take any 
prisoners. That confirmed it, that the branch officials were right in calling it off. It 
was a wise decision because I think that they could have got their own back. 
Anyway, we denied them that chance. 53 
In his chapter on the 1984-85 strike, Paul Rusiecki suggests that the incidents of 
13 November were 'on a scale and of a sort which far exceeded the "riot" on 
Westfield Lane almost 60 years earlier' in the 1926 lockout.54 But Rusiecki totally 
neglects the views of those miners who were involved in the confrontation, giving 
more detail to the harassment of a local strikebreaker. And yet while Rusiecki was 
disturbed that such a 'woeful picture was occurring in the village of my birth', 55 as 
we have seen, for many Frickley miners the early hours of Tuesday 13 November 
were actually amongst the highlights of the whole strike and would remain a part of 
local folklore. At that stage in the dispute the strikers had two options open to 
themr They could either permit large numbers of well-equipped police officers to 
invade their communities in order to escort a handful of strikebreakers to work and 
perhaps witness the start of a trickle back to work, or they could mount an effective 
challenge. At Frickley they chose the latter. This was the day when the Frickley 
pickets 'got their own back' for their battering at Orgreave and elsewhere. But the 
question now was, with the first strikebreakers at work, had the show of strength by 
the FrickIey pickets been enough to prevent the trickle back to work becoming more 
serious, as the depths of winter drew nearer? Already the strike was longer in 
duration than the historic struggle the strikers' forebears had endured in 1926. 
52 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
53 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
54·R . ki . 2 I 6 USlec ,op. CIt., p. . 
55 Ibid., p.203. 
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Tailing the scabs 
Because strikebreaking was now clearly a local issue at Frickley, from the middle of 
November onwards, the NUM activists had to be vigilant against the Coal Board's 
back-t~-work drive and mount a counter campaign of their own. One of the first 
duties was to discover who the strikebreakers actually were so that an attempt could 
be made to convince them to rejoin the strike. Ian Oxley recalls how there were 
members of the Coal Board staff at Frickley who were sympathetic to the miners' 
struggle. One was an upper management figure: 
. . . and he used to tip Dicky Nailor off about what was happening at the pit. 
He's a local born and bred bloke; a smashing bloke as a pit manager. He knew 
that it was in the pit's interest not to split the workforce into half of you scabbing 
and half of you not. He never used to give us names. 'Is so and so working?' he 
wouldn't comment on it. And that meant 'Check him out.' If you gave him 
another name, he would say, 'He definitely isn't working.' So he would tell you 
without telling you. Also, the head timekeeper would say, 'That man's definitely 
not working,' so that he didn't get any hassle. l 
If there were uncertainties about someone, 'We used to just send lads round to their 
house, round about twelve o'clock at night,' says Ian Oxley: 
They used to have to camp outside their house every morning for a week. And if 
the scab van comes and they've not left their house, we assumed that they were 
not in that van - clearly they could have flitted out, but we'd check that out as 
well. We just sent a union man up for a friendly call ... 2 
He says that some scabs actually rejoined the strike because of such visits: 
One was a local onsetter, that's a man in the pit bottom who loads the men and 
the material off the cage. His father was a union man for NUPE, he was a 
caretaker at a local school. So we actually went and saw his dad, and got his dad 
to see him. His dad had not given him any money, he'd got five kids. So his dad 
said, 'Look, I'll see that he's not short of money.' He never went in again. 
Another lad, he was an assistant engineer, a funny person. His wife was very high 
up in the social services, so he'd no money problems at all. But we went to see 
him, and he said that he'd been duped into working. He was told that all the other 
assistants were going in to work, so that's why he worked. He regretted it and 
said, 'I'm not going anymore.' These were two that I personally know of, and 
there were one or two more. So we were pretty successful in identifYing them 
pretty quickly. 3 
1 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
2 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
3 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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The precise number of miners who broke the strike at Frickley has never been 
discovered by the strikers. Nevertheless, estimates were made. According to Jeff 
Johnson: 
We calculated, by using certain methods - secret hiding holes, binoculars - on any 
given day the largest amount that went in was fourteen. And in total I think there 
was something like 43 scabs. Some would work one day, Some a week, then 
another one. There were on1y two or three - one of them was Ginty Carr - who 
worked all the time. All the rest were one-dayers. They thought there was a pit \ 
full of men, but when they got there, there would only be a handful. rve actually· 
had the tale told to me by scabs - a long time afterwards and who wanted to come 
back round the village - of what happened: about lads getting in the van, changing 
their mind and crying, but they wouldn't let them get out of the van.4 
Ginty Carr attained a reputation for being extremely hard-faced. 'We only ever 
saw one minibus coming in,' says Gary Hinchliffe, and 'one person used to sit at the 
front every time - Ginty Carr. He never bothered about hiding himself, but nobody 
else seemed to be keen to show their face. ,5 
If information was not always forthcoming about who the strikebreakers were, 
there were always other methods, as Tony Short explains: 
After you had done your morning picketing, you would go home, have a bit of 
breakfast, try to get an hour's kip, then wait for them coming out and follow 
them all over . . . they would go onto the DoncasterlW akeficld road towards 
Drodsworth; and just as it turns off for the Red House, there is a lay-by. Here 
they used to swap them out of the iron bus into a minibus. So we used to be 
across the road with binoculars, laid in the grass trying to see who the scabs were. 
In the end, my mam used to take us, because it was better if a woman was driving 
because they never used to stop you.6 , 
Gary Hurst remembers the time when he was part of a team that tailed a van and 
finally came face to face with a scab: 'He was a transferee from Hickleton. There 
was me, Shorty and Brad.' The group followed the van into Doncaster: 
It trundles off towards the centre of Doncaster, down to the roundabout, where 
the railway station is. It gets towards the roundabout, the police vans peeled off. 
and left the van that was carrying the scabs on its own. Just before the 
roundabout, there's a little slip road that turns off towards the station, it went in 
there. So by this time we are about a hundred yards behind the van with the scabs 
in. It turned round the comer; we were round within a couple of seconds of it,· 
And all we saw was this kid who Shorty knew off the haulage down Frickley pit 
saying, 'Thanks a lot,' and shutting the van door. And .shorty jumped out of the \ 
car and he shouted: 'Hey up, you scabbing bastard,' he called him hy name. And . 
4 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
5 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
6 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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at that moment, it was just a slight look on the kid's behalf, the van pulled away, 
and from round the other way, a police car came. He Tan in front of the police 
car, banging on it, shouting, 'Hey up, I'm a scab, I'm a scab, they're going to get 
me.' So we all jumped in the car and went home.7 
Ambushes 
Although a compromise had been reached with the police after 13 November, there 
were still serious attempts by the Frickley strikers to stop the convoys traversing the 
alternate route to the pit. Consequently, mass pickets of the Broad Lane entrance 
became a regular feature of the remainder of the strike. Indeed the following 
Monday morning saw what was later described in the Hemsworth and South Elmsall 
Express as 'one of the worst nights of violence on local picket lines.' Two miners 
were later jailed tor their part after 200 pickets clashed with police near Broadway 
Terrace at about 4.30 am.s 
Because of such dangers on the Frickley picket line, other, less legitimate, ways 
were employed to stop the strikebreakers' van, as Ian Oxley illustrates: 
... we went into the pit yard and we pinched some old five-gallon oil containers. 
We filled them with water and we stacked them on a Z-bend. We also got some 
stuff called 'soluble oil', which is an oil which mixes with water. We also got 
some bolt cutters. And we got some of that heavy reinforcing mesh they use for 
putting into concrete floors and roads. We cut these into star shapes, bent the 
stars in different directions. [f you threw these on the floor, then one point of the 
star always stuck upwards, puncturing the tyre of the scab van. We were relying 
on it being frosty, so we decided to lace the road with water and put the soluble 
oil on top of the water - that would make the road very slippy. 9 
The hope was that the van would lose control due to puncture, skid off the road, 
, At that point we would brick it and disappear into the night'. However, the scheme 
did not go quite to plan: 
The CB [citizen band radio posted at the start of the lane] sends the signal up: 
'Yeah, they are on their way.' We knew the plan, we'd watched it previously. The 
first thing to come through is a heavy-armoured Land Rover ... That flies up -
they've got these searchlights looking around for people. If it sees anything, then 
they'll send a police van full of riot police to try and chase you off. [t didn't spot 
us, we'd all got the old black balaclavas on, and we nipped out. I was on the 
metal spikes, while the other lads were giving it the water and the soluble oil. 
That was all done. Then we all went back into our hiding positions, with our 
suitable pile of bricks ready for what, we thought, would be an ambush of the 
scab van. The scab van came up, rode over the metal spikes at 40 miles an hour, 
straight round corners as though it was on rails. We didn't puncture it! We've 
since learnt that apparently they have these steel-reinforced tyres. You can't 
7 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
8 Hemsworth and Soulh Elmsall Express, 21 February 1985. 
9 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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puncture them with bullets, they are that good. And clearly the traction of the van 
was good enough to avoid our second trap, which was water and oil, which at the 
pit, anybody who works where there's water and oil knows that it's treacherou.s, 
and unfortunately it didn't work. And the place was white with ice,lO 
Guerrilla actions such as. the one described above were not planned by the 
Frickley branch of the NUM. 'You, generally, after six months; form into little 
groups of people that you can trust when it comes to it,' says Ian Oxley: 
Somebody comes up to you with an idea and says: 'I want to go do this,' and 
you'd think: 'Aye, sounds all right, that.' And they'd say, 'Get up at two 
0' dock,' and, sure enough, all the regulars that you know you can trust will tum 
up at two o'clock in a morning just to try something different to keep the police 
on their toes. 1] 
Although it was hypocritical of the press to condemn the miners for fighting back 
in such a way, considering their neglect of the police's tactics and the armoury at 
the disposal of the police such as truncheons, shields, horses, high-powered vehicles 
and the like, nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that there was a negative aspect 
to the acts of violence which miners' hit squads often carried out as a substitute for 
mass action. Steve Gaot remembers that a number of Frickley miners were arrested 
after one particular ambush, 'and the lads they arrested. weren't involved that 
morning. They'd got it wrong. They'd just gone for certain people.' Fortunately, 
'there were no charges. ' 12 But this was not always the case, as was shown at the end 
of November when the bungalow of a Wheldale Colliery miner woo lived in Upton \ 
was gutted by an arson attack following the discovery of his return to work. 
Immediately the police seized their chance and began a round-up of strike activists. 
Eleven Frickley miners were subsequently put on an 8pm to 8am curfew which 
prevented them from active participation in the dispute. 13 
Christmas 
The Coal Board's efforts to break the strike in November resulted in a greater 
number of miners returning to work in Yorkshire than in any of the previous eight 
months of the dispute. The Board persisted with their drive throughout December, 
when the question now being asked was whether the mass of the strikers would be 
willing to endure financial hardship with the Christmas period in sight. Nevertheless; 
by Christmas, despite all bar three Yorkshire pits having miners back to work, there 
were less than five per cent of the miners working in the coalfield. In Doncaster pits 
a mere one per cent of miners had broken ranks.14 Surviving Christmas was now 
going to be vital if a further P1Jsh was to be thwarted in the New Year. Miners' 
supporters everywhere were aware of this and a~ the festive season neared they 
10. Ian OxJey, interviewed by the author. 
11 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
J2 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
13 Hemsworth and South E1msall E:"Cpress, 29 November 1984. 
14 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p.179. 
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flooded into the coalfields bringing with them hundreds of thousands of pounds and 
enough food parcels to give the miners and their families a decent Christmas. 
Because of this, for many miners the comradeship and common struggle made the 
Christmas of 1984 probably the most memorable of their lives. 'I have a vision of the 
Miners' Institute being full of sacks of potatoes,' recalls Johnny Stones: 
There were parties for kids at the :Miners' Institute and throughout other places, 
such as clubs, as well. Obviously collections went on and appeals went out to all 
our suppOIters to get toys and money in for it. We had some visits from some 
Germans who brought toys and clothing. Generally it was done on a personal 
basis but also on a collective basis. We had toys, clothing and potatoes; and I 
think we also had turkeys donated as well. IS 
Ray Riley recalls how 'there was a good atmosphere' in the community during 
that Christmas: 
People were skint, but at the end of the day the community seemed to be at peace 
with itself in some ways. A lot of money that was raised was channelled into 
providing something for the kids, which was brilliant ... you went out when you 
could but obviously you'd got to get your priorities right: which was the most 
important, a pint of beer or buying a loaf of bread. So you had to weigh it up at 
times. But yeah, I can remember having a really good Christmas. The community 
pulled together, that was the great thing. You saw how society could be different, 
how people were taking control of their lives and planning and arranging things. 
And that will be what stays in my memory. 16 
What sticks in Gary Hinchliffe's memory is how his mother-in-law, despite the 
hard times, managed to put on a lavish Christmas dinner after his brother-in-law 
invited- home a couple of students he had met on a collecting mission to Lancaster 
University: 
These students thought that they were going to have grass pie for dinner. They 
came through the door: there was salmon, roast beef I looked, I thought: 'Where 
the fuck has she got all this from?' But because she'd got guests, she was putting 
a proper tea on. They'd been living on stew and dumplings for about six or seven 
months. Of course, these two students couldn't believe it. They were going to go 
back and tell the tale that we'd been living on grass pie, instead they had a 
banquet. 17 
The New Year 
Although the NCB's expectations of a post-Christmas surge back to work never 
materialised in early January 1985, their tactic of rolling back the strike at its 
. peripheries was becoming clearly visible. Scabbing in South Yorkshire was spreading 
15 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
16 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
17 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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from neighbouring Notts and North Derbyshire by way of Manton and Shireoaks 
collieries. The strike in the Barnsley Area was proving weakest at its western edge 
in the Calderdale collieries of Emley Moor, Park Mill, Denby Grange, and BullcIiffe 
Wood. Similarly in North Yorkshire where the scabbing campaign centred around 
the Selby complex. 18 In mid-January, though, the strike began to crumble. On 
Monday 21 January the NCB could claim that 593 miners had broken the strike for 
the first time in the strike's Yorkshire heartland. The force of the NCB's strategy of 
concentrating on vulnerable areas was demonstrated with astonishing results at 
Kiveton Park in South Yorkshire where 150 miners went back in an organised 
group. By Friday management at the pit could claim that out ofa total of735 miners 
432 had returned to work. Large numbers also scabbed at Kellingley that week. 
During January as a whole about 10,000 men were reported to have returned to 
work throughout Britain's coalfields.]9 
- The NCB was gaining from an increased feeling of demoralisation among miners, 
even in the most solid pits such as Frick1ey. 'You knew in your heart it was over; but 
at the time you weren't having it,' explains Tony Short.20 Frick1ey craftsman 
Lawrence Gertig had expected a long strike: 
. . . but by that time, because of the tactics employed, there was an air of 
despondence and despair about it. People were short of money, and the kids were 
asking for trungs. And as you can appreciate, it starts to wear a person down 
after a bit. If you can magnify this to the whole of the Yorkshire Area, that's what 
was happening. Plus what was happening with the TUC and everytrung else. 
There was a feeling that it could not last, that it would have to end soon, it was 
going dmvn hill.21 
Until this period Robert Walker had retained some optimism about the strike's 
conclusion: 
It's still there in the back of your head that you've got a chance of winning; but 
just after Christmas they showed you those pits that had been solid, just north of 
Notts, Kiveton, where they were marcrung in. It was propaganda really. But it 
was working; people were believing it. It was mainly the people who hadn't been 
involved. But people were talking about it; after Christmas there were mutterings. 
Before Christmas there had been mutterings, but we'd tried to keep it as solid as 
we could. But after Christmas, when everybody was like super-broke - they 
targeted people who were out of the area, and all these who weren't interested in 
picketing. The mutterings were from them. But the lads were solid. Most of the 
lads who lived in the area were backing the union one hundred per cent. 22 ' 
. 18 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp. 179-180. 
19 Callinicos and Simons, Ine Great Strike, p.197; Goodman, Ine Miners' Strike, 
p.l72. 
20 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
21 Lawrence Gertig, interviewed by the author. 
22 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
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Gary Hinchliffe thought that the satirical television programme ,\'pitting Image 
summed up the situation regarding the strike collapsing: 
There'd be MacGregor going, 'There's one, there's two, it's a flood, it's a flood!' 
And Scargill would be saying, 'There's no men going back to work!' Now you 
didn't believe owt that they told you in the press. You'd learnt by now not to 
believe what they told you. So we were getting told: 'There's only a handful of 
men going in. And even where the men are going in there's no production,' 
which, as it turned out, was so - there was vittually no production going oIT. But 
with the numbers that were going in - it was crumbling. You could see that it was 
going.23 
But some Frickley activists doubted the Coal Board's figures. 'It definitely wasn't 
collapsing,' argues Jeff Johnson: 
Now, at this time a lot of the lads were destitute, you couldn't get dole, and if 
you got any benefits you had the first fifteen quid taken off you, because that was 
deemed the amount of strike pay you were getting. At this point, for most of the 
lads, the only way they could get some brass - because it was winter and you 
couldn't pinch out of the fields, get taties and cabbages and various stuff - was to 
go on the sick. And if you were on the sick you were claiming partial benefits 
from the Coal Board. So they were deemed 'Prepared to work, but not fit.' So 
they went down as working. So that's what artificially massaged the fi!:,'rUres. We 
understood this because we had trade unionists who were working in the DSS, at 
all levels, and so we knew what was going off.24 
Paul Symonds though argues that because the strike dominated the activists' 
lives, and because they wanted to win so badly, they were often reluctant to believe 
the truth about the situation: 
I remember going to a Socialist Workers Party meeting in Kinsley where Tony 
ClifT' was speaking. It was a packed meeting, and Cliff argued about how Scargill 
was able to lead a strike, that Scargill was a brilliant general, but his problem was 
that he didn't know how to retreat. Tills was before Christmas, and Cliff was 
saying that the strike was going down. This was sometillng that you didn't want 
to hear. I remember being angry about this, at somebody telling us that the strike· 
was going down. But tills was one of the things which attracted me to the 
Socialist Workers Party: they were always honest in their assessments; they didn't 
get it right all the time but they were honest. Whereas Militant, and people like 
that, were saying: 'Here we go, just one more push' - willch wasn't the reality of 
the situation. It was far from that. Even though you didn't want to hear that 
things were going badly, it was true. I can appreciate that meeting now, but I 
couldn't at the time.25 
23 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
24 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
25 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
91 
Solid to the end 
An important factor in the strikers' demoralisation was that winter time was not 
bringing forth the power cuts that had been expected by NUM members. The 
February 1984 issue of Ihe A1iner had forecast that the coal stocked at power 
stations would eventually deplete and that power cut& could be expected in July.26 
John Picken thinks that the NUM's forecasts. were essentially correct: 
A Jot of people thought Scargill was wrong about the coal stocks. Arthur always 
said there was a big hole in the middle. But the big hole in the middle was being 
filled by Nottingham coal alone. And it was proven after the strike that tney'd get 
coal from anywhere to keep it going. The strike could have been over for 
November. 27 
. Rut the stark reality was that not a single worker was laid off for lack of 
electricity during the whole of the Big Strike. Further, there were no meetings 
between the miners' representatives and the shop stewards in the power stations 
until 16 January 1985, when the strike was beginning to crumble.28 
The Wintertons, like many other commentators both then and since, arf:,'Ue that 
'the conflict was futile' from the moment it was certain that Nottinghamshire miners 
could not be won over to the strike.29 But such a stance neglects that the 
government's position was not entirely secure either. For example, imported oil to 
the power stations m~ant a bill for the Central Electricity G~nerating Board of some 
£ 1 06. 5 million per week. 30 In 1992 one of Margaret Thatcher's closest political 
associates, Norman Tebbit, confessed that the strike bad been a 'close run thing', 
especially so during the NACODS' affair. In 1994 the CEGD's operations director, 
Frank Ledger, revealed that the energy situation had verged on the 'catastrophic' 
during the autumn, and secret bulletins at the CEGB actually forecast that the miners 
would win by Christmas if extra coal supplies were not transported through the 
miners'- blockade. 31 
Down but not out 
Much of the media began to pronounce the strike as good as over by the end of 
January 1985. However, there was stilI much for the miners still on strike to fight 
for, even if they were heading for defeat. Ray Riley recalls how there was 'an almost 
forlorn attempt to sustain the strike' amongst militant activists: 
A couple of rank-and-file initiatives then came through about militants going 
round knocking on people's doors, trying to get them interested in the strike 
again, get on the picket line. Because obviously the more class-conscious people. 
16. Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.186. 
21 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
28 Cliff, 'Patterns of mass strikes~, p.49. 
29 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.190. 
30 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.157. 
31 Milne, lhe Enemy Within, p.16. 
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involved in the strike could see that it was crumbling. They tried a few initiatives 
but they weren't particularly well received by the local leadership 32 
There were still substantial pockets of miners on strike even in early February, 
demonstrating that though the resistance had weakened, the struggle had not 
collapsed entirely. According to the Financial Times of 6 February 1985, although 
there were 6,272 miners back at work in Yorkshire: 
In the Bamsley pits of Deame Valley, Kinsley Drift, Darfield Main, Grimethorpe 
and Royston Drift at most eight miners are back at each pit, going down to as few 
as two. In the whole of the Doncaster area, only 404 men have returned to 10 
pits, with Frickley, Goldthorpe and Hickleton being among the most solid.33 
Why was Frickley so solid? The Frickley activists have given a number of reasons. 
For John Picken it was because 'everybody was behind it. Everybody knew. ,34 
Johnny Stones puts emphasis on Frickley NUM's operation to counter the NCB's 
attempts to pick off miners outside the locality: 
There were a lot of Frickley employees who lived within a four or five mile 
radius. We had some transferees from Hickleton. What we tried to do was any 
cash to be shared out we would get it across to Thurnscoe because of the 
HickletonlHighgate transferees that had come across in 1982-83. We tried to get 
money out to the kitchens at Fitzwilliam, Hemsworth, Ackworth, Upton, South 
Kirkby, and generally tried to help anybody that we could. It was a combination 
of those two factors; plus the fact that we were tightly picketing the pit and . . . 
the stigma that held people back if they'd to live within the community. 35 
Gary Hurst thought that this threat of being an outcast was a particularly 
important factor in discouraging anybody from breaking ranks: 
You'd got a few lads who were involved in politics and things like that who really 
made their mouths about it. I don't know whether it was fear that stopped a lot 
from going back, but you knew what you were expected to get if you went back, 
I'm sure you did. And I don't mean good hidings or owt like that. I think the lads 
had got more sense than that, to actually bray somebody in the pit yard or in the 
club or somewhere like that. But I think that threat of intimidation, of' Scab' and' 
nobody talking to you, nobody wanting to know your family or anything like that, 
that's got a great deal to do with it, I'm sure. 36 
Jeff Johnson does not share the view that intimidation was the crucial factor in 
keeping Frickley solid - instead he stresses the efficiency of the local strike 
32 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
33 Financial Times, 6 ~February 1985. 
34 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
35 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
36 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
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organisation. Nevertheless he remembers one specific threat, made by a branch 
official as the miners met to discuss the first scabs entering the pit: 
I've never seen a meeting as full, even the meeting to go on strike - and the words 
were: 'If any of you are thinking of going back to work, think again, because 
we've got the lads here who can find out who you are and stop you. ,37 
Ray Riley says that people in the area were 'aware of how they would be 
ostracised and vilified for the rest of their lives should they ever break the strike at 
Frickley.,38 Just what could be expected if anyone broke ranks had been set back in 
1926. The members of the Pretoria Working Men's Club, for instance, had barred all 
strikebreakers from its premises, and the ban had lasted right up until the latest 
dispute! Similarly, 'old timers' from Frickley would tell a macabre tale about a scab 
from 1926 who had been killed by a runaway tub down the pit, of how all of his 
workmates walked past him and refused to pick him up.39 
For Gary Hinchliffe, picketing had been crucial in limiting scabbing: 
I think that if every other pit would have had as many pickets picketing 
throughout the strike as Frickley had, and had as many on duty at the gates when 
the men were going back to work, then the numbers wouldn't have got out of 
hand. Definitely not. 40 
Picketing banned 
Though there was the odd sortie to other pits when the Yorkshire leadership decided 
to hold a token mass picket, for the most part after Christmas picketing was 
restricted to the strikers' own pits. What marked this period for Gary Hinchliffe was 
how an agreement had been reached with the police concerning conduct on the 
Frickley picket line. Henceforth: 
We used to go and stand at the pit gate when they took them in. We used to 
shout abuse at them - you really vent your anger, gave them a noisy reception. 
But as long as there was no violence, and no bricks were thrown, we could push 
as much as we wanted; the police weren't bothered ... Once the vans had gone 
in: you went home; they went. That was it. It dropped into a routine. By the time 
it came to MaI:ch, the police who were there knew all the pickets by their first 
names. 41 
37 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
38 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
39 Frickley NUM pamphlet, Commemorative Concert to Honour Our Women for 
the Role They Played in our Historic Struggle, (South Elmsall, March 1986), p.7; 
See also L. Gritnths, B. Lewis and R. Schuhle (eds) Privy to Privatisation, 
(Castleford, 1988), p.67. 
40 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
41 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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Throughout the dispute all the striking NUM Areas had consistently disobeyed 
court rulings. However, when a High Court ruling declared mass picketing illegal at 
eleven Yorkshire pits on ]2 February, the Yorkshire Area agreed to comply. And 
just to prove its intent, disbanded the Area Strike Co-ordinating Committee. 42 
Frickley was one of the pits on the list. 'They left all of this until the back end of the 
strike, leaving it to a few individual scabs to bring out injunctions,' recalls Paul 
Symonds: 
I think Ginty Carr was named on one of the irtiunctions ... a scab - who wasn't 
even living in the village - and he and a judge had decided that we were no longer 
going to be able to picket our pit. A lot of us just went mad over this; being told 
by a scab and a judge, that we couldn't even picket our own pit. Of course the 
union said that we weren't able to do anything because they would seize the 
. union's funds. 43 
With the exception of the Frickley branch officials, the general mood among the 
Frickley miners was to disobey the ruling. 'I think that we fully expected Bamsley to 
say, "Stick it," after all this time,' remembers Steve Gant: 
But they didn't. Directives came through to each pit that you had to limit 
picketing. We said that you might as well not send anybody at all and just give 
them a green light. All you were going to do by that was increase scabbing. This 
was all argued at the meeting. The officials lost on that one. They were saying, 
'There's nowt we can do about it. Bamsley are telling us that we've got to limit 
it.' It wasn't just the militants who argued against that. It upset more or less 
everybody. It was doing no good at all. You were more or less just giving the 
scabs a green light. With no picket on, instead of sixteen scabs, it would increase 
to thirty or forty.44 
Because the Frickley miners intended to maintain the right to picket their own pit, 
a demonstration and mass picket was hastily organised for 19 February, when 500 
miners and their families marched through the streets of Moorthorpe and South 
Elmsall to their picket line. 'That was organised unofficially by me and Jip, and the 
lads on the ground, such as Gaz Hinchliffe,' says Steve Gant: 
We got some leaflets knocked up. We argued for the banner. The union said that' 
we couldn't have the banner because it would make it official ifit was seen near a 
picket line. They said it would put them in the shit. The law would say that it had 
been organised by the officials, and so they would serve this injunction. We got 
hold of the banner, it was supposed to be handed back in at Weston Hall. The' 
union officials were waiting there to take it off us. But I think that the banner 
42 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.215. 
43 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
44 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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went up all the way ... It was a good little demo. Everybody was there, women, 
kids, the lot. It paid off.45 
It was enthusiasm and determination such as this that the NUM needed to tap into 
if it was to retain something from the strike. Instead, the superior influence of the 
Yorkshire NUM leadership led to the branch reversing its earlier decision and 
accepting the court's ruling 'under protest' .46 
No settlement 
February 1985 was marked by the government and the NUM manoeuvring so as to 
determine the strike's outcome. The government hoped to see the dispute resolved 
without the union being able to claim anything resembling a victory. But, faced with 
the government'S intransigence, a campaign began to emerge among a 'soft left' 
current of NUM officials, the most prominent being Kim Howells, the South Wales 
NUM research officer, with the aim of returning to work without a settlement. 
Arthur Scargill dismissed the whole idea as a 'complete fantasy'.47 Superficially at 
least, the soft left's proposition seemed attractive because it promised to stem the 
flood of strikebreaking and avoided the need to sign a humiliating deal with the 
government. 48 But many strike activists felt that such a return would mean 
abandoning the hundreds of miners who had been sacked during the course of the 
dispute. 'We'd said this at the beginning of the strike, that we were all coming out 
on strike together, and that we were all going back together,' argues Paul Symonds, 
who thought that the issue of the sacked miners should have been used as a 
'fall-back position' in the last weeks: 
If we'd have said that we now concede the argument over pit closures, we want 
to go back to work, but we are not going back unless we all go back, that would 
have done enough to stop the scabbing. I think that a lot of people were going 
back because they thought it was over, there was no end in sight - I'm not making 
excuses for them, but I'm sure that a lot of people thought that we were fighting 
a losing battle, and then by going back to work were hoping to bring about the 
end of the dispute. 49 
When talks between the TUC and the government collapsed, the return to work 
accelerated and many prominent NUM officials were now ready to surrender. 
According to the NCB, a record number of miners went back to work on Monday' 
25 February. By Friday, the Board were claiming that 5 per cent of the NUM's 
membership had returned that week alone. 50 Over the following days the pressure 
for a return to work snowballed as the Area councils of South Wales, Durham, 
Lancashire, and Northumberland voted to end the strike. In Yorkshire the decision 
-45 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
46 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.216. 
47 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., pp.206-207. 
48 Ibid., p.213; Mllne, op. cit., p.270. 
49 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
50 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.200. 
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to stay out was close. The Yorkshire Area Council voted by 42 to 22 to stay out but 
after consulting branches voted by 38 to 31 to go back. This decision, however, was 
then reversed by a card vote of 571 to 561 resolving to stay out until an amnesty 
was reached. 51 Johnny Stones, being the Frickley delegate, was mandated to put the 
Frickley miners' view forward at these meetings: 
We at Frickley, and I use it collectively, were willing to keep going. I didn't want 
to go back when we did go back. I was in a strong position. There were others 
where they were leaking in fast, your Mantons in Yorkshire, who were 90 per 
cent back. That rump of pits through Doncaster and into Barnsley Area were 
strong. But the numbers that were going back at collieries in Yorkshire narrowly 
swayed the balance at the end of the day.52 
By now the forces ranged against staying out had become too great, and the 
decision to end the historic strike - at twelve months the longest mass strike in 
British trade union history - was finally passed at a special national delegate 
conference of the NUM held at Congress House, the headquarters of the TUC, on 
Sunday 3 March. By 98 votes to 91, the South Wales resolution, for a return to 
work on the following Tuesday and for negotiations for an amnesty for sacked 
miners, was carried. 53 
But for having sprained his ankle, Tony Short would have been lobbying the 
special conference with his friends at this historic moment. Instead: 
I was on Minsthorpe fields watching the Pretoria football team playing, and 
somebody came over and said, 'It's just been on the wireless that the strike's 
over.' I said, 'No!' This kid had a transistor radio, so the game stopped and 
everybody came over to listen to it. It was strange. You knew that it was over by 
then; it was as good as dead. I can remember going out that night, there were a 
lot df people crying, which you didn't expect. A lot of people were devastated. I 
don't know if I was relieved or what. Don't forget that every day was like a 
Saturday. But you were living on tenterhooks. I bet I didn't weigh ten stone. You 
were running here, there and everywhere. I was glad that it was all over in that I 
didn't want it to get any more embarrassing with more going back to work, but I 
didn't agree with that 'marching back to work with dignity'. I thought that was 
utter garbage. 54 
Though Ray Riley was disappointed at having to return to work without an 
amnesty for the sacked miners, ultimately he did not see the strike's conclusion as a 
sell-out by the NUM leadership: 
The Trades Union Congress had washed their hands of us and we'd become a 
massive embarrassment to Kinnock. Our own members were going back to work, 
51 Goodman, op. cit., p.191; Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp.205-206. 
52 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
53 Callinicos and Simons, op. cit., p.219. 
54 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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there's no doubt about that. I don't think it was a sell out. It was very 
unpalatable, and it was definitely a hard pilI to swallow, but our options were very 
limited, We were sort of boxed into a comer, I think a lot of people were 
prepared to stay out on strike until the year2000 if need be, but 1 don't think 
there was a sell out at the end ... I don't think it was in the mind of Scargill to 
sell the strike out. It's not going to. go down in trade union history as a massive 
sell out.55 
Steve Gant remembers how, 'There were a lot of lads who had the attitude that 
we could stick it out fOf ever, "Fuck 'em, we'll not go back.'" But many activists . 
knew they had lost: 
It took some admitting; and you had to be careful who you said it to. But the lads 
-who had been politicised knew this. So we started to argue that if we go back, 
and it's going down to defeat, let's try to get something out of it, like the 
reinstatement of all the sacked miners. We called meetings at places like Kinsley 
and Hemsworth, and they were well attended. It got a good response: 'OK, the 
strike is over, we'll go back, but don't go back routed, with our heads down.'56 
Significantly, right to the end the strike held solid in the heart of the Yorkshire 
coalfield. Just eighteen per cent of Yorkshire miners had crossed picket lines on the 
eve of the formal return to work on Tuesday 5 March 1985. And most of these had 
done so only in the final week. A mere seven per cent had gone back in the 
Doncaster Area. 57 
Although the outcome of the strike was far from what the strikers had anticipated 
twelve months earlier, everywhere their struggle had been an outstanding display of 
resistance; especially with the failure of the upper reaches of the labour movement to 
provide any meaningful solidarity action. If there was one thing that the miners' 
strike had shown, it was that people change in struggle. As one writer has noted: 
'The minds of thousands of young miners were "blown" by the experience of 
struggle in much the way that the minds of thousands of students had been in 
1968.,58 Long-held prejudices and sectionalism had been broken down, and workers 
who had previously played little part in NUM politics had become active in a way 
they had never imagined before. At Frickley, self-activity had become the norm. The 
battles to prevent the first scabs into the pit, and the defiance of the judges in 
February 1985, had been organised at rank-and-file level, with the moderate branch' 
leaders shoved into the background. Now it would be the duty of the politiciscd 
minority to ensure that the radicalisation of their workmates did not tum to despair. 
The miners had been defeated; but what kind of defeat had yet to be decided. One 
thing was sure: life in the pits promised to be much different from what it had been· 
twelve months earlier. 
55 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
56 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
57 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.201. 
58 Harman, The Fire Last Time, p.368. 
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The march back 
The miners at Frickley Colliery actually marched back on Wednesday 6 March, the 
day after most of the others. Starting at the Miners' Institute in Moorthorpe, and led 
by Frickley Colliery Band, the procession marched into South Ehnsall and then 
headed up Westfield Lane towards the pit. I Frickley NUM branch president Keith 
Proverbs describes the scene in a letter published later: 
About 2,000 people marched through the village to the colliery. I felt very proud 
to lead the march but it was very emotional. Women and children stood clapping 
us with tears running down their faces. 2 
There was, however, still a final twist to this part of the story. Still very much at 
issue was the question of the sacked rruners. Scottish NUM delegates narrowly 
voted to stay on strike until an amnesty had been agreed, and there was a near 
unanimous vote among the 2,000 Kent miners to continue the strike. In Yorkshire, 
Armthorpe and Hatfield NUM branches also voted to stay out. 3 As a consequence, 
many processions back to work were greeted by representatives from Kent, 
Armthorpe or Hatfield as well as local sacked miners, as Ray Riley found out on the 
march back to Frickley Colliery: 
. . . we were virtually in the pit yard and we were met by Male Tulley waving a 
letter and shouting, 'Look what they've fucking done, look what they've done!' 
And they'd sacked him on the day we were due to march back to work.4 
Gary Hinchliffe, being one of the 11,3125 people who had been arrested during 
the strike, now feared that he too faced the sack: 'A couple of lads had got sacking 
letters on the morning that we were going back. I thought: "Fucking hell, I bet I've 
got one!" And then somebody said, "Aye, and the Kent rruners are here.'" He recalls 
that Frickley branch delegate Johnny Stones went over to talk to the rruners who had 
congregated outside the pit entrance: 
And I remember Johnny saying: 'Well, I don't cross picket lines.' All of a sudden 
there was nobody left to push this banner back down the hill. So we had to turn 
the banner round and push it back. Some of the men were arguing with them. • 
They were silly arguments such as: 'We rrught as well have somebody from 
Elmsall market come and put a picket line on.' We were saying: 'These lads are 
from Kent. We went down there twelve months ago and asked them to come out. 
of work and support us.' There were about forty men sacked down there for 
i Rusiecki, The Plough and the Pick, p.222. 
2 Cited in Samuel et a!., The Enemy Within, p.148. 
3 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p.206. 
4 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
5 1. Percy-Smith and P. Hillyard, 'Miners in the arms of the law: a statistical 
analysis', Journal (?tLaw and Society, Vol. ]2, No.3, Winter 1985, p.345. 
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having a sit-in at a pit. All their Area leaders were sacked, and all their branch 
officials at the three pits that they'd got open. And they didn't want us to go back 
to work until it was resolved. They didn't want men left; sacked while other men 
were retumiog to work, So aoyway> we pushed the banner down. Nobody 
crossed. Nobody went into work.6 
It was a scene repeated in many parts of the Yorkshire coalfield. The sackings 
were evidence of ho.w the NCB intended to operate in. the future. At Ledston Luck, \ 
Cadeby and Kilnhurst collieries, and at NCB workshops at Carcroft and Birdwell, 
NUM members were locked out merely because the umon's march back to work at \ 
9.00am did not coincide with regular shift time. Miners at Hickleton voted to remain 
on strike tor the remainder of the week over a new shift system that was being 
imposed, white at Manton, where over half the workforce had actually gone back 
before the end, as many as ninety per cent came out for a further week in protest at 
suspensions and sackings. At the end of the first day of the official return to work 
there were still 25,000 miners on strike in Yorkshire and some 36,000 nationally? 
At the end of the second day back, only a handful Yorkshire pits remained out. 
But after the Yorkshire NUM leadership issued instructions that the Kent picket 
lines were unofficial, the Frickley the branch officials asked the Kent miners to 
withdraw their picket line. And so the decision to return to work was finally made at 
a mass meeting at Frickley Athletic's football ground held on Thursday at noon.8 
Gary Hinchliffe describes what happened: 
Something had happened and these Kent miners had heen pulled off. But we still 
weren't going back to work; not until they'd lifted these sacking notices that 
they've given out. It was a big meeting on the football field. Keith Proverbs 
ram-roaded it through. If it had gone to a vote not to go to work, we wouldn't 
have gone to- work. But they were crafty. There were pleas from Arthur Scargill, 
and Jack Taylor and the Yorkshire Area: 'We've organised a return to work; it is 
going to look silly if the men don't go back. You can't stop out on your own.' So 
we had it passed, by a show of hands, fifty pence per man for these sacked lads, 
to make sure that they didn't lose out ... So, as we saw it, all that Proverbs had 
managed to do was pre-empt the ballot - which we thought was going to get 
passed anyway - to get the men back to work. This seemed to pacifY everybody -
barring those who were sacked. 9 
By the following Monday the strike was also over in Kent and Scotland, where 
miners decided to return to work without an amnesty after considering the scale of 
the return elsewhere. 10 
6 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
7 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp.206-207. 
8 Hemsworlh and ;.)'outh Elmsall Express, 14 March 1985.· 
~ Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
to Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.207. 
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The first shifts back 
Though many miners, considering the hardship, were glad to be returning to work, 
for the strike activists it was a depressing time. Below, Ian Oxley describes his first 
shift back at Frickley: 
There were no boilers lit, the boilers were out - the management deliberately kept 
them out. My first shift was on afters. It was a very cold day. I was with the lads 
who I'd been picketing with, Martin Leaf, Kevin Leaf, various other lads. I was in 
good company. And I physically, and mentally, was sick. I did not like being at 
work, because the workplace was cold, quiet, and I felt like a scab - because they 
didn't allow all the men to return to work. I'm an electrician, they allowed what 
they classed as 'safety men' to work, to get the pit ready for the rest. Even 
though the strike was over, not everybody went to work on that tirst shift. The 
. Coal Board put the boot in. They said: 'No, it's not ready for work for 
everybody, you'll have to go home. You'll not get paid until we say it's ready for 
you.' So the fitters had to check and strip and rebuild the boilers and things like 
that. We had to check and strip the winders etc. But what I remember most about 
it is - I can only put it down to depression and the problems of how sick I felt on 
that first day - I actually physically shit my trousers in that shift. I felt that much 
like a rat, being back at work. That is the worst day of my working life, that first 
day back to work. Nothing physically was said or done to me by the management. 
But I felt defeated, crushed, and I felt like a scab. I didn't want to be at that pit.}} 
He recalls that some of the machinery at the pit was not in working order because 
of the sabotage carried out during the strike: 
1 know a group of lads that went into Frickley Colliery and put sand in all the 
gear boxes and in as many places that they could find. Certainly they put it in the 
spare fan, and in all the gear boxes in the washer. That was done so that if the 
scabs got to such a number, the moment that they tried to run the washer, the 
washer and the gear box would seize. And hopefully they'd have no fitters 
scabbing, so the job would stop anyway. But when the pit got back to work, one 
by one, the gear boxes failed. I counted up to 28 gear boxes, including the spare 
fan bearings. 12 
Robert Walker also remembers the depression he felt on his first days back at' 
work. 'It was terrible,' he says, 'everybody was just down in the dumps moaning.' 
Rather than producing coal, most men were involved in a clean-up operation. He 
volunteered to work in the Little Pit, the Cudworth seam: 
One of the gaffers came on the face. Everybody was still down in the dumps, so 
they were just slow-timing a bit. The gaffer says: 'I thought you would have been 
wanting to earn money now that you are here, having been on strike for a year.' 
And one of the lads turns round and says: 'We're on a hundred pounds a week 
11 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
12 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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pay rise now because we were getting fuck all. We're getting £100 a week basic 
pay and we're happy with that.' The manager fucked off out of the way. 13 
The sacked miners' ballot 
In total, there were as many as 1,014 miners sacked by the NCB for their activities 
during or immediately after the 1984-85 dispute. 318 Yorkshire miners had been 
dismissed. On 4 March 1985 the Board made it known that they were ready to take 
just 67 miners back; ones who were guilty of only minor offences. 14 MacGregor's 
position was clear. In mid-March 1985 he told a House of Commons employment 
committee that though reinstatement was left to each Area and that each case would 
be considered on an individual basis, any miner convicted of serious acts of violence, 
intimidation, or vandalism could not expect to get his job back. Although many 
miners were subsequently to be acquitted in court, even this proved to be no 
guarantee of being reinstated. 15 
Sacked miners faced the possibility of extreme hardship; therefore between 20 
and 22 March the NUM conducted a ballot of its membership about whether a 
weeldy 50p levy should be held to support those who had been sacked. The result 
was a stunning blow to the militants. Only forty-six per cent of those balloted 
decided in favour of implementing the levy, moreover, the Notts, South Derbyshire 
and Leicestershire Areas boycotted the proceedings. NUM general secretary Peter 
Heathfield suggested that there was a feeling in the coalfields that establishing a 
compulsory levy 'could be misinterpreted by the government and the NCB as a sign 
that the union was prepared to back down on the crucial issue of reinstatement for 
those who had been dismissed.' 16 But Heathfield's comments could not hide the fact 
that the union stood accused of not mounting a serious campaign in order to get its 
message over to the rank and file. 17 Gary Hinchliffe was one of the critics: 
It was a disb'Usting time to be a union activist; I was ashamed of the NUM. We 
went to one meeting; it had been passed at a conference to spend £360,000 on 
new cars for the full-time officials. It was sickening. And you'd got to justifY why 
you couldn't organise a proper campaign to get fifty pence per man stopped out 
of their wages ... I couldn't believe that they could vote and do this stupid trick. 
How the national press didn't get hold of it, I don't know. You didn't want to go 
against your union and condemn it, but how could you justifY it. They showed 
you how to organise a ballot six or so months later over the political levy. There 
were thousands spent on maintaining the political levy to the Labour Party. That's 
how to organise a ballot. ] 8 
13 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
14 P. Gibbon and R. Bromley, "'From an institution to a business"? Changes in the 
British coal industry 1985-9', /<7conomy and Society, Vol. 19, No.1, 1990, p.76; 
Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.21O. 
15 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.211. 
16 Ihe Guardian, 27 March 1985. 
17 The Guardian, 27 March 1985. 
18 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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If most miners accepted the arguments put in the press about the sacked miners 
not deserving support, at least things were better in the Yorkshire heartland of the 
union and showed what could have been achieved if a good campaign had been 
mounted on the sacking issue. Overall in Yorkshire the vote was 54 per cent in 
favour of a levy. At some pits the support was particularly high - at Goldthorpe it 
was 90.1 per cent in favour, and at both Fryston and Hickleton it was 85 per cent. At 
Frickley 903 out of 1,077 miners, 83.8 per cent, voted for the levy.]9 'There was 
demoralisation on a large scale,' says Paul Symonds, 'but we went back defiant. And 
I think that mood of defiance fed into the ballot. That's why I would argue that there 
was such a discrepancy between Frickley's result and the other pits' results. ,20 
The loss of the vote did not necessarily mean that nothing could be done about 
the sacked miners in the better organised pits. By this time a branch levy had already 
been initiated at Frickley, but the branch had to hoodwink the Coal Board to get this 
in place, as Johnny Stones explains: 
... we couldn't present it as a levy for sacked miners because they wouldn't 
have stopped it. So what we had to do was increase our pit inspection levy -
which was 4 or 5p - and we were going to up it and split it between the sacked 
lads and the pit inspection. This was another source where pit officials could get 
about the pit, by making safety inspections. They [the members at a general 
meeting] overturned our recommendation for - I think it was for a 20p increase -
and came in with £1 to be split 50/50, so that we had a 50p levy of approximately 
1, I 00 men. And we paid our sacked lads in the region of £100 a week.21 
There were other means of helping sacked miners while the branch fought to get 
their jobs back, as Ray Riley recalls: 
. . . the pit shop was a shop where the lads could go in and buy things and have it 
stopped 'out of their wages over a ten-week period. And two or three of the 
sacked miners used to go in there and help out. So they were keeping in daily 
contact with the branch and rank-and-file members.22 
In the coming months the NUM leadership campaigned for an amnesty for the 
sacked miners. Later in the year, at the TUe and Labour conferences, despite the 
opposition of both the TUe General Council and Neil Kinnock, NUM resolutions 
demanding that a future Labour government should pardon sacked miners received 
majorities. In the final analysis, though, these resolutions proved worthless, and it 
was at pit level that any real progress towards getting jobs back for sacked miners 
would occur. 23 Below, Jeff Johnson reflects on what this entailed at Frickley: 
19 Yorkshire Miner, May 1985. 
20 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
21 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
22 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
23 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp.213-214. 
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... there were about fourteen to start with. But we kept our lads right, And we 
were able to get people back to work by having to do back-door deals. If we'd 
agree to this, they would let us have a sacked miner back. It was us that suffered 
but we got one of our mates back, so we actually thought we'd won something -
for me we had, any\vay ... Slowly, slowly, we got most back.24 
Face to face with the scabs 
One of the first issues that concerned the strikers at Frickley on their return to work 
was the matter of those miners who had broken ranks. There was no mercy shown 
towards them. Prominent scabs such as Ginty Carr never came back to the pit again. 
The rest had to be winkled out. Gary Hurst remembers two of the scabs who were 
uncovered: 
... there was a bloke called Ken Shepherd, he was a well-known person down 
Cudworth seam where I worked. He used to play in the band. I can remember it 
coming out that he'd scabbed. And he was actually working with us after the 
strike - but we hadn't a clue. It must only have been a matter of a couple of 
weeks when we found out he'd scabbed. I remember being told that they gave 
him a right time on the ramp, queuing up to get out of the pit, spitting at him and 
calling him scab and all things like that. He never came any more. I can remember 
another one, Dennis Seats from Doncaster. I don't know if he scabbed to this 
day, because I've never seen him since two days after we started back after the 
strike on afters. Now, I used to work with Dennis, in the 69s heading they used to 
call it. He was a heading man and I was the fitter. And we are all talking around 
the shaft side waiting to go down the pit on afters one day, and somebody, off the 
top of their head, said, 'Where have you been all the strike Dennis. We haven't 
seen you picketing or owt like that?' He just went right sheepish, never said 
anything, except, 'I was making my own way.' And you never saw him again 
after that day. But 1 don't know to this day ifhe's a scab, nobody ever said: 'Aye, 
he was a scab: or 'We've found out that he was a scab.' But he never came to 
the pit again after that day. 25 
Although the penalty for shouting abuse at a scab, or even just mentioning the 
word 'scab' was instant dismissal, this never deterred those who had endured the 
strike to the end from chastising their detested workmates. Some of the first scabs to 
be discovered would have a deputy assigned to look after them. Later, such 
individuals were gathered in teams and made to perform tasks in isolation from the 
rest of the workforce. Gary Hinchliffe remembers one incident after a management 
trainee was given the job of supervising a group of strikebreakers: 
He'd done his university degree and everything, and he was assigned to look after 
four or-five other men who'd come in during the strike, who we knew about. And 
he was stood on the pit top with them, underneath where we used to ride the 
shaft at Number 3s. They were spotted hiding down there. They must've been 
24 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
25 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
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told to get out of the way when the men were there, and to do a bit of cleaning up 
when they weren't. Anyway, they were spotted. And there was a big tub of chock 
wood, and the men got these really big pieces. of wood and started chucking.. them 
down onto them. Tbis. man in charge of them, screamed up, and so everybody 
stopped. Everybody thought that there was going to be a big inquiry over this, 
that he'd go and report it to the management. They'd want to. know who was at 
the shaft side, who saw what. But there was nothing done about it. They didn't 
come in anymore, these men; they took their redundancy money.26 
We- have see already how during the strike the branch was able to get information . 
about strikebreakers from sympathetic members of management and office staff. But 
this intormat~on was no longer forthcoming, as Gary Hinchliffe explains: 
Throughout the next few months the union was supposed to be getting 
information from the people who worked in the time office. Once they got into 
everybody's wages, seen how much they'd earned in the past year, they'd know 
who had corne to work . . . we left it a month, and then kept pressing the branch 
to press these people in the wages office. But I think that they'd been warned that 
they weren't going to refer anything, that it was going to cause trouble. They 
didn't want it on their consciences if anything went off.27 
But the lack of exact information about possible strikebreakers only increased the 
uncertainty and the suspicion amongst the miners. 'We never found out about a lot 
of them,' says Robert Walker: . 
There was nobody gave you a list of names; which really was wrong, because 
there were people who were getting accused of it. It was a bit upsetting for them, 
I suppose, if you hadn't seen them for a bit. I think the gaffers put the word 
around to cause a bit of animosity. 28 
'There were toads of men who were getting accused,' recoHects Tony Short,. 
'loads and toads. >- But: 
they always covered themselves. You had got to be 150 per cent sure when you 
accused somebody of that. You had only got to mention somebody just after the 
strike and their windows would be put through. Mick Proverb had a scab living 
next door. His house was done that many times that Mick knocked a post in his 
own garden with a post saying, 'Scab lives there,' so that he didn't get his 
windows done. 29 
Every so often the identities of strikebreakers would come to light. 'Whenever it 
was rumoured that there was a name coming out,' says Gary Hinchliffe, 'these same 
26 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
27 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
28 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
29' Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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people would stop coming to work. There was one bloke used to work in the 
headings, "Tony Tunneller", he ducked out and went to live down Nottingham.' One 
unexpected source of information about who had scabbed was Kenneth Shepherd, 
one of the first !Xcabs to have been urunasked: 
. . . when he left he took a stall on Barnsley market. Some of the lads saw him; 
and then the union officials went and spoke to him. He was supposed to be giving 
the names of people who went in. They used to go through and ask him: 'Look, 
we've got so-and-so given to us, was he on that bus when you were going in?' 
He'd say 'yea' or 'nay'. The one who had moved to Nottingham, they went and ' 
asked over him. He said 'Yes, he was.' But there were one or two who we have 
found out about since who he said hadn't. 3()' 
Though the most notorious strikebreaker at Frickley Colliery, Ginty Carr, was 
never seen at the pit again after the strike, Robert Walker recalls that one group of 
Frickley miners did come across him quite unexpectedly: 
Ronnie Cutts was saying that after the strike they all went to Scarborough with 
the IIariequin Club. Two or three bus loads went. They'd just got off the buses, 
he says: 'I was just walking down the front at Scarborough, and I heard Melv 
Wall shout: "You scabbing bastard.'" He said,. 'And when we all turned round, 
there's Ginty Carr running up the front.' SQ everybody dropped their kids and , 
wives and went after him. All the. Frickley miners. are chasing him up the 
promcnad~ throwing things at him;. he's got fishing tackle on his back. He 
jumped in this boat and this bloke's rowing like fuck to get out to sea with him. 3 ) 
Though the desire to root out the miners who had broken ranks probably lasted 
until the pit closed, the early level of resentment faded as new problems arose. 
'There'd been a lot of sitting about and talking, and doing jobs that weren't owt to 
do with production,' says Gary Hincliffe: 
It was a case of 'idle minds cause idle gossip~. But as soon as the pit got back 
under way, and they were seriously involved in production, and doing driveages, 
and fetching faces back, supplying headings and what have you, men didn't have .-
the time to sit about and discuss this thing. It was put on the back boiler. It was 
still a topic, but the names weren't coming out and being disproved and 
un-disproved as regular as what they had been.32 
Prospects 
The main issue facing miners as they returned to work was about what kind of 
industrY and what kind ofworking environment they would have to endure following 
their union',& defeat. Some indication was given not long after the return when the 
Coal Industry Act was rushed through parliament, with the insistence that the NCB 
30 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
31 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
32 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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must operate without a subsidy by 1987-88. There were other early signs of what lay 
ahead. By mid-July 1985 twenty pit closures had been announced since the strike 
was called off, A few of these were in the older parts of the Yorkshire coalfield,. but 
most were located in the North East, ScotLand and, South Wales. By this time there. , 
were some 14,000 fewer workers in the industry than there had been at the start of ' 
the strike. Moreover, the figure was changing daily as older or disgruntled miners ' 
rushed to claim their redundancy cheques.33 
In the months following the strike, the NCB revealed little of their plans for the 
future. But most forecasters envisaged a future dominated by job losses and 
closures. During the dispute the economists Gavyn Davies and David Metcalf had 
offered what they saw as a compromise between the positions of the NUM and the 
NCB: the industry should shed between 50 to 60 pits in the following decade. The 
Davies-Metcalfreport - which was hardly comforting for the miners - was thought 
to be appealing to the Labour Party leadership. A report by Bill Robinson of the 
London School of Economics had forecast in December 1984 that the Coal Board 
would have to function with as few as 138,000 miners by the end of 1985 if the 
industry was to break even by 1987-88. Jonathan Winterton., a lecturer at the 
University of Bradford and an adviser to the NUM, in a report published just after 
the strike, calculated that allowing for pit closures and the introduction of new 
technology into the mines that remained, there could be just 76,000 miners by 1990. 
Other reports noted factors such as how four new nuclear power stations were due 
to start producing electricity and that each would destroy between 6,000 to 7,,000 
mining jobs, and in addition, cheap electricity from French nuclear power stations . 
was soon to be added to the national grid by means of a new underwater link. Also, 
the further decline of manufacturing, enerh'Y conservation policies, and the predicted . 
saturation of the world coal markets by coal mines opened in South Africa, South . 
America and Australia, were all perceived as playing a part in the decline of British 
coal mining.34 Moreover, somewhere in the future lay the prospect of the 
privatisation of whatever remained of the coal industry. 
Despite the obvious direction of the NCB's industrial relations strategy under 
MacGregor, some NUM officials still clung to the hope that they played an 
indispensable role in the industry. For instance, during the strike Jack Taylor had 
boasted to Marxism Today that the Coal Board needed the NUM: "The one thing 
they can't do is run a successful coal industry on their own. '35 
But with the miners' defeat, one thing now seemed plain: the coal industry would 
be run with as little interference from the NUM as was possible. The whole 
argument of the Thatcherite wing of the Conservative Party had been that 
management ought to control production without any concessions to the trade union 
bureaucracy. In their view the whole array of consultation and review procedures 
that had become established on the industrial relations front were an obstacle to 
revitalising British capitalism. This philosophy, it was hoped, could now' be 
33 D. Thomas, 'Paying the price of coal', New Society, 12 July 1985, pp.49-50; 
34 G. Davies and D. Metcalf, Pit Closures, (London, 1984); Lloyd, Understanding 
the Miners' Strike; B. Robinson, 'How large a coal industry?, Economic Outlook, 
December 1984; Thomas, op. cit., pp.50-51 
35 Marxism Today, October 1984. 
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consolidated in the coal industry with the defeat of the NUM. David Hart, who, as 
we have already noted, had the ear of both Thatcher and MacGregor, had no doubts 
about what was required. On 12 April 1985 he told the readers of The Times that the 
employers had won a great victory and should not let it slip away. For Hart, the main 
issue of the strike had been whether the NCB had the ultimate right to manage the 
coal industry. He warned MacGregor not to surrender this fundamental principle 
now that the strike was over. 36 
MacGregor had already made it quite plain just what kind of working 
environment miners could now expect. In an interview in the Sunday Telegraph on 
10 March, he said: 'People are now discovering the price of insubordination and 
insurrection. And, boy, are we going to make it stick. ,37 Of course this was not the 
end of any CQntact with the NUM and especially as a substantial section of the 
union's leadership were willing to talk with the Board at any price. The NCB made 
it known that a precondition for any talks with the NUM would be the ending of the 
overtime ban which had preceded the strike. Consequently, on 2 April a special 
delegate conference of the union, with the recommendation of the NEC, voted to lift 
the ban. Talks took place soon after, but it was all too clear that the NCB had one 
intention: to humiliate the union. On 19 April agreement was reached on pay claims 
that were outstanding from 1983 and 1984. Miners were awarded two rises of 5.2 
per cent on grade rates. But to say that this was a result of negotiations is to 
overstate matters. The Coal Board simply imposed on the NUM the wage rates it 
had already agreed with the deputies' union. 38 
The attack on custom and practice 
In line with the attack on the union at national level, activists had been expecting 
local management to go onto the offensive at pit level. But this appears not to have 
happened at Frickley immediately, as John Picken remembers: 
... there was like a cooling off period. I expected the big stick in the first shift 
but it didn't come. But they must've been to their head-shrinking school to 
analyse how to work us, and how not to. Gradually, as things moved on, things 
got harder. 39 
Steve Gant recalls much the same. 
The deputies didn't dare say a word. They didn't want to upset anybody. They 
lived in the same village, they knew they had shit on you, they couldn't hold their 
heads up. They had been paid throughout the strike, the last thing they were 
going to do was start finding you work and threatening you. That was left to 
certain overmen, higher-level management who you expected it off It was like a 
holiday camp, but it was depressing, you'd lost, and it took a week or two to get 
it out of your system, to get back to normality . . . We were hearing from other 
36 The Times, 12 April 1985 .. 
37 Cited in Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp.216-217. 
38 Gibbon and Bromley, op. cit., p.76; Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.217. 
39 John Picken, interviewed by the author. . 
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pits that they were stamping their authority straight away. But at Frickley, we 
were regarded as a militant pit, and they seemed to be a bit steady with us did the 
management. It took time ... There was a feeling that it might blow again.40 
But before long, the assault on the NUM at national level became more obvious. 
The Coal Board's Doncaster Area director Albert Tuke in particular soon earned a 
reputation as an enthusiast for the post-strike hard line. Under his authority pit 
managers in Doncaster tried to claw back on custom and practice that had been won 
by generations of miners. Johnny Stones tells of a story he came across which sums 
up management's intentions: 
... the Area. director had all the colliery managers in and asked: 'If you had two 
wishes what would you wishT Some said, 'All branch officials back down the 
pit.' Some said various things: shift changes, shift time changes; things that had 
been stumbling blocks prior to the strike or they hated at their pit. And these were 
implemented upon the branches and the members when they went back to work. 
Ours was a shift change time, I believe, over which we had a mass meeting; and 
by a sleight-of-hand chairmanship, averted a strike. There was also the 
reinstatement of sacked lads. That became a problem for other branches as wel1.41 
The Wintertons have noted that immediately after the 1984-85 miners' strike, 
senior NCB officials who still sought a more conciliatory approach to industrial 
relations within the coal industry were either forced into early retirement or replaced 
in a management reshuffle.42 Ray Riley was one of a number of Frickley activists 
who observed there was a similar process taking place at pit level: 
One of the most notable things that happened was - and I heard the same from 
miners at other pits while I was on the trade union course at Leeds University - a 
new, younger, aggressive breed of management were brought in to replace those 
who shared an empathy with the miners, these who came through the ranks to 
achieve their positions. And that was very noticeable. There was a menacing 
atmosphere after the strike. You had to watch your P's and Q's, to be quite 
honest. You had to be careful not to step out of line because management were 
so confident that they would have sacked you because union organisation then 
was sort of splintered and very weak as a result oflosing the strike.43 
In this kind of environment, the miners were to find that management could be 
intransigent about almost everything now. Robert Walker remembers how 
management started to lay down the law on matters that had previously been left to 
the discr~tion of the colliers: 
40 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
41 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
42 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., pp.216-217. 
43 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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Before the strike it would've been: 'Ob, I think that we should put timber up.' 
Even stupid things like that needed doing. If they said it didn't, you had to rag up. 
I've known it where they've said, 'Dh, it doesn't need timber.' We'd say: 'Fuck 
that,' and put the timber up. Then they would put you in the book and stop your 
time - and you were in the right. That's how it was getting. They were screwing 
down on you. Their word was law, instead of talking about it and sorting it out 
that way.44 
Established working practices were an obvious target for management,45 as Ian 
Oxley points out: 
Bit by bit, we soon realised that management knew how great a victory they'd 
got: they just took every concession. 'Custom and practice' is the term that trade 
unions use. As a moderate type of person I found it inconceivable that 
management could take customs and practices away. It was custom and practice 
at our pit that if you went down the pit even for five seconds you got paid your 
shift. There were things like tea breaks - we'd always had a twelve-o'clock tea 
break. Every concession that we had was removed, and nearly all concessions 
involved perks, whether it was getting water-money, getting height-money if you 
work on the surface, whether it's paying your pit checks . . . after that, there were 
no perks. You were paid and you take it or leave it. 46 
The removal of the concessions for working in water were particularly detested 
by the miners, as John Picken explains: 
Before the strike, if you were working in water you could get a water-note, 
especially if you worked down Cudworth because it was a colder seam as well as 
damp. If you got wet, you could go out half an hour early, or you could go out an 
hour early and lose a certain amount of money. There was the Yorkshire Water 
rate. But what the manager was doing was not letting us go out of the pit but 
giving us roof- or floor-money for us to stop down the pit. We didn't want that. 
Some of lads were wet through. They didn't like it. They'd do anything. They'd 
spend money on clothing but you couldn't always work in these clothes because 
the conditions didn't allow you to - in some places it was too hot to wear this 
type of clothing. 47 
In chapter one we touched on how there was a long-standing tradition of 
absenteeism at Frickley. According to Robert Walker, 'laking' was tolerated by the 
pit's management before the strike: 'If you worked five on days and five on afiers, 
you could. have a Friday night shift off, because the gaffers knew that was part of the 
44 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
45 See R. Richardson and S. Wood, 'Productivity change in the coal industry and the 
new industrial relations', British Journal ~f Industrial Relations, Vol.27, No.1, 
March 1989, pp.43-44. 
46 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
47 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
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tradition; they used to get enough to cover the night shift. ,48 This certainly was not 
the case after the strike, as he found out when management tightened up on all 
aspects of timekeeping: 
We used to get our job done a bit early on a Friday - I'd got a job on afters 
regular. We used to make sure the job was done, get to the pit bottom, and then 
sneak out. We didn't think that we'd been caught, but we had. The personnel 
manager had me in. He had a chart up with different colours marked on it. I'd got 
a yellow mark for laking; something else for being on the sick. Well, I hadn't 
laked for ages, and I hadn't been on the sick, I thought: 'What's up with him? 
What are these?' To me they were just different coloured pens. He says, 'It's for 
coming out early.' I said, 'Well, we knew our job was done.' He said, 'Yes, but 
you're supposed to stop down that pit.' That's how it got. Before, they would 
have turned a blind eye to that. 49 
The drift to the right and new realism 
That many rank-and-file miners were dispirited in the aftermath of the 1984-85 
strike was clearly evident in the large numbers who volunteered for redundancy - it 
was believed that up to 4,000 of the 12,000 men at Doncaster pits had applied for 
redundancy by late May 1985.50 John Picken remembers that at Frickley some men 
never returned after the strike: 
One miner told me: 'If we lose this strike I'm never going back to the pit. They 
won't get me back in.' And he didn't go back in. A good lad, a good worker, a 
good picketer, and I respect what he did. But everybody couldn't do that. 51 
The demoralisation was also expressed in the miners' worsening attendance 
records - despite the clamp down on timekeeping. In mid-August 1985 the NCB 
claimed that as many as 19 per cent of the Doncaster Area's miners were failing to 
tum up for work - an increase of five per cent on the pre-strike level. 52 Adding to 
the despondency were the constant rumours sweeping through the industry about the 
future of pits. For example, on 22 May 1985 the Doncaster Star told of a rum our 
claiming uncertain futures at Frickley and two other Doncaster Area pits, Hatfield 
and Brodsworth. 53 And even when announcements about closure were true, there 
seemed to be little desire to fight to keep pits open. This was illustrated in 
September 1985 when all bar three workers at the Yorkshire Main Colliery, situated 
at Edlington just outside Doncaster, voted to accept the pit's closure. 54 
Even so, the more far-sighted members of the government could recognise that 
the miners would not always be in a weak position. A shortage of oil, for instance, 
. 
48 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
49 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
50 Doncaster Star, 22 May 1985. 
51 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
52 Doncaster Star, 12 August 1985. 
53 Doncaster Star, 22 May 1985. 
54 Doncaster Star, 23 September 1985. 
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could improve the miners' bargaining position as it had a decade earlier. And even in 
the short term, if the pound fell against the dollar imported coal would become more 
expensive. 
Faced with these possibilities, an important part ofthe NCB's post-strike strategy 
was to build on the strike-breaking stance of the Notts NUM and encourage a split 
from the NUM on the lines of the Spencer union after 1926. The division in the 
union came to a head at the NUM conference in July, when the Notts contingent 
walked out soon after a vote to dismiss leading Notts officials Roy Lynk and David 
Prendergast from the ~lJM payroll for pursuing policies against the union. Finally, 
in October 1985, the Notts NUM, along with breakaway groups from other Areas, 
formed the Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM).55 
But even within the ranks of those in the union's leadership who remained loyal 
to the NUM, it was becoming increasingly evident that Arthur Scargill was in a 
minority. More and more the message was conveyed that the militant tactics 
advocated by the union's president were counter-productive. And those who 
advocated this line were helped because defeatism was now widespread in the rest of 
the labour movement as well. 
Though the miners constituted a far smaller percentage of all trade unionists in 
1985 than they had in 1926, their defeat was still a massive blow to the wider labour 
movement because of the importance of the victories in the 1970s. A common 
utterance amongst workers now was: 'if the miners cannot beat Thatcher and the 
employers, what chance have we got?' Indeed strikes fell to their lowest level for 
fifty years in 1985.56 This shift was enthusiastically endorsed by the trade union and 
Labour Party leaders who had done precisely nothing to further the miners' struggle, 
and who revelled in this serious set-back to left-wing ideas and militant trade 
unionism by denouncing the class struggle and pointing to the election of a Labour 
government as the only hope for working people. In contrast to the enthusiasm felt 
during the strike, many left wingers began to proclaim that the miners had lost 
because there had not been a ballot, because of the failure to involve organisations 
such as the churches, and above all, because of mass picketing. 57 
The main theoretical inspiration for this shift to the right was provided by 
MarXism Today, the journal of the 'Eurocommunist' wing of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain, which in 1985 was well into the process of splitting into rival 
factions, a process from which it never subsequently recovered. Crucially, two key 
left-led Areas of the NOM, Scotland and South Wales, were under Eurocommunist 
influence. In short, the Eurocommunists' contention was that the labour movement 
Was in serious decline. This was because large numbers of the population no longer 
identified with collectivism but rather with the ideological appeal of 'authoritarian 
Populism', capital's new form of class rule, and typified by Margaret Thatcher's 
electoral success. The labour movement, it was argued, needed to adopt drastic 
55 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit. pp.228-230. 
56 P. Bassett, Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain, (Basingstoke, 1986), 
p.3. 
57 Harman, '1984 and the shape of things to come', pp.112-1 15; McIlroy, Trade 
Unions in Britain Today, first edition (1988), 'pp.54-56. 
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changes if the situation was to be reversed. Traditional methods of struggle needed 
to be abandoned in favour of winning the battle for public opinion, 
These 'new realist' ideas had been the basis of the sofllefl's opposition to the 
blockade of steel in 1984.. and then in forcing through the return without a 
settlement. In the aftermath oftbe strike the EUfQcommunist attack on 'Scargillism' 
intensified. In a roundtable discussion between leading NUM Communists in the 
April 1985 issue of Marxism Today, Alan Baker, the NUM branch secretary for 
Oakdale in South Wales, claimed that: 'Mass picketing was totally counter-
productive - in relation to just about everything - but certainly in relation to 
Nottingham,,58 George Bolton, the Scottish NUM vice-president argued that there 
should have been a national ballot instead of picketing in Notts,59 while Hywel 
Francis questioned 'the very traditional, almost archaic, solely industrial strategy of 
mass and flying picketing. ,60 
The Area leaders of Scotland and South Wales, and increasingly Arthur ScargiWs 
former allies in Yorkshire, took every chance they had to denounce the NUM 
president. Only the continuing popularity of Scargill amongst rank-and-file miners 
restrained them. The common strategy of the Area leaderships was to take 
advantage of the union's federalist structure by re-asserting their authority in their 
own coalfields and repeatedly keeping the national officials out of their affairs.61 
Increased productivity 
The most important development in the post-strike .coal industry was the intention to 
increase productivity, Just after the return to work, Doncaster Area director Albert 
TUke warned Doncaster mincrs that they had to 'increase production dramatically to 
protect long-term jobs and make sure the NCD nationally had confidence to invest in , 
future development. ,62 This objective was expressed in a number of plans issued by 
Coal Board officials in the following years. First, in September 1985, Ken Moses· 
presented a scheme which committed the industry to a cost ceiling of around £38 for 
every ton of coal. This target was then endorsed by the 'Wheeler Plan', the 
brain-child of Albert Wheeler, the former Scottish Area director who had since taken 
charge of the Notts coalfield. The Wheeler Plan was comparable to the private coal 
owners' strategy following the miners' defeat in 1926. The hope was produce coal . 
six days per week, introduce four continental shifts of up to nine hours per day, and' 
have coal wound to the surface for twenty-three hours per day,63 
Allied to the efforts to humiliate the union at national level was an attempt to 
circumvent the union at pit level through appealing directly to the workforce and by 
attempting to recruit mine workers to resolve production problems, One way of 
doing this was to conduct a propaganda barrage by issuing Area editions of Coal 
News and monthly full-colour newsletters prepared for each colliery. These were 
5
58 Marxism r;day, April 1985, p. 23. 
9 Ib'd 1 "p.24. 
60 Ib"d 31 i ., p. . 
61 M. Simons, 'The enemy within?', Socialist Review, October 1986, p.12. 
62 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 28 March 1985. 
63 Winterton and Winterton, op. cit., p.220; Leman and Winterton, 'New 
technology and the restructuring of pit-level industrial relations', p.59. 
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mailed to miners' homes and contained detailed production information and pleas for 
increased output. In addition, pit managers were given training in 'direct 
communication' techniques, and team meetings became fashionable after a 
management tour of American mines.64 
The NCB's overall aim was to have fewer miners producing more coal per shift, 
consequently the pit closure programme was relentless after the strike. At those pits 
that remained open, the NCB sought to squeeze greater output from fewer miners. 
There was a reduction in the number of faces worked at each pit, and where faces 
had been re-equipped with new machinery, an increase in the average yardage of 
faces occurred. 65 
It would be wrong to argue that new realism was only rampant in the upper 
reaches of the NUM. With the ever-present threat of closure, NUM branches were 
frequently putting forward the same argument as management: that the best way to 
keep a pit open was to make it economically viable. Hence within a year of the strike 
ending Yorkshire pits were breaking world coal production records. David 
Douglass, the NUM delegate at Hatfield Main, and a miner who prided himself on 
being a militant, explained in March 1986 how he now saw the way forward: 
I've been strongly urging a strategy that the pit must become profitable enough to 
get out of the danger margin to stop it shutting. This necessarily has made it look 
like I've changed my point of view. The fact is that the clock had moved on; 
yesterday'S slogan, like yesterday'S top coat, does not necessarily suit today's 
climate. The fact is once the disastrous policy of a return to work without a 
settlement had gone through we were left with only the overtime ban and guerrilla 
resistance down the pit as our only strategy.66 
The Hatfield delegate went on to arbTUe that the guerrilla strategy had meant that 
branches were forced to fight their own local issues as best they could. Some 
branches, being war-weary, had offered little resistance: 
Cortonwood just surrendered; others like Edlington, a modern pit with years of 
coal, ran themselves on to the rocks and let the pit flounder because they couldn't 
see any hope or direction in the Union and the industry. Well, I was determined to 
not let that happen at our branch. It was clear that unprofitable pits were closing, 
the Board weren't bluffing.67 
There can be little doubt that the ideas peddled by branch officials such as David 
Douglass were widespread and that many of the NUM activists who had manned 
the picket lines for twelve months were convinced that there was no alternative other 
64 1. Winterto~, 'The demise of collective bargaining in the British coal mining 
industry', in o. Kourchid and R. Temple (eds), Cent Ans de Conventions 
Collectives: Arras 1891/1991, (Revue du Nord, Lille, 1994), p.189. 
65 G"bb " I on and Bromley, op. CIt., pp.62-69. 
66 D. Douglass, 'Letter from Yorkshire, March 1986', in Samuel, et aI., The Enemy 
Within, p.236. 
671b"d I ., p.237. 
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than to increase output. Jeff Johnson, for instance, argues that the Coal Board 
would intentionally sabotage production at Frickley so that they had the perfect 
excuse to close the pit. He recalls how he and his workmates responded on one 
occasion when the management decided to abandon the face they were working: 
It might have been the wrong way of thinking about it, but we said, 'Right, we're 
going to get this coal out. They're not going to shut this face down. That way 
they're not going to make us redundant.' We'd fought for jobs; why give it up 
now? So we went on that face and we worked like bloody crazy. For about two 
months we really made it crack. And we ended up in the top ten of the Yorkshire 
coalfield for that type of coal. We broke all the production records. So what 
management then did was - there should have been something like sixteen of us 
working - they started taking a couple of men away every time, sometimes three, 
sometimes four. So I would do three jobs: I'd do my own job, then somebody 
else's and then somebody else's. We were flogging our guts out, but we were 
earning decent money. They couldn't shut this coal-face down and so next they 
starved us. They wouldn't supply us with any materials to do our jobs with, and 
so we stole them from other faces, and pillaged and raided other areas and got 
our equipment and kept going. And we actually got to the boundary and kept it 
going an extra five or six months. And they tried every shift to break us.68 
If such reactions were widespread among miners, it would suggest that 
management had tamed the miners in the aftermath of the strike. Certainly 
announcements from the NCB were giving credence to this. In the year after the 
miners returned to work, the rate of production increased dramatically at Frickley. 
The workforce, which had been around 1,600 before the strike, had been reduced by 
a third due to transfers and redundancies, but was still producing the same amount of 
coal. 69 In the South Yorkshire Area as a whole, three coI1ieries had closed and there 
had been a reduction in manpower from 25,947 to 18,]02. A Coal Board 
spokesperson told. the Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express of 6 March 1986 that 
in the last three months of 1985 'this Area has made a profit of £9 million after 
capital charges. If we can maintain this upward trend, we will be in the position to 
make a clear profit in the year 1986 to 1987. This success can be attributed to a 
number of factors, such as investment, good seams and the positive attitude by the 
workforce.'70 Writing in the NCB's Coal News five months later, Ian MacGregor 
claimed that '1985/6 has been a year of great achievement for the coal industry. 
Following the end of the strike, output rapidly recovered and major improvements in 
efficiency were achieved ... In large measure this was due not only to the efforts of 
management but also to the new spirit of realism and co-operation showed by our 
workforce .. .'71 And yet though these 'achievements' had been made at the miners' 
expense, as we shall see, this picture is not entirely accurate. 
68 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
69 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 27 February 1986. 
70 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 6 March 1986. 
71 I. MacGregor, '1985-6 it year of progress', Coal News, August 1986. 
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Fighting spirit 
Although working life had become intolerable for many miners, and despite the new 
realists seeming all too eager to surrender to the bosses' demands, in many pits the 
miners retained their combativity. Indeed, parts of the Yorkshire coalfield were the 
setting for almost continual class conflict for the remainder of the 1980s and into the 
1990s. This resilience was expressed at the official level in late October 1985 when 
Arthur Scargill supporter Sammy Thompson beat the moderate candidate, John 
Walsh, convincingly in a ballot for a position on the union executive. l 
Despite new realism having gained a toe-hold in the pits, there was still the 
possibility that the Board's conduct would provoke retaliations from the miners. In 
such circumstances the task for NUM activists was to build up the confidence and 
morale of the rank and file and wait for an issue upon which the miners could fight 
and win. Indeed, no sooner had the strikers returned to work when disputes began 
to break out throughout the Yorkshire coalfield. The earliest reported dispute of any 
note in the Doncaster Area occurred at Askem Colliery on 16 April 1985, when 
faceworkers walked out and brought the pit to a standstill for five days over bonus 
payments.2 On the last day of the same month there was a potentially more serious 
flare-up at South Kirkby where management summarily dismissed four men who 
were alleged to have intimidated strikebreakers. By the end of the week the miners at 
the pit and at the adjacent Ferrymoor Riddings drift mine were out on unofficial 
strike. Though other pits in the Barnsley Area were picketed out, the stoppage 
finally ended when both the Bamsley Panel and the Yorkshire Area executive 
refused to make the strike official. 3 
On Wednesday 15 May craftsmen at the Yorkshire Main Colliery in Edlington 
staged a lightning walkout over wages,4 and a week later production at Bamburgh 
pit was brought to a halt over redundancy offers to miners.5 From Thursday I 
August to Monday 5 August the 1,400 miners at Armthorpe took strike action in 
support ofworkmates who had been disciplined for walking out over management's 
refusal to implement the Yorkshire agreement over wet working conditions.6 On 
Friday 23 August Armthorpe was brought to a standstill again, and this time miners 
at the pit threatened to spread the action.7 Five days later, Thurcroft Colliery was 
shut down over the visit of coal minister David Hunt. 8 Then production at 
Rossington Colliery was brought to a standstill for the first two weeks of September 
1 Adeney and Lloyd, The Miners' Strike 1984-5, p.302; P. Foot, 'Battle for the 
NUM', Socialist ReView, January 1988, p.1 0; Gibbon, 'The miners' strike of 
1984-5', p.186. 
2 Doncaster Star, 17 and 22 April 1985. 
3 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, p.218. 
4 Doncaster Star, 15 May 1985. 
5 Doncaster Star, 25 May 1985. 
6 Doncaster Star, 1 and 6 August 1985. 
7 Doncaster Star, 23 August 1985. 
8 Doncaster Star, 28 August 1985; see also Gibbon and Steyne, Thurcroft, 
pp.256-257. ( 
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and work only resumed when management decided to reconsider their decision to 
scrap a long-standing agreement over the selection of coal-face workers. 9 No sooner 
had production begun at Rossin!,>ton when there was a 24-bQur stoppage at 
Brodsworth on 20 September because ot the possibility of management closing 
underground workings. 
Now all of this clearly points to the miners having a degree of confidence after the 
strike and which the beleaguered NUM needed to tap into if it was to become a 
powerful force once again. However, defeatism was also evident as well, as the 
failure to contest the closure of Edlington showed all too well. What could be 
witnessed was a contradictory consciousness. Because of the NUM's weaker 
circumstances, and because of the threat of closure and the pressure for increased 
output, many of the pits just mentioned above were breaking their own production 
records in the latter half of 1985. But at the same time there was resistance to 
management's claw back on bonus payments, custom and practice and so on. At 
Bentley Colliery, for instance, former pickets smashed the pit's individual production 
record during the week ending 7 September 1985, and yet on Thursday 17 October 
the pit was brought to a standstill in support of a workmate who had been sacked for 
allegedly attacking a scab.IO In the early autumn of 1985 the Doncaster and South 
Yorkshire coalfields were merged into a new South Yorkshire Area by the Coal 
Board. By December it was being claimed that output in this Area had shot it to the 
top of the national production league. 11 One of the output success stories of th~ n~w 
Area was. Silverwood near Rotherharn. But no sooner had it been announced that 
Silverwood had set a new European coal production record when on 19 December 
35 faceworkcrs. walked out in support of nine colleagues at the pit who remained 
sacked. 12 
Simmering below 
The defeat had hit the new layer of militants at Frickley hard and few incidents of 
outward resistance were reported in this period. 'People were gutted,' says Paul 
Symonds: 
They were beat, it was as simple as that. We just had to watch our step. That's 
why management could get away with it. They could ask you to do something 
that you wouldn't normally do, knowing that somebody would do it. And they 
were pretty confident that there would be no rag-ups. To be honest, the climate 
was such that if we had ragged-up we would have got ourselves sacked. There 
was fcar after the strike. 13 
The only strike at Frickley to be noted in the press during the remainder of 1985 
took place on Tuesday 27 August, and lasted until the following day. Production on 
the afternoon shift was brought to a halt a.ftet: two men working in the Cudworth 
9 Doncaster Star, 7, 16 and IT September 1985. 
}O- Doncaster Star, September 13 and October 17 1985. 
11 Doncaster Star, 18 December 1985. 
12 Doncaster Star, 19 December 1985. 
13 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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seam were sent home because of a row with an overman about the length of their 
meal break. By the night shift both pits were involved. It was reported that work 
resumed as normal on the afternoon shift the following day after discussions between 
NUM representatives and the management. 14 This incident may have been the only 
one to have come to the attention of the local press but other issues simmered below 
the surface. Ian Oxley describes how a long-standing disagreement over craftsmen's 
report money came to the fore immediately after the return to work: 
... they paid the underground craftsmen for writing reports but they wouldn't 
pay the surface men. We'd had this dispute for three or four years, that we 
wouldn't write reports. We gave verbal reports but not written ones. Anyway, 
we'd been back at work at least a week when the instruction came: 'You must 
write reports, or you will be sent home!' . . . So we had a meeting with the day 
shift. And the day shift says, 'Look, we'll take 'em on, we'll go home. We've 
been on strike for a year, we'll give it a run for two or three weeks.' Anyway, we 
didn't write reports. Our union man, George Parkin actually wrote one. It was 
crazy, we'd had a democratic discussion ... But the majority - the shop consisted 
of about sixteen - were not willing to write reports . . . we were sent home for 
three days. Eventually, the union had us all up and said, 'Look, you'll get sacked. 
You've got to realise that we can't support you because we are in such a weak 
position. 15 
But it soon became apparent to the craftsmen that they could sometimes tum the 
tables on management if they stuck rigidly to new instructions. Allied to the 
disagreement over writing reports was the issue over the times that electricians were 
supposed to report to their workshop. Prior to the strike it had been customary to 
spend the first half an hour of their shift in the workshop discussing any problems 
with the men they were relieving and to receive their orders for the rest of the day. 
Similarly at meal breaks and at the end of the shift they would report back early and 
talk to their supervjsors about any problems. Under the post-strike regime, Ian Oxley 
recalls that electricians were now: 
. . . sent out of the shop at quarter -past six in a morning - we started at six - and 
we were told that we mustn't return to the shop until twenty-past nine, our snap 
time. And then we must be out of the shop by nine-forty - that's a twenty minutes 
snap time, that's including making your tea. And you mustn't come back into the 
shop until ten minutes to two, when you've got ten minutes to wash off, write 
your report, and leave the shop at two o'clock. 16 
But, 'We just laughed at this,' says Ian Oxley. For electricians to work effectively 
they needed the freedom to use their own initiative about which jobs took priority: 
'Although we had assistant engineers, who were foremen basically, each electrician 
was his own gaffer.' Some tasks only took half an hour, and when they were 
14 Hemsworth and South Elmsall }.xpress, 29 AUh'Ust 1985. 
15 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
16 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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completed the electrician would head back to the workshop for further instructions. 
But now, in retaliation, the electricians decided to stay out as ordered: 
... we would go out of the shop at quarter-past six, use the vending machine or 
other people's snap cabins - there would be two-dozen snap cabins at various 
places on the pit top, it's huge, it's like a village on the pit top, massive - we'd 
not return back to the shop while ten-to-two, and make the gaffer find us ... So 
all those little jobs weren't getting done. And that lasted about three weeks before 
he put the white flag up and said, 'Oh, just keep the doors locked when you're in 
so that the manager can't catch you in here.' He backed our team rather than the 
manager, and we got back then to a good working relationship. And bit by bit we 
did get back our customs and practices. 17 
Back in the union box 
Another of the management's measures also backfired. One of the most stark 
examples of the Coal Board disregarding the NUM at local level was in how most of 
the branch officials at each pit were now to work down the pit rather than sit in the 
union office on a full-time basis. 'That,' says Johnny Stones: 
was one of the wishes from all the Area directors, from MacGregor downwards, 
and they implemented that. It left virtually branch secretaries on their own and 
paid by the union or with one or two shifts paid by the Board on a conciliation 
basis. 18 
Some activists were not entirely displeased with this situation but, because this 
was a clear attack on the union, backed the demand for the branch officials to be 
given their former status. As Ray Riley explains: 
... this was always a thorny question among rank-and-file militants because 
they should hav.e done shifts down the pit like anyone else. Before, they'd led a 
sort of insulated life, they were in the union box five days a week. They were in a 
position after the strike where the colliery manager insisted that they did shifts 
underground. And because the colliery manager was insisting, then obviously you 
took the side of the local officials. And that's what happened after the strike. But 
it was only a short period of time before the branch officials managed to weed 
themselves back onto the pit top again. But at the time, because it was seen as an 
attack on union organisation at the pit, then we were bound to defend the branch 
officials. 19 
In Jeff Johnson's view, the effect of making branch officials work down the pit 
ran counter to what the management actually wanted. Making the branch officials 
'do a shift' gave the men more contact with their union men than they had 
previously. Also, it: 
17 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
18 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
19 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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. . . worked against the Coal Board because the actual branch officials, to some 
degree, managed the workforce by keeping the lid on certain disputes: a miner 
had fallen out with a deputy, they'd resolve that problem; if there were problems 
with money on the bonus schemes, they'd find out information, work it out 
properly, go and argue with management, then there would be some sort of 
payment and things would be right. But the union officials weren't there, and so 
the men were phoning management directly. So management had a hell of a lot 
more work to do and we had more contact with our union men. So for me it 
backfired on British Coal who, after a short period, probably three to six months, 
started paying our union officials to go back in the union box because they were 
that fed up of being harassed by the men when the branch officials used to do 
things for them.20 
The post-strike FrickJey left 
The experience of the strike had ensured that left-wing ideas now had deep roots at 
Frickley Colliery. It had also brought the militants from the Big Pit and the Little Pit 
closer together. 'In the twelve months on strike you discussed politics at one level or 
another - it dominated your lives,' remembers Paul Symonds: 
You also built up friendships. And the main militants during the strike did tend to 
hang around together after the strike - which hadn't been the case before - and 
obviously things like running for the union, going to union meetings, and what to 
do in disputes were informally discussed. Sometimes they were formally 
discussed. There was certainly a focus for the left inside Frickley.21 
Two main left-wing political strands were now evident at the pit. The first was 
what could loosely be described as the 'Broad Left' and mainly consisted of 
members of the Labour Party. The second grouping was the members and 
sympathisers of the far-left Socialist Workers Party. For much of the time the two 
groups overlapped and would work closely together. 
The Broad Left at Frickley had actually been given a stimulus during the Big 
Strike when Dave Feickert, the NUM's head of research, and Mick Clapham, the 
head of the union's industrial relations department and one of Arthur Scargill's 
long-time Yorkshire NUM allies, invited activists from around Yorkshire to attend a 
strike activists' meeting at Northern College near Barnsley. 'It would be November 
time,' remembers Ian Oxley, 'pressure was really piling on': 
And looking at the people who were there, they were generally the lads that had 
been on the trade union industrial relations course at Leeds University ... And 
basically, it was just a question and answer session from these two research 
officers from the NUM.22 
20 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
21 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
22 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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With Scargill rapidJy losing the trust of his lieutenants in the Area leaderships, the 
hope seemed to be to re-establish links with the new generation of rank-and-file 
activists so as to form a fresh Jeft caucus able to challenge for positions in the union. 
Indeed, in the wake of the strike, such meetings would form the basis of an attempt 
to establish an organisation on the lines of the old Barnsley Miners' Forum - the 
Barnsley Miners' Campaign Group - with meetings at the Junction pub in Barnsley. 
Jeff Johnson was one of those involved: 
... we set off and called it the Barnsley Forum, but these individuals at 
Yorkshire Area level weren't very happy about it. They could see that we were 
aping their way to power ... and they actually took out some legal stuff to stop 
us using the Barnsley Forum as our name. So we changed our name. They'd 
actually had interviews and made statements in papers like The Sun. That really 
threw us out, that did. So we decided to go to town then. Initially we'd wanted to 
influence policy, both in the Yorkshire Area and nationally, but we didn't want 
their jobs. They could keep their jobs. We wanted to stay at pit level and influence 
things . . . But once the Yorkshire Area officials set about us like that, that's 
when we decided - and there were quite a lot of us - that we'd put up for branch 
officials' positions and get rid of the old men who had seen it all before and didn't 
want to try anything new.23 
The Voice (~f Frickley 
The Broad Left were the instigators of one of the most audacious challenges to the 
Coal Board's post-strike regime at Frickley: the rank-and-file newsletter Voice of 
Frickley. This first circulated amongst the colliery's miners in the final weeks of the 
1984-85 strike, re-appeared in late 1985, and was then issued on an irref:,7Ular basis 
until early 1987. 'It was published,' says Lawrence Gertig, one of the editorial team, 
'whenever we could get enough funds to publish it and the correct sort of 
information - not just trivia, but issues where it would involve people. ,24 Ray Riley 
was an occasionaI.contributor to the newsletter and remembers that its founders 
were Vic France and Ian Oxley: 
They were Labour Party members, but they were good members during the 
strike, supportive of the NUM, got off their arses - unlike some others in the 
Labour Party - and played their part.25 
Vic France recalls that the origins of Voice of Frickley lay m the activists' 
meetings at Northern College: 
One or two other pits had done it before and we got our lead from them. There 
was a core group of about five of us got together and said, 'Let's do it, let's put 
one together and see what it looks like.' We got some people in Doncaster to 
printit for us really cheaply - about £20 for a thousand. We put the first issue out, 
23 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
24 Lawrence Gertig, interviewed by the author. 
25 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
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it was well received and so we thought that we would carry on with it. The other 
people dropped out. It just finished up with two of us who were the core writers 
and editors. It was supposed to be a secret who was writing this thing - but it was 
an open secret: people were coming up to us giving us stories. Even management 
would give us stories; so it wasn't a very well kept secret who was doing it. 26 
The editors of Voice of Frickley maintained a tight control over the newsletter in 
line with their own political agenda. 'We were determined that we were going to 
keep control of it, and not let it get too political,' explains Ian Oxley: 
We were going to treat the newsletter in a light-hearted, Sun style of reporting. In 
other words, a grain of truth - if it was a good story - would have been sufficient, 
if it was regarding the management. But we wanted to inform the workers of the 
union's side ... we wanted to get our message across, but not in a heavy political 
sense of the Socialist Worker or News Line . . . It had to be brief, nothing more 
than sixty words, very short, punchy paragraphs, and light-hearted stories 
attacking 'No-neck', which was Don Clay, the manager ... We caJled certain 
overmen 'Sweet-feet', because they were renowned for having smelly feet. There 
was 'Bluenose'. Another one was an alcoholic. So we had all these names, and 
that's the type of humorous tone we ran it in.27 
The following extract from the February 1986 issue of Voice of Frickley, under 
the heading 'Here's the best', give us an insight as to the kind of articles which 
would appear: 
When Mr Deaks visited the pit a few weeks ago Manager Clay accompanied him 
on his tour of the Haigh Moor headings. Manager Clay was on his best behaviour 
actually talking to men whom he met on his rounds. Presumably this was to show 
Mr Deaks that he was operating a friendly pit and that everything was back to 
normal. Manager Clay then got a message that Mr Taylor from Area would be 
joining them for lunch. He then phoned Mr Webster the Mechanical Engineer and 
the following was the conversation which was overheard: 
MANAGER CLAY: 'Mr. Webster'. 
WEBSTER: 'Yes'. 
CLAY: 'This is Mr Clay, Mr Taylor will be joining us for lunch. He only likes 
John West Red SaJmon so I want you to go to the Asda immediately and buy a 
tin. Is that clear?' 
WEBSTER: 'Yes Mr Clay but we are broke down mechanically in the Cudworth 
seam'. 
CLAY: 'Don't "but" me. Just get down there and do the shopping'. 
WEBSTER: 'Yes Mr Clay'. 
CLAY: 'Oh, one other thing, make sure a table is set for four and a white table 
cloth is used'. 
WEBSTER: 'Yes Mr Clay'. 
26 Vic France, interviewed ~y the author. 
27 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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We have not managed to find out if Mr Webster got his money back from Clay, 
but we do know what a mechanical engineer's tool kit consists of - a tin opener.28 
In the management's eyes, this was all clearly subversive stuff and so the editors 
and contributors to the newsletter had to operate in a clandestine manner. Thus issue 
No 2 of Voice of Frickley informed readers that: 'Any contributees names will be 
kept secret . . . to protect them. At future branch meetings a bucket will be provided 
at the entrance in which contributions in the form ofletters can be placed. ,29 
Distribution was also a risky business. Ian Oxley describes what was involved in 
the operation: 
... it could only be done with the co-operation ofNUM members. But I used to 
actually distribute them. I used to put them in every workman's locker, which 
involved getting up at two in a morning, coming up to the pit, and putting them in 
the lockers. But, unfortunately, at the very end, the Coal Board actually to stop 
this put a security camera in the baths. But, being an electrician, I knew how to 
switch it off. I used to just go to the fuse box, knock the camera off, shove the 
newsletters in - which took about an hour - and then as I left I put the camera 
back on. The camera went to the control room, so the control room man is tied 
there, all he can do is ring our shop that the camera's off. Our lads knew to ignore 
it, and sure enough it would come back on and he would think that somebody had 
been up and mended it. So we got round things.30 
There were near misses though. 'One of the managers actually went into the 
union and said, "I know who it is,'" recalls Vic France: 
Geoff Siddons said, 'What do you mean?' 'I know who is doing Voice C?f 
Frickley.' Geoff Siddons said, 'Tell me, and I will stop it.' But they didn't 
actually approach us directly about it. The union was actually paying us this £20 
to have it printed; but they were denying any knowledge of it. 31 
Even activists who did not necessarily agree with the political stance of the 
editors saw the value of the newsletter and were willing to contribute articles. Ray 
Riley was one: 
. . . there was a need for some kind of leaflet or information, a short booklet, 
about what was happening in the pit and putting a correct slant on things; because 
obviously we were receiving propaganda from British Coal, filling our heads 
about productivity and how we've got to compete and things of that nature. I was 
approached and asked if I would like to contribute to this newsletter; which was 
really good, because there were a lot of arguments taking place underground. 
Don't think for one minute that all these arguments were won or that people 
28 Voice ofFrickley, No.4, February 1986. 
29 Voice C?f Frickley, No.2, December 1985. 
30 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
31 Vic France, interviewed by the author. 
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agreed with everything that we were saying. A lot of people claimed that we were 
talking out of our earholes. But one of the great things about it all was that we 
had the confidence to do it. And I saw the opportunity, in contributing to this 
newsletter, of putting socialist ideas over ... The first article that I wrote for this 
newsletter involved racism, and I related it to the struggles in South Africa and 
the struggles we'd gone through in 1984-85 - because at the time South Africa 
was very much a topical issue, and also, I felt it was necessary to put a good 
argument over that was anti-racist . . . Quite often you would find copies 
underground, just lying around, obviously where people had read them and then 
discarded them. It was really popular, and I thought at the time that it was a 
really innovative idea and was excellent because it actually came from below, and 
was published from below, rather than being something that was done from above 
and handed down.32 
The SWP's argument 
It was the realisation of the need to organise from below that was leading some 
Frickley activists to break from the Broad Left, which was always likely to 
accommodate to the union bureaucracy and accept some variant of new realism. 
'There was now a sizeable handful of us who were in the SWP, and there was also 
another layer who bought Socialist Worker and were swayed by the SWP's 
ar!:,ruments,' says Paul Symonds: 
And the argument that the SWP put to us was simply this: 'Putting up for union 
jobs is all right, but only as long as it doesn't entail you giving up your job 
underground, spending your time in a union office, and spending your time 
talking to the manager.' We went through these arguments time and time again. 
Immediately after the strike, it was never really on the agenda. But as we started 
to get better organised, arguments over standing for officials' posts came up. And 
that was the party's line on it, that it would be a disaster. We weren't against 
standing for full-time positions in general, it was about tactics. We'd just had the 
hiding of our lives, and it was a bad time to put left wingers onto the union 
because they would be pulled. There would either be nothing that they could do, 
or we would have been pulled by the management. That argument won the day 
and so most of the militants never put up for full-time positions, although we did 
occasionally run the odd person. 33 
Sometimes the gap between the two left-wing tendencies could become a chasm; 
as Paul Symonds discovered when he attended a meeting of the Barnsley Miners' 
Campaign Group: 
Jeff Johnson used to be involved, and Neil Parry and Steve Parry, maybe Vic 
France and Ian Oxley - the soft left. It wasn't the Militant Tendency or anybody 
like that who organised it. It was just good trade unionists, Labour Party types. I 
went to a few of these meetings, but I remember them arguing that the trade 
32 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
33 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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union laws had got to be obeyed. I remember having a big argument with either 
Neil or Steve Parry in the meeting, saying that we've got to break the trade union 
laws. They were arguing that those days have gone, that we've got to accept that 
these laws are here to stay. They were basically arguing new realism, that we've 
got to accept the new situation, that we've got to get a Labour government 
elected. That sort of stand was more widespread than ours, of strenf,rthening your 
section, strengthening your pit, sticking together, one out all out ... One of the 
things that came out of the defeat of the '84/85 strike was that a lot of the left 
were looking round for another way of fighting. But you can't fight on your 
knees. 34 
On the branch committee 
Although an influential section of the left at Frickley were wary of standing for 
full-time posts within the union, they did stand for lay positions on the branch 
committee - -and were increasingly successful in the years following the strike. 
According to Gary Hinchliffe, the first left militants to get on the Frickley branch 
committee after the strike were: 
Tony Short in the Big Pit. Steve Gant got on the first time that the Cudworth rep 
came up. Dave Wilson was the Cudworth rep, and Ganty stood against him and 
got the Cudworth rep's job. Paul Symonds got on the committee. In the next 
elections that came up, my brother Paul got on the committee. 35 
Also that first year, and as Steve Gant recalls, 'the president, Keith Proverbs, 
finished. Steve Tulley took his job. He came off the committee.' And so: 
Within the first year after the strike, we had a left-wing president - compared to 
Proverbs he was, without a doubt. It was a move for the better, and everybody 
knew it. It showed you that there was still some resistance there because they 
were electing known left wingers onto the branch. Now whether the men thought 
that they could do it for them, I don't know, but I just thought that these were the 
best people for job. They had been active through the strike, they'd been seen as 
being capable of organising things, speaking at meetings, things like that. That 
reflected itself in the ballot ... We put the foundations down for others later. We 
were starting to run meetings. We were questioning things. We were the ones 
who were doing all the leafleting. We were the ones who were challenging things 
at general meetings. Also at that time, a lot more people were showing an interest 
in coming to general meetings than they had done before the strike. 36 
Significantly, the increased influence of the left at Frickley Colliery meant there 
was now a qualitative difference in the whole manner in which trade unionism 
operated at the pit. For example, in contrast to the narrow sectional view that had 
predominated prior to the Big Strike, regular pit-head collections were now held for 
34 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
35 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
36 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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other workers who were in struggle, even ones from different countries. Also, 
left-wing activists ensured that wider issues were raised down the pit and at branch 
meetings. 'Politics was kept very much alive,' says Ray Riley: 
People started putting forward motions on abortion, campaigning against David 
Alton's Bill; what was happening in South Africa; also, the riots in Broadwater 
Farm in Tottenham. People were making connections with what had happened in 
our strike, so they could identify with the struggles of blacks in London. 37 
After the Broadwater Farm riots in the autumn of 1985, 'We actually fetched 
Winston Silcott's brother, George, up to the pit,' remembers Paul Symonds: 
It was a bit weird. We didn't have any black people working at Frickley, and so 
when George Silcott walked into our canteen that Friday, people's heads turned 
at this big black bloke. But the thing was, he did a speech and everybody signed 
the petition about Winston Silcott [falsely accused of murdering a policeman], the 
branch affiliated to the campaign and gave money. 38 
Another difference was in how the new generation of left activists intended to 
behave when they confronted management once they were elected to the branch 
committee. Ordinary miners had long been cynical about how their representatives 
sold out once they met management. This was something that Paul Symonds had to 
consider when he informed an older workmate how he was standing for a post on 
the branch: 
He asked me why. I said, 'I'm going to end all this shit that's been going off,' etc. 
I suppose I was talking like a typical young militant. But this bloke was a bit 
older, he says, 'Aye lad, but the trouble is, when you get on you will end up like 
the rest of them, just sat round talking to the gaffer.' I remember saying to him, 
'Well 1 won't. 1 am going to stick to my principles.' It was true, there was a level 
of cynicism about putting up for the union. A lot of them did used to abuse it. 
They were good blokes most of them, but they did get shifts out of the pit, they 
got out early, they got put on whatever shifts they wanted, things like that. And 
once you started accepting favours off management, management expected 
favours in return when the time came. 39 
As far as those activists who shared his views were concerned, there would be no 
more crawling or collaboration with the class enemy. 'I wouldn't dream of having a 
pint or a sandwich with managers,' argues Tony Short: 
I can remember the first year I was on the union, going to a meeting with 
management at Christmas; there were cases of beer, pork pies and chicken legs 
laid ott The manager opened the meeting and then shut it - and I'd got loads to 
37 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
38 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
39 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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bring up that the lads had told me to say. I looked at Gant and said, 'We are not 
having any of this.' I said, 'Is the meeting overT 'Yes.' Three of us walked out. 
But as we were walking up the corridor we heard them say something about us 
and then all laugh, it wasn't just the management but the union as well ... they 
really surprised me.40 
Mad scramble 
In one study of industrial relations in the coal industry in the aftermath of the Big 
Strike, the authors, Gibbon and Bromley, argue that a great many ordinary miners no 
longer cared about fighting for their jobs. This, they say, forced NUM branch 
officials into seeking alliances with pit managers 'who really believe pits can be 
saved by hard work and greater flexibility.'41 But were the rank and file now so 
apathetic that they would willingly accept the requests for increased output? It 
appears not; as David Douglass found out when he called for greater efforts at 
Hatfield: . 
I had to fight to get the branch, and the membership at large, to accept a strategy 
of trying to make the pit profitable, trying to tum coal, not for the Board's sake, 
but so that the great cause of the miners' union itself and our contribution to the 
rest of the working class wouldn't be lost. 42 
Elsewhere, Douglass has written that he termed his strategy 'Production Plus 
Disruption', arguing that pits which broke production records were now in a better 
position to take action, and that this became evident in the strike statistics in the old 
Doncaster Area. 43 But the reality was that Douglass's strategy was nothing other 
than capitulation disguised in fighting rhetoric. It was also a naive strategy for NUM 
branch officials to adopt. The belief that giving the Coal Board the output they 
required would save individual pits from closure ensured nothing other than to 
enforce the idea that miners at other pits were competitors and thus further splitting 
the union. In fact, -such a strategy promised to undermine any sustained resistance 
mounted against the Coal Board, because to put up a fight threatened the attainment 
of production targets that were supposed to ensure a pit's future. And this could be 
more so when miners wanted other pits to strike on their behalf All that the strategy 
promised was a mad scramble to survive at individual pits with no co-ordinated 
resistance and, importantly, to disguise the fact that there was no real logic as to 
why many pits headed the Coal Board's closure programme anyway. Striving to 
make pits profitable in the Yorkshire coalfield also ensured the isolation of pits in 
South Wales and Scotland which had little hope of meeting the Coal Board's targets. 
This only played into the hands of the new realists in these Areas who felt obliged to 
retaliate by accepting management's demands in the belief of improving their own 
coalfield's ability to compete. 
40 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
41 Gibbon and Bromley, "'From an institution to a business?''', p.81. 
42 Douglass, 'Letter from Yorkshire', p.237. 
43 Douglass, Pit Sense Versus the State, p.80. 
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Furthermore, and as the Oxford economist Andrew Glyn had pointed out in the 
Pi/walch magazine in December 19851 it was all too evident that the NCB's 
ambitions did not stop at breaking even anyway: 'MacGregor has boasted of 
increasing output to 4 tonnes per man shift at every. pit (an increase of about. one 
third). On thi& basis the number of miners required to produce 90 million tonnes 
would be 100,000 or less. ,44 Besides, British mines could not hope to match their 
competitOfs ffi the eneFgy maFket. An article in The Times in mid-MarcH 19&6 Hoted 
that oil was far cheaper. Moreover: 
The Americans, for instance, can boast productivity of 15 tons per man shift; that 
is five times the record levels now being reached in British mines and three times 
better than MacGregor's ambitious target of five tons for achievement by our best 
pits. 45. 
From a world perspective, miners who agreed to their bosses' demands over 
productivity were in the same situation as a dog chasing its own tail: always chasing 
but never quite catching up. The employers would always point to the miners in 
front as the ones to aim for, while those in front would be urged to work ever harder 
before competitors caught them up. The only answer for the miners was not the 
David Douglass strategy but to stop the mad dash through effective trade unionism 
and solidarity, even if the employers had the upper hand and were getting increased 
output. This is what the most far-sighted activists at Frickley aimed for. 
Opposing the Doncaster Option 
Much of the reason for the increased output in pits was not due to some faith in . 
keeping pits open through greater effort, but because of the need to payoff debts 
incurred after twelve months on strike. Bonus payments had formed a large part of 
miners earnings since the introduction of the- Area incentive schemes. Incentive 
payments were determined by the number of yards of coal cut at the coal-face and 
based on agreements negotiated by faceworkers. While face and development 
workers received one hundred per cent bonus, other mineworkers were paid a 
percentage of that. Because of the manner in which the incentive scheme had been 
introduced, there were a number of schemes in operation throughout the industry. In 
Kent and North Derbyshire there was an Area-wide incentive scheme based on the 
output of the whole Area and which resulted in an equal distribution of bonus 
payments between pits. In some Areas there were schemes based on individual faces 
within each pit. In Yorkshire incentive payments were based on the Yorkshire Area 
Agreement and determined on a pit-wide basis.46 
Though the Coal Board had been enthusiastic about introducing the incentive 
schemes. to split the coalfields1 there was the problem that militant miners could 
make the scheme work in their favour". as was the case at Frickley and th.e other 
Doncaster Area pits. 'They looked into it and found that the Doncaster Area got the 
44 A Glyn, 'Planning for chaos', Pitwalch, No.3, December 1985, p.6. 
45 I. Carson, 'Coal: the new trouble In store for Thatcher', The Times, 15 March 
1986. 
46 Gibbon and Bromley, op. cit., p.69. 
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most bonus in the country for the least production,' says Gary Hinchliffe. The 
NCB's solution was the 'Doncaster Option', which they attempted to introduce at 
individual collieries from November 1985. 'So then it came to us,' recalls Gary 
Hinchliffe, 'that if we don't accept this tonnage bonus, the Doncaster Option, they 
were going to close the pit. They were scaremongering. ,47 The militants at Frickley 
could see that the intent was to divide miners by increasing faceworkers' bonuses at 
the expense of the majority of the other workers in a mine. The Doncaster Option 
'Would have been beneficial for me,' argues Tony Short: 
I would have been on the top money. They used to put it on this special phone 
message. Say I was on 08s, it would say, 'Your bonus on 08s is £16 a day. Under 
the Doncaster Option you would have earned £66 a day. He did that for months 
and months ... But it would have meant about 100 men getting all the money, 
and the rest of the men getting nothing. 48 
And so the Doncaster Option had to be opposed. Gary Hinchliffe remembers 
attending a number of branch meetings where the issue was on the agenda: 
Geoff Siddons had a big thing over it. Keith Proverbs had left by now, and Steve 
Tulley was the new branch president. I can remember them being stood on the 
platform, practically pleading with the men to accept this Doncaster Option. We 
weren't getting any bonus at all at the time and they were saying that it was the 
only way we were going to get any bonus, the only way we were going to get any 
production, the only way that we were going to stop open. And it's the first time, 
so they tell me, in the history of Frickley NUM, that the men on the floor have 
not voted with a recommendation from the platform. We'd built up a good 
network among the pickets. We had a good rank and file at that time. We just 
weren't going to sacrifice people who were outbye workers ... They were on the 
lowest money as it was. We won the argument that we weren't going to take 
from their share -of the bonus to make ours bigger. The platform were in despair. 
They couldn't believe that they'd been beaten: 'Aye, they'll shut the pit now.' 
Two months later, it was back on the agenda again. I think Johnny Stones must 
have tipped Ganty off that there was a three-meeting rule: once something had 
been debated at three meetings, it couldn't come on the agenda again for twelve 
months. And that was the only way that we got it stopped. We got it stopped for 
twelve months. But it reappeared when we got a new manager. 49 
A turning point 
In the early period after the return to work, it was imperative that management were 
not given the opportunity to dismiss miners with militant reputations. 'Me and Jip 
[Paul Symonds] decided that we were going to keep our heads down,' remembers 
Gary Hinchliffe. But because of the countless grievances that arose, this was not 
always easy: 
47 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
48 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
49 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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They were riding twelve men out at a time, there were around 200 men on a shift. 
It was taking half an hour to ride the men out. But we were keeping our heads 
down! We were in the pit bottom, we were due out of the pit at quarter-past one, 
but it was quarter to two. The undermanager is stood there. Jip was getting 
madder and madder. And he just flipped: 'Can you just tell me something gaffer. 
Why does it take you ten minutes to ride us into the pit in a morning, and half an 
hour to ride us out at night?' I thought: 'Jip, shut up.' We dragged him onto the 
chair and out. I said, 'You soft bastard.' The next day, we came in and we were 
convinced that Jip would have to go out and answer to this. 50 
There was a point, though, when it was decided that enough was enough. Gary 
Hinchliffe was involved in an incident that probably proved to be a watershed in the 
miners' struggle at Frickley: 
For the first twelve months, I don't think that we were in a heading. Then, when 
we got back into the headings, when we got back on contract, some of the things 
that we used to get paid for before the strike had been terminated. The men who 
were the first back on contract would do anything bar go on strike. They would 
do anything bar argue over their money. We lost 'emergency', which is where 
you got paid the bonus that you'd earned if you were stood for any reason where 
it wasn't your fault. It wasn't part of your contract to put water pipes in and lay 
rails. But when we came to get our first contract, these men had accepted it. If 
you were stood, they had to pay you waiting time. But they were scrubbing it out, 
they weren't honouring it. Legally they had to pay this, they couldn't get out of it. 
So we said, 'Look, we've started this heading as we mean to go on. The first time 
that he fucks about with our money, we're going.' We weren't going to spend 
weeks arguing over it like everybody else, going into meaningless negotiations, 
and end up getting paid a bit. 51 
Such a situation finally arose. 'They turned us over for about four or five quid a 
shift,' Gary Hinchliffe recollects. Immediately the discrepancy was noticed, the men 
on the unit contacted the union office. The following day they were informed that 
Clay, the colliery manager, had refused to pay what they were due and so they 
decided to confront him instead of going down the pit: 
He walks in: 'Right, I am not having a £60,000 machine stood idle because you 
have got a bit ofan argument over a couple of pence. That's who I talk with over 
the incentive scheme, and if you're not happy with him [a branch official], get 
somebody else to do it for you.' He says, 'You're fuclcing sacked!' And he 
walked out of the room. So me and Jip looked at one another, and the union 
officials went charging after him. So I says to Jip, 'Well that's it then. Fetch the 
pit 5,>ut.' We were at the point of no return now. We'd made our decision about 
what w: were going to do: we were having the pit out, we were having the 
50 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
51 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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pickets out - we were like three jumps in front of everybody else, me and lip. We 
hadn't just got our pit out, we'd got the country out. Anyway, he came back 
through the door, he says, 'If you go back down the pit, I'll make it a final 
warning. You'll have your final warning, kick that machine up.' 'We ain't going 
down the pit, we want our money sorting out.' This took the wind out of his sails 
. . . So then he went again . 
. . . Clay comes back in the room: 'Look, I'm going to tell you lot something, 
the things that I've done to keep this pit open. Do you know that I've had men 
come to me who couldn't feed their families during the strike?' lip says, 'Oh, is 
that why you were chasing them off the coal stacks when there was all that coal 
all the way through the strike. Having the security on them, when they were just 
going to get a few cobbles to light a fire? That's how concerned you were!' 'I 
didn't do that!' 'You fucking did!' It got into this kind of argument. lip says, 
'You, you're taking the bread out of my kid's mouth, you bastard! That's my 
money, I've earned it, and if you don't pay it the pit's shutting down.' It was a 
humdinger of a row. It got to where lip was throwing chairs about; Clay was 
banging the table. Clay then storms out of the room. We are left in. We looks out 
of the window, there's a crowd of men, the afters shift, outside. 
Clay came in again: 'Tell those men to go down the pit!' 'I'm not telling them 
to go down the pit.' So the union went to tell them. They wouldn't go down 
unless they'd seen one of us out of the room to ask if we wanted backing up. So 
anyway, they went home. Word had got round that lip had flattened Clay. Clay 
said he'd lift the last warning, and he'd pay our waiting time. He'd sit through it 
again with the branch officials and he'd seriously consider taking up some of 
these things if we went down the pit. So I think we ended up going down the pit -
but most of the afters shift had gone home! 
. . . I think that was the first attempt at really digging the heels in over the 
incentive scheme. Up until then it had been accepted that the manager could do 
what he wanted. After that it gave everybody the confidence to go in and argue 
over their money . . . People had just accepted that they couldn't win anything. 
But we showed them, there and then, that you could; you could resist being 
threatened and bullied. If you just stood your ground, you were OK. 52 
In the testimony above, we are presented with one of the advantages of the oral 
history approach to data collection. Official statistics on industrial disputes merely 
tell us that here was a stoppage - that is, if the dispute was actually acknowledged -
but there is no emphasis on whether its outcome was favourable to the workers or 
the employers. Statistically, this was just a short stoppage, no different to countless 
others that took place in the coal industry. But we have seen that for those involved 
it held greater significance. And it was by standing firm in such a way that the ideas 
of solidarity and resistance that had gained widespread favour during the course of 
the Big Strike were retained at the Frickley despite the harsh industrial climate. Thus 
the fouvdations were laid for further and more sustained challenges to management. 
52 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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One year on 
A year after the miners had returned to work the Tories' prime strategy for the coal 
industry, crippling the NUM and streamlining the workforce, seemed well on course. 
As many as 31,000 miners had left the industry and 21 pits had closed since the 
strike. Although productivity had been raised massively, uncel1ainty within the 
industry remained due to the government's insistence that coal would have to break 
even; and fi!,1Ures released in late February 1986 showed that as many as two-thirds 
of Britain's pits did not match the government's criteria for remaining open. Making 
matters worse, oil prices were falling. 1 
The first anniversary of the end of the miners' strike also marked the fifth week of 
the most Important Industriat dispute of 1986: the lockout of printworkers working 
on The News oj the World, The Sun, The Times and Ihe Sunday Times as media 
tycoon Rupert Murdoch transferred his News International operations from Fleet 
Street to a new printing plant at Wapping in east London.2 As many miners now had 
personal contact with Murdoch's employees from during the Big Strike, and because 
they felt forever indebted to the Fleet Street workforce for their support, this was a 
dispute they could not ignore. As early as February 1986 the front page of Voice of 
Frick/ey" reminding Frickley NUM members of their obligation to the printworkers,,-
asked its readers not to buy any of Murdoch's publications" to pass a resolution at 
the branch for a £1 a week levy, and demanded that they 'get involved in any 
demonstration or picket lines in support of SOGAT 82.'3 Tony Short remembers 
visiting Wapping on numerous occasions: 
It was like being in the strike again. I never got involved in the organisation side 
of it, but I knew that it had to be done - it was the next stage from us. Once 
they'd thrashed us they were going for them, and they knew it . . . The only thing 
we could do was go down and do what we knew. We'd get a bus up in the 
Empire on a Saturday afternoon, and at that time you would get forty or fifty lads 
in the club. We ~sed to say, 'There's a bus going to Wapping, anybody want to 
goT and it used to get fiUed. 4 
But trade unionism was not supposed to operate in this manner anymore. In fact 
the News International dispute was the first great test of the new realist approach to 
combating employers. Brenda Dean, the SOGAT leader, and Tony Dubbins of the 
NGA, claimed to have learnt the lessons of the miners' strike. They argued that mass 
picketing and defiance of the law had been Arthur ScargiIl's folly, insisting that the 
key to victory in 1986 lay in winning 'public opinion' and stressing that unions were 
now harmless institutions which needed a few more legal rights. It mattered little 
that no amount of public sympathy and no amoWlt of 'peaceful picketing' had ever 
1 The Guardian, 26 February 1986. 
2 H.F. Gospel and G. Palmer, British Industrial Relations, (London, 1993), p.215. 
3- Voice of Frickley, No.4, February 1986. 
4 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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won an industrial stoppage.5 In the event, the dispute dragged on for a year and the 
finally collapsed.6 However, as Paul Symonds stresses, the respect for the 
printworkers continued long afterwards at FrickJey: 'Up until shutting, Frickley 
Colliery was a Sun-free zone, after Murdoch sacked them. It was a detested paper.,7 
~;Iore 'rag ups' 
At the end of April 1986, the National Coal Board (soon to be renamed British 
Coal) disclosed that its financial position had been transformed - a deficit of £875 
million in the year before the strike had been reduced to just £50 million. But those 
miners who saw a let up in the onslaught in all of this would have been bitterly 
disappointed. The industry's competitive position was said to have deteriorated 
because of the fall in oil prices, thus a further four pits were to close and three more 
were in the appeals procedure. 8 
But the anger and frustration at such announcements, and the continuing 
determination to hold the line against the pit management, meant that local 
stoppages Were still prevalent in Yorkshire. In mid March there was a protracted 
strike at Woolley over bonuses, which the miners won. And just afterwards, at 
Thurcroft, a pit that had been split down the middle at the end of the Big Strike, the 
miners walked out after they found out there were two UDM members at the pit, 
eventually forcing one of the men to re-join the NUM and the other to transfer to 
Creswell in Derbyshire. 9 There was a strike at Redbrook Colliery on 2 April to 
prevent management picking who should be transferred to other pits in the Area, and 
one at Wistow in the Selby coalfield after Easter when miners claimed they were 
being forced into working harder for less money. Again the pit management were 
forced to back down. 10 On 9 April the day shift and the afternoon shifts at Hatfield 
stopped work because some men had been forced to work with scabs. 11 Perhaps the 
most significant dispute in this period was a week-long strike at Armthorpe, which 
began on 19 May after a solitary miner - a well-known militant who had received 
three warning letters for 'ragging up' - picketed the pit to a halt over his own and 
another miner's dismissal. Armthorpe militants then picketed nearby Bentley 
Colliery. However, the strike came to a conclusion when the South Yorkshire Panel 
announced that support would only be forthcoming after three weeks. And so while 
there was evidence that basic trade-union principles were still being honoured, there 
was also evidence that many NUM branch officials had moved to the right. 12 
Scargill isolated 
This drift to the right within sections of the NUM was at its most stark when the 
Yorkshire Area leadership neglected to invite Arthur Scargill as a speaker to the 
5 Socialist Worker, 1 February and 8 March 1986. 
6 Gospel and Palmer, op. cit., p.216. 
7 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
8 THe Times, 30 April 1986. 
9 Socialist Worker, 5 April 1986. 
10 Socialist Worker, 12 April 1986. 
II Socialist Worker, 19 April 1986. 
12 Socialist Worker, 24 and 31 May 1986. 
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Yorkshire miners' gala in June. Nevertheless, the union's president did receive a 
hero's welcome by the rank and file when he made an appearance. 13 It was a similar 
story too when Scargill addressed the NUM conference in Tenby just afterwards, 
listing the demands the miners should expect if Labour returned to office. Among 
these were the reinstatement of all victimised miners and the restitution of all the 
union's assets seized by the courts. He criticised those who claimed there were 
alternatives to industrial action. 'With this government,' he said, 'no amount of new 
realism, persuasion or silent protest will shift it. Only direct action which carries 
economic impact can do that.' 14 However, according to The Guardian's labour 
editor, Keith Harper, Scargill's remarks were greeted with 'little enthusiasm. Some 
delegates, notably from Scotland and Yorkshire, either clapped politely or remained 
silent.' 15 Even Socialist Worker, which backed Scargill's attack on new realism, was 
forced to admit that the new realists were 'more in tune with majority opinion in the 
pits than the NUM president.' 16 The problem was that Scargill spoke in the abstract, 
and did not stress what action was possible. Neither did he put any emphasis on the 
increasingly'large number of local stoppages that were breaking out as the way 
forward and declare that the union should support all of these in the future. In 
private Scargill probably welcomed the mounting resistance in the Yorkshire 
coalfield, but this was never made public. He remained trapped because of his 
adherence to working within the official machinery of the union which he thought he 
had captured for the left. To have backed the wildcat strikes would have meant 
defying the Area leaders who were doing their utmost to dampen down the 
resistance. 
In August, there were a further three days of disruption at Armthorpe involving 
around 200 men; there were two 24-hour strikes at Hatfield - the latter one for the 
reinstatement of the pit's three remaining sacked miners; there was an overtime ban 
in operation in South Wales; and resolutions demanding an overtime ban were being 
passed at branch meetings throughout Yorkshire and Durham as frustration mounted 
over NUM members going almost two years without a pay rise. 17 
Frickley's first notable stoppage for almost six months also occurred in August, 
on the 22nd, when the presence of Ken Moses, now British Coal's technical director, 
sparked off a 24-hour lightening strike at the pit because of his role in the Big Strike: 
'As the official party toured the coal face at 9.] Oam., disgruntled miners started to 
walk out, refusing to work on. Their unofficial strike brought the pit to a standstill 
for three consecutive shifts with an estimated loss of 3,000 tonnes of coal 
. production.' 18 
Uncle Bob 
In September 1986 the aged Jan MacGregor retired from the chairmanship of British 
Coal to be replaced by Sir Robert Haslam, formerly the deputy chairman of ICI, 
13 Simons, 'The enemy within?', p.12. 
14 THe Guardian, 1 July 1986; Socialist Worker, 5 July 1986. 
15 The Gliardian, 1 July 1986. 
16 Socialist Worker, 5 July 1986. 
17 Socialist Worker, 2, 23 and 30 August 1986. 
18 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 28 August 1986. 
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chaimlan of Tate & Lyle, and latterly chairman of British Steel. According to l1ze 
Times,. 63-year-old 'Uncle Bob' had a 'maImer aIId style' that were 'a world apart 
from that of Sir laIl.' 19 Nevertheless he still pro{!lised to be a formidable foe for the 
miners~ indeed he had actually been Margaret Thatcher's first choice to take over 
from Sir Derek Ezra as chairmaIl of the NCB back in 19&2, hut only a serious illness 
had ruled him out of contention. 20 
Haslam's 'manner and style' were evident almost from his first day in his new 
post. On 8 September, without consulting the NUM, Haslam imposed the previous 
year's disputed pay deal on the union. As a result, all members of the NUM were to 
be paid an extra £8 a week, back-dated to 1 September.21 Although this seemed as 
if the new coal chief had ridden roughshod over the NUM, the reality was that in 
giving a rise of such proportions, Haslam showed he was wary of the miners' 
potential power and was hoping to buy peace in the pits by attracting the support of 
the NUM's Area leaders. But this promised to be a dangerous trap: at British Steel 
Haslam had slashed jobs and wages just as effectively as MacGregor had. 22 
The end of Clay 
There was also a change of personnel at the head of FrickIey' s management team in 
this period. Throughout 1986, Frickley, like other South Yorkshire Area collieries, 
was constantly breaking production records. But British Coal was intent on 
squeezing even more output from its workforce. Rank-and-file activists at Frickley 
may have beaten off the initial efforts to int(oduce the Doncaster Option incentive 
scheme at the pit but the issue never went away. Gary Hinchliffe remembers that: 
As far as Clay could see, and the Area manager, the root of all the problems at 
Frickley was this infernal, out of date, useless incentive scheme. 'Let's replace it 
and have a simpler one that hasn't got aU these man-minutes and stipulations. We 
are- going to make it simpler,' this was their argument . . . There was nothing 
wrong with the incentive scheme that we had. It was their plan. They invented it. 
They sold it to us. This was the package. We all contribute by putting something 
into the pie, we all get a cut of the pie. 100 per cent for them on the face~ 60 per 
cent for those inbye; 50 per cent for them at the bottom of the gate~ 40 per cent 
for those on the pit top. We all put in, we all got a share out; for everything.23 
But once they had been given the example of how to stand their ground against 
the pit manager, 'People then started to kick up against Clay,' recalls Gary 
Hinchliffe.24 Steve Gant remembers how there were numerous small-scale disputes 
over bonus payments in the final period under Clay: 
19 1he Times, 14 August 1986. 
20 lhe Times, 14 August 1986. 
21 1he Guardian, 9 September 1986. 
22 lhe Guardian, 9 September 1986; Socialist Worker, 13 September 1986. 
23 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
24 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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... each face and each heading had their own task, and their own disputes and 
their own arguments. These were all more or less taken up individually. If the 
manager increased the production norms carte blanche, then it would be a pit 
issue. Other than that, they were to do with individual units and individual faces 
arguing over their own conditions they were working in. Most of these got 
sorted. Occasionally they would get no joy, Clay would give them no more - and 
that would be it: phones would ring, people would be out of the pit. It would then 
roll round 24 hours. We made that more or less the unofficial union policy: that 
once one shift had gone back, it would roll the whole 24 hours, so that we had all 
been the same, we had all lost a shift. We stuck together for that 24 hour. They 
knew then that if a shift was sent back on afters, the night shift wouldn't work 
and the day shift wouldn't work the following morning. They were going to lose 
24-hour's production if it got that far. 25 
With mounting unrest under his regime, at the end of September 1986 Donald 
Clay was finally despatched to Silverwood and replaced by new manager Tony 
Lawson,26 or TL as he became known. 
TL 
Tony Lawson was to become a legendary figure to every Frickley activist. There was 
only one reason why he had arrived: to put a stop to their influence. And it was soon 
evident to the activists that the new manager had done his homework as to whom 
were the likely ringleaders in the pit. Tony Short recalls the first time he met TL: 
The first time I saw him was down the pit. He used to wear blue overalls. He 
always had knee pads on and a stick. He came on the unit and asked for me, 
'Who's Short, who's this with the big mouth?' That's exactly what he came out 
with! Of course, I'm laid in the chocks spitting baccy, not taking a bit of notice of 
him. He came with that attitude: 'I'm the manager, you'll do whatever I say.' I 
think we were on 05s and I was supposed to be cleaning up in front of a chock 
and I wouldn't-do it because it was snap time. When Lawson came down with his 
cronies, Terry Bradley was shovelling up. He pulled the chock in the wrong way 
and knocked all the clogs off at the back. We couldn't have done owt worse 
when he first came to meet us!27 
Vic France, the co-editor of Voice of Frickley, was similarly surprised at the new 
manager knowing who he was: 
I remember that he'd picked up on my name, and he'd only been there a few days. 
I was working in the surface compound and he was walking across the gantry, 
and some guy who worked in the compound didn't have a helmet on. Suddenly I 
heard this voice shouting: 'Vic!' I looked up and there's this Lawson guy. I'd 
never even seen him before, but he was telling me to tell this guy to put his helmet 
25 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
26 Frickley Newsletter, October 1986. 
27 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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on! So he'd obviously gone out of his way to find out who he might have 
problems with ... He must have seen the issue after Clay left: 'Good riddance to 
bad rubbish.' And the word that we got straight away was that he thought this 
was slanderous, and that he wanted something doing about it. So that may have 
been how my name had filtered through to him. But I was surprised that he had 
shouted my name when he hadn't even seen me before.28 
At the top of Lawson's blacklist were the prominent Socialist Workers Party 
members Paul Symonds and Steve Gant. 'He knew about me before we actually 
met!' recalls Steve Gant. 
1 was on the consultative committee, and when they were introducing people 
round the table to the new manager, he said, 'Oh yes, Steve.' So obviously he'd 
been in my records, and had been told where the problems were coming from. 
There wouldn't have just been me. He would have known about Paul Symonds, 
and what he called 'The Niggers' Clock'. He was going to stop that, because he 
said that they were the ones who were running the pit: 'Them under the clock in 
the Niggers'. That was one of his quotes. Plus, at that time, they fetched in that 
Mr Deans. He was a bastard as well; another one who came with the hard-headed 
approach. He was the undermanager. He was going to stamp it all out, all this 
militancy. He was going to have no shit off anybody. 29 
It was not long before Steve Gant clashed with his new adversary: 
We were in a consultative committee meeting - it was about two years after the 
strike - that consisted of the deputies, management and the unions. We were sat 
in the office, Lawson came in. I had a sheepskin coat on. It was one that I used to 
go picketing in, and 1 still had Coal Not Dole badges on it. Lawson sits down, 
opens the meeting. The first thing that he says is, 'Steve, can you take that coat 
off?' 1 said, 'Why? What's the problem?' 'You're offending me with your badges. 
Take your coat off!' 1 said to him, 'The coat's stopping on. The badges were on 
before you came, and the badges will be on when you go. My coat is stopping 
on.' He said, 'Well leave the meeting.' 1 refused. I said, 'If it offends you that 
much, you leave the meeting.' He did! He jumped up and walked out like a 
ten-tonner, and banged the door behind him. We heard an all-mighty crash down 
the passage. He'd actually kicked a door off the hinges further down the corridor. 
Everybody in the meeting was looking at each other: 'His fucking head's gone!' 
It had. He'd lost his head. 
About ten minutes passed, we are sat there, no meeting, wondering what's 
going off Steve Tulley said, 'I best go and see what's going off.' He went out to 
try and find him. He couldn't, so he came back. He said, 'Fucking hell. He's 
kicked the door of the hinges, and there's a right hole through it. He's gone 
upstairs back to his office.' About twenty minutes passed, and we are still sat 
there in this non-meeting, before Lawson decides to come back down - he must 
28 Vic France, interviewed by the author. 
29 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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have dipped rus head under some cold water. He came back into the meeting, the 
first thing that he does is apologise, 'I'm sony about that, I shouldn't act that 
way. I apologise to everybody concerned. My mistake. I will now declare the 
meeting open. Will you take your coat off Steve, just for trus meeting?' I said, 
'No, I won't take it off.' Then he just carried on with the meeting regardless. 
That was one of my first clashes with Tony Lawson. But when you've got a 
man's blood boiling that much, you know that there's going to be some kind of 
revenge coming somewhere.30 
The 'will to win' 
Writing in the management's Frickley Newsletter of October 1986, Tony Lawson 
explained what he expected from his subordinates: 
I was appointed Manager on 29 September 1986, which I proudly accepted, to 
become part of what I feel, at this stage, is a team of Management, Officials and 
Workmen with a WILL TO WIN in an ever more competitive atmosphere ... We 
are currently losing just over £ 1 million and if we can continue with our current 
good performances, we can eradicate the deficit by the end of OctoberlWeek 1 of 
November. Over the next few months, I shall be looking to bring our operating 
costs down to an acceptable level. 31 
Gary Hutsby would become active in the NUM during Lawson's reign at 
Frickley. On rus very first contact with the new manager he was given an exhibition 
of what exactly the 'will to win' entailed: 
The first time that I ever laid eyes on trus bloke was when I was on a button . . . 
he says, 'What's your name?' I told rum. He never introduced rumself AlII knew 
was that he was this right big bloke who had got a stroppy attitude about rum. I 
thought that this had to be the new gaffer. He started ranting and raving about the 
rollers being made up with dust and muck and that it was a hazard. I had cleaned 
the outer edges of the rollers, but right in the centre of the belt, where the central 
rollers were, it was made up solid. I said that I had cleaned the outer edges but -
and I shouldn't have been doing this anyway - the shovel that I had was too big 
to get into the centre of the rollers in the middle of the belt. I remember him 
saying, 'Well this isn't good enough.' I said, 'What do you want me to do? Do 
you want me to stop the job?' He snapped at me sometrung like: 'There's no need 
to stop the job!' And then he got on rus hands and knees, and he got this wooden 
wedge that they used to stick under tram wheels to stop them rolling, and he 
shoved the length of his arm into the rollers and started hacking at this muck with 
this wooden wedge. I just thought, 'You are fucking mad. You deserve to get 
your arm torn off' And then he turned round and said, 'See, it's that easy.' I just 
said, 'Aye, all right.' Then he went off to the face. 32 
30 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
31 Frickley Newsletter, October 1986. 
32 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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Other men were also given exhibitions of the standards Lawson expected, as 
Robert Walker recalls: 
Some of the lads were in the yard. It was pis sing it down and they asked for some 
waterproofs and some warmer clothes. This day it was freezing, and he went 
down the yard with no top on, bare-chested, walking round the pit yard saying, 
'It's not that cold, what's up with you?' But then he was going back to his office. 
That's the sort of bloke he was.33 
Intimidation and bullying were central to Lawson's whole approach. 'He set off 
by attacking the deputies,' remembers Paul Symonds: 
Pits are hard places to police. People are working in the ends of dark tunnels, and 
so it's not as if they can stand over you and watch your every move. The main 
management instrument for policing you was the deputies. There was one deputy 
for every-unit. By and large, a lot of deputies were either sympathetic towards us 
or they were intimidated by us, and they just wanted something to write in their 
report book at the end of the shift. I think that Lawson cottoned onto this and so 
he started making their lives a misery. And obviously, in tum, they started to 
make our lives a misery. So Lawson, very quickly, became very unpopular. Just in 
terms of his size, he was big; and he was loud. The deputies used to quake in their 
boots near him. One deputy told us about an occasion when Lawson was coming 
onto a unit, and written on the bars and the rings was: 'Lawson is a bastard,' 
'Lawson, we hope you die of cancer,' general abuse about the manager, which 
was a common thing. Lawson sawall this graffiti and he shouted this deputy 
over, he shone his light at it all and he said, 'Look at these for references kid. 
That's when you know that you are doing a goodjob!' That's the sort of bloke he 
was. He took great pleasure out of people hating his guts.34 
Tony Short recalls a bizarre incident when a member of the management team 
was ridiculed during a special meeting one Saturday morning: 'He was sat there, and 
his personnel manager came in wearing a track suit and T-shirt. And he made him go 
out of the room and put a tie on over his T-shirt! He was one of those types.'35 
Tony Lawson seems to have favoured British Coal's strategy of circumventing the 
union, as Gary Hinchliffe testifies: 
He'd come down, open the snuff tin. He'd stand and have a talk with you. His 
way of running the pit was to have his officials frightened to death of him, but the 
men thinking that they could talk to him. He'd come down to me regularly and 
say: 'Now then Gary, how are we?' ... There was no difference between him and 
the right wing on the union. He didn't agree with what was going off; he didn't 
vote Tory: 'But we've got to keep Frickley open until the next Labour 
government. The best way that we can do that is to sell all our principles down 
33 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
34 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
35 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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the river, cut in overtime, go against everything that Yorkshire Area says. Let's 
have the tonnage bonus in.' He never stopped trying. He worked at it all the time. 
Behind everything that he did, that was the ulterior motive. He used to try - and 
he was very successful at it as well - to divide the union officials away from each 
other. He'd certain people on the branch who he could pull away and use. It was 
like listening to one or two on the branch, listening to Lawson. He browbeat and 
bullied Steve Tulley. It ended up where he pulled him away from the rest of the 
branch. You didn't dare trust Steve Tulley in a room with TL.36 
Lawson's approach seemed to be paying dividends almost immediately he took 
charge at Frickley. On 20 November 1986 the Hemsworth and South Elmsall 
Express proclaimed that 'Frickley tops the production table' in South Yorkshire. 
Output at the pit had reached 6.6 tonnes per manshift compared to the national 
average of3.5 tonnes. The pit's new chief told the paper that: 
... for the first time Frickley output has topped 30,000 tonnes, putting it in the 
big league. We want to be able to do it consistently because I believe we have the 
potential to stay amongst the big hitters. The aim is to tum Frickley into a 1.5 
million tonnes a year mine, bring down production costs and produce regular 
good bonus money for the miners. 37 
Over the following months the Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express would 
consi stently carry reports of the South Yorkshire Area's, and in particularly 
Frickley's, productivity achievements. On 31 December it was reported that 
Frickley's driveage record had been 'smashed' by development workers who had 
completed 100 metres of roadway in five days. This was 10 metres further than the 
previous record set a year earlier. The report added that 'each of the 15 men has 
been presented with one of the pit's yellow jerseys by Mr Lawson in recognition of 
their outstanding achievement at the pit.' 38 At the end of March 1987 the paper 
announced that a new pit record of 3 1,179 tonnes had been set the previous week by 
the 1,090 men at- Frickley and that the colliery was on track to break the million 
tonne barrier for the first time for over a decade. 39 Then the May issue of Coal 
News proclaimed that the pit had indeed re-joined 'the coal millionaires club'. It was 
a 'super-human effort' stated Tony Lawson.40 
But these reports in the press about new production records did not always 
impress Frickley militants. As Gary Hinchliffe explains: 
One of the things with Mr Lawson was that he was very good with the 
accountancy figures. If he wanted records to be broken, they could be broken ... 
There was production borrowed from the year before. We were still paying some 
of that million tonnes back three months into the fol1owing year. If he wanted a 
36 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
37 Hem~worth and South Elmsall Express, 20 November 1986. 
38 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 31 December1986. 
39 Hemsworth and ,South Elmsall Express, 26 March 1987. 
40 Coal News, May 1987. / 
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heading to do ] 00 metres; that heading did ] 00 metres. But the point that every 
other heading didn't do any yardage didn't seem to matter ... He put units onto 
three shifts, so that it meant that faces were back before we'd got headings to 
replace them. It was a propaganda exercise. He was good at them, was TL. 41 
Part of the propaganda exercise was that miners would be presented with special 
awards, such as ties and yellow jerseys, for outstanding performances. But not 
everyone was thankful. 'I never used to go and collect owt from the office,' says 
Robert Walker: 
1 got a tankard and a bottle of beer. My tankard and bottle of beer must've got 
knocked down when they knocked the pit down, because I never went to collect 
it ... They were trying to slap a carrot in front of you. But a bottle of beer! It's 
just taking the piss, isn't it?42 
Tony Short held the same sentiments: 
1 never collected one in my life. They had tankards, they had bottles of beer, if 
you attended all year you got a pen. 1 never used to have time off, but I would 
miss a shift on purpose because they would put your name in newsletters or on 
the phone. I told the management, 'I don't want my name going in anything like 
that.' There would be 'King Arthur' - that would be Arthur Thorpe - or 'King 
CuftY' set so many rings. Some of the men used to love it. They would give you a 
yellow T-shirt with a daft slogan on it if you did four or five bars or five strips in 
a shift. Paul Sharpe did the best thing, he got his tankard, took it in to the 
blacksmith, put it under the jack-hammer, flattened it, and nailed it to the door. 43 
Not surprisingly, discontent soon started to surface over Lawson's manner and 
style, as Gary Hinchliffe remembers: 
as TL came in; Geoff Siddons went out. They might have overlapped for a couple 
of weeks. And Johnny Stones returned to the pit [after a heart attack]. And 
within a month, I would say, Johnny Stones and TL were at loggerheads. Lawson 
came up with 'The Frickley Money Spinner'! Johnny Stones was staunch 
Yorkshire Area policy and the Yorkshire Area Incentive Scheme. He couldn't 
budge Johnny off it. In the end, he refused to sit down and negotiate with Johnny 
over the incentive scheme. He wouldn't sit down and go through the sheets like 
Clay had done ... Lawson had disputes on his hands within the first month over 
this~ back and forward, he wanted to deal directly with the men. 44 
Well within a year of the new manager being appointed, his aggressive manner 
would rebound on British Coal in spectacular fashion. But before we come to that 
41 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
42 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
43 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
44 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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we need to examine other, wider issues in the industry which were also preparing the 
ground for this showdown. 
Margam 
One issue dominated NUM politics for much of the spring of 1987: the decision by a 
South Wales Area conference in Porthcawl on 7 March to agree to six-day working 
at the proposed £90 million Margam superpit. 45 South Wales president Des Dutfield 
justified the decision to abandon conditions that had been in practice since 1908 by 
arguing that, 'if we don't accept six-day working we give the UDM and other unions 
a beeline to get into South Wales.' Labour leader Neil Kinnock praised the move for 
its 'courage and foresight'.46 But NUM militants at Frickley did not quite see it in 
this way and so travelled down to Wales to lobby the South Wales delegates. 'We 
just saw it as the thin end of the wedge,' argues Paul Symonds: 
that it was going to lead to six-day working, that you would have to work on a 
Saturday afternoon or a Saturday night - and it would be compulsory. It was part 
of the general offensive by the Coal Board. If they'd have got this in South Wales 
it would have ended up coming in everywhere. We found out the night before 
that the Welsh NUM were going to vote on it. We got a call - it must have come 
from Scargill - to get as many miners as we could down there to lobby their 
meeting. And we did. They were arguing for it. Big rows were starting to emerge 
inside the NUM. People had talked about new realism and stuff, but this was the 
first place where the NUM was accepting six-day working in the pits.47 
The renewed sacked miners' campaign 
The Welsh decision may have been a blow to the militants, but not everything was 
going the new realists' way in the industry. Given the significance of the miners' 
defeat in 1984-85, the mounting resistance over day-to-day issues in the pits was 
phenomenal. There had been as many as 237 stoppages involving 65,700 workers in 
the coal industry in 1986. Eight times as many working days had been lost to strike 
action in coal mining than the average for the rest of British industry. Speaking in 
February 1987, a worried Sir Robert Haslam complained that there were only 15 of 
the country's 125 pits which had not witnessed strike action during the previous 
twelve months. Nearly two-thirds of lost production had been in Yorkshire pits.48 
1987 promised to see a similar high level of struggle. 
One of the first major stoppages that year began on 16 February when 3,000 
miners in the £ 1.4 billion showcase complex at Selby stopped work for a week over 
lost bonus payments, a dispute described in The Guardian as 'the tip of the iceberg 
of grumbling discontent in the coalfields. ,49 In the first few days of April there was 
45 A. J. Taylor, 'Consultation, conciliation and politics in the British coal industry', 
Industrial Relations Journal, Vo1.19, No.3, Autumn 1988, pp.228-229. . 
46 Th; Guardian, 9 March 1987; ,Socialist Worker, 14 March and 4 April 1987. 
47 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
48 Coal News, February 1987; Socialist Worker, 7 March 1987; The Guardian, 17 
February 1987; The Times, 19 February 1987. 
49 The Guardian, 17 February 1987. 
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disruption at Armthorpe after deputies were found to be carrying out electricians' 
duties. 50 During the following week there was a one-day strike at Brodsworth and a 
two-day strike at Frickley, on 9 and 10 of April, over high levels of coal dust. 
Workers on one particular face at the pit had suffered high levels of dust for a 
number of weeks. The men had been finishing early to clean the dust out of their 
eyes, but management stopped this. These miners then called the rest of the pit out 
in support. A union meeting decided to go back to work but agreed to refuse to 
work in areas with high dust levels. The Frickley miners also passed a motion 
demanding that the Yorkshire Area instigate an overtime ban as part of the campaign 
against the Wheeler Plan. 51 
The resistance to British Coal's attacks was not limited to Yorkshire pits. In 
mid-April both UDM and NUM members walked out in a 24-hour strike at Ollerton 
after an injured miner had his wages stopped. And on 21 April, seven of the eight 
pits in Staffordshire and Warwickshire struck for 24-hours for the reinstatement of 
miners sacked in the Big Strike. Around 8,000 miners were out, more than actually 
came out in '1984-85.52 
On Friday 1 May miners at the old Doncaster Area pits of Askern, Hatfield, 
Armthorpe, Rossinf,rton, Goldthorpe and Frickley collieries also took part in a 
24-hour stoppage in support of sacked colleagues after they were greeted at the pits 
by picket lines manned by sacked Kent miners. 53 Paul Symonds was mid-way 
through his shift on days when he received a phone call explaining that there were 
some Kent miners picketing the pit: 
There wasn't just me who was a committee man knocking about, there were 
people such as Paul Hinchliffe. We decided that we shouldn't be underground 
when we'd got pickets at the pit, so we came out on strike. There were some men 
working in a heading - they were road men - somebody said that we had better 
tell them. We couldn't get in touch with them by phone so we put a conveyer belt 
into reverse and I went down to them. I was wondering if I would end up having 
a big argument with them, I didn't know how they would take it, they weren't 
known as militant men. I got there, they said, 'What's up?' I said, 'Come on lads, 
get your coats on, some Kent miners have put a picket on the pit.' l'd been 
wondering how I would convince them but they just said, 'Right, that's it let's get 
our coats on.' They just downed tools straight away. I was over the moon about 
this.54 
The sacked miners had arranged a follow-up meeting at Armthorpe Miners' 
Welfare Club that day. But the contingent of Frickley miners who went there soon 
found themselves at odds with the tactics envisaged by the Kent miners. The most 
prominent personality among the sacked miners was Terry French who had just 
served a prison sentence for his part in the Big Strike. 'He seemed to have got this 
50 ... \~o~ialist Worker, 11 April 1987. 
51 Socialist Worker, 18 April ]987. 
52 Socialist Worker, 2 May 1987. 
53 Yorkshire Post, 2 May 1987. 
54 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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plan, and there was no way on earth they were going to deviate from it,' recalls 
Steve Gant: 
Their strategy was going to be wildcat strikes. Nobody knew where they were 
going to hit and nobody knew when, so that management couldn't campaign 
against them. But you might not see them for a week or two, and then they could 
go into the Barnsley Area, hoping to shut that down for a day, move to another 
Area a month later and shut that down for a day. Though we argued that any 
action is better than none, and they had shown the support was there by shutting 
the Doncaster Area down, we said thaCif they were really serious about defending 
the sacked miners ... once the ball was rolling, shut it down properly. We were 
arguing this in the meetings. But they would never deviate from their line. We 
found out afterwards that the instructions for this had come via the national 
executive. That was how they saw that you should run these disputes. It had 
actually been planned at a higher level than Terry French. It had been planned by 
the bureaucracy, by the top men in the union. But it was a poor way of going 
about things. Obviously it collapsed. It collapsed not long after. 55 
The next major plan for the campaign was to picket out the Barnsley Area pits on 
Monday 18 May. On 17 May a further meeting was held at Wakefield Labour Club 
in preparation for this. However, Frank Clarke, the right-wing branch president from 
South Kirkby Colliery, and other Yorkshire branch officials put in an appearance and 
argued against the action, claiming it did not help threatened pits which needed to 
carry on working so as to increase output.56 Because of this, 'Come Monday,' says 
Paul Symonds: 
we decided that we should go and give them some moral support at Kirkby, 
because we knew Frank Clarke, we lived in the same village as him, and we knew 
if we were there it would be much harder for him to tell the men to go past the 
Kent pickets. We went as bystanders, but to help carry the argument. But, of 
course, we weren't on strike that day because they'd decided not to picket us, so 
a number of us put rest days in because we didn't want to miss out on the action. 
I can't remember exactly who was there - there was certainly me, Gant, Tommo, 
maybe Gary Hinchliffe and Shorty - but a handful of us went down to Kirkby pit 
at four o'clock in the morning. When we got there, there were no Kent miners 
there. The day shift started to roll up for work. We were stood there and they 
were saying, 'What are you lads doing here?' We said, 'The Kent miners are 
putting a picket line on.' Most of them were saying, 'Oh, all right then,' and then 
turning round and going home. We were hoping that these Kent miners would 
hurry up and arrive. Soon, the bulk of the men started to arrive. And then Frank 
Clarke and all the union officials arrived. So by now there were about two 
hundred men stood at the end of Kirkby pit lane; and there was just us, a handful 
of miners from Frickley pit - and we'd got rest days in! We are thinking: 'Fucking 
hel1!' Frank Clarke said to us, 'Well they are not here yet.' But we said, 'We were 
55 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
56 Socialist Worker, 23 May 1987. 
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out last week, you've got to show solidarity.' We were in an impossible situation. 
And the next thing that happened was that a car pulled up with Joe Henry in it 
and a couple of Kent miners. They shouted, 'Come on, they've called it off' 
They'd called it off and half the day shift had gone home! So we just disappeared. 
We'd put a holiday in and gone and picketed another pit Qut!57 
This saw the end of the campaign. Rather than building on the bitterness in the 
pits and develop the sacked miners' fight, the Yorkshire Area leadership, with an eye 
on not harming Labour's chances in the coming general election - now called for 11 
June - contacted all the branch officials in the coalfield demanding that no further 
action be taken if sacked miners turned up at pits again. 5& 
Vibrations 
The Frickley miners were actually on strike as the electorate went to the polls. The 
stoppage, which spread over four days, began on Wednesday 10 June when 
managemenf asked miners working on the afternoon shift to travel to an alternative 
shaft because of a breakdown. There had been a long-standing worry amongst the 
miners over vibrations when riding down this shaft, and the issue had gone through 
all the 'proper' channels, as Lawrence Gertig, the craftsmen's representative on the 
colliery's consultative committee remembers: 
It went on for a period of time. The management kept saying, 'It's all right, we've 
done this test, we've done that test.' And then ooe day the men just turned round 
and said, 'That's it, we've had enough, we are not going down the pit.59 
Because of the men's refusal, management stated that pay would be docked for 
the delay. This prompted a walkout of the whole afternoon shift and then spread to 
the entire workforce. What sticks in Gary Hinchliffe's memory of the dispute was 
manager Lawson's remarks to the men: 'Thank Steve Gant for me.' 
In other words; he'd got Steve'"s card marked then. I think that Steve was one of 
the main ones refusing to travel. I remember this one because the shaft men even 
came up - the shaft men were notoriously right wing. They were 
seven-days-a-week men, twelve and fourteen-hour shifts. But even they said that 
this shaft wasn't safe.60 
On the Friday, a meeting was held and the men decided to go back to work. 
However, when the Monday day shift returned, they told management they were not 
prepared to wait two hours to be transported underground and so went home once 
more. Production eventually resumed on the afternoon shift.61 
57 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
58 Sociali~~t Worker, 16 and 23 May 1987. 
59 Lawrence Gertig, interviewed by the author. 
60 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
61 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 17 June 1987. 
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CHAPTER TEN: THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
New disciplinary procedures· 
The general election result was a terrible blow to the millions of trade unionists who 
had put their faith in the election of a Labour administration, with the Tories getting 
back in office with their majority hardly dented. What the miners could expect in the 
following period was summed up in the Financial Times editorial on the day the 
election results were announced: 'the slow, painstaking business of raising efficiency 
closer to intemationallevels has to go on ... ' 1 
Alongside the Coal Board's efforts to raise productivity was an attempt to tighten 
up on working practices and disciplinary measures. Frickley NUM branch delegate 
Johnny Stones remembers that: 
We had already, within the Nationalisation Act, got a disciplinary procedure 
which had operated and was agreed and signed within the industry. But the Coal 
Board and the government decided to issue one based upon the guidelines of 
ACAS. That was mooted and debated in March, April, May time. 2 
What was being 'mooted and debated' was the Code of Conduct. Under these 
reb'1llations, colliery management were to be given licence to dismiss miners for any 
criminal offences they had been charged with outside their pit, whether they were 
found guilty or not. Those miners who were issued with written warnings could now 
be sacked if they stepped out of line at any time within the following three years, 
indeed management could now sack any miner without notice for a single instance of 
misconduct even where he had no current warnings under the procedure. In 
addition, and as Frickley miners were to find out, the Code gave management the 
power to listen to charges against a group of miners on an individual basis, and 
furthermore managers could now choose which union official they wanted to 
represent men at disciplinary hearings. A new set of offences were also introduced, 
such as 'behaviour not conducive to good employee relations', absence from work 
without prior authority, and late arrival at work. Lastly, the Code also abolished the 
final stage of the old appeal system which consulted an independent umpire.3 The 
intent of all this was made explicit later when the director of industrial relations at 
British Coal, Kevan Hunt, described the new disciplinary procedure to the press as a 
means of 'ridding the industry of a culture of industrial conflict' by removing 
'militants whose actions cannot be tolerated.,4 
Rothesay 
The main issue on the minds of most Frickley activists during the early summer of 
1987, however, was still the Welsh NUM's decision on six-day working; and it was 
because of this that two 18-seater minibuses full of Frickley miners travelled to 
Rothesay in Scotland to lobby the NUM conference in the first week in luly. 'One 
1 Financial Times, 12lune 1987. 
2 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
3 Gibbon and Bromley, 'From and institution to a business?', p.79. 
4 Cited in ibid., p.79. 
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went up at night and the other followed us up in the morning,' recalls Steve Gant. 
He particularly remembers visiting Rothesay because, on arrival, he went to the 
conference building to arrange for some visitors' passes for the Frickley contingent, 
but ended up in a quarrel with one of the architects of six-day working: 
... as I was tuming to go out and get my head down for an hour, there was Des 
Outfield and George Rees and all the Welsh delegates walking up. So as 1 was 
walking past [ ended up arguing with Des Dutfield about six-day working: 'You 
want fucking, fetching this up. We shouldn't even be here lobbying this 
conference.' He started shouting back, and the argument got more and more 
heated. He was saying, 'You'll not listen to the arguments.' I said, 'I was at 
Porthcawl, I heard your arguments down there. They were wrong then, and they 
are wrong now. And you know they are wrong.' He got really angry then, he was 
saying, 'You shouldn't have been down Porthcawl.' 1 said, 'This is a national 
union.' [t got like that. A few more words and we would have been wrestling on 
the floor: But when 1 looked round, all the foyer was chock-a-block, and you 
could hear a pin drop; everybody was just watching me and Des Dutfield having a 
go.5 
Despite the debacle over Margam, the Frickley contingent were encouraged by 
the response of the delegates in the debate on the Code of Conduct. 'They were 
saying that we'd got to fight it, that it would be the death of the union,' remembers 
Paul Symonds: 
You could see the top table clapping away at every speech that condemned the 
Code of Conduct. And so it wasn't a surprise that we started to think that the 
Code of Conduct was a bad thing, that everybody in the union was against it, 
from the union president down to the rank-and-file delegates.6 
The conference delegates had been disturbed enough by the new disciplinary 
proceedure to can for a ballot on industrial action - most likely to be an overtime 
ban. 3,000 miners in South Wales were already on written warnings, and the 
possibility of dismissal within the next three years, after taking industrial action over 
coal concessions. In Durham, an NUM branch official had been disciplined under the 
Code for handing out leaflets, while a Notts miner had been fined £150 by 
. management following a scuffle outside a pub. There was even the case of a miner 
who had been fined £500 by management because his wife, following a tiff, had told 
them he had pilfered small amounts of British Coal property.7 What the new Code 
held in store for union activists was made plain at Stillingfleet on 13 July when the 
pit's NUM branch secretary, Ted Scott, was suspended and then sacked for 
'industrial misconduct' after having instructed his members about Yorkshire NUM's 
policy on not cutting coal at weekends. 8 
5 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
6 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
7 The Guardian, 17 July 1987; Socialist Worker, 25 July 1987. 
8 York.. .. hire Miner, October 1987. 
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With British Coal going full out to introduce six-day working and increased 
output alongside the new disciplinary measures, the miners were going to have to 
fight hard at some stage if they were to resist this offensive. But unbeknown to the 
Frickley contingent at Rothesay, an earlier incident at their own pit was in the 
process of developing into a decisive test over the. Code of Conduct. 
The o.rigins of the Code of Conduct dispute 
The NUM conference had actually taken place while Frickley Colliery was closed for 
its annual two-weeks' holiday from Friday 26 June until Monday 13 July. During this 
period the latest issue of the pit management's Frickley Newsletter had been 
despatched, with the foreboding message from the pit's manager that the thirteen 
weeks period to the end of June had been disastrous. The pit had lost £1.25 million 
and this would lead to a £10 mitlion deficit by the following March. One of the 
factors which had cost output, argued Tony Lawson, 'has been "rag outs" etc.' He 
continued: 
Without dwelling on the individual causes, I wish to make my position clear: a) I 
will pay men for the time they are in the pit and working. I will not pay them for 
time spent on the surface. b) I will retain the right to deploy people and I expect 
men to go to the work they are sent to do. 
I have always been a fair and reasonable manager", and I will lead Frickley in 
the right direction to maintain its capacity., If you prefer to follow a certain 
element of the workforce (whom you all know), then I can see big problems at 
:Fricklcy.9 
As we shall see, faced with such belligerence, it was this 'certain element' whom. 
the workforce would follow. 
The initial wrangle that led to the Code of Conduct dispute had actually taken 
place at Frickley on the last working day before the holiday. It began in the Big Pit 
when a deputy confronted five men who were taking a late snap break. The men 
claimed they had worked through their break, but British Coal argued they intended 
finishing early for the holiday.lO Jeff Johnson had just been elected to the Frickley 
NUM branch committee and it was this which led him to be among the first miners 
at the pit to fall foul of the new disciplinary measures: 
... in the end he [the deputy] ordered these blokes out of the pit. I was there. If 
you stay down the pit when a deputy's given you an instruction, its a sackablc 
offence. I'd just got on the union at this time and I thought: 'Well I'm here, I've 
heard it all, I'll go out and represent these lads.' So I went out of the pit 
The first accusation against us was: 'You've left your place of work early 
without permission: So our argument was: 'We've been sent out by the deputy', 
The deputy denied it. So we said, 'Right, it's a dispute between the deputy and 
the lads who have been sent out.' In normal circumstances we'd go into a 
meeting with the deputies' union, management, the NUM and the people involved 
9 Frickley Newsletter, July 1987. 
10 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 22 July 1987. 
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dispute; find out who is telling the trut~ face to face. We were refused pelTI1ission 
for that to happen. 11 
During the holidays, the five men involved received letters from Lawson stating 
that they would have to face individual disciplinary hearings on their return to work. 
When they did go back on 13 July, they refused to attend the hearings,12 because as 
Jeff Johnson recalls: 
You weren't allowed to hear what was said against you so that you could 
counteract it and say, 'No, that's not true, this is the way it happened.' You 
weren't allowed to hear what your mates said to see if you were all singing from 
the same hymn book. He said he would judge what had happened and we 
couldn't even have a sort of jury trial by a group. Unless I could hear the 
allegations made against me, I didn't know how to put my defence forward. It 
was against all the forms of democracy that I knew of or the legal system. We 
weren't even allowed anything similar to going into a magistrates' court. So we 
said, 'You can stick it, we're not going in.' He then brought it round that by 
refusing to go into the meeting we'd broke the Code of Conduct. 13 
After this, the five men were refused their underground checks, and thus denied 
permission to go. down the pit. Their workmates stopped work in support and 
eventually all of the 900 NUM members at Frickley were on strike. The following 
day a mass meeting at the Pretoria Working Men's Club voted by a massive majority 
to stay out indefinitely. Robert Walker remembers that feelings were running high 
over the issue. The victimised miners were, 'really good workers, they never caused 
rag ups or anything like that. It was surprising that it was them ... Everybody was 
mad about it.'14 'Ifit had been somebody like me, Gant, Jip or Tommo,' says Tony 
Short, ' ... the lads would probably have said "sack them." But with it being them, 
older blokes, it was a bonus for us.' 15 
Although there was strong support for the victimised miners, the course that the 
latest strike would take was in the balance almost from the start. A section within the 
branch leadership openly argued for the dispute to go through the 'nolTI1al' channels, 
to consult the Doncaster Panel. Militants such as Steve Gant saw things differently: 
... we'd been through Panel meetings, and we'd no faith at all in the Panel. We 
knew exactly what they'd do: the strike would just disappear and these lads 
would end up being disciplined. We knew that if we didn't fight it now, we would 
end up with the Code of Conduct being implemented. It would give the gaffers 
more confidence. These are the things that we were arguing from the floor of the 
general meeting. After a heated debate, the officials wouldn't move. They wanted 
to go through the Panel. We argued against it, and won the vote! We'd been 
11 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
12 Hemswbrth and South Elmsall Express, 22 July 1987. 
13 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
14 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
15 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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saying that we should be sending pickets out and going for it. That resulted in the 
branch officials walking oIT the stage. Somebody shouted, 'Well what are we 
doing?' The officials shouted back, 'See Ganty and Jip. They are in charge of it,' 
and they walked straight out of the meeting. 
So me and Jip got back on the stage and just carried the meeting on from 
there. We announced that we were going picketing. We announced how 
important it was going to be that everybody turns up. \Ve asked them all if they 
could· get down to the Miners for four 0' clock, and how many cars would be 
going - we knew how to organise picketing because we'd had a year of it. The 
response was brilliant. We were nervous, as you'd expect - it takes a lot of guts 
to take charge of something like that ... But the numbers that stopped back was 
brilliant. They all came forward to the stage asking where we were going. There 
must have been a hundred people there, maybe more. We said, 'We want as many 
cars as possible. Let aU your mates know who have not been to the meeting. We 
want you at the Miners at tea-time. 16 
The return of the flying pickets 
As many as two hundred miners turned up for picketing that evening, almost a 
quarter of the whole branch. 17 Crucially, for Paul Symonds (Jip), the sacked miners' 
strike in May had been important because it had proved that picketing still worked, 
'So we had a good idea that picketing would deliver the goods for us.' Unexpectedly 
thrust into leadership, he and Steve Gant 'were like commanders,' he recalls: 
We were saying, 'Right, you lot go to this pit, you lot go to that pit.' We were 
shitting ourselves. llut everybody was doing as. they were told. We went 
picketing as well, we weren't just sat behind a desk. As soon as the last car went, 
we jumped in ours and went away. The first pickets went out on the night shift. 
We had a feeling that it would be aU right. We had a strategy where we would get 
the Doncaster Area out first, then South Yorkshire and Bamsley. We would 
build a head of steam up. The first night we pulled all the Doncaster pits out -
every one of them came out to a man. And so for the first night on strike there 
were something like 12,000 miners out. I can't remember which pit r went to 
first, but we'd arranged fur everybody to meet back at Bentfey. We got back to 
Bentley and there were just hundreds and hundreds of miners there. It wasn't just 
Bentley miners and us who were there, they'd come from other pits as well. 
Everybody was solid. I've never known anything like it. 18 
On \Vednesday they picketed out another six pits in the South Yorkshire Area. 
By the end of Thursday the South Yorkshire Panel had been pressured into giving. 
its blessing and the dispute had spread throughout the South Yorkshire coalfield, 
bringing 13,000 men out and all 16 pits to a standstill. 19 The flare up was now so 
16 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
17 Socialisl Worker, 25 July 1987. 
18 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
19 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 22 July 1987; Socialist Worker, 25 July 
1987. 
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serious that it had become the main story in the national press. In Friday's issue of 
The Guardian the paper's labour editor noted how the Frickley miners, following a 
swift two-day operation, 'have managed to produce an impact, the like of which has 
not been seen in the British coalfield for three years. In some cases, the Frickley 
pickets have numbered up to 30. In others it has required no physical presence, only 
word of mouth. ,20 
For this to happen, the strike clearly had popular support at many pits. 'We were 
getting standing ovations at meetings,' recalls Robert Walker: 
They'd have a general meeting and they would invite one of the lads in to speak. 
People were cheering them. I went to Bentley. We weren't allowed into the 
meeting, but they might invite one of us in to speak on behalf of the Frickley 
miners. We'd stand outside: 'Vote for the lads!' 'Of course we will!' But the 
feeling got bad when we were no longer in the Donny Area. That was the main 
bit of solidarity. It was brilliant there. Everybody was in the same boat; they were 
all pissed off with what was happening. This was like a flicker of light. It was: 
'Righto lads, we'll vote for you.' They were clapping you and shaking your hand: 
'No problem. ,21 
Ray Riley reflects on how this was a novel situation: 
You've got to understand that the Big Strike was bureaucratically controlled. 
This particular dispute wasn't - at this stage it wasn't anyway. So there was a 
different sort of enthusiasm. [ don't know if people made this connection, but my 
understanding of it was that this was something new: branch officials not 
organising a strike? 
Steve Gant remembers that where there were problems, the NUM Area 
headquarters in Bamsley was the source. Moreover: 
I think that our branch officials were called straight through to an emergency 
meeting at Bamsley once they'd lost control of the dispute: 'What the fucking 
hell is going off here? Get them back to work.' But they couldn't get us back to 
work because they'd lost control of the dispute. I dare say that they got a severe 
bollocking for walking out of the meeting. They would have argued that there 
was nothing else they could do. They had pleaded and pleaded for us to use the 
machinery. So pressure would have come on that way, because as we are pulling 
pits out, each pit's officials were then ringing in to Barnsley, and ringing Johnny 
Stones. I lost a lot of respect for Johnny in that strike, because he didn't help us 
one iota during it. This made it harder when we started going to Manton and 
places like that, which are on the border line. They were asking questions about 
who was running the strike, and why had our officials walked out. We told them 
that we had no faith in the Panel. But all the time we were getting total respect 
20 The Guardian, 17 July 1987. 
21 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
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for the picket lines. Even people who didn't agree with you weren't going to 
cross your picket line. We'd still got that, which was great.22 
He recalls that, 'after one or two days of picketing, , John Picken, recently elected 
as the branch president, Steve Tulley, who had recently vacated the branch 
president's post to become the branch secretary, and Johnny Stones the delegate, 
turned up at the strike headquarters and finally got involved in picketing so as to 
take control of the dispute: 
Chick [John Picken] turns up with a list of which pits we are going to go to. 
'Right, pickets,' he shouts, 'Let's get you off.' But nobody goes to him. The lads 
are saying, 'What's going off? These are running it.' We were stood there taking 
names as welL So they were coming to us because we had deployed them the first 
night. In the lads' eyes, we have done a good job, we've been running the 
picketing so they are coming to us. 23 
Eventually though, the branch committee did start acting in harmony and the 
strikers' next step was to explain their case at other pits' general meetings as the 
perimeter of the dispute widened. Steve Gant recalls his intervention at Maltby: 
By this time we'd got a leaflet out on the Code of Conduct, a good one as well, 
but it was getting a bad response outside this meeting. It was a really big meeting; 
probably a thousand men there. Men were coming past saying, 'Who are these 
fuckers?' It was a bit scary. Anyway, I went into the foyer and asked if I could 
speak to a union man. Somebody came out and I told him I was the Cudworth 
representative at Frickley Colliery. He said, 'You can't come in here cock, this is 
a private meeting.' I said, 'I'm not asking to come in throughout your meeting, I 
just want ten or fifteen minutes to let you know what's going off.' 'I'll ask them,' 
he says. So I'm stood outside this meeting, and the doors were shut on me and 
locked. 
By now I -was really nervous, and I was wishing that I'd never asked for 
speakers' rights for this meeting, I could hear what was going off They were 
giving an official rundown on the dispute: that we'd been asked to go through the 
Panel and all this. Then they were saying that it was their bull week. It wasn't 
going our way. Their officials didn't want anything to do with this dispute; that 
was the feeling I was getting. Then this official says, 'Now there's a lad here from 
Frickley - he sLrys that he's on the branch committee.' He said 'says he is' as 
though I was some kind of liar. He carries on, 'He says he wants to address the 
meeting. I told him to wait outside in the passage.' I thought, 'That's nice of you, 
give me a good build up, you bastard.' He says, 'We'll put it to the vote.' They 
were even questioning whether to have a vote. But then this lad stood up, and 
said, 'Well ifhe's come down here, and he's on the branch committee, we might 
as well listen to what the lad has to say.' So they voted to let me in. I went in, but 
all"the chairs were blocking the walkway, it was that packed. I had to walk right 
22 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
23 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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through the middle of them. It was really unnerving. I then got on the stage and 
put them in the picture about the dispute: why we'd no faith in the Panel - I gave 
Ted Scott as an example - I careered then into what had happened in Wales with 
Des Dutfield. And all the time I was being barracked by one of their officials at 
the side of me: 'Stick to the issues.' He was trying to make it as hard as he could. 
I just turned round to him and said, 'Look, will you give me a break here, I'm 
trying my hardest to get a message over.' One or two lads clapped at this. In the 
end I got the message over. I asked them for their support. I said that we had got 
to fight it together. I said that I realised the position they were in because it was 
their bull week, but I said that we can't pick our time and our issues - otherwise 
we would have done. I said, 'But it's here now, and there's nowt we can do 
about that.' I finished, got off the stage and started walking through. You could 
hear a pin drop. But then all of a sudden I got a round of applause. It was lovely. 
And so at that meeting they decided to give it another week for something to be 
sorted out, and for Bamsley to get a grip so that we could do it together - which 
wasn't bad. Another week would keep the strike going.24 
Going to plan 
Though the strike was going to plan, the Frickley activists at the centre of the 
dispute were aware that the Area officials would try to sabotage the action at some 
stage. 'We had a strategy for dealing with that,' explains Paul Symonds: 
Because we didn't trust any of the Yorkshire officials, our plan was to break it 
out of Yorkshire within a week. [fwe could break it out of Yorkshire it would be 
a national dispute. We understood how the union worked. Once the strike had 
gone beyond Yorkshire, people such as Scargill would have to get hold of the 
helm. We were picketing places out, and if they were going to scab, we were 
going to continue pushing out, we weren't going to go back. That's what we had 
worked out, and we were doing it. At first we had no problems. There were one 
or two pits came out and then had narrow votes to go back, but we thought, 
'Fuck them, if we tum it into a national dispute by next week we will be 
laughing. ,25 
On Thursday the Frickley strikers lobbied the North Yorkshire Panel which was 
meeting at Kellingley and which faced a stark choice about what to do over the Ted 
Scott affair. But the Panel decided to continue working on the Friday while the case 
was heard, and pleaded with the Frickley pickets to keep away because they did not 
want Be to consider the case while it had 'a gun to its head'. The Frickley pickets 
were furious, but held off on the Friday morning. 26 Later on Friday the North 
Yorkshire Panel recommended that the 16 pits in the Area come out at the start of 
the foHowing week. But as the success of the strike so far had been down to the 
strikers hitting other pits fast and hard, the Frickley pickets could not wait that long 
24 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
25 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
26 Socialist Worker, 25 July 1987. 
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and so rut the coalfield immediately. Paul Symonds remembers worrymg over 
whether Kellingley and the Selby pits would be supportive: 
half of Kellingley ended up scabbing in '84/85. About twenty of us formed a 
picket line and they all just drove in past us. We were so demoralised about this. 
There was nothing we could do, they just went in. But what they had done was 
gone inside and had a meeting in the canteen to decide what they were going to 
do about these pickets on the gate - and they decided to come out. So about ten 
minutes after they had gone in, all these cars started to come back. It was an 
unbelievable feeling. Then we got all the Selby pits out. 27 
With the strike going from strength to strength, now was the time to venture 
beyond the boundaries of Yorkshire. 'On Friday afternoon we were really itching to 
take it out of Yorkshire,' says Paul Symonds: 
We were· already getting messages from the North East and Kent asking, 'When 
are you sending pickets up here?' I can remember after we had picketed some pits 
out on the afternoon shift, there were some of us in the Empire Club and we were 
discussing tactics. There were about twenty of us trying to decide what to do. 
Though there was a core of people that were organising the strike, there was no 
formal structure and nobody had any specific jobs. Anybody could just come and 
join in and argue what to do next. We decided that we shouldn't wait while 
Monday to go to Kent. We thought it would be a big job sending pickets up to 
the North East where they had a lot of pits. But because of the sacked miners, 
we'd got contacts down Kent and they told us that they were itching to go. They 
said, 'Get some pickets down here and you've got Kent.' To be honest, they talk 
about the Kent coalfield, but we knew that there were only three pits in Kent. But 
it would sound pretty impressive when it was announced that Kent and Yorkshire 
were on strike. So we despatched a couple of car loads there and then. People 
just ran home and made some sandwiches and jumped into these two cars and 
went to Kent.- Unfortunately, they didn't get there in time, because their night 
sruft started at six and not at ten. By the time they got there, they were already in 
work. They rang us up to teJI us about trus, so we said, 'Stay there until Monday 
moming.'28 
Sabotage 
By late Friday, events were swinging so much in the strikers' favour that The Times 
could report on how 'even British Coal spokesmen yesterday said they expected the 
coalfield to be at a virtual standstill at the beginning of next week ... ' 29 Anxious 
senior management had been forced to spend the whole of Friday trying to counter 
the spread of the strike. As NUM branches prepared to meet over the weekend, 
North Yorkshire Area director Albert Tuke sent out letters to the Area's 16,000 
miners telling them to 'come to their senses'. In South Yorksrure, a letter from 
27 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
28 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
29 The Times, 18 July 1987. 
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Frickley manager Tony Lawson, originally to be sent just to Frickley miners, was 
despatched throughout the Area on the personal instructions of Sir Robert 
Haslam.30 Lawson made his position quite plain: 
Frickley cannot afford action of this kind. I would be failing in my duty if I 
allowed the stoppage to continue without making it clear that the strike action is 
a serious breach of your contract of employment that will lead to disciplinary 
action and this may lead to dismissal . . . I do not see this as part of any move 
towards 'jackboot' management, but because in today's world none of us can 
expect to continue to be employed on the basis that we may walk out when 
something happens that does not please us. 31 
Significantly, threats such as this began to have an effect on those NUM branch 
officials who were already hesitant in their support for the dispute; as Gary 
Hinchliffe found out to his astonishment when he picketed pits in the old Barnsley 
Area, now part of North Yorkshire, on Friday evening: 
Now in the first couple of days, they [the branch officials at the pits that were 
picketed] were telling the men what was going off But on the Friday it started: 
they were telling the men to work. They were saying, 'We are asking you to lift 
your picket line.' This was at Grimethorpe. 'No we're not.' You sensed that there 
was something wrong here, with some of these branch officials. 'Well Johnny 
Stones hasn't sent you,' this was Ken Hancock: 'I know for a fact that Johnny 
Stones hasn't sent you because I've had him on the phone. None of your branch 
officials have sent you here.' I said, 'Branch officials?' He said, 'Well who was 
there today when you carne picketing? Who told you to come here? If Johnny 
Stones hasn't told you to come here, you are illegal pickets; you are not official 
pickets from the NUM.' I said, 'We are official pickets from the Frickley branch.' 
He said, 'Who's decided this then?' I said, 'We had a meeting on Monday. We 
voted to go picketing. The branch officials turned up, and Tony Jenkinson has 
turned up tonight to give petrol money out. He's the branch treasurer.' 'He's not 
Johnny Stones. I know for a fact that Johnny Stones hasn't told you to come 
here. And 1 know that he recommended that you didn't picket this week.' So 
anyway, we had a big argument with him. These men went home; there's only a 
handful of men on the maintenance shift at five 0'clock.32 
From Grimethorpe, Gary Hinchliffe and his band of pickets moved on to nearby 
Darfield Colliery where they met with the same kind of reception. However, they 
were amazed to discover that some men at Darfield had already been disciplined 
under the Code of Conduct without any resistance: 
Of course then we set off laying into this branch official from Darfield - and his 
own men did, when they found out what we were on strike for and what we'd put 
30 lhe Times, 18 July 1987. 
31 The Times, 18 July 1987. 
32 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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our foot down over. They started slagging him. 1 said, 'Tell your men to go to 
work then. Because the half-past five shift hasn't gone in, the afters shift hasn't 
gone. You tell these to go to work when all the others have gone home.' We got 
in the cars and went. We could see them arguing at the pit gates, and everybody 
was going home.33 
Robert Walker recalls having similar problems that same night elsewhere in North 
Yorkshire: 
There were three of us at Gascoigne Wood, we turned all the night shift back. 
Johnny Stones phoned up - this was on a Friday night - 'Call your pickets off' 
We said, 'We can't call the pickets offnow, we've turned half the pit back. We're 
all right letting half of them work, we might as well tum them all back.' Anyway, 
their union men came and said, 'Look, we understand what you're saying, we'll 
turn the others back. ,34 
Gary Hinchliffe, clearly confused about these developments, decided to visit the 
Mill Lane Working Men's Club in South Kirkby to see Frank Clarke, the South 
Kirkby NUM official and a member of the Yorkshire Area executive: 
'I want a word with you Frank. What's going off'? All the radio bulletins that we 
are picking up in the car have Jack Taylor on saying that all Yorkshire's going to 
be out on Monday over this Code of Conduct. But every pit that we've been to 
since tea time has been giving us trouble. The branch officials are there telling 
their men to work and mouthing us off. What's going oft'?' He said, 'Barnsley 
are calling the strike off tomorrow.' 1 said, 'Why?' He said, 'Because it's come to 
their attention that your union aren't running this strike. The SWP are running it.' 
I said, 'What are you on about? The men have voted on it. It's not the SWP who 
have been out picketing, it's the men.' He said, 'Aye, but Johnny Stones 
recommended that you follow the union guidelines on convening the Panel. You 
haven't taken tmy notice. You've followed the SWP's opinions and policy on it; 
so they'll call it off tomorrow. ' 
After this I goes down for Jip. Jip and Ganty have just got back from the Selby 
pits. They've had a flaming row with somebody at one of the pits there. They've 
managed to get the men to go home, but they've had a big row with the branch 
officials. Some of the men had been to Prince of Wales and got cracked; one of 
them got a smack in the mouth. I told Jip what Frank Clarke had told me. He 
said, 'Frank Clarke knows nothing. We've just had Jack Taylor on the radio as 
we've been coming back from Stillingfleet. All Yorkshire's out on Monday.' I 
said, 'I know, I've heard it. But I'm telling you what Frank Clarke's just told me.' 
He wouldn't have it. Of course, the next day Yorkshire Area has called it off. 
They were asking Frickley to withdraw their pickets. 35 
33 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
34 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
35 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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Betrayal 
British Coal may have feared the strike would escalate, but when the Yorkshire 
NUM executive met on Saturday 18 July, they did their utmost to make sure this 
did not happen and instead recommended a return to work. The North Yorkshire 
Panel, which had been expected to support Frickley, then voted to obey the 
executive. 36 All the fine words that the Frickley contingent had heard at the NUM 
conference about tackling the Code of Conduct had been an illusion. Nevertheless, 
this was not quite the end of the dispute. 
A mass meeting was arranged for the following day at the Pretoria Club in South 
Elmsall so that the Yorkshire NUM leaders could order the Frickley miners to end 
their strike. But the resolve of the strikers was far greater than the Area officials ever 
anticipated. And if the Yorkshire leadership were under the impression that the strike 
was merely the actions of a handful of socialist militants at Frickley, they were to be 
proven wrong. 
Of course socialists at the pit were playing a leading part in the dispute and by the 
weekend were preparing for the Area official's visit. 'We knew why they were 
coming,' says Ray Riley: 
and so we had a meeting in another working men's club in South Elmsall the 
night before. And there were activists there from other pits - Askern in particular. 
It wasn't just the SWP, it was a militants' meeting - people who wanted to fight. 
Anyone was welcome. It was through word of mouth and it was well attended. 
We discussed tactics and talked about things. We even considered ambushing 
Jack Taylor's car, preventing him from speaking at the meeting - and that wasn't 
an idle threat! It was something that was realistically proposed! We agreed that 
we had to be cohesive in our arguments when someone got up to speak. Our left 
hand had to know what our right hand was doing, so to speak. 37 
All the Yorkshire Area NUM full-time officials came to South Elmsall for the 
showdown: Jack Taylor, the Area president, Ken Homer, the Area vice-president, 
Sammy Thompson the Area general secretary and recently elected national 
vice-president, along with Frank Cave, the South Yorkshire agent. The Guardian 
described the reception for the Area officials as 'hostile' .38 As we shall see from the 
testimonies below, this was certainly an understatement. 
Prior to the general meeting, the Area officials addressed the Frickley branch 
committee. However, as Paul Symonds recalls, when he and Steve Gant, the two 
most prominent committee members in the action against the Code, arrived for this 
important meeting, they found it had already been in session for a lengthy period 
without them: 
In the committee room were the four Area officials and all our officials and 
committee men. They'd decided that they were going to recommend a return to 
work for Monday. Me and Steve Gant were completely furious. And while we 
36 Hem.\worth and South Elmsall Express, 22 July 1987. 
37 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
38 The Guardian, 20 July 1987. 
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were in the committee room, men were coming up and booting the committee 
room door, shouting: 'Taylor, we are going to fucking kill you when you come 
out of there! , It was brilliant. You'd got all these men who were gathering for this 
mass meeting and they were really angry that it was being called off, that we'd 
been stabbed in the back by the officials. The arguments continued in the 
committee room - they were trying to calm me and Steve Gant down. In the end 
we said that there wasn't much point in continuing to shout at people if the 
decision had already been made. By now a really large crowd had gathered 
outside the committee room - the four Area officials were shitting themselves. 
People were coming up to the window outside, saying: 'You bastards! You're 
dead!' They were shitting themselves, they were wondering where they had come 
to. Just when the big meeting was about to start, Gant says to Steve Tulley, 
'Steve, I think you had better go out there to calm them down, because we don't 
want any bloodshed.' You could see the colour draining out of the Area officials' 
faces. It sounds quite unbelievable, but Steve Tulley had to go out and appeal for 
the safety of the Area officials, that we'd not got to beat them up. He managed to 
do it by saying that there was the media outside and that it wouldn't look good if 
they reported it. It wasn't about any sense of loyalty to these four blokes. It was 
just that it would look bad in the papers!39 
Eventually the Area officials made their way to the club's concert room to 
address the gathering. Gary Hinchliffe describes the scene: 
They fetched them out of the committee room, marched them through the 
Pretoria. They thought that they were going into a boxing match: they'd got the 
branch officials in front of them and the committee lining their sides; these four 
heavyweight champions walking through the crowd. It was hostile; you'd have 
thought they were scabs: 'You fucking Judases!' They were screaming and 
baying. The officials were shaking when they got on that stage, they couldn't talk 
for fear. Every one of them tried to give some sort of an argument as to why 
they'd called it off. They couldn't. Jack Taylor said, 'We've got to have unity. 
We are no good without unity.' So Jip says, 'Aye, you want us to have unity with 
scabs and pits that won't fight. You want us to have unity with people who 
would let their branch secretary get sacked without raising a finger!' Then 
Sammy Thompson gets up: 'The first person that gets sacked under this Code of 
Conduct, we're all out.' 'Sacked? Sacked? They've just fucking sacked Ted 
Scott, you stupid bastard!' Frankie Cave gets up. He was the Area agent at this 
time. He said, 'Look lads, I know how you feel. We've disputes all over. I know 
what this macho/jackboot management is like. On Friday I was down at 
Silverwood and had a meeting with men over their money. Then I had to go to 
Bentley.' Then you just heard this voice say, 'And I bet you're bollocksed, aren't 
you?' They got really hammered. 40 
'Thafmeeting was just unbelievable,' remembers Paul Symonds: 
39 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
40 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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You think to yourself: Here we are, just rank-and-file miners, all we do is work 
down the pit. And here are the four Area officials, and the NUM has got a lot of 
clout, the members are very loyal to it, and most of the members respect Jack 
Taylor and Sammy Thompson, they have good track records - unless you know 
the ins and outs of it - and not only do you have the Area leaders, you have the 
four branch officials, and you have all bar three or four of the committee men, all 
recommending a return back to work. The odds are against you. And they have 
already ordered the rest of the coalfield back to work, which there was nothing 
you could do to stop. But we set off, and we argued that we shouldn't listen to 
them, that they were betraying us. I've never been in a meeting as heated. The 
arguments that were put were good ones. We argued that we should stay out on 
strike - it was a pretty hard position for us to argue from - and that we should 
picket out the other pits on Monday morning. It should have been unthinkable for 
us to argue this, but we did. And when it came to the vote, they voted for it by a 
massive majority. It was like being on another planet. The officials could not 
believe what they were seeing in front of them: loyal NUM members voting with 
the SWP - that was the crux of it, everybody knew what me and Steve Gant 
were. And they'd made every effort to tell people that was the choice. They had 
been hoping to play on that to divide us. But we won it, it was just amazing. They 
had to leave the room by a side exit. They didn't want to be in that room when 
the meeting ended, and so they left after they had said their piece and every one 
of them had been shouted down - but shouted down with good arguments.41 
The eventual result of the two-hour meeting was that the Frickley miners took an 
unprecedented decision, voting by 616 to 84, to oppose the Area executive and to 
continue the strike. Branch secretary Steve Tulley told the assembled press that his 
mandate was for an indefinite strike until the withdrawal of the suspensions against 
the five Frickley miners: 'The feeling is that we've been let down as a branch. It's a 
vote against the Yorkshire Area officials. They are voting against the Yorkshire 
executive decision - they feel they've been sold down the river. ,42 
Defiance 
The battIe against the Code of Conduct was not merely a local wildcat strike that 
had somehow lost control. For those involved it was a deadly serious issue to be 
fought to the end. As Gary Hinchliffe explains: 
The men who lived in Hemsworth had been round and collected off the traders 
there with a view to setting up kitchens up in the St Pat's club. We thought that 
there was going to be a four or five week dispute over it. We had men up in 
Northumberland and down in Kent and South Wales. They were just waiting to 
go picketing on Monday morning.43 
41 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
42 The Guardian, 20 July 1987. 
43 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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But now the actions of the Yorkshire Area officials had wrecked these plans. 
After Sunday's mass meeting, the activists involved in the picketing met to discuss 
their next step in light of the vote to stay out. 'But we weren't just mindless 
militants,' argues Paul Symonds: 
We understood the score and we knew that we wouldn't be able to hold out 
against the Area officials. If we'd had a base at the other pits like we had at 
Frickley we could have held the line. But we hadn't. We knew that it was just us 
at Frickley, that we had mates at Armthorpe and a few others here and there, but 
who weren't as strong as us. That Sunday afternoon, me and Steve Gant 
discussed what we were going to do. We decided that we would pull Doncaster 
Area out on Monday morning, and then on Tuesday we would call the strike off 
at the next meeting ... We knew that we couldn't hold out against the Area 
officials. They'd got clout. And the branch officials would order men through our 
picket lines. We didn't want to split the branch wide open~ have some men 
crossing the picket line and some not. Me and Gant realised that the furthest we 
could take it was to picket the Doncaster pits out on Monday. That would show 
them! And then we would call it off44 
That Sunday evening it looked as if even these intentions might be 
over-optimistic, as just one other Yorkshire pit declared support for Frickley.45 
Nevertheless, despite the worsening odds, the fight did continue. The next day, 
Monday 20 July, Frickley miners defied the instructions of the Yorkshire executive 
and managed to picket out nine South Yorkshire pits and nearby South Kirkby/ 
Ferrymoor Riddings and Nostell in North Yorkshire. 46 But because of fears of 
splitting the union, the pickets were given particular instructions, as Paul Symonds 
recalls: 
We said to everybody, 'If anybody crosses the picket lines at these pits, we don't 
want anybody being called scab, because people are only doing what the union 
has told them'to do. If people start going in, pull the picket lines off; we should 
remove the picket line before we give anybody the excuse to cross one. There 
were about rune pits to picket in the Doncaster Area. The only one where we had 
any trouble was Hatfield Main, where David Douglass was the delegate. He was 
supposed to be a left winger, with a national profile. That was the only pit where 
we had to remove the picket line. I went there. The manager fetched him to the 
pit in a car. Hatfield was on holiday that week and so there were only a few who 
were working. Basically, he told his men to cross the picket line. We moved it. I 
said to him, 'Davie, this is going to be the only pit in the Doncaster coalfield 
today that has gone to work.' He was saying, 'No, you're mad. You're living in a 
dream world, they've all gone back.' This was at about half-past five in the 
44 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
45 The Guardian, 20 July 1987. 
46 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 22 July 1987; lhe Times, 21 July 1987. 
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morning. \Vhen we got back, we found out that they had all respected our picket 
lines.47 
On Monday evening the pickets. were met with the .samedegree of success. Six 
South Yorkshire collieries were stood along with South Kirkby. However, by now 
an important meeting of the Yorkshire Area Council had taken place, which only 
demonstrated· Frickley' s increasing isolation and how the sabotage of the Yorkshire 
Area officials had taken its toll. The Area Council voted by a massive 53 votes to 3 
to recommend an end to the strike.48 Johnny Stones, being the Frickley NUM 
delegate, was at the meeting: 
A request was made that we return to work and stop picketing other pits because 
of the national ballot. The trade union legislation at that time made it so that we 
couldn't hold a banot until there had been a resumption of work, something like 
that. But yes, weight was put on us, plus the fact that support was waning within 
the pits. I went to the Yorkshire Council and the tenor of the debate was that we 
weren't going to keep getting pits coming out in support of us. That's as I saw it, 
that's how I reported it back. 49 
The men at the centre of the strike realised now that they had taken the strike as 
far as they could. 'A lot of the men were surprised to hear us ar!,'1le this,' recollects 
Paul Symonds, 'because here were two blokes who had argued all the way through 
that we had got to keep it going. But we explained why.'50 As a final gesture it was 
decided that rather than just go back to work they would send out pickets once 
again, for the Tuesday day shift, but this time only to thank the men at other pits for 
standing by them, rather than asking them to stop work, 'We stood on the gates and 
clapped them as they came in,' explains Steve Gant. 'We handed out leaflets saying 
"thanks for your support, it's been a noble effort but we've been sold out." That was 
the end of that dispute, more or less. ,51 
Paul Symonds argues that in contrast to Arthur ScargiU, who only knew how to 
lead men forward, the Frickley activists at the centre of this strike knew how to 
retreat when the odds were not in the favour: 
. . . we wanted to retreat intact. And we did. And I think that it left a number of 
things. Firstly, the respect of the picket lines remained intact - nobody ever 
crossed picket lines. Secondly, we didn't split any workforce - which was a big 
thing at that time because people were just getting back together after being split 
in the '84/85 strike. It was a defeat in a sense; but it wasn't the Coal Board that 
had defeated us: it was the union that had defeated us - and evelybody knew that. 
It was important that everybody knew why we were going back. They knew that 
it wasn't because they were crap, or that the Coal Board was too powerful. They 
47 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
48 Yorkshire Post, 21 July 1987. 
49 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
50 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
51 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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knew that it was because of the Area leaders bowing to the trade Uluon laws or 
whatever. 52 
The dispute finally ended at a reconvened mass meeting that Tuesday morning, 
21 July, when all but 19 of the Frickley miners voted to go back to work. The 
dispute had cost British Coal as much as £8 million in lost production. And just in 
case management had any ideas about seeking retribution for this loss, Frickley 
branch secretary Steve Tulley gave British Coal the following warning: 'If there is 
any victimisation or reprisals on anybody by management we'll take immediate strike 
action.,53 
Shock waves 
The reason given by Jack Taylor for calling off the strike was so there could now be 
a pit-head ballot over the Code. He claimed that moderate pits outside the Area 
might vote against takjng action if Yorkshire jumped the gun. 54 But the Frickley 
action, far from being divisive, actually showed that militancy still worked. 'When 
we went back the management weren't cocky,' says Paul Symonds: 
We were the cocky ones. We could say to them, 'We'll do it again if you are not 
careful.' They knew the score and we knew the score. For me, that particular 
strike was a couple of the best weeks in my life. It proved that it could work if 
you did it properly. 55 
Further proof came later when the five suspended Frickley miners were finally 
brought before management. True they had to undergo the dishonour of being 
interviewed individually and had to endure what Steve Tulley described to the press 
as 'kangaroo courts'. However, their only punishment was to be given verbal 
warnings for 'failing to accept reasonable instructions and leaving the pit without 
permission. ,56 Compare these disciplinary measures with what eventually happened 
to Ted Scott, whose case was championed by the Yorkshire leaders and thus went 
through the 'proper' channels. Though the Stillingfleet official was later reinstated, 
he was forced to work at Kellingley and not long afterwards left the industry. 57 The 
deciding factor was that there had been no industrial action on Scott's behalf, 
whereas it had cost British Coal millions of pounds in lost production before they 
could even force the Frickley miners into attending a hearing. 
The reality was that the action of the rank-and-file miners at Frickley had sent 
shock waves through British Coal and the government. Two years after the end of a 
serious defeat, this latest strike had shown that the miners were still a force to 
contend with. However, what the strike also showed was that the left-wing 
leadership of the Yorkshire NUM were very much in control of matters and hardly 
52 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
53 The Guardian, 22 July 1987; The Times, 22 July 1987. 
54 1he Guardian, 21 July 1987. 
55 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
56 Yorkshire Post, 23 July 1987. 
57 1he Times, 28 March 1988. 
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differed from the new realists in South Wales and Scotland when it came to 
challenging British Coal's olTensive. While the rank and file were well organised at 
Frickley, it was evident that what was missing was a wider network of militants that 
could have co-ordinated the action despite the Area officials' opposition. 
Significantly, Arthur Scargill may have been the trade union movement's most 
vociferous opponent of new realism in this period, but what marked the Code 
dispute was his absence from the conflict. 'Where was he?' asks Steve Gant: 
He never came on the radio or television during the Code of Conduct. He had 
been speaking at all these meetings about the best way to fight it, but when we do 
all the groundwork and we pull all the pits out, where is he? He goes missing. He 
doesn't make an appearance. He still carried a lot of weight at the time, but he 
just went walk-abouts. He was just letting the machine do the work for him - the 
machine that wanted him out at the end of the day. He would have been better off 
sticking with the rank and file, as he did in '72.58 
Here had been an ideal opportunity for Scargill to appeal over the heads of the 
Area leadership to the rank and file, in order to contest the Code of Conduct and 
thus challenge the increasing domination of the new realists. The Frickley action had 
shown that miners were willing to support a fight back. But Scargill failed in this 
because his allies were not the rank-and-file NUM members but the Area officials, 
the very men who had called the strike off. And yet the outcome promised a massive 
blow to militancy in the union and the further ascendancy of new realism. 
58 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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The Code of Conduct ballot 
With the Ted Scott issue still smouldering, on 21 August, three days before the 
result of the Code of Conduct ballot was due, British Coal again went on the 
offensive when it announced that seven Yorkshire collieries - Armthorpe, Hatfield, 
Nostell, Prince of Wales, Redbrook, South Kirkby, and Woolley - were on the 
danger list. BC also announced that it hoped to introduce six-day working into the 
militant South Yorkshire coalfield. As the ballot papers were being counted, it 
appeared that British Coal had calculated the prevailing mood amongst the miners 
correctly after the Frickley action. At branch meetings throughout Yorkshire to 
discuss what action to take over Scott, only Frickley amongst the Doncaster pits 
demanded an all-out strike. l But the outcome of the ballot was at odds with this, 
with 77.5 per cent of NUM members voting for 'industrial action short of a strike', 
the first national vote in favour of industrial action by the union for over a decade, 
and the first under Arthur Scargill's leadership.2 In the words of Frickley activist 
Gary Hinchliffe, 'it was a tremendous result.,3 
British Coal had refused to negotiate with the NUM since the end of the Big 
Strike, but now hastily changed tack and called for talks at ACAS. Talks began on 
27 August but broke down on 14 September. The NUM had actually made a serious 
climb-down and offered to accept the principle of independent binding arbitration on 
disciplinary matters. British Coal, however, insisted that disputes should be settled 
by industrial tribunals. This was an important sticking point for the NUM because 
under industrial tribunals victimised miners such as Ted Scott could not be 
guaranteed reinstatement in their old jobs. The Guardian outlined what was explicit 
in British Coal's latest intransigence: 
Sir Robert [Haslam] made it clear that one of the main objects of the current 
exercise was to rid the pits of union 'activists', who had been responsible for a 
rash of unofficial stoppages, mainly in Yorkshire. Sir Robert and his colleagues 
do not want them back in the industry.4 
Little clout 
It was becoming noticeable that the only way the NUM could force the corporation 
into making meaningful concessions was to make sure the overtime ban hit swiftly 
and hard. However, from the way many NUM executive members were interpreting 
the vote for action, this option seemed unlikely - indeed the leaders of the South 
Wales and Scottish miners had hoped to call off the action at the first sign that Be 
were going to make concessions. 5 
Nevertheless action did eventually take place. In Yorkshire, an overtime ban 
began on 14 September and national action began a week later. However, rather 
1 Socialixt Worker, 22 and 29 AUhTUst 1987; Yorkshire Post, 22 August 1987. 
2 The Guardian, 25 August 1987; The Miner, October 1987. 
3 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
4 The Guardian, 15 September 1987. 
5 Socialist Worker, 19 September 1987. 
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than implementing a total overtime ban as initially intended, the NUM executive 
merely ordered its 94,000 members to cease overtime working on production faces 
and development work. Such a move promised to offer little clout because only one 
per cent of coal production was ever carried out in overtime.6 Ray Riley recounts 
how ineffective the overtime ban was at FrickJey: 
There was an overtime ban - but there were some strange dealings and some 
strange manoeuvrings going on to ensure that people would get their five shifts 
in. The mandate to hold an overtime ban was not so much adhered to as 
accommodated to, which allowed flexibility. A proper overtime ban would hit 
production, it really would, and obviously result in people losing shifts, there's no 
doubt about that. But it was so flexible in its approach, and in the way that it was 
done, that hardly any production was lost. A couple of shifts were lost, but there 
should have been a lot more people sent back home if it had been done properly. 
And so it just became a farce. 7 
The limited nature of the action also gave management the opportunity to divide 
the miners, as Ian Oxley illustrates: 
We were always told that some Selby pits were working seven days a week. 
Johnny Walsh was the Area official in that Area. And he was anti-Scargill, 
anti-union, anti-everything by then. So, unfortunately, because we'd no direct 
contact with those pits, one tended to believe rumours. Now I think that the 
rumours were probably exaggerated, but certainly the manager keeps hitting you 
with: 'They're coaling seven days; aren't you bothered about keeping Frickley 
open? They're working hard at Silverwood trying to keep their pit open. They're 
working hard at Goldthorpe trying to keep their pit open. Why is there onJy 
Frickley?'s 
Walking slow 
The ineffectua(overtime ban only helped to increase British Coal's confidence to 
intimidate miners at pit level - as Frickley miners were soon to find out when they 
were again forced to take strike action on Thursday 22 October. The Hemsworth 
and South Elmsall Express described how this particular dispute began: 
Frickley Colliery was hit by a lightening strike last week, as miners walked out in .. 
a dispute over docked wages. According to NUM branch officials, the dispute 
started on Thursday when 40 men working on the Cudworth seam received their 
pay. Wage slips showed that three-quarters of an hour's money had been docked 
from the previous Friday when the Cudworth 'Paddy' was out of action. Inquiries 
to management revealed that the money had been docked 'because the men had 
6 The Times, 18 September 1987. 
7 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
8 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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not walked quickly enough to the seam', and the Thursday afternoon shift on 
both Cudworth and Hague Moor seams consequently walked out. 9 
Robert Walker was one of the Frickley miners who had their pay docked: 
I remember that because the paddy had broken down, so we had to walk - it 
would be a couple of miles in. The roads are rickety, you have to bend under 
where there's a bit of weight on. We'd be walking so far and then we'd have a 
minute. We weren't going to walk in at first, but they said the paddy couldn't be 
fixed in the shift; so we had to walk in. We were walking steady, having a minute, 
a slice of bread and a cup of tea, but they'd got the deputies to time us walking in. 
So they docked us so much time off ] think it was everybody. There were a few 
who rushed in, they didn't get owt docked. But you can't be rushing in down 
there, the road's awkward, it's not meant for walking anyway ... It cost us to get 
our money back, but I think that we won that one. 10 
The walkout ended after a mass meeting on the Friday voted to return to work on 
the following Monday morning. At the meeting activists spoke of their concern over 
management's continuing efforts to intimidate the miners into passivity, and of the 
need to prepare for action in order to preserve the 'market system', in which the 
union had a say on how jobs were allocated in the pits. II 
Scargill's bombshell 
In early November 1987 British Coal intensified its pressure on the NUM by 
announcing that the union's members would only receive a 4.3 per cent pay increase 
- the second stage of a two-year deal - when they called off their overtime ban. 12 
When the union's executive met on 12 November to discuss the latest 
developments, Jack Jones, the Leicestershire miners' leader, demanded that the 
union accept six-day working at the new Ashfordby superpit, and there were 
attempts by the l!ew realists to end the overtime ban. But it was what followed that 
was the real surprise. Arthur ScargiIl, under fire from his critics, stunned his 
opponents and supporters alike by unexpectedly putting his leadership of the miners' 
union on the line and declaring his intention to seek re-election as NUM president. 13 
At a press conference afterwards, ScargiIJ stated his intention to stand on a militant 
platform in opposition to the new realists. 14 
An NUM militant at Frickley Colliery told Socialist Worker what he thought of .. 
Scargill's decision to stand for re-election: 
There's real relief that Scargill has done something ... the right wing on the 
exec' were saying they wanted all the action called off Now Scargill's resignation 
9 Hem!lworth and ,South Elmsall Express, 28 October 1987. 
10 Robert.Walker, interviewed by the author. 
11 Socialist Worker, 31 October 1987. 
12 Socialist Worker, 7 November 1987. 
13 Socialist Worker, 21 November 1987. 
14 The Guardian, 13 November 1987. 
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puts it all hack on the agenda. We can start arguing again about what we are 
going to do about the Code of Conduct, about six-day working ... Fighting new 
realism has got to be the theme of the campaign. But I wish Scargill had done this 
round the Frickley dispute. Instead, he and Heathfield helped engineer its end so 
they could ballot on the overtime ban. 15 
Considering that the new realists wanted rid of Scargill, his decision to stand for 
re-election actually threw his critics into disarray. Surprisingly, the only challenger 
for the presidency came not from the new realists of the Scottish and South Wales 
Areas but from a traditional right winger, John Walsh, the NUM's North Yorkshire 
Area agent. Immediately the 'Re-elect ScargiIl' campaign was on its way, and 
between late November and 22 January over forty meetings and rallies were 
organised throughout the British coalfield. 16 'We had posters up, "elect Scargill" 
and things like that/ recalfs Steve Gant, 'and a lot oflads were going up Scotland 
and putting them up, because their Area leader, Eric Clarke, was a Walsh man ... 
We had meetings and I spoke at a few of them.' 17 
Scargill addressed the Frickley miners at the Pretoria Club on Thursday 10 
December, telling them that his campaign would rest on his honesty, integrity and 
devotion to the miners, and stated that his predictions of massive job losses had 
proved correct. The Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express reported that Scargill 
was given a standing ovation at the meeting. I8 To the detriment of the NUM, 
though,. the same edition of the newspaper could also proclaim that in the previous 
week the South Yorkshire coalfield had set a new productivity record of 4.09 tonnes 
per manshift. 19 This, we need to remind ourselves, was in the midst of an overtime 
ban that had then been in operation for almost three months. 
As the NUM presidential election campaign got under way, the class struggle 
continued - and once again Frickley miners showed the way to take on British Coal 
when, during the final week of November, they forced the colliery management into 
a humiliating climb-down after the pit's bosses suddenly withdrew concessions for 
working in deep water underground. At first management declared that they would 
not discuss the issue even if the miners stopped out until Christmas. However, the 
walkout had barely begun when management were telling branch officials they 
would back down. 'This miscalculation gave everyone heart and will make 
management think twice before trying it on again,' a Frickley militant told Socialist 
Worker. 20 
Bentley 
In the period since the Dig Strike, industrial action in Dritain remained at its lowest 
level for over 40 years. Because of this, when Margaret Thatcher gave her New 
Year's message for 1988, she said that strikes were a thing of the past, she had cured 
15 Socialist Worker, 21 November 1987. 
16 F. Watters, Being Frank, (Doncaster, 1992), p.I78. 
17 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
18 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 16 December 1987. 
19 Hemsworth and South ElmsallE)cpress, 16 December 1987. 
20 Socialist Worker, 5 December 1987. 
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the 'British Disease'. Days later, however, a dispute at Bentley Co1Jiery over the 
victimisation of three men, who were alleged to have been slacking, would lead to a 
substantial walkout in the Yorkshire coalfield once again. Just as with the Frickley 
dispute over the Code of Conduct five months earlier, this latest display of mass 
defiance would stun British Coal. Significantly though, as with Frickley, the dispute 
also bore the mark of new realism.21 
The Bentley strike began on Monday 4 January. By Tuesday night Bentley miners 
had picketed out all of the old Doncaster Area pits.22 When they arrived at Frickley, 
'I thought that they were bank robbers,' recalls Gary Hinchliffe: 
They'd got face masks on with eye slits in, so that none of the management at 
Frickley would recognise them if they took photos. Because apparently, when 
we'd been on strike, they'd been taking photos of us and they were on about 
disciplining us under the Code of Conduct. 23 
Paul Symonds arbrues that the Bentley strike was the culmination of a chain 
reaction: 
We'd got the confidence to go for the Code of Conduct strike because the Kent 
miners had proven that there was still life left in picket lines. And then Bentley 
had a dispute. And they thought exactly the same: 'Why don't we do what 
Frickley did?' They did, and it worked.24 
On the Wednesday, with 6,000 miners failing to go to work, and 8 of the Area's 
19 pits at a standstill, Ted Horton, British Coal's South Yorkshire director, warned 
that legal action might be taken against the flying pickets. The scale of the dispute on 
his hands, over what appeared at first sight to be such a small issue, clearly horrified 
Horton, who declared that he did not understand the miners' 'lemming-like attitude 
of walking out ... '25 The reality was that the Bentley strikers were tapping into 
resentment that remained in the coalfield over the consistent and vicious attacks 
from management, and, crucially, that miners still respected the principle of not 
crossing picket lines. By the end of Friday 14,000 miners were out at 19 Yorkshire 
pits.26 
Nevertheless, serious problems were already becoming evident. Steve Gant, like 
many other Frickley activists, was involved in the Bentley dispute almost from the 
. start and could see the weaknesses: 
Their lads were asking us how we'd got on in our strike. We told them that they 
would not be able to do it on their own, they would need to get as much 
21 Socialist Worker, 16 January 1988. 
22 Gibbon and Bromley, 'From an institution to a business?', p.80; Ihe Guardian, 7 
January 1988; Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 13 January 1988. 
23 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
24 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
251he Guardian, 7 January 1988. 
26 The Times, 9 January 1988. 
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involvement as they could. But you could see when you got involved in that 
dispute that it was nowhere as well organised as ours. There were no meetings 
anywhere after they'd been picketing. It was more in the hands of the officials, 
Johnny Church and them. They were OK, but they were always going to be under 
the rule from Bamsley. It never got loose, the rank and file never got a grip of the 
strike. That's what we used to argue for at meetings. Although John Church and 
them weren't hostile towards us, they tried to keep it under their guide-lines. 
That's how the Bentley dispute petered out. There was no good base for it.27 
Matters were so bad that Frickley miners seemed to be more involved in the 
dispute than Bentley miners. 'We got into the ridiculous situation where we were 
sending pickets from Frickley to help them when there would be no Bentley pickets,' 
says Paul Symonds: 'You could have six or seven people there and it didn't matter 
as long as one of them could say that he was from Bentley. But if you were all from 
Frickley it looked bad. ,28 
The shortage of Bentley pickets was not an accident. The Bentley branch 
leadership 'were appalling,' remarks Gary Hinchliffe: 
they frightened everybody off from going picketing by telling them that they were 
liable to get the sack. We went through to Bentley. We said, 'What are you 
playing atT What they said was that they couldn't have people going picketing 
without informing them of the dangers, that there was a very real prospect that 
further action could be taken, that they could've been sacked.29 
Of course there can be little doubt that the application of the Code of Conduct 
was making picketing harder during the Bentley issue, as Robert Walker recalls: 
We were fucked because we were classed as secondary pickets. If anybody asked 
us, we were from Bentley; because we were going on their dispute. They were 
only supposeq to picket their pit. So we were going with balaclavas or scarves 
round our faces, things like that. 30 
However, as Steve Gant argues, the need to wear disguises was actually a sign of 
the weakness of the dispute: 
... that wouldn't have been the case with the Frickley strike. Nobody would 
have bothered with balaclavas - there were that many of us, we were more 
confident. Whereas Bentley didn't have the same input.31 
But the lack of initiative on behalf of the Bentley branch officials was of nothing 
compared to the undermining tactics elsewhere in this important confrontation. 
27 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
28 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
29 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
30 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
31 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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Wherever branch officials supported the pickets, it was easy for them to carry their 
members. But some officials were not so supportive, as Jeff Johnson found out when 
he went picketing in South Yorkshire: 
I went to Dinnington. Bloody hell fire, it was hard work was that. The union tried 
to throw me off the property. I ended up on the canteen table and there was a 
union man on another table speaking at the same time. But I persuaded the shift 
to down tools and go ... We had to keep a constant picket, that was the problem 
there. We couldn't leave a pit and go to roll the next pit over, because as soon as 
we left that pit word got round and they went back to work. 32 
Some branch officials were reported to have been so vehemently opposed to the 
action that they described the pickets in terms which echoed those coming from 
N ottinghamshire in 1984 - calling them scum and rabble. 33 
Under such circumstances, at the weekend, following a recommendation by the 
South Yorkshire Panel, and under pressure from the Yorkshire Area leadership, the 
strike was called off by the Bentley branch in the hope that negotiations would take 
place with British Coal. 34 It was later revealed that if the Panel had not ordered an 
end to the strike, then Jack Taylor was ready to do so at a meeting of the Yorkshire 
Area Council. 35 
The vote 
After the events at Bentley the NUM presidential campaign heated up. If Scargill 
were to lose the presidency, the new realists in the NUM bureaucracy, who wanted 
peace at any price, would then be in a position to surrender on everything that 
British Coal wanted. John Walsh never put any blame on British Coal or the 
government for the continued attacks on the miners, but stressed what he saw as 
Scargill's ·obsession' with confrontation. He went as far as to attack Scargill for 
refusing to discuss the possibility of flexible working in the pits and gave his blessing 
to the South Wates miners' leaders for wanting six-day production at Margam. 36 It 
was because of such policies that Jeff Johnson argues there no support for Walsh at 
Frickley: 
Anything Scargill said, Johnny Walsh disagreed with. He was all for talking with 
the UDM; he was all for productivity bonus; he was for various things that we 
didn't want at Frickley. So he didn't have a camp at Frickley, nobody followed 
him. I never actually met many folk that were for Johnny Walsh. If there had been 
somebody of Scargill' s standing put up, maybe they would have gone for him. 
But Walshy never had a chance and that was reflected in the vote.37 
32 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
33 Sociali8t Worker, 16 January 1988. 
34 The Times, 11 January 1988. 
35 Socialist Worker, 16 January 1988. 
36 The Times, 16 January 1988. 
37 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
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In contrast, Scargill' s great appeal was that he was not In with the bosses. 
Speaking at one election rally, he told miners: 
You should vote for me because Margaret Thatcher and the Tories hate me and 
want to see me defeated. You should vote for me because Sir Robert Haslam and 
the Coal Board desperately want to see me defeated. And if the bosses want to 
see me defeated, I must be the best candidate. 38 
When the votes were counted and announced on the weekend of 23124 January, 
'King Arthur' had been re-e1ected as the president of the union, but with a greatly 
reduced majority, receiving 54 per cent of the total. The right had clearly lost out 
with the formation of the UDM. Nevertheless, in the Yorkshire coalfield, the power 
base of both contenders, ScargilI managed 64 per cent of the vote. Moreover, in the 
heartlands of new realism, 61 per cent of Welsh miners and 69 per cent of Scottish 
miners backed Scargi11.39 
And yet even though Scargill retained the presidency, the militants' dilemma 
would not be resolved because management's offensive promised to continue and 
the new realists and the right would remain influential within the NUM. Indeed, the 
after-effects of the climb-down in the Bentley dispute were still being felt as Scargill 
returned to office, when ten Bentley miners were issued with final warnings for being 
involved in the flying picketing. Around the same time all the miners in the South 
Yorkshire Area were sent a threatening letter from British Coal, warning that 
'Management are determined that the small militant faction in the area will be 
prevented somehow from disrupting continuous production. ,40 
But British Coal could not have gone this far with its threats if it had not been 
given the opportunity to do so by the pit-level officials in the coalfield. On the 
weekend after calling off the Bentley strike, the South Yorkshire Panel had gone as 
far as to declare that in future no pit should send pickets out until the action had 
been sanctioned by a Panel meeting. And at branch meetings held that same 
weekend, many branch officials in the South Yorkshire Area also asserted that the 
overtime ban should be called off to pave the way for negotiations over pay.41 
In such a situation there were two options open to Scargi1J. He could let himself 
be tied by the rightward moving officials, or he could vehemently support every 
struggle of the rank and file which erupted in the pits. To do the latter, though, 
would mean a complete change from the strategy he had long endorsed, and meant 
risking the wrath of those NUM officials who had recently supported his re-election 
campaign but were hostile to unofficial action. 
The first test of Scargill's new standing came at a special NUM delegate 
conference in London on 3 February when Scargill attempted to get the overtime 
38 Transcript of Panorama, 11 January 1988. 
39 Hem.\worth and ,South Elmsall Express, 27 January 1988; Socialist Worker, 30 
January 1988: The Miner, January 1988. 
40 Socialist Worker, 30 January 1988. 
41 Socialist Worker, 23 and 30 January 1988. 
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ban extended. But it was the new realists who won the day, with delegates deciding 
to hold a membership ballot to review the action.42 
The nurses' heroes 
The Bentley dispute was not the only example in early 1988 of how the trade unions 
had not been tamed to the extent Margaret Thatcher was claiming. On 9 February, 
an editorial in The Times conceded that 'Britain is still suffering from industrial 
disease.' It went on to say that the government's trade union legislation had done 
much to reform the unions, 'but little, it seems, to remove the feelings of trade 
unionists in favour of the strike weapon to settle their grievances. ,43 The reason for 
such alarmism from such a pro-Tory newspaper was that car workers at Fords were 
taking industrial action, there was trouble brewing in the health service, and seafarers 
were taking their first strike action since 1966. And though tougher action now 
looked unlikely over the Code of Conduct, Britain's pits came to a standstill on a 
number of occasions during February, as members of NACODS took national strike 
action for the first time in their history, in a series of one-day stoppages over bonus 
payments and British Coal's threat to remove the union's closed shop. 
n was the NHS dispute which most attracted the public's attention though. On 3 
February thousands of health workers throughout Britain took part in a 'day of 
action' over pay and funding in the health service. The Times gave a rundown of the 
demonstrations and industrial action that had taken place. Though strike action had 
been patchy among health workers, significantly, one non-health-related workplace 
had actually struck in support of them: 
At Frickley Colliery near Pontefract, West Yorkshire, 1,000 miners stopped work 
for 24 hours in sympathy after a delegation of four nurses from Leeds arrived to 
enlist support. More than £100,000 of production time was lost.44 
Here, surely, was real proof that solidarity with other workers was now taken 
very seriously by the miners at Frickley. However, the issue was much more complex 
than this brief'report indicated and subsequently proved to be a testing time for some 
left-wing activists at the pit. 
Tony Short was coming offwork on the night shift when the day of action began: 
I can remember coming out of the pit at about five or six o'clock. I think that I 
was the only union man there. But when I came out of the baths there were three 
or four nurses outside. Everybody was milling about, humming and ahhing about 
coming out. 45 
The NHS dispute was something the miners at Frickley could hardly fail to notice .. 
with there being a small hospital, Warde-Aldam, sited only two hundred yards from 
42 A. 1. Taylor, -Consultation, conciliation and politics', p.232. 
43 The Times, 9 February 1988. 
44 The Times, 4 February 1988. 
45 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
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the colliery entrance. However, Johnny Stones remembers that these particular 
nurses: 
... came by about a dozen pits from Leeds to get to Frickley. I think there were 
other forces afoot in regards to that one. I couldn't tell you whether it was the 
RCP [Revolutionary Communist Party] or the SWP. But there were other forces 
because it was too coincidental. I agreed, personally, in principle, to supporting 
them because they supported us - I wouldn't say the membership did. 46 
According to Gary Hinchliffe, it was the RCP, a tiny organisation with no 
influence at the pit, that had instigated the stoppage: 'this group had told these 
nurses to go through to Frickley knowing full-well that Frickley wouldn't work. The 
men were very sceptical.'47 Paul Symonds and Steve Gant were later branded by 
their political opponents as two of the instigators of the stoppage. Both remember 
being on the afternoon shift that day. Paul Symonds first heard about the stoppage 
on the radio: 
At first I just thought: 'Who's organised thisT I couldn't really believe that 
something like this could happen without us knowing. I went straight up to the 
pit, and there they were: four or five nurses in uniform stood there, and they'd 
turned all the pit back. I wasn't sure if the union hadn't had a bit of a hand in it. 
Without a doubt, it was nice to see miners being prepared to go on strike for 
nurses. It would bring a smile to any trade unionist's face, and it certainly did 
mine at the time. It was a good feeling. 48 
Steve Gant first heard of the action when he met Steve Tulley, the branch 
secretary, while taking his children to school that morning: 
Steve Tulley had been on a brewery trip with The Mallard on Tuesday night. The 
first thing that I said to Steve this morning was, 'Did you have a good night?' 
'Aye, a great night; barring having to get up at five this morning.' I said, 'Why, 
what's up?' 'Fucking nurses are up at Frickley. They've turned the pit back, we 
are on strike.' I genuinely didn't know anything about this: 'Brilliant.' 'Aye, but 
it's only Frickley though.' I said, 'Well owt is better than nowt.' I dropped the 
kids off at school and went straight up to the pit to find out what's going off 49 
When he arrived there, he found a lot of discontent amongst the Frickley workforce: 
There were some people hanging about waiting for the afters shift corning up. But 
by this time it had been on the news and by now they know that there's only" 
Frickley out. They are saying: 'Why only Frickley, why only us?' Don't forget, 
these are lads who have had dispute, dispute, dispute, strike, strike, strike. 
46 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
47 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
48 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
49 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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They've had ten times more than any other miners in Yorkshire. So some are 
thinking, 'We've had our fair share. What's this going to prove; Frickley being 
out on its own?' I agreed with this, in a way. I couldn't understand why they 
hadn't hit the Doncaster Area; because at the time the feeling was behind the 
nurses. If they had done that it would have been a lot better, and there wouldn't 
have been as much shit hit the fan as did.50 
Despite this undercurrent against the stoppage, the nurses informed Frickley 
NUM ofa health workers' rally in Leeds that afternoon and invited a Frickley branch 
official to speak. Subsequently an emergency branch meeting was held and a coach 
booked to go to the rally. However, as Gary Hinchliffe recalls, neither: 
Steve Tulley nor Johnny Stones would go through to speak. They ducked out of 
the issue, saying that it was nothing to do with them, once it turned out that we 
were going to be the only pit that was going to be on strike. 51 
Though the militants in the branch were puzzled as to why only Frickley had been 
hit, they nevertheless went through to Leeds. When the contingent arrived at the 
rally, they were treated as heroes. 'We'd got the banner with us,' says Steve Gant: 
and we put it up at the rally, near the platform. We were Frickley miners and they 
were all clapping us. Calendar and Look North wanted to do interviews with a 
union man. I turned them down at first. But then I was getting pressure from 
some of the lads to do it; so I agreed. 1 stated in the interview that we were 
behind the nurses one hundred per cent, but [ thought the mistake they had made 
was in only coming to Frickley. I said that they should have gone to the 
Doncaster Area, and they would have got support because everybody relates to 
nurses, we all understand their predicament. 52 
In Tony Short's view, it was this appearance on television, 'with the Frickley 
banner and the dirty dozen stood there,' which made matters worse for the militants: 
There was Gant speaking and there were us, like his bodyguards, behind him. And 
of course everybody has a fit about this, don't they? Even my mam said that it 
looked bad, every pit in Britain working barring ours. 53 
Witch hunt 
Over the following days, investigations within the branch soon revealed that the 
nurses who had arrived outside Frickley were not an official delegation from the 
health service unions. Thus a special general meeting was arranged for the following 
Saturday so that those who were thought to have instigated the walkout could face 
50 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
5l Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
52 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
53 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
174 
The overtime ban 
the wrath of their workmates. Gary Hinchliffe says that about seven hundred miners 
were there and 'they were baying for blood.' Moreover: 
that's probably the first time that the moderates and the right wing in the union 
were organised. It was a witch hunt. They wanted all the branch committee on the 
stage so that they could see who they were. It was like McCarthy being there: 
'Did you know that this wasn't official?' Steve Tulley was saying that he knew 
nowt about it. They were being called 'liars'. They really got attacked. And that's 
when I would say that the right wing and the moderates got orgamsed, when they 
started putting candidates up for elections. But that was gutlessness. All it needed 
was for Steve Tulley and Chick Picken to stand there and say that they'd been 
taken in. They let Jip, Ganty and our Paul take the full brunt of it: 'The SWP had 
organised it. The SWP had sent them.' The official thing was that they didn't 
know, but they knew that it was a left-wing orgamsation. Everybody assumed it 
to be the SWP. Jip tried to teU them that he'd been contacted the night before to 
warn him that it was coming; but he wasn't in. He said that if they had done, he 
would have told them. But they wouldn't believe it, they wouldn't have it. From 
then on in, Lawson had a stick to bait people with then: the SWP. It was as if all 
the good work that we'd done went with that; and everything became hard work 
then. 54 
Steve Gant recalls that although there were not many calls for him to resign from 
the branch committee, the fact that some were made hurt him. 'I felt really Jet down 
at the moment,' he says: 
Because all that I seemed to have done since I started at the pit was put myself in 
the firing line. I'd not been on the union for myself, and I thought that I was a 
damned good umon man. I don't want to blow my own trumpet, but I was the 
best for the lads; and that's what I still believe. So all this hurt. It took some time 
to get over it. And I lost a few friends. After that, one or two came up to me 
while I was out socialising: 'I'm sorry about that.' And once they had heard the 
story, some of them started to. believe that it.wasn't.us. I would be telling groups 
of men what the SWP's theoflC:s wer~ on this: that It wasn't Our aim to organise 
secret strikes, that we were agamst this as much as anybody. 55 
The paradox about this was that the rrtiners at FrickJey and elsewhere were 
starting to retreat at the very time that other workers were starting to stir, albeit on a 
very limited scale, for the first time since the Big Strike. The rrtiners' retreat b~came 
all too clear one month later, on 6 March, when the result of the overtime ballot 
showed that NUM members had voted by 58 per cent to end the ban. Out of the 
union's 17 Areas, only three had voted to continue the action. 56 The Code of 
Conduct was now a fact, and if this situation were to continue, the prospect of 
flexible working practices being forced onto the miners seemed a very real one. 
54 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
55 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
56 The Times, 7 March 1988. 
175 
CHAPTER n"JELVE: PEACE 
War weary 
The end of the overtime ban signalled a period in which hostilities all but ceased in 
the Yorkshire coalfield. An article in the Yorkshire Post on Monday 13 June 1988, 
under the banner 'Peace in our mines', assessed the situation. It was argued that in 
the Yorkshire coalfield, 'the bane of industrial relations', the previous couple of 
months: 
have been among the most peaceful in the history of the nationalised industry. In 
April and May last year 21,208 shifts were lost through strikes at Yorkshire pits; 
this April and May only l,n5 shifts have been lost - a 95 per cent decrease. The 
mood in the mines has changed. Prosperity has a reaT chance of emerging in an 
industry which has appeared cursed by a death wish. t 
And there was plenty more evidence to suggest that the mood in the mines had 
indeed changed. Between mid-April and mid-June 1988 Britain's miners were said to 
have broken the all-time production record on five occasions; and since the overtime 
ban had been called off some miners were said to be earning as much as £500 a 
week, with overtime and bonuses.2 
The reality, as the militant activists at Fricldey had found to their cost,. was that 
many miner& were war weary_ Added to this, Yorkshire NUM branch officials were 
now more reluctant than ever tn back strikes and so disputes were kept to a 
minimum. Many officials placed their hopes in the series of private talks that were 
held between the NUM and British Coal. It was noted in the press that conciliatory 
noises were evident in these negotiations. Indeed, Sir Robert Haslam was even 
reported to have backed down on one issue, indicating that six-day working would 
be confined to new- pits. 3 So peaceful had affairs in the industry become that some 
new realists on the union's national executive were predicting that the forthcoming 
NUM conference, due to open at Great Yarmouth on 27 June, would be the quietest 
on record. 4 
The price of peace 
Peace there may have been, but it was the miners who were paying the price. In the 
year to April 1988 a massive 20,000 workers had left the industry, 16 mines had 
closed, leaving just 96 still operating. f'ive pits had closed in March alone and there 
were now little more than half the number of pits there had been at the beginning of 
the Big Strike. 5 The Wakefield Metropolitan District, which included South Elmsall 
and South Kirkby, had been badly affected by closures. In the nine years since the 
Tories had come to power, Wakefield District had lost 14 of its 20 pits. Five pits. 
had closed in the previous six months alone. Astonishingly, there were now no pits 
1 Yorkshire Post, 13 June 1988. 
2 Yorkshire Post, 13 June 1988. 
3 The Guardian, 11 June 1988. 
4 Yorkshire Post, 13 June 1988. 
5 The Times, 28 March 1988. 
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at all in the traditional mining commuruties of Castleford and Featherstone. Similarly, 
there had been six pits in the adjacent Hemsworth parliamentary constituency in 
1984: Acton Hall, Kinsley Drift, NosteIl, South Kirkby, Ferrymoor Riddings and 
Frickley. By the end of 1987 the first three pits on the above list had closed.6 Then 
came another bombshell. On 9 March 1988 British Coal announced that the 
combined pits of South KirkbylFerrymoor Riddings, which employed 1,300 workers, 
were to close too. The following day, the dispirited miners who worked at these pits 
voted by four to one in favour of accepting the closures without offering any 
opposition.7 
The social and economic costs of pit closures to this particular region were 
immense. Estimates of the local unemployment rate were now set at an alarming 24 
per cent, and were predicted to rise with the snowball effect on other industries.8 
Was Frickley safe? 
Though British Coal's axe was swinging ever closer, initially at least, the future still 
seemed rosy at Frickley - that is if output figures had any importance. In the first 
week of April the pit had produced 37,637 tonnes of coal, beating the previous best 
tonnage record by over 600 tonnes. The output per man shift record was also 
extended from 7.10 tonnes per manshift to 8.06 tonnes per manshift. 9 Ken Davies, 
the pit's deputy manager, told one of the local newspapers that: 
This is an excellent start to the year for us. £30 million has been invested in a new 
winders shaft, deepening and developing the Top Haigh Moor seam and currently 
improving development work in Meltonfield and Newhill seams. An achievement 
like this repays some of the investment and while we continue this sort of 
performance the pit will go from strength to strength. IO 
The message, th~n, was that if the Frickley miners worked hard enough their 
future was secure. But was this really so? Not long after, in mid-May 1988, a report 
prepared by the Coalfields Communities Campaign gave an astonishing forecast, 
predicting that within four years at least 16 more Yorkshire pits were likely to close, 
with the loss of 15,000 jobs, as a direct consequence of the privatisation of the 
electricity supply industry. Throughout Britain as a whole, a total of 51,500 mining 
jobs were said to be in jeopardy if privately-owned power stations were allowed to 
import coal without restrictions. 11 When the report was later discussed at a 
conference attended by such interested parties as Wakefield District councillors, 
mining unions and British Coal, one of the pits said to be in danger was Frickley 
Colliery. 12 
6 Hem:,fworth and South Elmsall Express, 23 March 1988; Yorkshire Post, 15 
March 1988. 
7 Hem~worth and South Elmsall Express, 16 March 1988. 
8 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 23 March 1988. 
9 Hemsworth and ,South Elmsall Express, 13 April 1988. 
10 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 13 April 1988. 
11 Yorkshire Post, 19 May 1988. 
12 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 22 June 1988. 
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Of course one of the main concerns of NUM members was the possible 
privatisation of the coal industry itself under the Tories. On 12 October 1988 the 
government's intentions were laid bare at the Conservative Party conference in 
Brighton when enerf,'Y secretary Cecil Parkinson made what he called 'an historic 
pledge', stating that coal would be privatised if the Conservatives won the next 
general election and that the government would retain its firm commitment to 
nuclear power. 13 
Victimised 
The after-effects of the NBS day of action were felt for quite some time at Frickley. 
'We lost a fair bit of credibility there. That's probably why there wasn't a dispute for 
six months,' suggests Tony Short. 14 With a clear division evident in the workforce 
for the first time since the Big Strike, management now felt confident enough to 
attack the militants in the pit. 'They were always trying to victimise us, so you had to 
do what you could to avoid it,' explains Paul Symonds: 
One of the things that I always tried to do was work in a team of men when I 
worked in the headings, so that it was very hard for them to pick on me as an 
individual. If they victimised me, they had to victimise all my team. I never gave 
them the excuse to; in terms of work, I used to be a good worker. So I kept 
victimisation down to a minimum. 15 
Another one of Frickley management's main targets, Steve Gant, was not so 
fortunate: 
Not long afterwards, I was going down the pit on the afternoon shift. Now I've 
always been good at smelling a rat straight away. We used to go down the pit and 
we used to get deployed off the board - a blackboard where they used to chalk up 
your numbers telling you which part of the pit you would be working in. This day, 
my number is there, 493, 'On a dint. Take pick and shovel.' I thought that there 
was something wrong about this, but I didn't say anything because it was the first 
time that this has been done. I couldn't jump the gun; not after what has gone off. 
I goes on this dint. [t was a job that had been created out of nothing. It was away 
from everybody else, there was nobody else there. I knew there was something 
wrong because this doesn't happen; this is planned. The deputy on the unit was 
Andrew Symonds, one of myoId schoolmates, although we are not friendly at 
this time. As he came past I asked him what the crack was with this job. 
'Nothing, why what's up?' He was very evasive. I said, 'Andrew, I know that 
there's something up. You know there's something up. I want you to tell me 
what's up. [ will not quote your name, I will not say a word about where it's 
com€? from.' You could see that Andrew didn't want to say anything - could he 
trust me? But I gave him my word and he accepted that. So he tells me: 'Yeah, 
you have'to be deployed onto this job, on your own, every day. Nobody has to be 
13 The Guardian, 13 October 1988. 
14 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
15 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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deployed with you. And I have to mark down every day the exact amount of 
work that you do.' 'Thank you, I know where I am now.' That just confirmed 
what was going through my mind. 16 
The following day he complained to the branch officials about how he was being 
victimised, but they were not sympathetic. He faced a dilemma: 
I was trapped because the men were against me and the union had enough of me. 
lt was like Catch 22: I can't pull men out, I've lost that bit of credibility. Is it 
going to fall on deaf ears? If it does I'm sacked. I thought: 'Has Lawson set me 
up on this for that reason? Yes he has. He wants me to jump the gun. He wants 
me to fetch the men out, for it to fall dead, for me to be sacked.' By this time he 
had already established a way to go about disputes; the Code of Conduct was 
coming in steadily. So I've got to dint; I've got to eat shit, basically. 
Now Lawson knew this. He would have his visits. He would always make a 
beeline to go to that job; and would fetch his two or three overmen with him, and 
maybe the safety officer. I'd be on my job, he'd say, 'Now then Steve, how's 
your dint going?' trying to goad me. He fetched a right crew down one day. 
There were about ten of them: deputies, overmen, safety officers and visitors 
from somewhere. 'This is Steve's dint,' he told them in front of me. , Then he gets 
his snuff tin out, 'Do you want a bit of snuff Steve?' I said, 'Not if your fingers 
have been in it. No.' 'What do you mean by that?' 'Well what does it mean? It's 
obvious enough what it means.' Now I don't think he knew how close he was 
that day for me to smash him with this pick that I had in my hand. I've never been 
as close. It was unbelievable. I was shaking after he'd gone. How I didn't do it I 
don't know. He'd got me if I'd have done that; that was it. And I would have had 
a problem with having to do time as well. But I got through. 17 
Short-manning 
Despite the best efforts of the new realIsts, the peace in the Yorkshire coalfield was 
short-lived. And even if militants were no longer in a position to offer a lead, the 
reality was that they were not the ones who had been the initiators of the stoppages 
in the pits anyway. 'Apart from once, I've never fetched people out on strike,' 
argues Tony Short, 'none of the militants have. If you ask all those who were 
supposed to be the ringleaders, I'll bet that there's not been one dispute over us. It's 
always been over other people.' 18 
And so it proved. On Tuesday 20 September, for instance, production came to a 
halt once more, for 24 hours, after men on the night shift refused to go underground 
because of a disagreement over manning levels. 19 That same week miners also 
struck briefly at nearby Brodsworth and Barnburgh collieries. There was a further 
encour~ging sign for militants in late September when a conference of South Wales 
16 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
17 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
18 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
19 Hemsworth and .")~outh Elmsall Express, 28 September 1988. 
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nliners did a remarkable U-turn' and rejected British Coal's demands for six-day 
working at Margam.20 
There were further walkouts at Frickley the following month. On Friday 14 
October there was a strike on the afternoon shift on 83s unit in the Little Pit, and 
four days later there were strikes involving L27s in the Big Pit and C90s in the Little 
Pit. Like most of the disputes in this period, most of which were unrecorded, these 
were over 'short-manning'. 'They'd let about 175 men go with redundancy,' recalls 
Gary Hinchliffe: 
the pit was getting so run down and de-manned - instead of there being a fitter for 
every unit, and men for every unit, plus a market list, it was getting to where if 
somebody didn't turn up for a face, they wouldn't replace him. They'd argue that 
we haven't got the manpower, had no men working. They'd deliberately caused a 
situation where we were understaffed, and then they expected the men to work 
undermanned on a face ... Management would blame your colleagues who were 
not coming into work, the absentee levels. The union would cite the fact, 'Well 
you knew this before you let these 175 men go' ... A contract for a job might be 
for eleven men. But then Lawson came in with a ten-man contract, a nine-man 
contract, an eight-man contract ... And then he would say to the men, 'Look, if 
you think that you can run this face with just four men - just because the union 
says it's an eleven-man face - we'll pay you the money that eleven men would 
earn; you can share it between you.' We had big battles over this.21 
GCIIQ again 
In late October 1988, the issue of trade union organisation at GCHQ, the 
government's electronic spying centre at Cheltenham, grabbed the attention of trade 
union activists once again - as it had prior to the Big Strike - when the Tories 
diSrrUssed four of the 18 remaining trade unionists at the establishment for refusing 
to relinquish their trade union affiliations.22 Even the TUC, now more prone to 
promoting credit cards, mortgages and glossy advertisements as the stuff of modem 
trade unionism, felt forced to respond over this and called a day of action for 
Monday 7 November, but urged unions to take action short of strikes, generally 
lunch-time rallies and marches.23 When it took place, the day of action demonstrated 
just how resilient British trade unionism remained, with solid action across the civil 
service and isolated action elsewhere. But the action also showed that the trade 
union movement was still trapped by its compliance with the legal restrictions; and 
so no strikes were called, even by the NUM.24 Nevertheless, one Yorkshire pit did 
strike that day, and once again it was Frickley Colliery.25 After the debacle over the 
20 Socialist Worker, 1 October 1988. 
21 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
22 Socialist Worker, 22 October 1988. 
23 Socialist Worker, 29 October 1988. 
24 Socialist Worker, 12 November 1988. 
25 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 9 November 1988; Yorkshire Evening 
Post, 7 November 1988. 
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health workers earlier in the year, 'This was so ironic it was unbelievable,' says Paul 
Symonds: 
The consensus at the pit was this: 'We've had our day of action for the nurses 
and we are not having another one.' But it still went onto the agenda for a union 
meeting to discuss whether there should be a 24-hour strike in support of GCHQ. 
There was a big notice about this went up in the union box; and there was a 
steady stream of men going into the union and saying, 'We are not coming out on 
strike. What's this notice doing up?' The union officials, mainly led by Chick 
Picken, reassured all these blokes that they fully understood their circumstances, 
that it was just a formality, that we wouldn't be coming out on strike and that 
they shouldn't worry about it. This was going on for weeks. And to be honest, I'd 
got my head down a bit and wasn't really arguing for it - I thought that it would 
be better to mark this one down as a loss.26 
Although Paul Symonds had no wish to see any strike action taken over the 
GCHQ in the current climate, he still wanted the branch to debate the issue and so 
invited an SWP civil service union activist from Sheffield to address the meeting: 
I met Kieran and I said, 'Look, we don't want to be coming out on strike. Just 
get up and say your piece.' Kieran gets up and what does he do? He makes this 
brilliant speech about why people should support GCHQ! There were only about 
twenty-five people in this room - and they were all cheering him! I was stood at 
the back of the room with my head in my hands, thinking, 'Oh, no.' It was the 
first time in my life that l'd stayed silent in a union meeting. And as soon as he 
finished speaking everyone said, 'There's no problem, let's support them.' I really 
didn't know what to do. I couldn't force myself to speak against it, although I 
knew that it was a big mistake, because I knew that the men at the pit were dead 
against it. Barring two or three abstentions, it had been voted for unanimously -
and I was one of the abstentions! 
There was hell-on on Monday. It was mainly the union officials who got it -
men were going to rip their heads off: 'You told us there wasn't going to be a 
strike!' 'But, but, but.' What a situation that was. You want to go on strike when 
you have the backing of the majority of the men. But the pit was in a no-strike 
mode, and the union meeting had voted to take strike action. It was still solid, 
nobody scabbed; but it was one of those things that shouldn't have happened.27 
Almost 
1988, the year of relative industrial peace in Britain's coalfields, almost ended as it 
began - with an NUM overtime ban in place, this time to force British Coal's hand 
over pay and because the corporation was denying the NUM negotiating rights in 
UDM dominated pits. In the event, however, the miners narrowly rejected any action 
by 29,386 (50.6 per cent) to 28,650 (49.3 per cent) and thus allowing British Coal to 
impose a 7.5 per cent wage increase. Within the result, Yorkshire miners showed 
26 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
27 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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signs of their combativity by voting 58 per cent in favour of action. But once more 
the worst damage had been done by the Scottish and South Wales Area leaders who 
openly campaigned against challenging British Coa1.28 
The failure to get a vote for action vividly showed the NUM bureaucracy's 
dilemma. Sections of the leadership continued to dampen down the fights over local 
issues in favour of larger-scale actions. But they failed to see that victories at pit 
level remained the key to rebuilding confidence in the pits in order to tackle wider 
questions such as national pay claims. To make matters worse, the rebuff for 
national action came just as British Coal declared a renewed pit closure programme, 
and just after the corporation and the Health and Safety executive had announced 
plans to slacken underground safety regulations - this when the existing reh:rulations 
were hardly enough: already the accident rate was increasing, with as many as 11 
deaths in the first 32 weeks of 1988, double the rate for the previous year.29 Ken 
Moses, still British Coal's technical director, vocalised management's absolute 
indifference to miners' working conditions on 29 November as he pressed the 
government to change the restrictions on working hours enshrined in the 1908 Coal 
Mines Regulations Act, stating that, 'It doesn't seem to me there is anything very 
onerous about working under ground for ten hours or more. ,30 Moses' remarks 
were made two days after the first ever six-day working agreement had been signed 
by the UDM for the new Ashfordby pit in Leicestershire. 31 
On 24 January 1989 British Coal told mining unions that five South Yorkshire 
pits, Barnburgh, Brodsworth, Dinnington, Shireoaks, and Thurcroft were 'causing 
concern', even though the Area had made a profit of £ 13 million, after capital 
charges, in the three months up to December. Three other pits were also said to be 
operating at costs less than British Coal's minimum level of £1.50 a gigajoule.32 
And yet despite the miners once again having voted against action, the resistance 
at pit level that had disintegrated after Bentley was still in the process of mounting. 
Amongst the most prominent disputes in this period was a two-day strike in Selby 
over safety in mid:December. In late January 1989 there was a 24-hour strike at 
Kellingley and a three-day strike at Barnsley Main, both over bonus payments. Also 
in late January, the Yorkshire Area NUM banned all production in overtime. 33 
Significantly, British Coal had faced little opposition on the question of closures 
since the end of the Big Strike. Suddenly though, on 5 February 1989, things 
changed briefly when miners at Barnburgh Colliery, some six miles south of Frickley, 
voted unarumously to fight to save their threatened pit and 750 jobs. Management 
were so stunned by the decision that they had to abandon their plan to immediately 
run the pit down for fear of provoking a strike. 34 'This was like a breath of fresh air 
for us,' recalls Paul Symonds: 
28 The Guardian, 19 December 1988; Socialist Worker, 7 January 1989. 
29 Socialist Worker, 10 December 1988. 
30 Yorkshire Miner, Christmas 1988. 
31 Yorkshire Miner, Christmas 1988. 
32 Yorkshire Post, 25 January 1989. 
33 Socialist Worker, 7 January and 4 February 1989. 
34 Socialist Worker, 11 February 1989; Yorkshire Post, 6 February 1989. 
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at last a pit had said 'No'. There was a campaign around it, and initially I think 
there were some walkouts over it. We were over the moon. A car load of us from 
Frickley went over to a public meeting over the closure. The best speaker on the 
night was a local vicar called Rodney Marshall. He was dead militant. 35 
However, there were signs that new realism would scupper the Barnburgh fight. 
At one meeting the rift between Arthur Scargill and the Yorkshire Area leaders was 
evident once again. Scargill called for industrial action to save pits, but Jack Taylor 
saw the battle to save Barnburgh only in terms of presenting a good case to the 
review procedure.36 'But once you put it in the procedure, it just dragged on and 
on,' arb'Ues Paul Symonds: 
Your bonus would be down because they would stop you earning it, and they 
would make it so that you just wanted to get out. There hasn't been any pit that 
has gone into the review procedure and survived it. So the union's strategy was: 
yes, they wanted people to vote against closure - but that is all they wanted them 
to do. 37 
And so it proved, with the campaign to save Barnburgh eventually collapsing and 
the pit closing. 
Transferees 
A consequence of pit closures since the mid-1980s was an influx of transferees at 
Frickley, replacing the older and disillusioned miners who had taken redundancy. 
Thus it was noticeable that the pit was gradually changing from being one in which 
the vast majority of the workforce lived in the immediate vicinity. But as we saw in 
the introduction to this present study, theorists have long associated close-knit 
mining communities with militant workforces, and in line with this thinking, some 
Frickley miners were wary of the influx of transferees; as Gary Hutsby recollects: 
Some people at the pit would theorise that along with a lot of good, solid 
militants leaving Frickley, the pit had been diluted by the men who had been 
shipped in from pits that had closed. They would argue that the militancy wasn't 
there any more. Some people referred to these who had been transferred to 
Frickley as 'Gypsies', which to my mind was a load of bollocks. You can go 
through all the disputes that took place from '85 onwards, when half the pit was 
made up of people from outside the locality, with people who didn't grow up in 
the same streets as us; but if they were so weak and spineless and weren't 
prepared to fight, how come every strike we ever had was solid? Some people 
had a pop at them openly: 'Aye, it's your faults, we wouldn't have stood for this 
years ago.' But when people were asked, 'Are you going to go on strike over this 
matter?' .it was always one hundred per cent, everybody always marched down 
35 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
36 Socialist Worker, 25 February 1989. 
37 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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the lane. People were trying to find excuses for why things had turned from the 
way that it had been.38 
Robert King had transferred to FrickJey, via a short spell at Askem, after South 
Kirkby closed, and recalls hearing the same argument: 
. . . a lot were saying that these from other pits were watering it down. But it 
wasn't. I think it was the Frickley miners themselves who were getting their heads 
battered against the wall. Because I noticed that at meetings it was those who 
were fresh from other places who were sticking their hands up to strike, and they 
were doing picketing and that. Whereas some of the Frickley lads who had been 
doing it for years had had enough.39 
John Picken, Frickley's branch president in its final years, pays the following 
tribute to the transferees at the pit: 
We'd got a lot oflads from what we call 'over the common', from Goldthorpe, 
from all over. Credit to them lads. They backed us all the way. If there was a 
strike coming up, they were with us. They were at the forefront with us, they paid 
into our levies. They were as good as any man you could work with. 40 
Nevertheless, there was a genuine fear amongst militants that the pit management 
would try to reinforce any divisions and attempt to get newcomers to deviate from 
what was regarded as normal practice at the pit. Paul Symonds recalls that one of 
the main concerns was that the transferees were moving into the better-paid jobs on 
the coal face that were usually taken by younger miners once they had gained 
expenence: 
Although these weren't circumstances that we particularly wanted, we on the left 
thought that we had to welcome the transferees to the pit for the simple reason 
that these men had not sold their jobs and wanted to stay inside the industry. 
Because of this, there was a discussion in a union meeting and it was agreed that 
we would accept transferees, but that there would be negotiations between the 
branch and management about how many there would be and what jobs they 
would do. If there were button men sent, we would use these to try to free the 
button men who had been waiting for years. So, by and large, they were pretty 
much welcomed.41 
He explains that Frickley NUM was fortunate in that many of the newcomers 
were militants who had especially requested a transfer to Frickley because of its 
reputation. However, he remembers that the efforts to integrate the transferees were 
not as good. as they should have been: 
38 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
39 Robert King, interviewed by the author, 13 December 1996. 
40 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
41 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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Looking back, there were things that the union didn't do but could have done -
and I suppose I should have raised it. I remember thinking about when new men 
came to the pit, they would have a meeting with the management and the 
manager would welcome them to the pit. But they were marched straight past the 
union office, and the union never made any attempt to say, 'Welcome to Frickley 
NUM, this is how we do things here.' So that was missing.42 
Robert King remembers the reception he encountered with Frickley management 
just after he arrived at the pit: 
I was up in the offices and somebody said, 'You'll have to see TL.' I thought: 
'Who's TL?' That was Lawson's nickname; I didn't know. He got me in the 
office with the personnel manager and they made me a cup of tea and what have 
you. Then it was: 'Are you a member of the Socialist Workers Party? Do you go 
drinking in the Niggers? He knew that all the militants drank in there. And I just 
lied to him. And he knew I was lying.43 
But wherever the miners who constituted the Frickley workforce resided, in early 
1989 the workers at the pit would once again demonstrate the most effective way to 
tackle British Coal's attacks. 
Water tight 
In an earlier chapter we touched on how Frickley Colliery management were eager 
to end the practice of granting concessions to miners who worked in wet conditions. 
The issue would remain a potential powder-keg for a long time. 'This,' says Johnny 
Stones: 
was one of the Issues that when we resumed work after the strike and managers 
had got a wishing well and could wish what they wanted; they collectively agreed 
that the Yorkshire Water Agreement, as we'd understood it in the past, was no 
longer operating in that way.44 
There was no way of avoiding water underground - and water was not just wet, 
sometimes it was acidic or icy cold, and sometimes consisted of slurry - and so the 
issuing of 'water-notes' permitting miners to leave the pit early or receive a special 
payment was always likely to remain contentious. In theory, water-notes were issued 
at the deputy's discretion and had little to do with senior management. But 'there 
was always some kind of argument over water-money or water-notes,' recollects 
Gary Hurst: 
We went. through a phase where there were no such things as water-notes. We 
were getting told: 'You can have water-money,' and then when it was really bad, 
42 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
43 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
44 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
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'Oh, you can have an half-hour note but you can't have water-money. You can 
have one or the other but you can't have both.' ... They seemed to be ruled by 
the wind over it. It was never a clear directive about water-money, or 
water-notes, because I can remember that we used to get an hour's note in lOs 
heading on Fridays, and 69s heading, prior to the strike. It was just below the 
knees in water, raining in from above, You were wet from head to toe. But as far 
as hour notes were concerned after the strike, there was no such thing. You used 
to get at the most half an hour, and that was going in the water - you really had to 
be drenched to get that . . . Sometimes the men used to take it on themselves: 
'Are you giving us a note?' 'No!' So it would be like a mini-dispute.45 
In mid-February 1989 there had been water present on one particular face at 
Frickley, C83s in the Little Pit, for about a week; but not enough to warrant a 
water-note. By the morning of Monday 20 February though, water levels had risen 
to between 12 and 18 inches in depth. Deputies on both the day shift and the 
afternoon shift agreed that water-notes were in order but were afraid to sign them 
because senior management had declared there was no water and that any deputy 
who issued a note would face disciplinary action. 46 'We were asked to work in these 
shocking conditions without receiving any payments,' remembers Ray Riley: 
We were not prepared to work in that area unless we got paid accordingly. And 
the deputy gave us an ultimatum: that we make our minds up within half an hour 
about what we were going to do, or else we could get our coats on and go. So 
obviously we took his advice and went.47 
When the Frickley NUM branch officials and a team of senior colliery managers 
got involved after this, management assured the union representatives that they were 
prepared to leave the issuing of water-notes to the deputies' discretion. However, 
workers on the night shift found this not to be the case as deputies again refused to 
give out notes because of pressure from senior management. The men on the day 
shift on Tuesday were back to square one and quickly getting soaked. The NUM 
branch officials tried to solve the problem by asking for the colliery manager to visit 
C83s. A water pumping system was being installed and production was stood by the 
time Tony Lawson arrived at the site. Lawson now declared there was no water and 
refused to sign a water-note. However, he said he would allow men with wet clothes 
to change into fresh clothing at the face. 48 Angered at this, the men involved then 
walked out of the pit. Robert King was among them: 
... we were all on the paddy waiting to go out on strike, and the manager was 
there. He'd been on the face and he sat down and he said to this bloke something 
like: 'It's madness.' This bloke said, 'It might be, but we're still going home.' 
And that :-vas it, we all got on the paddy and went home . . . And he was on the 
45 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
46 Labour Briefing, 21 March 1989. 
47 Ray Riley, interviewed by the author. 
48 Labour BriefinK, 21 March 1989. 
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same paddy, shaking his head, It was great, because he was powerless. They're all 
right getting you in the office when you are on your own; but he couldn't do owt, 
he couldn't threaten anybody with the sack. He couldn't intimidate anybody 
because we were all going. He was a nasty piece of work, an intimidating bastard, 
and he couldn't do owt, he was just impotent.49 
A mass meeting was held the following day and the men voted to stay out until 
Saturday. Later that week British Coal sought the advice of an industrial solicitor to 
see if the Yorkshire Water Agreement could be overcome in court. To their 
consternation, the corporation found that the agreement was legally binding, and so 
backed down. Frickley management apologised to the NUM and promised not to 
interfere in the handing out of water-notes again. The miners subsequently returned 
to work the following Monday. 50 
Writing in" the left-wing newspaper Labour Briefing under the pseudonym 'A 
proud miner from Frickley NUM', Jeff Johnson asked for other miners to follow the 
FrickJey example: 
The problem to me as a rank and file member of Frickley NUM is how many 
other pits have already experienced the same style of aggressive management, had 
long-standing agreements torn up, and done nothing? Once again it has been 
Frickley fighting to maintain the status quo, as we have done dozens of times 
since 84/85. I know at some pits faced with closure morale is low, but where is 
the miners' tenacity? Others won for us what we have. Are we going to give it up 
Mthout even raising our voices? Now more than any other time is the time to 
stand up and be counted.51 
This victory was especially important considering that the management at Frickley 
were once more pressing miners to break the one million tonne mark by the end of 
that financial year. The miners needed to remain vigilant because such pressure was 
causing the accident rate in the pit to increase. Indeed in one 36-hour period just 
prior to the walkout there had been as many as five serious accidents at Frickley, 
including one miner suffering a broken back. 52 
The battery dispute 
Hardly had the dust settled from the strike over water payments when another 
walkout occurred at Frickley. This is how the Yorkshire Evening Post of 12 April 
1989 described the latest stoppage: 
Frickley Colliery, at South Elmsall, was strike bound today after a walkout 
sparked by an instruction to carry a battery. British Coal say a man waiting to go 
underground for yesterday's night shift refused to take with him a lamp battery 
for use on a man-riding car. He was then sent from the pit and was followed by 
49 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
50 Labour Briefing, 21 March 1989. 
5] Labour Briefing, 21 March 1989. 
52 Socialist Worker, 4 March 1989. 
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the rest of the men on his shift. Today's 6 am shift also refused to work leaving 
more than 600 of the pit's 970 workforce idle. 53 
The row which sparked the dispute had been running for over two years and 
stemmed from managemenfs refusal to continue paying custom and practice 
payments. <It was because we had a new man-riding haulage system in, which took 
the men into the pit bottom,' recollects Johnny Stones: 
There was an engine that drove it that was in the pit bottom and there was a 
Cyclone Converter paddy-engineman. What he'd got to do was carry a batteIY 
that was charged up in the lamp room on the surface. He'd to carry it from the 
lamp room, down to the shaft side, and from the shaft side to the Cyclone 
Converter haulage engine house underground. But there was no payment for it. 
He got paid for carrying an oil lamp, only a minimum payment . . . which was 
about 10p per shift. 54 
Although the issue was relatively trivial in comparison to others that led to 
walkouts, Gary Hurst thought that the question of payments for carrying objects 
underground always had the potential to flare up: 
A lot of men were under the same feeling as me, because, being a fitter, we used 
to be loaded up to the nines with tackle to carry in to our job every day. We 
started work at six o'clock and we were going into an office to report at quarter 
to six. And then they were giving us tackle to carry to the job and we didn't start 
until six. And we were always falling out over that. So it was no surprise when 
the battery thing came up, because the men have to present themselves down the 
pit for work. That's their contract for employment. And they were asking them to 
pick batteries up at quarter to six, carry them in their own time to their job. It 
sounds small aJ:l.d petty, but if it's in your own time have they got any rule over 
you? I know you are on their premises, but you are not getting paid by them, 
why should you do as you are told before six. 55 
The walkout ended the following day, 13 April, when a mass meeting voted to 
accept a recommendation from the South Yorkshire Panel to go back to work and 
allow talks between the NUM's Area agent and British Coal.56 
To outside observers, and even many Frickley miners, the dispute may have 
seemed petty. This may have been so. But, crucially, what this stoppage did 
demonstrate once again was that it was going to cost British Coal dear if it picked 
on even a single worker at the pit, even though a large section of the workforce 
were weary of continually having to take action. 
53 Yorkshire Evening Post, 12 April 1989. 
54 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
55 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
56 Yorkshire Evening Post, 13 April 1989. 
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'Just like old times' 
Without doubt there was still great pride in being a member of the NUM. However, 
by the time of the union's 19-89 conference in July, moves were already under way to 
bring about a merger with the giant Transport and General Workers' Union, with the 
miners constituting a part of the TGWU's energy group.l Union mergers were very 
much in vogue in this period. By 1992 over 40 per cent of all trade unionists would 
belong to conglomerate trade unions.2 
The fact that such a merger was even being contemplated by the NUM 
bureaucracy was a sign of how they were losing faith in the miners' industrial 
strenf,Yfh. And yet, though the merger itself eventually fell through, the great irony is 
that such a move was being sought at precisely the time that the Conservative 
government started to face severe difficulties. According to the new realists, 
'Thatcherism' was supposed to be invincible, and yet Labour was now 14 per cent 
ahead in the opinion polls, and inflation, whjch the Tories had claimed was under 
control, had now reached 8.3 per cent and showed no immediate sign of falling. 3 It 
was a similar story on the industrial front, where the unions were supposed to have 
been tamed. As the Tories celebrated ten years in office, The Economist commented 
on how it was 'Just like old times, really, suddenly strikes arc back in fasmon.,4 [n 
the following weeks there was a strike ballot amongst engineering workers in a pay 
dispute; 37,000 power workers voted by 10 to 1 to take action over pay; there were 
unofficial walkouts on the London Underground and one-day strikes by London bus 
workers; at the BBC there was a series of one-day stoppages by 20,000 television 
workers; postal workers were threatening strike action; 7S0,000 local government 
workers were in the process of being balloted over pay; and the firefighters' union 
was threatening action on pay and in defence of national bargaining.5 In June there 
were also one-day stoppages on the railways, strikes on North Sea oil rigs and 
strikes by dockers .. 
With the miners desperately needing to gain confidence to fight the next round of 
pit closures, all of this should have been welcome. But the industrial action that took 
place also showed clear signs of new realist influence. The strikes were limited, they 
tended to be of one-day duration, they were sectional, and they were within the law. 
But what was most worrying for the Tories about these developments on the 
industrial front was sometmng that 17,e Econumist also noted: 'Tight laws regulating 
official strikes may be making wildcat action more common. ,6 
The 'wildcat action' that The Economist bemoaned hail of course, long been a., 
common feature at Frickley Colliery and would remain so during the rest of 1989 .. 
On 20 and 21 of June, for instance, there was a strike in the Little Pit over 
1 17Je Guan/ian, 4 July 1989. 
2 l.ahour Research, June 1990, pp. 9-11; McIlroy, Trade Unions in Britain Today, 
second edition, (Manchester, 1995), p.17. 
3 Socialist Worker, IS July 1989. 
4 The F;conomist, 29 April 1989. 
5 Socialist Worker, 13 May 1989. 
6 the If,conomist, 29 April 1989. 
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'redeployment'. As with the short-manning disputes, deployment disputes were a 
consequence of the large numbers of redundancies at the pit. 'We were always 
having do's over things like that,' recalls Gary Hurst: 
Everybody used to get the monk on over redeployment. You got sent to a job, 
during the job it might've broken down. There might've been an hour when the 
men couldn't do that job, so they used to redeploy them onto other jobs. 
Basically, they were trying to keep you doing something, but not on your own 
job. You had your regular job, the men on the face especially. They saw it as part 
and parcel of their job to do that job. That's what they were employed for. They 
were picked out for that job, they were put on that job, they didn't see why they 
should walk another mile somewhere else to do another job, which they haven't 
got enough men to do. But the gaffers expect you to do it because you are not 
doing owt. You always used to have disputes - but not disputes as far as going 
out on strike over it. But you used to have bits of these pretty regularly: 'I'm not 
being redeployed, you can knackers. I'll go home first!' And they used to go 
home. 7 
Another indication that militancy at Frickley was beginning to recover somewhat 
from the low point after the NHS dispute was the continuing success of left-wing 
candidates seeking positions on the branch committee. Gary Hinchliffe had stood for 
branch secretary in 1987: 
1 got beaten on that . . . But 1 was elected to run the pit shop for a couple of 
years. Then I got on the branch and came off the pit shop . . . I was voted on with 
the highest number of votes as well, and I was re-elected with the highest number 
of votes. I got re-elected twice. 
Perhaps more signi-ficant was the re-election of Steve Gant: 
I increased my vote. Which was funny. One year I was being asked to resign, but 
when it came round to voting again I was back on. Which was smashing. All this 
attitude about Frickley having had enough, 'Let's hide our banner and get some 
coal off and set more bars,' didn't stop management attacking them all the time. 
So after a period of time - when we've been getting all this shit - it's never going 
to stop, so they start realising that when it comes to the elections, and who do 
you want on your side, at the end of the day the best lads for the job were us. 
And 1 think that's why we got re-elected. They knew that although we had our 
fall-outs, and that things had gone wrong, at the end of the day we were the most 
capable people at the pit for arguing on their behalf 8 
There were further walkouts on a number of different headings at Frickley from 
Tuesday 19 'September and Friday 22 September 1989. Later in the autumn, on 
Thursday 16 November, the entire day shift struck in the Little Pit. 
7 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
8 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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Pessimism 
Job losses still dominated thinking in the coal industry as the new decade 
approached. In late July 1989 it was announced that a further 80 jobs at Frickley 
had to go and that a face in the Cudworth seam would have to close. The Frickley 
branch officials were so disturbed by these latest losses that they requested the 
matter be put through the colliery review procedure. 'At the moment,' Steve Tulley 
told the IIem,\worth and South Elmsall Express, 'feelings at Frickley are terrible and 
talk is always of it being closed down, more job losses and the like.' .9 
The pessimism at Frickley was probably indicative of the climate elsewhere in 
British pits in the coming months as further speculation about the prospects for the 
industry were disclosed. On Monday 7 August 1989, for example, The Guardian 
newspaper revealed that British Coal had drawn up plans to close a further 20 pits, 
cut almost 30,000 jobs, and reduce output by 25 million tonnes, to just under 60 
million tonnes, if the industry was privati sed over the next four years.1O More 
immediately worrying was the forthcoming electricity privatisation. On 30 October, 
a leaked cabinet memorandum revealed that up to 18,000 miners could lose their 
jobs as a direct result of the sell-off and there would be a further 12,000 
redundancies in a clear-out. II 
AUblUst 1989 also witnessed British Coal attempting to put the NUM under threat 
in a more direct manner, when it retaliated to the NUM's pay demand of a 
£30-a-week pay rise by threatening to terminate the check-off agreement, which had 
existed since 1949, under which NUM members had their union subscriptions 
stopped directly out of their wage packets. If this measure was implemented, it 
promised severe financial difficulties for the NUM.12 In addition, the end of the 
check-off could provide the perfect excuse for those miners who were discontented 
with the union to drop out of membership altogether. In the event, the threat was not 
put into operation on an industry-wide level at this time. Nevertheless, British Coal 
knew they were aiming at the NUM's jugular, and so later made the same threat at 
pit level to miners involved in local disputes - as Maltby miners found out in January 
1990 when they held a series of one-day strikes over their demand for a pit 
ambulance. 13 A few weeks later, in early February, British Coal stopped the 
check-off of all Notts NUM members, arguing that it was 'inconvenient'. 14 It was 
with this threat to union organisation hovering in the background that the next major 
stoppages at Frickley would occur. 
\Veld mesh 
The next stoppage of any significance at Frickley Colliery took place in late February 
1990 and had its roots in the worsening safety record in the coal industry, and in 
how British Coal were taking advantage of the weakened NUM and bullying 
workers into ignoring safety rules. In the year up to September 1989 there had been 
9 Hem,\worth and South Elmsalll'-xpress, 2 August 1989. 
10 Ihe Guardian, 7 August 1989. 
11 The Times, 31 October 1989. 
12 Ihe Times, 15 August 1989. 
13 Socialist Worker, 27 January 1990. 
14 Socialist Worker, 10 February 1990. 
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18 fatal accidents in the industry. To make matters worse, the government's mines 
inspectorate, which was supposed to maintain safety levels in the pits, was in the 
process of negotiating a series of new health and safety laws which threatened to 
reduce the existing safety standards. IS 
Gary Hutsby operated an under.bYTound conveyor belt at Frickley and tells of an 
incident which typified management's attitude to safety in this period. He says that, 
'Everywhere that you went there were safety posters: "Have you remembered to 
check this today.'" But this was only superficial: 
the first time that you say that you are going to have to stop the job because it 
isn't safe, they used to go absolutely ballistic with you. They would drag you into 
the office for stopping the job. One day this gaffer collars me. He says, 'Look at 
all this paper on the blind side. It's a fire hazard. I want you to get it cleaned up.' 
I said, 'Yes I'll do it, no problem. The belts will stop for snap time in about 
twenty minutes, I'll jump over the belt when it's stopped and clean it up.' He said, 
'No, no, no. There's no need for that. Just jump across the belt now, it won't take 
you five minutes. You can get all that paper up, the job is still running, everything 
is fine.' I said, 'Look, I'll do it, but I am not going to go over there while the belts 
are running.' Safety-wise you are looking for an accident, you could get caught 
on a roller. And legally, you shouldn't be on the blind side when the belt is 
running. If something had happened to me, I wouldn't have had a leg to stand on 
because I shouldn't have been there. But he was saying, 'No, no. You don't see 
what [ mean. Just jump across the belt. You will be all right.' I said, 'No, I'm not 
prepared to do that.' I'd now become a militant, and little things like this seemed 
important to me ... This undermanager hadn't been at the pit long, he took his 
helmet off and threw it onto the ground. He says, '} don't know what's wrong 
with you lot here. Every time I ask somebody to do something it's fucking "No, 
no, no." Forget it, I'll do it myself' And he did. He jumped across the belt and 
cleaned all this rubbish up. I was just wishing that something would have 
happened to him. 16 
The dispute which erupted followed hard on the heels of two safety incidents at 
Frickley. In the first, two miners had been buried by a roof fall - one of them was so 
badly injured it was feared he would never work again. A Frickley management 
bulletin issued at the time stoked up the unrest when it blamed the accident on 
'sloppy working practices.' 17 The second incident took place in another part of the 
mine, after management refused to allow miners to use corrugated sheeting, which 
the miners needed to protect themselves from falling dirt while contract workers 
were boring to insert steel rods for strengthening the roof Instead they had to use 
weld-mesh. 18 Ian Oxley, an NUM safety inspector at Frickley at that time, explains 
the union's case: 
15 Socialist Worker, 2 September 1989. 
16 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
17 Socialist Worker, 2 March 1990. 
18 South Yorkshire Times (South Elmsall and Hemsworth edition), 23 February 
1990. 
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The case was that the men had previously been using tin sheeting, which gives 
total safety over the men's heads. Under the tin sheeting is pieces of wood. The 
men are used to this, they are quite happy with it, and they can earn good bonus. 
Production-wise it's good. Safety-wise it's good. But the colliery manager - in my 
opinion and that of the men - to save money, changed to mesh, which has holes 
in, I would say two inches wide, if not wider, by four inches long. You had to 
drill this roof and it was friable, in other words, the rock was breaking into small 
pieces, and as you were drilling the roof, it shakes the small pieces off So you 
can imagine a piece of dirt, that could be up to four inch, two inch wide, falling 
from a height of eight to ten feet and catching you on your shoulder or your arms. 
It's very painful. But the men said: 'No. We don't want mesh, we want tin 
sheeting. ' 19 
At first the dispute looked to have been settled in the miners' favour without any 
need for a walkout. On Tuesday 20 February the deputy manager visited the men 
with the grievance, accepted their demands and even arranged for two or three 
bundles of corrugated sheeting to be sent underground. 20 But then pit manager Tony 
Lawson got involved. 'Unfortunately', reflects Ian Oxley: 
the manager, instead of going down to the men and saying, 'Look lads, I 
understand that you are used to this method of work, what's your problem?' 'Big 
bits are bouncing through'. 'Well, I'll tell you what lads, we'll put you a finer 
mesh in, but get back to your tin sheets while I get you the new mesh.' But it isn't 
that. It's, 'You will put that mesh up because I say so. I am the manager. I say 
that's safer.' And so the men's safety was disregarded. The union's advice to the 
men was: 'Go and get every piece of timber you can find in that gate, and put it 
over the top of the mesh until no bits can fall through it. But clearly, there's a 
limit to how much wood you can find in a gate. The manager refused to order 
extra wood. We're at an impasse now, because there's no tin sheets in the gate -
he'd had it all removed - there's only mesh, which has got these large gaps in it 
... Now at that stage we should have had the safety engineer in, and the men 
should either have been taken off the job and redeployed or allowed to continue 
with the previous method of mining. But that wouldn't happen, because we're at 
a macho management situation - it's: 'Get off home.' And unfortunately, again, 
we went home. 21 
Some of the more recent walkouts at Frickley had been over local matters and 
remained within the confines of the pit. This dispute was different. As Gary 
Hinchliffe points out, 'This becomes a national issue and an Area issue, because it's 
over safety.' But, as he notes, the Frickley militants could foresee problems if they 
sent pickets~ out: 
19 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
20 South Yorkshire Times (South Elmsall and Hemsworth edition), 23 February 
1990. 
21 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
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... we've seen what's happened in the past with our strike and the Bentley 
strike, that we would probably have one day's success at it, and then they would 
have meetings and vote to work. We weren't even convinced that they would 
convene a Panel meeting until we'd withdrawn the pickets. This is how much 
they'd clamped down on it. A lot of pits weren't ever going to go on strike over 
anything at their own pit, never mind back somebody else up.22 
But the dilemma was that the importance of the dispute required that British Coal 
needed to be confronted, and so 'We decided to take them to task over safety,' says 
Gary Hinchliffe: 
We got in touch with as many papers as we could, and TV stations, and told them 
that we were on strike over safety. What we did was go out to all the pits in the 
Doncaster Panel and addressed them at canteen meetings - where we could. A lot 
of managers wouldn't let you into the canteen to speak to the men, and union 
branches were getting very frightened about you getting onto the pit premises. 
We had about ten thousand leaflets printed and we dished these out to the men as 
they were going into work ... We took the initiative. 23 
As with the Code of Conduct strike, the Frickley strikers' message was well 
received at other pits. 'Everywhere that we went to the other miners were saying 
that it was unbelievable,' recalls Robert King: 'They were saying, "What do you 
mean, you can't use sheets?" They couldn't understand it. You were allowed to use 
whatever you wanted. ,24 
But it was colliery manager Tony Lawson's behaviour that particularly marked 
this dispute for Gary Hutsby: 
The contempt-that he had for us was shown in how he caused this dispute and 
then he went on holiday. One of the Area directors had to come in to manage the 
dispute. This Area director actually fetched Lawson back from his holidays ... 25 
According to Gary Hinchliffe, Area management got involved because they were 
worried about all the activity in the coalfield over the issue: 
The next thing we knew, they are fetching the top HMI [ mines inspector] in, our 
top safety engineer from the union, and theirs from the Coal Board; they're going 
down the pit with our union, the manager, and the Area director, to look at it. I 
think it was Steve Tulley who said, 'We got down, we looked at it, not a thing 
had come down! The last piece of weld-mesh they'd left up was still up there.' He 
said, 'I thought we were going to get hammered.' But the Area director took one 
22 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
23 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
24 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
25 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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look at it and said, 'Yes, I think you are right. If your men want to use sheets and 
they are not happy with weld-mesh, by all means they can use sheets. ,26 
The men returned to work on Wednesday 27 February after six days on strike. 
Once again the Frickley miners, despite increasing war weariness, had shown that it 
was possible to stand up to management aggression. But there was a further reason 
for the miners to celebrate their action. Not only were they successful over an 
important safety issue, they had also paved the way for the exit of a manager who 
had been appointed specifically to further impose 'management's right to manage'. 'I 
reckon that within a month or two months Lawson was out,' recalls Gary Hinchliffe: 
His departing statement was that he felt that he no longer had the support of the 
men at the colliery and that everything that he suggested as a means of improving 
production, or improving Frickley's chances of competing, would not be seen in 
the light he portrayed it, but seen in a derogatory way by the men. Those were his 
official reasons for going. But he'd failed in his job that he'd been sent to Frickley 
for. In all his attempts and everything that he tried to do, he never managed to 
take one concession off us that we had before he got here: from water-notes, 
payments for carrying batteries and lamps, to what we put over our heads, to how 
we ran the pit, to who picked the men for faces, even down to the incentive 
scheme that we were on - we were still on the Yorkshire Area incentive scheme 
three-and-a-half years after he'd arrived, and he'd spent three-and-a-half years 
trying to get us off it. 27 
Hatfield 
No sooner had the Frickley men returned to work when, on Monday 5 March 1990, 
they were called on to take solidarity action with Hatfield miners, who had walked 
out after management redeployed three teams of development workers for not 
working fast enough. The Hatfield strikers had gone straight onto the offensive and 
picketed out the seven remaining Doncaster pits in what was the first large-scale 
stoppage in the Yorkshire coalfield for over two years.28 However, as Jeff Johnson 
recollects: 'it didn't last long. They packed it in. We were ready to run with them, 
but they'd gone. They weren't there. Dave Douglass stopped that one, nipped it in 
the bud.'29 
The Hatfield strike was an indication to militants of how British Coal now 
intended to take full advantage of the legal restrictions on trade union action. With 
the flying pickets out, the corporation was granted a High Court injunction against 
Hatfield NUM because no ballot had been held prior to the action. But this dispute 
was also an indication of how NUM branch officials were afraid of the law. Faced 
with the legal threats, the Hatfield officials backed down - though they did call on 
26 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
27 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
28 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 7 March 1990; Socialist Worker, 10 
March 1990. 
29 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
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the other South Yorkshire pits to stay out a further two days.30 'We went mad that 
Hatfield had taken notice of it,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
Up until then British Coal had always threatened that it was secondary action; but 
they were prepared to sit it out for three or four days while the NUM put the 
boot into it. With the Hatfield dispute, they decided that they weren't waiting. I 
think they'd convinced themselves that there was so little support about that they 
could wipe this out. 3 I 
The 'Scargill affair' 
On the very day that the Hatfield miners picketed Frickley Colliery, a new bombshell 
rocked the entire NUM to its foundations. Accusations appeared in that day's Daily 
Mirror - then controlled by media tycoon Robert Maxwell - that Arthur Scargill, 
along with Peter Heathfield, was guilty of embezzlement and corruption. The 
Mirror alleged that 'while miners were losing their homes at the height of the bitter 
1984-5 strike', Scargill and other NUM officials had used money collected for the 
miners to payoff personal debts. Not surprisingly, considering that here was a 
chance to lay into the man who epitomised militant trade unionism more than 
anyone, the scandal immediately attracted intense press coverage and condemnation 
of the miners' leader. The Today newspaper (6 March 1990), for instance, 
proclaimed that 'everything Mr Scargill stands for is fit for history'S dustbin.' For a 
while, speculation was rife that Scargill would soon be forced out of his job, or even 
finish up in prison. 32 
At pit level, miners with right-wing views were only too willing to believe the 
allegations, as Gary Hinchliffe recalls: 
They were coming up and saying, 'What about that bastard then? That Arthur 
Scargill.' We had a meeting over it to point out where the anomalies were ... I 
bet this was ol1e of the best attended meetings that we ever had because they'd all 
come to knock him ... Some people weren't bothered what you told them. They 
wouldn't have it. You see, what was throwing weight behind it was that it was a 
Labour paper. 33 
But such miners were in a minority at Frickley. Jeff Johnson argues that most 
miners did not believe the stories because they had been on the receiving end of bad 
reporting so often themselves: 'We knew what lies the media told anyway. So it 
wasn't believed. Nobody took a great deal of notice about it. Maxwell was never a 
friend of the miners anyway. ,34 What is certain is that union activists at Frickley 
were solidly behind Scargill, indicated by the appearance of a letter, signed by Steve 
Tulley, the secretary, John Picken, the president, and Tony Jenkinson, the treasurer, 
30 Socialist Worker, 10 March 1990. 
3] Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
32 Milne, Ihe Enemy Within, pp.38-39. 
33 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
34 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
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in Socialist Worker on 17 March 1990. They argued that the campaign being waged 
against Scargill and Heathfield was: 
... a cynical attempt to try and change the leadership of the NUM when the coal 
board is stepping up its attacks. The allegations that Scargill had his hand in the 
till by taking money for his own personal gain is ridiculous to say the least. Ever 
since the 1984-5 miners' strike began, the Tories and the right wing of the labour 
movement have queued up to attack Scargill at every opportunity. In the year 
long strike literally hundreds of thousands of pounds were collected and donated 
to the strike up and down the country. With so many miners collecting 
bucketful's of money - was Scargill supposed to account for all this? As well as 
this the Tories were busy sequestrating the union's funds, with Scargill doing all 
he could to make sure the strike didn't run out of money. This shows his 
determination and loyalty to those of us who were fighting. It is no thanks to the 
TUC and Labour leadership who left us to fight alone without funds. Luckily the 
feeling in the pits seems to support Scargill so we need to call branch meeting 
passing resolutions to stand by him. The real reason why everybody from 
Thatcher to the right wing leaders want to see the back of Scargill is because he 
stands for a fighting union - something that terrifies them all. 35 
The intricate details of the 'Scargill affair' have been dealt with elsewhere. 36 
Nevertheless it is germane to note that the controversy ended with not a single one 
of the original claims proven against the NUM leaders, thus the Frickley miners' 
faith had been fully justified. But Frickley activists played no small part in bringing 
about this conclusion, as Paul Symonds explains: 
. . . again, the activists at Frickley played a vital role in terms of orchestrating 
meetings. Our little network swung into action. It's a funny carry on, trying to get 
meetings arranged. Speakers have to be invited by the branch to come and speak. 
So we got our network going and we got Scargill and Paul Foot [columnist on 
the Daily Mirror] invited to different pits, and they ended up doing a tour round 
the coalfields and the big cities. I remember a big rally in Sheffield. And there was 
such as myself and Mike Simons. If you couldn't get Foot and Scargill, you got 
me and Mike Simons. So we did a sort of mini tour as well, to fill a few gaps. I 
don't think that all of this can be underestimated. Because we went straight onto 
the offensive, this meant that there was no chance for people inside the pits who 
would have loved to have had Scargill' s head to sow the seeds of doubt. We were 
able to lift all the heads of those who were Scargillites and motivate them to go 
onto the offensive. So we at Frickley did have an effect on things far greater than 
just in our own pit ... And it ended up being a successful campaign. Again, this is 
one of those unsung battles that nobody really acknowledges - but the outcome 
could h'!ve been devastating. If they had got Scargill and Heathfield, it would 
have taken years for the trade union movement to have recovered from it. 37 
35 Socialist Worker, 17 March 1990. 
36 See Milne, op. cit. 
37 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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Organising against the poll tax 
Ironically, at the very time as the Scargill scandal broke, the government were so 
unpopular in the opinion polls that there was open speculation about the 
Conservative Party actually replacing Margaret Thatcher as. leader) 8 The primary 
reason for this was the explosion of anger against Thatcher's flagship- policy, the 
Community Charge, or poll tax, which had been devised to replace the old rating 
system for funding· local authorities, and which was viewed by many as a 
continuation of the government's attacks· on working people. But actually 
implementing the tax was rapidly becoming Margaret Thatcher's biggest challenge 
since the miners' strike. Despite no lead whatsoever from the official labour 
movement on how to force the government into a climb-down, the dissent over the 
tax was widespread and thousands demonstrated outside town halls and council 
chambers the length and breadth of Britain. Millions were to play their part in a 
campaign of non-payment which would eventually see the Tories back down. 39 In 
the mining communities of Yorkshire the mood of defiance was almost on a par with 
six years earlier. As elsewhere, meetings organised by anti-poll tax campaigners were 
full to overflowing. "'Can't pay, won't pay" seems to be the general consensus of 
opinion in Ilemsworth when it comes to the poll tax,' admitted the Hemsworth and 
South Elmsall Axpress. 40 
Activists from FrickIey were in the forefront of the local campaign. Though the 
poll tax was not directly a trade union issue, the question of non-payment was~. 
because local authorities could seek to have the tax stopped from workers' wage 
packets. 'We tried to get a campaign going within the NUM to put pressure on the 
Coal Board to stop them deducting money from our wages,' remembers Gary 
Hutsby: 
Another thing - and this was without the help of the TUC or the Labour Party -
was the demonstration that was called in London. We, the militants at Frickley, 
proposed that the union should put on a bus to the demonstration, or, if not, 
partly pay for the bus that was going down locally. We pushed this at a general 
meeting and it got passed. I can't remember how many seats were sponsored, but 
that was something that we got through, and we actually got the branch to put up 
posters in the union box advertising this demonstration. At the same time there 
was also the David Jones march, which was an annual event, and we raised the 
issue of the poll tax on the march and pulled people from that onto the national 
demonstration in London.41 
38 Ihe Guardian, 10 March 1990. 
39 B. Croxall and L. Roberts, Contemporary British Politics, (Basingstoke, 1994), 
pp.188-189; R. Bentley, A Dobson, M. Grant and D. Roberts, British Politics in 
/<iXlIS, (Ormskirk, 1995), pA85. 
40 Hem~worth and South Elmsall Express, 14 March 1990. 
41 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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Still a force 
Th~ humil~a~ion of the NUM as a national organisation had continued since the Big 
~tnke. BntIsh Coal had repeatedly bypassed the national bargaining procedures, 
Instead conducting separate negotiations. with the minority UDM. Any resumption of 
negotiations with the NUM were always conditional upon the _ union accepting some 
principle or other, such as the role of incentive payments or the Code of Conduct. 
The NUM rejected such conditions. The regular pay settlements made with the 
UDM were then repeatedly extended unilaterally to the-NU~ which the NUM then 
accepted as an ~interim settlement' with little hope of any subsequent negotiations.42 
And yet, more than anything else, -the smears against ScargiH and Heathfield were 
testimony to how the NUM was not quite finished as a force. Though British Coal's 
workforce had been much reduced, and though output at British pits had sunk from 
90 to 76 million tonnes in the seven years to 1990, nearly 80 per cent of Britain's 
enerbty was still being generated by the domestic coal industry. Most worrying of aU 
for the government was that 80 per cent of this coal was mined by Scargill's 
members.43 
But with the NUM severely weakened by the allegations, British Coal took the 
opportunity to announce that a further 7,000 miners' jobs were to go. The situation 
was exacerbated when the government back-tracked on an earlier commitment to 
install £2 billion of 'chimney scrubbers' in power stations - the most effective means 
of reducing the sulphur emissions which cause acid rain. Instead, power stations 
were expected to use gas and import low sulphur coal from countries such as South 
Africa. This threatened up to 30,000 jobs.44 Arthur Scargill, on 22 May, dubbed the 
government's plans 'the economics of the madhouse', considering how they had 
closed down 50 pits which produced the lowest sulphur coal in the world and were 
now planning to import coal with a higher sulphur content. He added that the miners 
still had tremendous industrial strength and should be prepared to use it. 4S The 
government certainly took such threats seriously, hence a week later energy 
secretary John Wakeham instructed National Power and PowerGen, the two private 
electricity supply companies which were due to replace the CEGB, that at the 
beginning of winter they must hold jointly no less than 27 million tonnes of coal 
stocks and have at least 22 million tormes at winter's close as a safeguard against 
NUM action. 46 
'We will survive' 
Of course not all pits and power stations were threatened by the government's 
failure to invest. In April 1990 Wakeham had announced that PowerGen had been 
given the go-ahead to fit a sulphur cleaning plant at Ferrybridge n and C power 
stations. This meant that coal mined in the Yorkshire coalfield could still be burned 
and that the power station would still comply with the EC's strict acid rain 
. 
42 Leman and Winterton, 'New technology and the restructuring of pit-level 
industrial relations', pp.56-57. 
43 Milne, op. cit., pp.9-1O. 
44 The Times, 21 May 1990; Socialist Worker, 26 May 1990. 
45 The Guardian, 23 May 1990. 
46 Ihe Times, 30 May 1990. 
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prevention standards. This, according to Peter Box, the chairman of the Wakefield 
District Council's Employment and Economic Development Committee, promised 'a 
longer life for pits such as Sharlston, Prince of Wales, Kellingley and Frickley, which 
send most of their coal to Ferrybridge.'47 
The danger in this situation was that workers at Frickley would concentrate 
solely on the survival of their own pit. John Owen, the Frickley branch secretary of 
NACODS, certainly seems to have seen it in this way. 'Frickley has as good a future 
as any pit in the country and better than most,' he wrote to the Hemsworth and 
South Elmsall Express in mid-June 1990, when taking issue with a correspondent 
from the Green Party who had dared to suggest that the pit might close: 
It is one of only three pits authorised to supply National Power and PowerGen 
because the sulphur content in our coal is lower than the 1.8 per cent they will 
accept. The chlorine content is 0.19 per cent and both companies will accept 0.3 
per cent, the ash content is 16.9 per cent and the moisture content 10.5 per cent. 
With an average of £1.50 per gigajoule this current year and only £1.28 for the 
month of May, Frickley can compete with foreign coal and has the right quality 
skilled workforce to do just that . . . One does not need a degree in economics to 
know that low sulphur coal on the world market is very limited and, in a market 
economy, as demand rises so does the price . . . Relative to the future, we have 
nothing to be complacent about at Frickley, and though we may make things 
difficult for ourselves at times, we will survive.48 
But the NACODS branch secretary was neglecting one of the key lessons that 
were evident from the most recent batch of job losses in the industry: that the 
'viability' of individual pits had little to do with the efforts of the workers involved. 
Massive cut backs in the industry had been justified since the early 1980s on the 
grounds that low productivity in British mines had given foreign rivals a competitive 
edge. But this was no longer so in mid-1990. Since the end of the 1984-85 strike, 
half the industry'S workforce had been shed, colliery costs had declined by a third 
and an estimated £900 million a year was being saved by British Coal. Nevertheless, 
the relentless pursuit of greater efficiency was continuing unabated, especially as BC 
was struggling to get back into profit. The truth was that the coal industry was 
vulnerable to far more than just low output. There were fluctuations in the 
international price of fossil fuels to take into consideration, variations in the 
exchange rate, and interference by governments; all of which affected coal's 
standing. In addition, the electricity supply industry, on which coal was now totally 
dependent for its sales, could search for cheaper alternatives such as oil or gas.49 
Viewed in this light, the efforts of even the hardest working miners who attempted 
to make their own pit a viable concern hardly mattered. All such a notion did was 
enhance the uncertainty within the workforce and spread the belief that workers 
should a~cept longer shifts and more flexible working if they wanted to remain in a 
job - factors which the NUM had long fought against. 
47 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 25 April 1990. 
48 Hemsworth and South E1msall Express, 13 June 1990. 
49 Socialist Worker, 2 June 1990. 
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Another boss, another strike 
[n mid-May 1990, Tony Lawson was replaced by Malcolm High, until recently the 
deputy manager at Houghton Main.l 'He actually took the benefits from Lawson's 
reign,' argues Paul Symonds: 'I don't think that Lawson had reaped them himself, 
but he certainly had us war weary by the time Malcolm High got here. Malcolm High 
got here when the men had enough, basically.'2 The new manager 'came with 
exactly the same portfolio as Lawson,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
His task was to get us off the Yorkshire Area Incentive Scheme, onto a tonnage 
bonus, remove the market system and everything - break the stranglehold of the 
NUM at this pit. The next manager came, and 1 think he wasted no time at all in 
getting us out on strike.3 
The stoppage Gary Hinchliffe refers to began on 13 July, a Friday, when 
management sacked a miner, Glyn Fryer, for allegedly working on a building site in 
Manchester while off sick. 4 Johnny Stones recalls what happened: 
The personnel officer at that time alleged that he'd had a phone call to the effect 
that Glyn Fryer was on the sick, getting both sick-pay make-up along with his 
statutory sick-pay, and was working. So our personnel officer, a true spy that he 
was, followed him in a car, and saw from a distance who he alleged was Glyn 
Fryer. Had him in, sacked him.5 
That could easily have been the end of the matter, but, as Gary Hurst explains, 
Fryer had been caught working while the pit was closed for the summer break: 
He maintained that he was on holiday during the time that he was working and 
that he shouldn't have been sacked. And we maintained that aspect with him, to a 
certain extent. We all realised that he'd done wrong, but it was a bit severe during 
a holiday week. 6 
According to Ian Oxley, what had happened to Glyn Fryer was not an isolated .. 
incident; spying had become a common management practice: 
So if a man was on the sick, they'd send the pit nurse up to visit him, on the 
pretext that she was 'interested', she was 'concerned'. The nurse would then 
1 Hem,\worth and ,South Elmsall Express, 16 May 1990. 
2 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
3 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
4 Hem,\worth and South Elmsall Express, 19 July 1990. 
5 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
6 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
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write a report: 'Tms man's a malingerer. There's no reason why he can't start 
work.,7 
Injunctions 
The 750 NUM members then employed at Frickley stopped work as soon as the 
sacking was announced. But the reverberations of the recent dispute at Hatfield 
were still being felt. Gary Hutsby recalls the first mass meeting of the dispute: 
I can remember one of the branch officials getting up on the stage and saying, 
'It's all illegal tms, we are breaking the law, and I've got to tell you now that 
you've got to return to work.' At the same time he was giving us the nod and a 
wink, as if to say, 'It's a load ofbollocks, but I've got to tell you tms if we go on 
strike.' Anyway, the meeting took a vote that we would stop on strike.8 
On Monday, however, British Coal took out an injunction to stop the strike, 
claiming £200,000 worth of damages because the miners were striking without 
holding a ballot. The High Court in London duly deemed the strike illegal and 
ordered the men back to work. After copies of the injunction were delivered to the 
homes of the Frickley branch officials, a mass meeting was immediately called for the 
following morning in the Pretoria club. 9 Again Gary Hutsby was there: 
A part of this injunction was that all the officials should tell us to return to work. I 
can remember Steve Tulley, Chick Picken and Johnny Stones saying that we'd to 
call the dispute off and go back to work. But if my memory serves me right, when 
it got to Tony Jenkinson, he said, 'Fuck it, I'm not telling you to go back to 
work. Bollocks to them.' At that, a massive cheer went up in the hall. And then a 
vote was taken that we were still stopping on strike. 10 
The men voted by 2 to 1 to defy the judges. They called for the unconditional 
reinstatement of the sacked miner, with no loss of pay, and demanded that 
disciplinary proceedings be initiated against the pit's personnel manager and Area 
security. Also, they called for an end to any spying on the workforce, and insisted 
that Area and national officials stand behind the branch's defiance of the law rather 
than forcing them to back down. 11 Tmngs did not quite work out this way. 
On Thursday, the Frickley NUM officials were issued with yet another High 
Court injunction, this time ordering them to completely disassociate themselves from 
the action. 12 John Picken, one of the four officials, recounts what happened next: 
7 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
8 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
9 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 19 July 1990; South Yorkshire Times 
(South Elmsall and Hemsworth edition), 20 July 1990. 
10 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
II Socialist Worker, 21 July 1990. 
12 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 26 July 1990. 
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On the Thursday it became that serious that we were called in at ten o'clock to 
the Yorkshire Area headquarters. I was there until half-past six at night ... We 
were told that we'd got to give in. Our legal department said that we must be 
seen to break the strike, go back to work, have a meeting, and - this was from 
British Coal- there'd got to be cameras in our committee room at the time. And I 
said 'No way. I'm not going to chair any meeting where the media is coming into 
our committee room. I'd sooner go to prison.' . . . I told our legal department, 
faxed it out, and there was a long wait. Then it came back: 'Right then, you must 
face the cameras outside the Pretoria club when you go back to work.' 13 
Strike called ofT 
A meeting originally scheduled for Saturday was hastily re-arranged for Friday 
morning. By now management had also gone further onto the attack and announced 
that they intended to stop the check-off system at the pit. 'We told our committee 
that we were going back to work,' says John Picken, 'they couldn't understand it. 
We explained that we were going to be arrested at two o'clock ifnot.'14 Tony Short 
was among those committee men with a different perspective on what was needed: 
My point of view was that if you are in the job [as a branch official], you are in it. 
It wouldn't have bothered me. They wouldn't have jailed you for long. But the 
older-end on the committee were shitting themselves. We had a vote and it was 
six-six. Six voted for them not to just walk off, that it should be discussed with 
the men; and the six others said that they should read a statement out and we 
should go straight back to work . . . For me, if you are going to be a trade 
unionist, the laws are there to be broken. You are never going to win a dispute by 
going by their trade-union laws . . . That totally disillusioned me with the union 
did that. I thought that if the job was too hot for them, they shouldn't have been 
in it. They s~ould have stood down for someone who was willing to take all the 
risks. In fact, if I'm not incorrect, I'm sure that they were on about changing all 
their mortgages into their wives' names, and crap like that. I think that there was 
about sixty-odd grand they wanted to put on all of our heads. It might as well 
have been sixty-quid for me; sixty grand is a ridiculous amount of money. My 
house wasn't worth much, and lowed £18,000 on it, but it wouldn't have 
bothered me if they had taken it. 15 
There were only around 180 miners attended the mass meeting due to it having 
been re-arranged at such short notice. But what happened there was bizarre. On the 
advice of the Yorkshire Area NUM leadership, the Frickley officials read out a 
statement prepared by solicitors in London, and declared that they had no alternative 
other than to recommend a return to work. No discussion was held and no vote was 
taken. The officials then simply left the meeting and headed for the pit. 16 'We went 
mad ove~ it,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
13 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
14 John Picken, interviewed by the author. 
15 Tony Short, interviewed by the author. 
16 Socialist Worker, 28 July 1990; South Yorhhire Times (South Elmsall and 
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the men were milling about outside the Pretoria; they wondered what was going 
off I said: 'I'm not returning to work.' We were all adamant that we weren't 
returning to work, apart from Jeff Johnson who ran up the hill and was the first 
one down the pit - a committee man. People were coming up and asking our 
advice. I said: 'Well I'm not going back to work; not today anyway. As far as I'm 
concerned I'm on strike.' And then, people seemed to take it that the officials had 
done this because they had to do, that they really didn't want us to go back to 
work. So there were very few men went back to work. So that made the situation 
worse. 17 
Defiance 
A group of about twenty miners, angry at what had happened, met just afterwards in 
the nearby Frickley Colliery Club. There, it was decided to meet again the following 
day in the same venue to organise further defiance. Gary Hutsby was one of them: 
We decided that we would knock our own leaflet up saying that the Frickley 
membership should have the right to decide what Frickley NUM policy is, and 
nobody else, whether it is a High Court judge in London, the Coal Board, the 
Area officials or whoever. At the end of the day, it was us who were the members 
and it should be our opinions which count. The leaflet called for a proper branch 
meeting to be held where the issue can be discussed, that if we were going to 
return to work, it had to be through a decision made by the membership at 
Frickley. Because after that final meeting where Steve read out that document 
and left without any vote or discussion, there was still a lot of confusion as to 
whether the dispute was still on, with the officials having given a nod and a wink 
at the other meetings. 18 
Over the next day the leaflets were distributed in all the pubs and clubs where the 
Frickley miners socialised. Gary Hutsby recalls little opposition to their proposal: 
The vast majority of the people we spoke to actually said, 'Thank God somebody 
is doing something, because nobody knows what's going off We don't know 
whether to turn up for work on Monday or not.' Obviously we went through all 
the arguments about the Coal Board dictating the branch's policy and all that. Out 
of all the pubs that we did, we only came across two or three men who disagreed 
. . . and all the people who had been to other places came back with the same 
tale. 19 
Another of those organising the defiance, Paul Symonds, argues that there was no 
feeling of euphoria in what they were doing, 'We were in a fix. For the first time, 
they had. managed to drive a big wedge between the activists at the pit and the 
Hemsworth edition), 27 July 1990. 
17 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
18 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
19 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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branch officials. We'd always managed to keep them on board or in check.' That 
split became all too apparent outside Frickley Colliery early on Monday morning: 
We should have had every militant at the pit there. There should have been at 
least 30 of us. Five of us turned up! Four of these were SWP members and the 
other was a miner who was on the sick. We were in trouble - and we knew it. We 
got to the pit at about a quarter past four, armed with the leaflets that we had 
written, arguing the case that there should be a union meeting, that we should not 
be ordered back to work by some judge sat in London, that we run this union. 
When we got there, the pit managers and the branch officials were there, waiting. 
And as the men started turning up for work, we asked them not to go to work. 
There was a bit of confusion about whether this was a picket line or not. We said 
that it wasn't, that we were just giving leaflets out. But this hour and a half was 
one of the worst times of my life. We had stand-up arguments with the officials. 
They were ordering the men into work, and we were trying to stop them. You 
could see blokes there who you worked with every day. But they were in a 
position where union officials - and the most credible and well-respected union 
officials as well - were telling them to go to work, but they are also faced with 
their workmates who are saying, 'Don't.' Me and Johnny Stones almost carne to 
blows. We ended up trading personal insults, we were nose to nose at one time. 
And while all this was going off, the managers were stood behind us. Some men 
would hear one argument and then decide they were going to stick with the union 
and start arguing against us. But even then, they still didn't go into work. I think 
that we were stood there until about half-past six - everybody was supposed to 
have been down the pit by six. It got to the stage where we simply refused to 
back off from our position - which was probably a mistake seeing that there were 
only five of us turned up. But we were in it too deeply. And the union wasn't 
going to bacl~ off. So we were in a head to head. And if you looked at the history 
of Frickley since the strike, it was bound to have happened sooner or later. It got 
to where you heard people saying, 'Corne on, I'm going to work,' and leading 
men past you. It was bad. Then there was a rush and they all went in.20 
There was but one bright moment for Paul Symonds that morning. The pit's 
upper management 'had smiles like Cheshire cats,' once they realised the militants 
were isolated from the majority of the workforce: 
One of the managers said something to Johnny Stones like, 'We've got them 
now.' After me and Johnny had been nearly to blows, you would have thought 
this would have been music to his ears. But he turned round and screamed to this 
manager, 'You are sacking nobody else from this pit, mister. You've sacked one 
man too many!' It was so comforting to hear that. And I'll always respect Johnny 
for that~ We were in trouble.21 
20 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
21 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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Just how much trouble the five men were in became apparent that afternoon. 'We 
were at Mark Thompson's, talking about what had gone off, and there was a knock 
at the door,' Gary Hutsby recollects: 
There was this guy there with a registered letter from the Coal Board, accusing 
Tommo of gross misconduct for stopping the pit working, telling him that he had 
been suspended, pending an inquiry. It said, '[f it is found that you have 
committed gross misconduct then you will be sacked.' We thought that they 
wouldn't have just come to Mark. Jip rang home and found that the same letter 
had come for him. It was the same with Paul Sharpe and Wayne Donell. I didn't 
receive one at first - apparently the gaffer who had taken the photos had his line 
of view blocked by a pillar and couldn't identify me.22 
Originally fighting the sacking of a workmate, the five were now fighting for their 
own jobs. But their response could not have been more at odds with the timidity that 
was now customary amongst the official trade union movement. 'Immediately we 
started organising, seeing people such as Ian Oxley and Jeff Johnson and winning 
them over to our position,' says Paul Symonds: 
But one of the nicest things was when we had a meeting with the SWP's 
industrial organiser, Sheila McGregor. She came up here, and basically she said to 
us, 'Look, the decision to sack you is not going to be taken by the pit manager. 
That decision has probably already been taken by senior management at Area 
level.' The thing was that management knew that we would act independently of 
the union. It's one thing to sack a militant and then the union refusing to call any 
action. But they knew that if they sacked us we would go for it. And we had 
made that absolutely plain from the start. Sheila said that these disciplinary 
meetings they were calling us to were designed to do nothing else but humiliate 
us. She said that they wanted to make us regret everything that we had ever done. 
They wanted to make us feel so guilty that we had put ourselves and our families 
in this position. She said, 'Don't give them the satisfaction ofletting them see you 
on your knees.' At the time, the Eastern European revolutions had just taken 
place, and the newspapers had been full of how brilliant it had been that these 
people had been demonstrating and going on strike, that they wanted a free 
society where you could say what you think. She said, 'These people sat in that 
room will have been cheering when they've seen those workers. Tell them this.' 
She said, 'Don't deny anything. They saw you lot giving leaflets out at the pit, 
they know you were trying to stop people going into work, so don't say that you 
didn't mean to do it.' She said that there was no point in trying to say that it was 
all a misunderstanding. From that minute I felt better. We decided that they 
weren't going to grind us down. 23 
When Paul Symonds finally faced the pit management, 'it was exactly as Sheila 
said,' he recalls: 
22 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
23 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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There were the branch officials there talcing notes, the personnel manager and his 
secretary, and the manager sat at the end. The first thing he said was, 'I 
understand that you have a son.' 1 said, 'Yes.' He said, 'How old is he?' 1 told 
him. He said, 'What would you like him to do?' 1 said to him, 'You haven't got 
me in here to talk to me about my son. What happens between me and my son is 
my business. Can we get on with why I've been brought here?' He just went, 'Er, 
er.' It was true. He was trying to make me feel guilty for messing up my son's 
life. 1 said, 'I'm not bothered what he does as long as he doesn't tum out to be a 
pit manager.' Everybody in the room was gobsmacked ... Then he said, 'Right, 
at 4.15 on Monday morning, we've been told that somebody meeting your 
descliption was trying to stop the pit working.' 1 said, 'Yes, it was me. I arrived 
at quarter-past four.' 'Were you giving leaflets out?' 'Yes, I was leafleting.' 'Why 
were you leafleting?, 'I was trying to stop the men going into work.' 'Oh, so you 
admit trying to stop the men.' 1 said, ' Yes, that's precisely what 1 was there for!' 
It just went on in this vein, and 1 felt so good and cocky about it all that I didn't 
care whether they sacked me, to be honest. I remember walking out of that room 
with a big smile on my face. The manager was fuming. The union officials were 
wondering what was happening - 1 was supposed to have been a broken man. 
And as I walked out, I met Tommo, coming in. And Tommo had a big smile on 
his face. He just said, 'I hope you gave it to them in there, Jip?' 1 said, 'I hope 
you do as well.' He said, 'Don't worry. ,24 
Gary Hutsby's experience in his disciplinary meeting was much the same. 
However: 
Because 1 hadn't been around like Tommo, Jip and Sharpy, who were all known 
by the management for being militant, they must have thought: 'Here's a lad who 
has always turned up for work, he's never been one for ranting and raving, we've 
got a soft touch with this one, we'll have an easy ride with him.' But because we 
had met earlier and discussed how we were going to tackle it, as soon as they 
started barking questions at me, straight away 1 was barlcing and snarling back. It 
was such a shock for them. They were saying, 'Were you at the pit giving leaflets 
out?' I was saying, 'Yes, of course I was. Do you think 1 am going to let you lot 
decide what Frickley NUM does? It's us who decide.' I was banging the table. I 
said, 'What about democracy? Do you believe in democracy? Don't I have the 
right to my opinion?' They wouldn't answer this.25 
The tactic of standing firm and resolute against the class enemy worked. Though 
they were all put on final warnings, none of the five dissident miners were sacked. 
But contrast this with what happened to the unfortunate Glyn Fryer, whose case 
went through the industrial tribunal procedures, as recommended by his union, 
without the threat of any further disruption. Though he actually won his case for 
unfair dismissal when it came up in January and February 1991, there was no 
24 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
25 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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obligation for British Coal to reinstate him, nor was it deemed that he should receive 
any compensalion.26 In other words, he remained sacked. 
Significantly, the Glyn Fryer dispute proved to be the last major stoppage at 
Frickley Colliery to be initiated by the traditional means of a spontaneous walkout 
and a show of hands at a mass meeting. Despite dogged resistance, Frickley NUM, 
under pressure from their own Area leadership, had tinally succumbed to the 
government's legal restraints. As Gary Hinchliffe notes: 'As far as we were 
concerned, it was the first step backwards that we'd taken since the end of the strike 
- and we were to pay for it later as well. ,27 
Thatcher's fall 
If morale was extremely low in the pits in this period, paradoxically, the miners' 
hand was being strenbJthened by wider matters. In July The Economist had noted 
that, while coal mined in Britain was expensive at $86 a tonne, 'the longer-term 
supply of overseas coal is neither secure nor necessarily cheap.' There had recently 
been bitter strikes in Russian and American mines, and other coal supplying 
countries, such as Colombia and South Africa, were far from stable.28 In addition, 
the nuclear power industry was facing problems. And when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 
AUb'Ust 1990, energy economics was significantly altered as oil prices soared. 
It was against such a background that a special NUM delegate conference in 
October 1990 decided to push for a £50 a week pay rise. And as the miners prepared 
for their ballot in mid-November another major development added weight to their 
cause: the government's political crisis, intensified by the failure to impose the poll 
tax, had reached rupture point and the Conservative Party was hopelessly split. 
Indeed, many Tory MPs now saw that their only hope was to dump Margaret 
Thatcher. 29 Rarely had there been a better time for trade unionists to make up lost 
ground. This was especially so in the pits, where pit-head coal stocks had fallen from 
7.3 million tonn~s in August 1989 to just 4.8 million tonnes twelve months later. In 
fact, power stations in Yorkshire were even being supplied with coal from Scotland 
because of the shortfall. 30 
In the event, though, activists in the pits were unable to convince the rest of the 
membership of the NUM's strong bargaining position; consequently a vote of23, 181 
(57 per cent) to 17,654 against taking action was delivered. As before, the press and 
the new realists in the union immediately proclaimed this as yet another disaster for 
Arthur S cargill , 31 this being his fifth ballot defeat in a row. 32 And yet the greatest 
irony was that it would not be the miners' president who would be flung into the 
political wilderness that month, but rather the miners' most prominent foc, Margaret 
Thatcher herself 
26 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 17 January and 21 February 1991. 
27 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
28 Ihe Economist, 14 July 1990. 
29 B. Jones, (ed.) Politics UK, (London, 1994), pp.396-397; Croxall and Roberts, 
Contemporary British Politics, p.239. 
30 Socialist Worker, 24 November 1990. 
31 Socialist Worker, 24 November 1990. 
32 Routledge, ,,\Ycargill, p.229. 
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By early December 1990, with Thatcher unceremoruously dumped by her party, 
John Major had taken over as prime minister. By the beginrung of the following year, 
there were changes at the top of the coal industry, with Neil Clarke replacing Robert 
Haslam. But these changes did not sif,rnal any changes in policy regarding coal and 
soon a further wave of pit closures and job losses were under way. February 1991 
saw the very first closure in the new Selby group, with the decision to axe Allerton 
Bywater Colliery. In South Yorkshire, Treeton and Brodsworth collieries were 
already in the process of shutting following decisions taken in late 1990. Then in 
mid-February, rruners at Dinnington voted to accept their pit's closure. Later, on 28 
February, the closures of Dearne Valley and Barnsley Main were announced at a 
special review meeting. This meant that with Denby Grange due to close in the 
summer, only Grimethorpe and Houghton Main now remained in the old Barnsley 
Area. There were also threats from BC that Askern Colliery would close if 
productivity did not improve. And yet this was happening just as productivity in 
British mines reached a new peak of 5. 10 tonnes per manshift.33 
All of this certainly had an effect on the miners' willingness to mount any sort of 
challenge to British Coal. They may have been bitter about the direction the industry 
was heading but most saw little point in taking industrial action if they were to lose. 
What is more, British Coal's use of the legal restrictions was clearly working. In fact 
by this time, legally, miners wishing to take action were in a worse position than 
FrickJey NUM had been at the time of the Glyn Fryer dispute with the government's 
latest anti-union laws taking effect. Indeed, for a period in 1991 industrial unrest 
was almost non-existent in the coal industry. According to the Employment Gazette 
- and these rounded-up figures included the coke, mineral oil and natural gas 
industries as well! - in January there had been 5,000 working days lost to industrial 
action, in February 4,000 days lost. In March, however there were just 1,000 days 
lost; in April: 0; May: 2,000; June: 0; and July: 1,000.34 
Because of their anxiety about the increasing legal restraints on effective trade 
union action, the delegates to the NUM conference in the summer of 1991 passed a 
series of resolutions condemning the new laws and demanded that a future Labour 
government repeal them. 35 But passing resolutions was simple. Soon the union 
would be faced with a major local strike which would again test the orgarusation's 
resolve to challenge the restrictions head on. And once more Frickley Colliery would 
be at the centre of the storm. .. 
Asleep 
In the last week of July/first week of August 1991, industrial unrest started to bubble 
over again in parts of the Yorkshire coalfield. At Manton, former British Coal 
employees who were now contracted to BC by outside firms walked out. At Maltby 
at around the same time, 200 subcontractors were sacked after they stopped work in 
protest at their bonus being cut. All bar 12 were subsequently reinstated. Then, on 
July 31;"a potentially explosive situation erupted at Armthorpe, where miners 
stopped work after management withdrew water-money payments for twelve miners. 
33 Yorkshire Miner, March 1991. 
34 Employment Gazette, March 1992. 
35 Yorkshire Miner, August ]991. 
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However, Yorkshire Area officials and solicitors turned up at the strikers' meeting 
on Friday 2 August and argued that the 1990 Employment Act made the Armthorpe 
miners liable to injunctions, writs and selective dismissal. In a repeat of the Glyn 
Fryer dispute at Frickley twelve months earlier, the men were ordered back to work 
without a vote.36 
No sooner had the Armthorpe dispute ended when another strike erupted at 
FrickJey on the following Monday, 5 AUb'Ust, in support of a fitter who had been 
sacked after being caught sleeping underground a few weeks earlier. Gary Hurst, 
being the NUM craftsmen's representative at the pit at this time, was involved: 
This undermanager, Northc1iffe I think it was, had caught Tony Proverbs asleep. 
Northcliffe had said that he'd tried to wake him up, couldn't, so he took his 
spanners off his belt to prove that he'd actually been there, walked up to another 
gate or to the entrance to another heading, and found a deputy or an overman, 
took him back with him, and then woke Tony up, while having this deputy or 
overman as a witness and proof with having these spanners in his hands, and 
consequently marched him out of the pit to be interviewed by the manager . . . it 
finished up that he got the sack for the offence; which seemed very harsh. 37 
Johnny Stones argues that everybody who works down the pit has fallen asleep at 
some stage: 
There's not been anyone who's worked in a pit on days, afters or nights who's 
not slept underground. And a manager will have had to have had five years' 
experience underground to have become a manager, and have worked on a face 
or a heading for two years to get experience - he will have done days, afters and 
nights; and he's feB asleepl38 
One of the things that angered the men about the dismissal was that the sacked 
miner had a seven-month old baby at home who was ill and keeping him awake 
during the night. He had even requested a rest day over this matter but management 
had refused it. 39 'As far as the men were concerned,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
it wasn't even a fining offence, but they were prepared to accept a fine. For the .. 
last bloke who had been fined for this, it had been something like £50, or the cost 
of his shift. And by all accounts, this undermanager thought that he would get 
fined. When he went out of the pit, he went for the fine book. The personnel 
manager wanted to know why he wanted the fine book. He told him. The 
personnel manager then got Area management on the phone to see whether men 
were still fined for falling asleep. He was under the impression that now that they 
got sacked. Area told him, 'Yes, you do sack them.'40 
36 Socialist Worker, 17 August 1991. 
37 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
38 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
39 Socialist Worker, 10 August 1991; Yorkshire Post, 12 August 1991. 
40 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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On 22 July Frickley NUM appealed against the sacking but British Coal rejected 
this because the sacked miner had admitted falling asleep, and by so doing had 
breached the Code ofConduct.41 But, as Robert Walker recollects, 'They'd ground 
us down that much that we'd started to go through the procedure. ,42 Consequently, 
instead of the traditional show of hands at a mass meeting, a pit-head ballot was 
organised by the branch for Thursday I August.43 Moderate activist Ian Oxley was 
in favour of holding ballots for strikes, but not under these circumstances 
It really stuck in my throat that it was because of the Tories that we were having 
ballots rather than because it was in our union rules ... Because what happens is, 
now you've got to have what you put on the ballot paper approved by the gaffers 
- and yet it's our ballot paper - which is crazy. So aU he's got to do is say: 'I 
don't agree to this.' He'll slow it for ages. 44 
Even so, the result of the ballot, with 72 per cent voting for strike action,45 
showed conclusively that the combativity of the Frickley miners in the preceding 
years was not based upon bullying by a handful of militants at mass meetings. On the 
following Monday an 'official' strike duly commenced. But this dispute was 
memorable more for its passivity than for mass activity. 'I remember the first day, on 
the Monday,' says Robert King: 
Five or six of us went up to picket the pit. That's all there was there. I think: 
there was me, Tommo, Jip, Ian Utley, Gary Hutsby. It was a really bad 
atmosphere. The management were peeping at us from everywhere. And the 
deputies were all stood there. I think that was the reason that we'd gone up there, 
to ask the deputies not to work ... We felt very uncomfortable, because really it 
wasn't an NUM picket line, it was a militants' or even an SWP picket line. 
Another reason why we felt uneasy was that some of those on the picket line 
were still on warnings from the Glyn Fryer dispute, and we felt that the 
management would try to sack some of these with warnings. We were wondering 
why there weren't any branch officials there, so somebody phoned Steve Tulley 
up and he carne. But after this we phoned other people up and told them that the 
pit was solid and not to bother corning up, because we didn't want anybody to 
come up and get victimised because there were so few of us on the picket line. At 
your own pit you expect forty or fifty to tum up.4G 
When the strikers met to discuss the direction of the stoppage on Saturday 10 
August, the strike took a dramatic tum when it was disclosed that only recently an 
electrician at Denby Grange Colliery near Wakefield had merely been fined £300 for 
41 Yorkshire Post, 12 August 1991. 
42 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
43 South Yorkshire Times, (South Elmsall and Hemsworth edition), 9 August 1991. 
44 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
45 South Yorkshire Times (South Elmsall and Hemsworth edition), 9 AUb'Ust 1991. 
46 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
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falling asleep instead of being dismissed.47 lt was now all too obvious to the Frickley 
miners that British Coal deliberately wanted a showdown with them because of their 
leading role within the NUM since the Big Strike. Thus they responded by resolving 
to step up the action. Nevertheless, caution still prevailed, and the branch tried to 
side-step the legal restrictions rather than confronting them .head-on. 'We tried a 
new tactic with Tony Proverbs; deliberately taken within the committee,' says 
Johnny Stones: 
Rather than go back to work and let Area organise a ballot of Yorkshire - with all 
the legal ramifications at that particular time that needed to be complied with - we 
went a different road. We asked pits to organise their ballots rather than Area. 
Because Area, in order to comply, had got to call meetings, have an Area Council 
meeting to debate it, go back from the Council with a recommendation back to 
branches to hold general meetings, to agree to have a ballot - all that 
paraphernalia. We saw a quicker way - and not having any interference from the 
Area officials, or bringing the Area officials in, and we told them - was to go to 
collieries, address general meetings, and ask them to hold their own ballots, in 
compliance with the law as it was at that particular time, and ballot to support 
Tony Proverbs at their pit.48 
The first step in this strategy involved leafleting the other pits. The response 
seemed favourable. On Monday 12 August miners at Bentley stopped work in 
support ofFrickley. In Gary Hutsby's view, 'It was quite a testament to the Bentley 
miners, that after all the kickings that we'd had, that still, at this stage in the game, 
they marched out spontaneously. ,49 fiut this was the limit of any solidarity action. 
On Wednesday, the Bentley miners returned to work after Area officials promised a 
ballot for action at the end of the week. 50 'It was a similar sort of tale up at 
Stillingfleet up in Selby,' says Gary Hutsby.51 
Defeat 
At the weekend of that second week of the strike, NUM branches throughout 
Yorkshire met to discuss the dispute and prepared for ballots later in the week. The 
result of the coalfield ballot was not to be determined by the total of the Yorkshire 
NUM membership voting for action but rather by the aggregate of pits voting in 
favour. 'We knew that we couldn't win the whole of the Area,' recollects Gary 
Hinchliffe: 
But we also weren't convinced that if we got an Area ballot that a lot of men 
wouldn't work. So we thought that we'd got a good chance of getting some of 
the Doncaster pits, our traditional allies, to vote to back us up, and then try to 
47 Yorkshire Post, 12 AU!:,>1Jst 1991. 
48 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
49 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
50 ,Socialist Worker, 24 AU!:,>1Jst 1991. 
51 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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take it from there ... I went down to Manton and spoke to their branch. We'd all 
been delegated to pits that we had to go to. 52 
With the rank-and-file activists and branch-level NUM officials in the pits lacking 
confidence to campaign actively in the dispute due to the legal pressures and 
management threats, a positive lead from the Yorkshire Area officials was essential, 
especially given the wider consequences of the latest confrontation and how a more 
sustained assault from British Coal and the government was in the offing. But the 
amount of propaganda aQ,ruing the Frickley case was minimal, and there was no 
recommendation to support the strike on the ballot papers. The result, when it was 
announced, was a shattering blow to the strikers: only three pits, Kellingley, 
Whitemoor in the Selby complex and Thurcroft, voted to support Frickley.53 
Although -there was a possibility of substantial support elsewhere if Frickley and the 
three other pits had sent out flying pickets in the traditional manner, unfortunately, 
as Gary Hinchliffe testifies: 
... the proviso that was sent from two of the pits was that they would support 
us, but not on their own. They said that they could carry it, but while ever there 
was only a few pits out, the men wouldn't wear it. When they'd voted they 
expressed that they would support us while everybody else is out on strike. So we 
sent people to see them and thanked them for their support, but we decided that 
we wouldn't squander the handshakes and the goodwill that had come from these 
pits over our strike. 54 
With no desire to fight on alone after three weeks out, on Saturday 24 August the 
Frickley strikers voted to return to work and allow Tony Proverbs' case to be taken 
to an industrial tribunal. 'We thought he'd win an industrial tribunal and we could 
prove his case -without a shadow of doubt, and they'd have to reinstate him,' recalls 
Jeff Johnson. But, he continues, 'We lost the tribunal. We lost everything with 
Tony. ,55 
Ultimately, the failure of the Tony Proverbs strike, as one Frickley activist notes, 
'finally knocked on the head any real resistance at Frickley. ,56 But the ramifications 
of the dispute went much further than a defeat for miners at a single workplace. 
Given that further pressure on jobs and closures was expected in the near future, and 
resistance needed to be mounted, it was a significant and unnecessary defeat for the 
NUM as a whole. Crucially, the NUM's Area and national leadership had done 
precisely nothing when one of the pits which had become synonymous with the 
miners' resistance had been singled out for a strategic attack by British Coal and left 
to fight alone. Little wonder there was now widespread despair among the union's 
militants about how to challenge the industry'S bosses. 
52 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
53 Socialist Worker, 3 1 August 1991. 
54 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
55 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
56 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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The Rothschild Report 
Speculation continued relentlessly in the press about the bleak future facing the coal 
industry. The main concern was over the supply contract between British Coal and 
the two power supply companies, which stood at between 65 and 70 million tonnes 
of coal a year and which was set to end in March 1993. National Power and 
PowerGen were contending that imported coal was far cheaper. While the average 
price of a tonne of BC coal was put at £47, estimates put imported coal at just £36. 
Consequently in September 1991 it was reported that National Power, British Coal's 
biggest customer, had signed a £65 million deal to construct a massive 
coal-importing facility at Bristol, which could handle over 5 million tonnes of foreign 
coal a year and have the capacity to handle double that amount if need be. Four pits 
would be threatened directly. Additionally, National Power was in the process of 
negotiating similar projects on the Humber, the Tees and the Tyne. The company 
would soon have the capacity to import 14 million tonnes of coal a year, around 
one-third of the amount it currently took from BC. 1 And not long afterwards it was 
announced that PowerGen was to build a £40 million terminal in Liverpool capable 
of handling 5 million tonnes of coal from overseas. 2 The power generators were also 
in the process of diversifying to other fuels, particularly gas. Estimates suggested 
that there was already 6,500 megawatts of gas-fired generating plant under 
construction and a further 10,000 megawatts was likely to go ahead, which all 
added up to the equivalent of 30 million tonnes of coal. Besides this, the power 
generators were attempting to overcome pollution controls so as to bum Orimulsion. 
Contracts for 8.5 million tonnes of Orimulsion had already been drawn up by 
December 1991.3 
In October there was an even more worrying forecast for miners when a leaked 
report on the l'rivatisation of coal by merchant bankers N M Rothschild suggested 
that the Tories intended to almost eradicate what remained of the coal industry. The 
report indicated that within three years as many as four out of every five miners 
currently working would be sacked and that the privati sed coal industry would 
operate with as little as 14 pits and a mere 11,000 miners. Of the 26 pits operating in 
Yorkshire in October 1991, just seven would stay open.4 
It transpired that one of the pits apparently to be spared the axe was Frickley. But 
this did not give much hope to miners at the pit, as Gary Hutsby recalls: 
For a few years previous, there had been a lot of talk about these secret hit lists of 
pits they were going to shut. But these were all rumours. But Rothschild's, this 
was a government sponsored report, and they had actually stated who they were 
and weren't going to shut. So it gave people hard, concrete proof of what was 
going _off They said a lot of pits were going to close, but everybody in the pits 
The Guardian, 11 September 1991. 
2 The Guardian, 24 January 1992. 
3 The Guardian, 14 December 1991. 
4 Hem.~worth and South Elmsall Express, 17 October 1991; Socialist Worker, 19 
October 1991 . 
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knew that it was coming. We knew that privatisation was at our door. The way 
that I remember it was that they could have said they were going to close all the 
pits - your expectations were so low you expected the worst. When they said 
there were only going to be about twelve pits left, it was like, 'Oh, is there?'s 
Transferees such as Robert King had heard such forecasts about pits being safe 
when they had worked elsewhere: 
Personally, I couldn't see a future for Frickley because 1 had seen the investment 
they had put in at Kirkby, and the pits at Selby and Kellingley were in a lot better 
position than Frickley. But you heard that many reports. Was this one true, or 
wasn't it true? If the economic situation changed the year after they might want 
thirty or even fifty pits. You didn't know.6 
And yet, even though there was widespread gloom amongst miners after such 
disclosures, the implementation of the measures predicted by Rothschild were not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion. Britain's miners still held enormous political and 
industrial muscle, and it was for this reason that the Conservatives' energy secretary, 
John Wakeham, immediately played down the leak, stating that the reports of 
Rothschild's advice 'were highly speculative,.7 
Despair 
There was further depressing news for NUM activists in mid-November 1991 when 
the union's membership yet again rejected a call for industrial action over wages in a 
ballot. So deep was the despair in the industry that even the normally militant 
Yorkshire miners had voted against action this time around. For activists, it was now 
a matter of once more going 'back to basics', of building on any small disputes that 
erupted, if they were to rebuild confidence in the pits. 8 For some activists, though, 
this was too much to ask. Steve Gant, for so long a stalwart of the resistance at 
Frickley, admits that by this time he had had enough: 
I've more or less said 'Fuck it' by now. By '91 I started having time off on the 
sick. I was involved in other things than politics at that time. You get sick of 
banging your head against a brick wall . . . I was still on the union, but if I tell the 
truth, my heart wasn't in it. I was missing meetings. I was thinking of resigning. 
This would be just after the Tony Proverbs strike; and when that went down as 
well, when they had that pit-by-pit ballot and it failed, and Tony just remained 
sacked, that was it. We were never going to win things. The more defeats that 
you go through, especially when you are at the front of them, it just grinds you 
down eventually. 9 
5 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
6 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
7 Socialist Worker, 19 October 1991. 
8 Socialist Worker, 23 November 1991. 
9 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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In January] 992 Malcolm High's brief reign at Frickley came to an end when he 
was replaced by Kevin Whiteman, a former manager at Nantgarw and Penallta 
collieries in Wales and more recently a member of British Coal's directing staff at 
their training colleges in Buckinghamshire and Staffordshire. lO 'Whiteman,' recalls 
Steve Gant: 
was another one like Lawson. I was in a consultative meeting and he just said the 
same thing as Lawson did when he took over: 'Steve, oh yes, I know Steve.' 
He'd never met me! I'd never had a run in with him or owt like that; but that 
doesn't matter. He's remembered. He knows I'm there and he wants me out -
preferably with no severance. This is all that's on my mind after Tony Proverbs 
has been sacked. I can see what's coming: I'm going to get sacked, I'd got 
twenty years' service and I'd be out without a penny. 1 1 
He says that at one point he was 'set up' by Whiteman. He was due to meet the 
pit manager because of his recent absenteeism record, but was astonished to find that 
he was already supposed to be on a final warning. He argued that he had never 
received notice of any such warning. In reply, the pit manager told him: 
'OK then, you are on one now.' He says, 'You are on the edge ofa cliff, and I'm 
going to shove you off.' At this time there was nowhere to go. If it hadn't been 
for severance and £27,000 being involved, I would have just got up at that 
meeting and whacked his fucking head off. But you can't. You have to sit there 
and let him talk to you like a piece of shit. It's either that or fuck off without owt. 
I thought: 'No, Steve's going out, but he's going out with some coin.' That's all 
that was on my mind at this time. Nobody wanted to fight back. For me, it was 
just a question of time before I was sacked: they were putting me on button jobs; 
they were trying to catch me asleep; I was getting sent onto the worst jobs in the 
pit. So when I got this final warning, I worked about three months without a day 
otf, solid, and then 1 threw on the sick, long term; and I never started back 
again. 12 
Steve Gant was one of a number of key activists at Frickley whose presence 
would be missed in the coming struggle. Vic France and Ray Riley had left the pit in 
1989, while Tony Short had been stricken by a serious illness since the Easter of .. 
1991. 
Solid in Newhill 
Though a mood of doom and despair prevailed at Frickley, and though resistance 
was minimal in comparison to earlier years, some industrial action did in fact occur 
during the following months. On 5 February 1992 there was a strike in the 
newly-d.eveloped Newhill seam. By this time, a number of militants had deliberately 
volunfeered to work in the new seam to stop a situation where transferees were 
10 Hemsworth and 5;oulh }<.'lmsall &press, 9 January 1992. 
II Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
12 Steve Gant, interviewed by the author. 
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starting to tolerate working practices that were unacceptable elsewhere at Frickley. 
Gary Hinchliffe was one of those involved in this important walkout: 
They'd put deputies in there who weren't getting on with the men in Cudworth, 
who couldn't take the attitude of the men. We called them 'can't cope deputies'. 
They put them in the Newhill with men who were getting transferred from other 
pits. When we moved in there - me, Jip and our Paul - it was a regime that we 
weren't use to, and they were now having to move men in from out of Cudworth; 
so it was obvious that there were going to be some sparks. What the men in this 
seam had accepted as normal working practice just wasn't nornlal working 
practice as far as we were concerned in Cudworth. And apparently this had gone 
ahead with the knowledge of the branch as well. Whenever the men had gone in 
to complain about what they'd had to do, they were told that that's how things 
were. So we had a big bust up with Steve Tulley and the union. He denied that 
he'd ever been in to see the manager for help over money, over their contracts, 
over what they were working in. So we ended up with a couple of disputes in the 
first month that we were in the Newbill. They wanted us to bucket water onto a 
belt. I refused to do it. I said, 'You can get a pump in and do it. I don't mind if 
there's something buried here, if something has got to be done urgently, but as a 
day-in, day-out job, bucketing slurry onto a belt, no.' The deputy I had, Andrew 
Savage, backed off The deputy our Paul had was Andrew Hall - he didn't back 
off 13 
The men realised there was going to be a stand-off the following day because 
Paul Hinchliffe was again going to refuse to shift water with a bucket. But, as Paul 
Symonds explains, a traditional walkout was now out of the question: 
There had been a time when we would have stood on the pit head and held what 
we used t6 call a 'gear header', stand at the gear head, get everybody round and 
say, 'Are we doing it or aren't we? No. Well let's march.' With the trade union 
laws and having to go through the procedures, we had to tread carefully. But we 
knew that something had to be done. So we arranged, as we went down the pit, 
that if Paul got sent out - which he surely would for refusing to do this job - that 
he had to walk a certain route out of the pit, and not talk to anybody. We didn't 
want it where he could be said to have incited a strike. They refused him again. .. 
Paul never spoke to anybody, and walked out of the pit. But every group of men 
that he passed, though nobody spoke, they all put their coats on and followed 
him. All the Newhill came out on strike. We didn't even dare use the phones for 
fear of the deputies saying that we had rang round to tell the men. But we all 
knew what was going off, we all whispered to each other and the whisper went 
round ... It created an amazing situation: there was no screaming and shouting, 
there. had been no speeches; we just all went home. ] 4 
13 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
14 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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Management retaliated by forcing all the participants in the dispute to sit through 
individual interviews, where they were quizzed about who were the ringleaders of 
the walkout. 'They kept plugging and pushing about whether Paul Hinchliffe had 
asked them to come out on strike in support,' says Gary Hinchliffe: 
I'll give them credit; everyone, to a man, said 'No.' And when they were asked 
why they'd come home they said, 'Because it was a strike.' There were only 
thirty or forty men involved, but nobody would betray rum, even though they 
were all getting threatened with the sack and put on their final warnings. He was 
after a head to roll and he was after Paul Hinchliffe's. He didn't get it. IS 
Holding back for the election 
Because .a general election was due in 1992, the government was anxious to play 
down any gloomy forecasts for the coal industry.16 Though Labour was not 
promising to deliver much, expectations were rugh amongst NUM members for the 
return of a Labour government to save pits. But there was a price to pay for such 
hopes, as Armthorpe miners found to their cost when the most important dispute in 
the Yorkshire coalfield in early 1992 threatened to escalate. 
Just prior to Christmas, Armthorpe NUM had been informed that two new faces 
at the pit were to be developed by outside contractors, while the established 
development teams were to be disbanded. After protracted talks and selective strike 
action during March, the Armthorpe branch committee turned to the Yorkshire Area 
for assistance. Support was promised but the date for a coalfield ballot was 
delayed. 17 Gary Hutsby recalls attending a meeting where Frank Cave, now the 
NUM vice-president, addressed the Armthorpe miners. Afterwards, he decided to 
quiz the NUM official about the delay: 
Because we'd got copies of Socialist Worker with us, when he turned round he 
must have-thought: 'Who are these? They must be outsiders.' He said something 
along the lines of: 'Who the hell do you think you are talking toT At this, my 
temper started to escalate. J said, 'I'll tell you who I am; I'm the bastard who 
pays your wages. I'm a miner, I'm a member of this union and I want some 
answers out of you.' He tried to calm trungs down then. But at trus, you could 
hear the other miners who were stood in the hall also saying, , Yeah, how come 
it's taken you so 10ngT He says, 'I'll tell you what it is, there's the general 
election coming up, isn't there? And we can't afford to be having any disputes 
and embarrassing the Labour Party.' At that I just went berserk and started 
shouting at him. He jumped up, swore at me, and then stormed out of the 
meeting. But that is where new realism had got us. IS 
IS G~ry Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
16 D. Powell, The Power Game: The Stmggle for Coal, (London, 1993), p.228. 
17 K, Coates, L. Paterson, M. Reeves and S. Taylor, 'The young ones: they have 
woken a sleeping tiger', in Armthorpe NUM, Ihe Kane Story (Doncaster, 1994), 
pp.I04-107. 
IS Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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A coalfield ballot was eventually held on 15 and 16 April. By this time, though, 
the general election was over - the Tories were back in office with a majority of 21 
and were already promising the rapid privatisation of the coal industry. And yet 
despite the obvious despair which greeted this outcome in the pits, the ballot over 
Armthorpe actually proved to be successful. But even now the prospect of action 
was delayed in the hope of talks. However, when talks did take place on 1 May, 
British Coal simply said they were recommending that Armthorpe close. With no 
support forthcoming from the Yorkshire leadership over the closure announcement, 
the Armthorpe miners called off their action. 19 Once more new realism had allowed 
British Coal to make an example of a pit that had stood firm. 
Bloodbath 
By mid-September 1992 the day of reckoning seemed to be drawing nearer for the 
coal industry. Leaked secret documents obtained by lhe Guardian revealed that the 
Tories were shortly to announce massive c1osures.20 On 13 October, the waiting was 
over and the miners' worst fears materialised when President of the Board of Trade, 
Michael Heseltine, declared that a staggering 31 of the country's 50 pits were to 
close by the end of March. Of these, six pits would stop working by the end of the 
week and a further 13 would close by Christmas. In total, British Coal's workforce 
was to be reduced from 53,000 to 23,000, with output reduced to as little as 25 
million tonnes a year. There was to be no more deep mining in Lancashire, North 
Wales, North Staffordshire and North Derbyshire. South Wales, Scotland, 
Warwickshire, South Staffordshire and the North East would be left with just one pit 
each.21 
Gary Hinchliffe, like thousands of other miners that day, was anxious to find out 
what had happened: 
1 was on afters and I phoned out of the pit to the control room. I tried to get the 
union on at first but there was nobody in. I told the control man who I was and he 
told me what had gone off. I said, 'Where's the manager?' He said, 'He's in his 
office. He's gutted.' I said, 'Is he taking calls?' He said, 'No. Steve Tulley is up 
there with him, and so is Chick Picken and Johnny Stones. But they're not taking 
calls.' He'd been told that Frickley was shutting!22 
The announced closure of Frickley 'was a big shock' for Johnny Stones. He had 
always thought the pit was safe: 
... with Frickley's size, its infrastructure, its coal clearance system, shaft sizes, 
and especially with the amount of money that had been spent on it since the 
strike, to develop a new seam and access for three seams at one pit bottom - tens 
of millions of pounds had been spent on it, and it had started producing and 
19 Coates et al., op. cit., p.1IO; The Guardian, 2 May 1992; Socialist Worker, 9 
May 1992. 
20 The Guardian, 18 September 1992. 
21 Routledge, Scar gill, p.232; Ihe Times, 14 October 1992. 
22 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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getting results ... We'd obviously had our problems. But our results were such 
that we'd made about £26-28 million profit over the previous five or six years. 
That had reduced a lot because manpower had been run down and we'd had all 
the internal upsets that you have when running down manpower. But it was the 
first year that we'd not made a profit - we'd had two slight deficits. Our 
capabilities were there and they knew they were there.23 
Transferees such as Robert King had faced a similar situation before; but now 
things were far worse: 'When I lost my job at South Kirkby Colliery, at least there 
were other pits to go to. But there was no way out now, it was the dole. It was 
obvious that it was the end of the line. ,24 
Robert Walker would never work at FrickJey again. He had been off sick when 
the announcement was made but had been preparing to go back to work: 
I'd just sent for an unbreakable flask. I sent for it in the morning when the hit list 
came out on the telly that Frickley was one of them. 1 was at my mam's. She says: 
'Have you sent for that flask yet?' 1 said, 'Yeah, 1 sent for it this morning.' She 
says, 'Come and have a look at this!' And when I walked into the room Frickley 
was on. 1 said, 'I don't believe it.' So 1 went back on the sick then, and kept on. 
They finished me before the end.25 
Outrage 
Despite only just having be re-elected, the Tories had in fact been in serious trouble 
since 16 September, 'Black Wednesday', when they had been forced to devalue the 
pound and abandon membership of the European exchange-rate mechanism. This 
meant that the Tories were gambling that the closure announcement would go 
through with the minimum of fuss. But with the widespread demoralisation in the 
pits, there was every chance that the gamble would payoff. Two demonstrations 
were hastily -organised by the NUM and the Tue: the first for 21 October, a 
Wednesday and while parliament debated the pit closures, and then for the following 
Sunday. But Gary Hutsby recalls that, initially, there was little enthusiasm amongst 
his workmates to participate in these protests: 
I can remember going to work and arblUing that we'd got to get down London 
and lobby parliament, that if we were going to do anything, we had to have as 
many people down there as possible. And from the full shift of people who 1 
argued with, not one of them said that they would come on the demo. This didn't 
surprise me, because at that stage in the game everybody was just saying: 'What's 
the point? They are going to shut us. It's reality.'26 
Things did not stay this way. While most miners were despondent about the 
closure~, elsewhere there was widespread public outrage and condemnation of the 
23 Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
24 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
25 Robert Walker, interviewed by the author. 
26 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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Tories' actions. In the following days a massive sea change took place in British 
politics. When a loyal Tory newspaper such as The Sun started to abuse John 
Major's government for being 'a bankrupt, clueless, lying, incompetent, complacent, 
arrogant administration, ,27 it was plain that something was happening. Similarly 
when 3,000 people marched through the Tory heartland of Cheltenham in protest 
against pit closures on the Sunday following Heseltine's announcement. Just as in 
the last days of Margaret Thatcher, again there was talk in the press of a leadership 
contest or even a general election. 'Life-long Cheltenham Tories,' reported 171e 
Times, 'have now joined Conservative MPs, church leaders and navy-blue Tory 
newspapers such as The Sunday Telegraph and Daily Mail in what only recently 
would have seemed an unlikely posse ofMr Major's critics. ,28 Suddenly, the miners 
were popular with the media, as Jeff Johnson remembers: 
By this time I worked on the surface after some accident I'd had down the pit; 
and the amount of people ringing the pit up - interviewers, radio people - waiting 
in the pit car-park to talk to miners. Everywhere you went photographs were 
taken. 29 
And one audacious stunt briefly put FrickIey in the media spotlight during the 
early days of the coal crisis. On the same day that 'middle England' marched for the 
miners in Cheltenham, a group of FrickJey miners and their supporters were busy 
dumping coal at the gates of Michael Heseltine's 400-acre estate in Oxfordshire. 30 
Resistance, of sorts, was beginning to mount. 
On the march 
As the day of the first demonstration drew nearer, at FrickIey the response was 
starting to look far more promising than had been anticipated. Branch committee 
man Gary Hinchliffe was involved in arranging transport down to London for the 
Frickley miners, their families and friends: 
I spent two days booking buses. I could only have nine at first. I kept getting onto 
Area about it: I'd filled the nine buses with the men who had been putting their 
names down who wanted to go to this lobby of parliament. I couldn't get buses 
from anywhere. I was getting buses in the end from Northallerton and York to 
come down to Frickley to take us down. I think we ended up with nearly forty 
fifty-seater buses. Very few men worked at Frickley that day. All the pit must've 
gone down. It was a big demo. 31 
Arthur Scargill' s initial reaction to the closure announcement was to recommend 
that the NUM should hold a strike ballot. But by the following day his tone was 
entirely different. Now he stressed that he would only support a strike if the 
27 Cited in Socialist Review, November 1992. 
28 The Times, 19 October 1992. 
29 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
30 Ihe Guardian, 19 October 1992. 
31 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
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government refused to accept 'the logical arguments supported by a wide breadth of 
public opinion.'32 This emphasis on public opinion was to dominate Scargitrs 
approach to the campaign against closures. It also changed the nature of the coming 
demonstration. Initially the protest had been billed as a march and lobby of 
parliament, but with the new-found enthusiasm among miners, activists such as Paul 
Symonds were starting to envisage thousands of protesters arriving at London and 
then proceeding to hammer on the gates of parliament, thus forcing the government 
into a climb-down: 
Down the pit we had been laughing that this would be brilliant, there would be 
that many of us that the MPs wouldn't even be able to get past us to vote. We 
were saying that the Tories would have to get dressed up as road sweepers to get 
into the House of Commons. That was the mood, that was the euphoria that was 
starting to build around it. 33 
The size and constitution of the demonstration, organised at short notice, on a 
working day in mid-week, showed that the plight of the miners touched the hearts of 
masses of other workers who were looking for a focus to channel their bitterness 
over a whole range of other issues such as the massive wave of redundancies in 
process, the threat of wage freezes and the attacks on social services and education. 
There were upwards of 100,000 people on the march,34 and more than five hundred 
union banners in evidence.35 'It was unbelievable,' says Robert King: 
I can remember that during the miners' strike of '84/85, we went on demos and it 
was just miners, with a few people from other industries tailing off at the back of 
the demo. But this time it was us who were the tail, we were in the minority.36 
So huge was the procession that by the time the first marchers had completed a 
loop of Hyde-Park and the surrounding neighbourhood, thousands of marchers were 
still waiting to set off, two hours after the start of the procession. 37 Gary Hutsby 
remembers the scene in the nearby streets: 
. . . as we were marching through Kensington, which is packed full of antique 
shops, there were people hanging out of the windows, waving and cheering us 
on. Some of them had knocked up placards saying: 'No pit closures.' It was quite 
a shock ... it was an absolutely superb demonstration, which lifted the morale of 
the men. And so now they were no longer sure of walking all over us. Having 
said that, it wasn't because the miners were going to stand in their way. It was 
because of the feeling across the country.38 
32 Ihe -Times, 19 October 1992. 
33 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
34 Routledge, op. cit., p.236. 
35 Socialist Worker, 3] October 1992. 
36 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
37 The Guardian, 22 October 1992. 
38 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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Many miners had been expecting to head for the House of Commons. Instead the 
march returned to Hyde Park for another rally. 'Everybody was saying, "What are 
we doing, we're back in Hyde Park?'" recalls Paul Symonds: 
We were saying: 'What the fuck have I had the day off work today for? Just to 
walk round a park and listen to some speeches?' And this was certainly the 
attitude amongst the lads when you got to the pit the day iller. I don't want to 
take anything away from the size of the demonstration, but I often think that if 
that 150,000 had been stood outside parliament, live on TV, and that 
announcement was made, I reckon that we would have invaded it. We would 
have taken it over. And who knows what would have happened after that. 39 
It was not just the missed opportunity to march on parliament that disappointed 
activists. Many were hoping for the speakers in Hyde Park to make a call for a 
general strike in support of the miners. Though Arthur Scargill made an emotional 
speech on the miners' behalf, he made no request for action from the other trade 
union leaders sharing the platform. 'The mood was there,' argues Robert King, 
'there were that many people with us, they were angry and they had all had enough. 
That call should have been made. ,40 
Courting the Tory 'rebels' 
With the government being so unpopular, workers had an unprecedented 
opportunity to force concessions from the Tories, or even drive them from office. 
And yet though Arthur Scaq,till may have liked to have seen industrial action, at the 
decisive moment he held back for fear of turning the press, the official trade union 
leadership, and 'sympathetic' Tory MPs against the miners, clinging to the hope that 
the government would be beaten in parliament - ironically, the only forum where the 
Tories had any chance of attaining a majority at that time. Of course simple 
arithmetic showed that if just eleven Tory back-benchers rebelled, the government 
would lose its majority - and eight had already said they would dery their whips over 
the issue, with others promising to abstain.41 With the Tories bitterly divided over 
Europe and economic policy, a mass protest outside of parliament would have gone 
a long way towards forcing more Conservatives MPs into backing down over pit 
closures. Instead, a select number of NUM activists were invited to leave the main 
march to lobby parliament as the debate on pit closures commenced. Jeff Johnson 
was one of these, but spent his time trying to find common ground with Tory MPs: 
We had a list of the wavering Tory MPs. We went through their calling system 
and debated with them, in the lobbying chambers, about all sorts of aspects. Some 
people believed that they should shut pits down because of the ecological damage 
we. were doing to the ozone layer and forests through acid rain; but we counter-
acted these arguments by saying that there should be investment in putting filters 
39 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
40 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
41 Routledge, op. cit., pp.235-236. 
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on power stations ... We even tried to use nationalism - which these Tory MPs 
stood for - as an arb>ument to keep pits open, to try and get their non-European 
stance to come behind us. We got promises from thirteen Tory MPs - it took us 
hours and hours of doing it; non-stop talking - but as they went into parliament, 
their whips got hold of them and gave them certain promises that there would be 
a study to see which pits were economically viable. So the vote never came 
through. They stitched it up.42 
With six Tory MPs eventually voting alongside Labour and five abstaining, 
Heseltine sought parliamentary peace by announcing a freeze on the closures of 21 
of the threatened pits until a Department of Trade and Industry report was published 
in the New Year.43 Gary Hinchliffe was one of many NVM members who were not 
impressed by this V-turn though, and saw it as a sham to buy time: 
. . . the longer it went on you realised what was going to happen. This had 
happened in 1921, 1926, and 1981. They were going to negotiate through the 
winter, and carry on with the same plan when it got to the summer. They 
announced a moratorium. They were going to look into it, they were going to 
spend a fortune to re-examine these pits to see if they could find any more 
markets for coal. But you knew they weren't going to.44 
People power 
The second march in support of the miners was even larger than the first, with over 
200,000 people in attendance despite torrential rain. It was, one commentator has 
noted, 'the largest gathering of its kind since the TUC's march against the Industrial 
Relations Bill more than twenty years earlier. ,45 That, though, was the high point. 
At this crucial moment, with the government on the ropes and with millions of 
workers thinking in terms of widespread industrial action - even a general strike - the 
TVe refused-to sanction the type of action which could cripple the government. But 
because the miners were not likely to come out on their own over pit closures, 
Scargill and the leaders of the NUM continued to see winning public opinion, and 
explaining how the closures were morally wrong, as the only realistic option open to 
the union. Speaking at a rally in South Kirkby on the day after the second great 
demonstration, Frickley branch president Steve Tulley made the NUM's stance clear. 
Sharing the platform alongside Ken Homer, Frank Cave, Labour MP Jimmy Hood, 
and a local Methodist minister, he called for a 'rolling campaign' of public pressure 
and sustained 'people power'. 'People power is good,' he explained, 'and the 
Labour and trade union movements are built on people behind them. ,46 
It soon became apparent what 'people power' actually entailed, as the NVM's 
campaign settled into a series of local rallies and marches. On Saturday 31 October, 
3,000 supporters of the miners marched through Barnsley and a further 2,000 
42 Jeff Johnson, interviewed by the author. 
43 Routledge, op. cit., p.236. 
44 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
45 R. Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics, (Oxford, 1993). 
46 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 29 October 1992. 
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through Doncaster.47 The following weekend there was another demonstration in 
Barnsley, this time with 5,000 marchers, while 400 marched in Portsmouth, 2,000 
people attended a North West TUe march in Manchester and 2,000 went on a UDM 
march in Nottingham.48 On 14 November, 1,600 people marched through Merthyr 
Tydfil, 500 in Hull, 400 in Southampton, over 200 in Cannock in the West 
Midlands, and a further 800 people packed a Scargill rally in nearby 
Stoke-on-Trent.49 Weekend after weekend, this type of activity was repeated in the 
coalfields and elsewhere. But it was soon becoming evident to miners that tlUs route 
was getting nowhere, as Gary Hutsby recollects: 
For months and months, people marched and marched. In fact, as the campaign 
went on and on, it got to where you were wasting your breath arguing with 
miners to go on demonstrations. They were saying: 'March? March where? We 
are sick of marching. That's all we are doing. I've worn a pair of shoes out in two 
months. I don't want to march anymore. ,50 
Johnny Stones, a man with a reputation for being a loyal supporter of union 
policy, goes as far as to say: 
We didn't have a campaign. We supported all the Area things in '92 and '93 - we 
ordered buses and there was nobody on them hardly. There was apathy and a lot 
of people were looking for other jobs ... We had a bus laid on to go to 
Huntingdon, to go to lobby Major's constituency - I don't think we got six on 
that. We laid them on but they weren't supported. 51 
As the campaign dithered, the government went ahead with what the Yorkshire 
Post described as a 'closure by stealth' policy. 52 Ten of the threatened pits were 
being kept open only on a care and maintenance basis, with miners having to report 
for work before then being sent home. Elsewhere, other miners were encouraged to 
apply for redundancy. 53 Over 5,000 miners had left the industry by Christmas. 54 
Under such conditions, Arthur Scargill was becoming desperate for some kind of 
meaningful action, but wanted this to be officially sanctioned. When the TUC 
General Council met at a specially convened meeting in Doncaster on 25 November, 
he aimed for support for a day of action, but tlUs was rejected. Norman Willis 
informed miners that solidarity action was illegal, arguing that 'there is no way the 
TUC puts its head in a legal noose. ,55 Of course with the intensity of the coal crisis 
and the massive sympathy for the miners, the TUe could not dare to openly betray 
47 Socialist Worker, 7 November 1992. 
48 Socialist Worker, 14 November 1992. 
49 Socialist Worker, 21 November 1992. 
50 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
5] Johnny Stones, interviewed by the author. 
52 Yorkshire Post, 26 November 1992. 
53 Routledge, op. cit., p.237. 
54 Ibod I ., p.241. 
55 Financial Times, 26 November 1992. 
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the NUM, and so had to he seen to be doing something about pit closures. The 
result was the 'National Day of Recovery' on 9 December. It was perhaps the most 
pitiful effort of a pitiful campaign. At least in earlier crises during the Tories' rule the 
TUC had sanctioned token action: over the anti-union laws in 1980, over the health 
service in 1982, over GCHQ in 1984, and even limited action over the ambulance 
workers in 1990. With not the slightest hint of shame, this is how the TUC later 
described its action on behalf of the miners that day: 
More than 100,000 leaflets were distributed to trade union activists urging them 
to approach employers that day on job losses and seeking support for the TUC's 
programme for National Recovery. A national campaign conference was also held 
on the day at Congress House, which was attended by senior trade unionists and 
representatives from industry and local government. A keynote address was given 
by Mr Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, General Secretary of UNICE, the European 
employers' organisation. 56 
Rather than hitting the employing class, who at that time were laying off hundreds 
of thousands of workers and whose political representatives were in the process of 
sacking thousands of miners, the leaders of the organised working class wanted to 
talk to the bosses. Little wonder there was cynicism among NUM members about 
this initiative, as Gary Hutsby recalls: 
People at the pit were saying, 'What does that mean? A National Day of 
Recovery sounds like we are all going to get pissed-up on a Saturday night and 
then on Sunday we'll lay in bed recovering.' The idea was, apparently, because 
the economy was in such a dire strait, for the employers and the unions to sit 
down and talk about how they were going to get the economy out of the mess. 
What planet do they live on757 
Another TUC initiative was 'Switch off Saturday' on December 19, in which 
supporters of the miners were asked to turn off their lights for five minutes. A more 
serious proposal would have been to have asked power workers to turn the lights 
off Gary Hurst says that he never expected anything from the TUC after what had 
happened in the Big Strike; but this latest effort 'was just a waste of time.'58 In 
Robert King's view, the public 'should have been turning lights on for the miners, to 
use up more power - not turning them off' 59 Things did promise to escalate that 
month though, when, faced with the TUC's inaction, Women Against Pit Closures 
began a short occupation of Armthorpe Colliery and Arthur Scargill issued a call for 
miners and rail workers - who were also facing privatisation and closure - to stage a 
South African-style 'stayaway' protest for 19 January.60 Scargill was starting to 
recognise that public opinion was of little use unless something was done with it. In 
56 TUC Conference Report, 1993, p.1S4. 
57 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
58 Gary Hurst, interviewed by the author. 
59 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
60 M. Simons, 'A battIe undermined', Socialist Review, December 1993, p.14. 
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Gary Hutsby's view, however, the NUM leader did not seem to realise the full 
significance of what he was pushing for with stayaways and people power: 
I listened to him and the other NUM leaders speak on loads of occasions and they 
kept using the examples of South Africa and Eastern Europe, about what had 
happened in Romania. They were saying that these were the kinds of examples 
that we should be looking at . . . but if you looked at Romania, what had they 
done to the head of their country? They'd shot him on Christmas Day. If you 
looked at South Africa, you'd got the ANC leading a guerrilla army against the 
state. The NUM leaders had to come up with something, but they didn't want to 
talk about strikes, and so talked about people's power and stayaways. But in 
South Africa a stayaway was a general strike. So Scargill was trying to moderate 
his language, but using examples which were far more extreme than the solutions 
people were actually arguing for. It was quite funny in one sense, because I was 
all for using the solutions that the Romanians had used against the people who ran 
their lives - but I would have been quite happy to have started with a general 
strike.6) 
Sit-ins 
Although the call for a stayaway was welcomed, a minority of activists in the 
coalfields had been organising for something different for some time. 'We came out 
with the idea of miners occupying their own pits,' says Gary Hutsby.62 
As early as 14 October 1992, Arthur Scargill had stated his support for pit 
occupations as a means of fighting closures at the meeting of the NUM executive. 
However, the NEC and a special delegate conference the following day both took a 
different view. Scargill has since arb'Ued that if miners had seriously considered 
occupying pits, they could have gone ahead with them: 
I was approached at different times by a number of NUM members who claimed 
they only needed my 'go ahead'. On every occasion, having stressed the decisions 
of the NEC and the special delegate conference, I nevertheless made clear that if 
anyone took direct action including occupation to defend pits, jobs and 
communities the union would support any and all actions designed to save our 
industry.63 
But, as we shall see, this is far from how Frickley activists who attempted to 
organise pit occupations recall Scargill's stance on the issue. 
In the very early stages of the campaign, Paul Symonds, like many other activists, .' 
had put his faith in the call for a general strike. But then, in late October, he received 
a telephone call telling him that leading NUM figures at Trentham Colliery near 
Stoke-on-Trent wanted to meet with Frickley miners to talk about fighting the 
closures. After Paul Symonds had informed the Frickley branch officials about this 
request, he and Steve Tulley travelled down to Trentham: 
61 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
62 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
63 A. Scargill, 'History distorted', Socialist Review, February 1994. 
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We met them in their welfare club. All their branch officials were there. Their 
delegate had worked there for 40-odd years, he was saying, 'I'm not bothered 
about my redundancy money, I want this pit to stay open.' The branch secretary, 
he was in his mid-40s, he was the same: 'They are not shutting this pit.' They 
wanted to occupy. And they wanted Frickley to occupy with them. This was like 
music to my ears. I thought: 'These men aren't idiots. They are serious men, 
prepared for something big.' They knew of Frickley' s reputation, that's why they 
had got in touch with us. They were wanting to occupy and they were asking us 
what to do. 64 
But Paul Symonds soon found out that the Frickley branch officials were not as 
enthusiastic about the proposal as their Trentham counterparts: 
Back at Frickley, I argued with Steve Tulley that we had to do it. I said, 'And 
Steve, you've got to lead it as well. It can be done.' But he wouldn't have it. You 
have to understand the consequences of all this. These were men with a lot of 
years' service. If their jobs are going to go, they want their redundancy money. If 
you occupy a pit and it goes wrong, you are sacked, you are on the dole. On a 
personal level, for the miners involved, the stakes were as high as they could get -
apart from being shot. This cannot be taken lightly. These were blokes with 
families and mortgages. And you had to be prepared to throwaway £40,000 on a 
gamble. Steve Tulley didn't refuse as such, he was saying all the right things, but 
he wasn't going to do anything. He was saying things like: 'The time's not right, 
let's wait.' I thought Johnny Stones might be on for it so I tried him. He didn't 
slam the door in my face, it was: 'Mmmm, it's an interesting idea, I'll think about 
it. ,65 
Paul Symo-nds decided to go ahead with the plan for an occupation despite the 
branch officials' reluctance. First he needed to pull a group of supporters together: 
I started sounding all the lads out. I remember spending the next week or two sat 
with lads down the pit. There was no work done. We started to pull a core of 
people who would. But people said they would, and the day after they would 
change their minds. The next day they would be on for it again. 66 
One of the early recruits was Robert King who 'thought it was a great idea.' 
However, because of the threat of sackings, he found it difficult to recruit anybody 
else: 
I didn't get anybody. Jip asked me to have a word with one lad who I knew really 
weJl: He was interested. But he asked how many others were going to do it. I had 
64 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
65 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
66 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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to be honest and tell him. He just said, 'No chance.' That was it, he didn't want to 
know any more. There were four of us, with him. It wasn't enough.67 
In such circumstances, a mass occupation of the pit was out of the question. 
However, Paul Symonds contends that: 
You don't need a hundred men to occupy a pit; you only need six or seven . 
It's a high-risk strategy. We said that if we were able to get into the Newhill, we 
would have been able to isolate the shafts. You could knock a fail-safe device off 
by pressing a red button and they couldn't override it from the surface. Don't get 
me wrong, we were aware of the impact this was going to have. But there was an 
opinion that the miners didn't really want the pit to shut. You couldn't hold an 
open meeting and decide to do this, it had to be kept secret otherwise you would 
never have got down the pit to occupy it.68 
Time to move 
In late October/early November, Paul Symonds met with the Trentham activists to 
iron out details such as when the occupations at the two pits would take place. Other 
events, though, suddenly upped the pace of the agenda. On 5 November, Russ 
Telford, an ex-miner, forced his way down Armthorpe Colliery armed with a gun, in 
protest against the pit closure programme.69 'We in the SWP realised that now was 
the time to move,' says Paul Symonds: 
We initiated a public meeting in Armthorpe for the Sunday night after this 
incident, and we persuaded Scargill to speak at it. He didn't want to do it at first, 
then Paul Foot coaxed him into it. We also invited Bob Anderton and his posse 
from Trentham to come up. The meeting was packed. On the platform were Bob 
Anderton .. Brenda Nixon, Arthur Scargill and a couple of branch officials ... At 
this meeting, I spoke from the floor, and I really raised the temperature. I talked 
about the TUe, about it being a shit campaign, that the NUM had its hands tied. I 
didn't attack the NUM because Scargill was on the platform. I said that it was 
time we did something; I said everything barring mention an occupation.70 
He was under the impression that 'this must be music to Scargill's ears,' but soon 
realised his mistake: 
When I sat down, Scargill really laid into me. He was pointing at me, and then he 
made a really savage attack on the SWP. He said that his strate!:,,), was absolutely .-
right, that it was working. Scargill blamed the men for taking the moneyJI 
67 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
68 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
69 Yorkshire Post, 6 November 1992. 
70 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
71 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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Paul Symonds argues that not only did Scargill kill the euphoria that had been 
building up at the meeting, but also frightened off the Trentham contingent: 
I spoke to Bob [Anderton] after the meeting; he wondered what was going off 
With Scargill being so aggressive towards me, Bob was worried. He loves and 
respects Arthur Scargill, but he has only known me for a week. All of a sudden, 
he's unsure. He must have been wondering who he was working with; was I some 
kind of maverick? Basically, that was it. We were blown straight out of the water. 
And Scargill knew that. He had intended to scupper the occupations. All that was 
left then was to start building bridges again. That was the first time Scargill did 
this; he would do it again. 72 
Another try 
This first attempt at pit occupations had been limited to just two pits. Soon, 
however, moves were under way to mount an even more substantial operation. 
There was now a great deal of animosity between Paul Symonds and the NUM 
leadership whenever their paths crossed at demonstrations and rallies. However, the 
Frickley activist was surprised when not long afterwards Frank Cave approached 
him to discuss the prospects for widespread pit occupations. 'There were three 
meetings,' recalls Paul Symonds: 
it was all a bit cloak and dagger. He said, 'We've got to talk about it Paul, but me 
and Arthur can't be seen to be party to anything like this.' He was the 
go-between, the liaison, with Scargill. We would meet in The Plough in South 
Elmsall and then drive off somewhere. I set off building a picture of pit 
occupations in Frank's mind ... I said, 'Frank, we are serious. We are not talking 
about getting outsiders to do it. We are talking about members who have worked 
in the pit~ all their lives, risking everything, and staying down until we can get the 
pit closure plan scrapped.' He was nodding his head and agreeing ... What they 
were most worried about was that with it being illegal they could be taken to 
court and have the union's funds sequestered. I said, 'But the main problem is, 
we've got a handful of SWP members and others in the pits who will definitely do 
it, but they need to know if you will support it. If you give me a nod and a wink 
that if we occupy you will throw the full weight of the NUM behind us, we can 
pull it off. But these men have got to know this.' He says, 'But we can't tell you.' 
He wouldn't budge off this because of the courts.73 
Eventually it was arranged that an historical article on pit occupations in South ., 
Wales would appear in the next issue of The Miner as a signal of Scargill's support. 
It was hoped that 1993 would begin with at least eight pits under occupation, 
creating a momentum that would transform Scargill's call for stayaways into a 
massive strike throughout industry.74 Gary Hutsby was one of a group of miners 
who toured the coalfields trying to raise the profile of the planned occupations: 
72 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
73 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
74 S· . 14 lmons, op. CIt., p. . 
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We spent all our Christmas touring the country, arguing with people that 
occupations were a viable way forward. From that, we actually organised a 
meeting in Doncaster. There were about 35 miners there from across the country, 
who had come to hear the arf,rument for the occupations. There were fifteen pits 
represented by these 35. No decisions were taken with this being the first meeting 
we'd had. People were raising all kinds of arguments, such as the occupations 
should only take place at those pits that were immediately under threat. The idea 
was that a handful of individuals could get into their own pit and occupy it, and 
the snowball effect from that would be that pits would be back onto a national 
footing, people would have turned on their tellies and seen pits being occupied.75 
Everything was going to plan, and a further meeting in Doncaster was arranged 
for the last Sunday of the miners' Christmas holiday. The occupations would go 
ahead the following Tuesday. Early on Saturday evening though, Paul Symonds 
received a stunning telephone call from Dave Temple, one of the men involved: 
He was from one of the Wearmouth pits and he was a personal confidant of 
Scargill's. He said, 'Jip, it's urgent, I think, you better see me.' Me and a few 
others met him in a pub in Doncaster. He said, 'I've got some bad news. I've just 
left Scargill and he's told me to tell you that if you go ahead with these 
occupations, he's going to disown them. I'm going to have to tell everybody at 
the meeting tomorrow that Scargill doesn't support you.' I said, 'You'll kill it. 
You can't do this.' 
Anyway, the meeting went ahead the next day. I kicked it off, I said, 
'Everybody knows why they are here, the final plans are laid, with the authority 
of this meeting we can do it this week. But I think that everybody should listen to 
what Dave Temple has got to say.' He told them that Scargill wasn't backing it. 
That was it, he'd killed it. We still argued that the union would never dump us; 
twelve pits occupying, they would have no choice but to support us. But people 
started saying that maybe it wasn't the right time now, that perhaps we should 
wait for this Commons Select Committee report. It was dead now, and there was 
nothing we could do about it. 76 
The last action 
With the failure of the planned pit occupations, the focus of the struggle shifted 
elsewhere. Early in 1993 the TUC Emergency Committee turned down the NUM's 
call for a stayaway on 19 January and also Arthur Scargill' s alternative date of 15 
February. The TUC were now putting their faith in the publication of a Commons 
Trade and Industry Select Committee report due at the end of January. But the four 
Labour MPs on the parliamentary committee betrayed the miners by signing a 
document which, though it recommended a subsidy for the coal industry, did not 
recommend that all the threatened pits should stay open. While Arthur Scargill 
denounced the report as 'unacceptable', the people who were calling the shots in the 
75 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
76 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
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miners' campaign thought otherwise. Norman Willis congratulated the MPs and 
claimed that the report 'opens the way forward.' But all it did was enable the 
government to hold firm against such feeble opposition.77 
The miners' campaign would remain becalmed until 5 March 1993, almost five 
months since the great protests against the government, when a ballot for joint 
one-day strikes with the rail workers was staged.78 But the action being 
recommended was 'tokenism' says Paul Symonds: 
Let's be honest, it wasn't on. Were they going to call the pit closure programme 
off after a day and a half? We had a national strike going for a year! What was 
two days going to do? All it served to do was demoralise people.79 
Small wonder then that there was little enthusiasm to campaign for a vote for 
action at Frickley - as Gary Hutsby found out when he enquired in the union office 
for some stickers backing the strike call. Steve Tulley told him he had a pile of 
stickers at home and would bring them to work the next day: 
The day after, I went in the union box again: 'Steve, did you get those stickers?' 
'Oh no, I've forgot them.' I says, 'OK, bring them tomorrow.' The next day, I 
went in again: 'Steve, have you got those stickers?' 'Oh no, I've left them at 
home.' That lack of confidence that Ifel( about arguing with people to take strike 
action, Steve Tulley was showing it. I believed that he wasn't bringing the stickers 
in because he'd forgot them, but because he felt that nobody in the pit would 
wear them. And so in the end, when I finished work that night, I actually went to 
his house and said: 'Steve, the stickers!' And he gave me a great bundle of 
stickers. 80 
And yet even at this late stage 12,913 NUM members voted for strikes, with 
8,465 voting against. 81 The first strike was set for 2 April, but by that time the 
Tories had sensed they had seen out the worst of the crisis and so on 25 March 
finally declared their revised plans for the coal industry in the long-awaited DTI 
report. Not a single extra tonne of output was promised for the industry, but rather a 
subsidy of £500 million for ~ritish Coal to seek new markets in the run up to 
privatisation. Frickley was named as one of 12 pits on the list of 31 that were to be 
given a short-term reprieve while production costs were reduced to international 
.. 
market levels. 12 pits were to close and a further six would be mothballed, while 
one pit, Maltby, would be used for development purposes. 8,000 miners had already 
left the industry since October, thousands more were now set to join them. The ., . 
report also declared that the 'dash for gas' would continue, that coal privatisation 
would be introduced at the earliest opportunity, and that miners would have to spend 
77 Routledge, op. cit., pp.244-245; Simons, op. cit., p.14 ; Socialist Worker, 30 
January 1993; TUC Conference Report, 1993, pp.156-157. 
78 S· . Imons, op. CIt., p.14. 
79 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
80 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
81 Routledge, op. cit., p.246. 
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more time underground.82 Further unease for miners fol1owed when National 
Power and PowerGen signed contracts with British Coal for just forty million tonnes 
of coal for 1993/4 and with a reduction to just thirty million tonnes for each of the 
next four years.8) Frickley NUM branch secretary Steve Tulley told the Hemsworth 
and South Elmsall Express that the DTI report had, 'Not done a scrap of good for 
any of the 31 pits as no extra coal has been negotiated.' He predicted therefore that: 
By next year all 31 pits earmarked last October will have closed. They will be 
followed by five of the 19 remaining and then the pits will be privatised and the 
government can wash its hands of them. Friday's day of action is the only way 
forward. We've tried everything else and it doesn't seem to have worked. 84 
The Joint NUMlrail stoppage on 2 April was extremely effective. Every NUM pit 
stopped work. On the railways, there was just one passenger train and one goods 
train in motion. Scargill insisted that the first national coal strike for over eight years 
was not the end of the campaign, 'it's the beginning. ,85 The second joint-stoppage 
on 16 April was again effective. However, soon after, rail workers' leader Jimmy 
Knapp abandoned the miners when he called off his union's action, claiming he had 
secured a deal with British Rail. 86 
Co-ops and buy-outs 
The miners were in no position to fight alone foHowing this latest betrayal, and the 
Tories knew this. Soon after the government started to press forward with more pit 
closures. Eight pits closed during the last week of April. At other pits miners were 
volunteering in increasing numbers for redundancy, either through the pull of 
enhanced redundancy payments or to avoid victimisation and the sack if they 
remained.87 'Some of them did right getting out,' thought Robert King: 
Two lads got sacked for laking, for having time offwork. One of them got his job 
back because the management didn't go through the procedure properly. Phil 
Greenbank lost all his redundancy money. But five miles away, at another pit, 
they were sending everybody home on full pay. By this time it didn't really 
matter. Everybody knew the pit was going to shut. But the management still felt 
that they had to be vindictive. Dave Turton wasn't even a militant. Maybe it was 
the management trying to make names for themselves - 'I've done this at 
Frickley' - for when they went for other jobs. 88 
82 N. Walden, 'Energy Policy', in P. Catterall (ed.), Contemporary Britain, 
(London, 1994), p.lS7; Hem,<,worth and South Elmsall Express, 1 April 1993; 
ROutledge, op. cit., p.248. 
83 Ibid., p.249. 
84 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 1 April 1993. 
85 Routledge, op. cit., p.2S1. 
86 S· . 14 lmons, op. CIt., p. . 
87 Socialist Worker, 8 May 1993. 
88 Robert King, interviewed by the author. 
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Steve Tulley's prophesy soon began to ring true. On 18 June British Coal began 
the closure of the 'reprieved' pits. Leaks - apparently from BC's headquarters -
indicated that Frickley and two other pits supposedly reprieved in March were now 
in danger yet again.89 With little chance of the labour movement acting to save the 
coal industry by now, some Frickley activists started looking for other solutions to 
keep the pit open. One apparent option was a workers' buy-out. 'We didn't really 
think that was a good idea,' recalls Ian Oxley, but, 'We did investigate it. We talked 
to someone from Wakefield District Council. We did tentatively look at it. We were 
absolutely certain that a slimmed-down pit based on Newhill could be viable. ,90 
Superficially, a buy-out seemed like a radical solution. But the reality was that no 
matter how hard miners worked after a buy-out, they would still have to sell their 
coal in the very same rigged market that had led to the pit closure programme in the 
first place. Miners at Monktonhall Colliery in Scotland had already found this to 
their cost. By April 1993 the consortium which ran the pit had collected debts in 
excess of £l.6 million, the Bank of Scotland had refused to advance any more cash 
and a wealthy new business partner was being sought.91 
There were even hopes among some NUM activists that their pits would remain 
open under a sympathetic owner following privatisation. According to Ian Oxley: 
... a lot of people wanted to go with Malcolm Edwards [the former commercial 
director of British Coal] and basically buy the pits that were going to shut. We 
thought about that route, keeping contact with him, and seeing if he was 
interested in Frickley ... and he did come and look at the viability of the pit. 92 
The end 
Throughout the following months, speculation mounted in the local press once more 
about how Frickley was near to closing. By the early autumn the rumours were 
starting to have more substance. According to the Yorkshire Evening Post of 28 
September 1993, Frickley, Hatfield and Bentley were among a new wave of closures 
to be announced soon. 93 But when British Coal chiefs announced that the pit 
required further review and that a meeting would be held on 12 November to 
consider Frickley's future, the pit's fate was almost sealed. Union leaders had been 
informed by BC's Northern Group director Alan Houghton that since the 
government's coal review in March, developments in the energy market had virtually .. 
eliminated the potential for extra coal sales.94 Hence it was no real surprise when the 
four Frickley NUM officials met British Coal chiefs on 16 November and were told 
that Frickley was to close. It was said that the pit had lost £1. 8 million in the first six 
months of the financial year and as much as 60 per cent of its weekly output was ., . 
being stockpiled. Further, they were told that Frickley miners would qualify for an 
89 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 24 June 1993. 
90 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
91 Socialist Worker, 10 July 1993. 
92 Ian Oxley, interviewed by the author. 
93 Yorkshire Evening Post, 28 September] 993. 
94 Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 11 November 1993. 
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extra £7,000 on top of their redundancy packages if they withdraw the pit from the 
colliery review procedure and accepted the pit's closure in writing within ten days.95 
On 20 November a mass meeting of Frickley miners met to discuss the new 
developments. 'We had the "I'm not voting to shut my colliery" thing,' says Gary 
Hinchliffe: 
I had a disagreement with Jip over this. I'm glad that the pit shut, because that's 
the first one that we'd had. Jip said that we should take no part in this, we 
shouldn't have a ballot, we shouldn't do owt, we shouldn't shut the pit. I said, 
'We are not shutting the pit, Jip. We are asking the men whether they want to 
take this money or not. The pit is going to shut.' 'We are shutting the pit!' He'd 
got this big thing that the men were voting to shut the pit. [ said, 'Jip, we've 
stood up here, this union, and asked these men to come out on strike, I've lost 
count how many times, since the end of the strike. More than any other pit in the 
country. We are doing them a disservice if we don't do the honourable thing.' 
The thing was that British Coal didn't need the vote of the men in the pit. They 
needed the four branch officials to put their signature to say that this pit wouldn't 
go into the review. 96 
Gary Hutsby was one of those who wanted to make a final principled stand 
against British Coal in the face of closure: 
It was a foregone conclusion that the pit was going to close, but it was how it 
was going to close that mattered. Were people in years to come going to say that 
Frickley miners actually voted to accept closure? This was something we 
shouldn't do. But the branch officials were arguing that it was something that we 
should do, that we should have a vote on it, that every member had a right to 
state what they wanted. It was a big get-out clause for them ... There was only 
me, Jip and Andy Butler - who had transferred to Frickley from Armthorpe - out 
of hundreds of miners at this meeting who argued that we shouldn't be balloting. 
We were getting booed and hissed. Jip jumped up and shouted, 'I propose that 
we don't have a ballot for closure. Have I got a seconder?' Either me or Andy 
Butler seconded him ... But they [the branch officials] just said, 'We are voting 
next week, at the pit-head. That's the end of the meeting.' There was no show of •. 
hands; they wouldn't accept our proposal - which we knew would get beaten ... 
because they knew that they would have to stick their hands up and vote for 
closure. 97 
Even though the proposition to not vote on the pit's closure was not taken up, as 
Gary Hinchliffe explains, the Frickley miners still had plenty to be proud of as their 
final meeting concluded: 
~ 
95 Yorkshire Post, 17 November 1993. 
96 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
97 Gary Hutsby, interviewed by the author. 
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We stood up and thanked them for their support over the years, and how many 
times we'd asked them to back the men up: 'Whatever decision you make, don't 
let anybody say that you've shut your pit. There's nobody done more to keep this 
industry going than the men have at this pit. And if everybody else had battled as 
hard against the Coal Board's policies since we came back off strike, we wouldn't 
be in this position now. So do what you want to do; you've got wives, you've got 
kids, you've got futures.'98 
There were still 740 miners working at Frickley Colliery when the ballot over 
closure took place, but only 357 men voted - many of the remainder were not 
eligible to vote having let their union subscriptions lapse. All but 27 of Frickley's 
remaini!lg miners voted to accept British Coal's offer of enhanced redundancy terms. 
Nevertheless, the historical record needs to acknowledge that it was British Coal and 
the Conservative government that closed the pit, not the miners. The Frickley miners 
were simply voting for what they perceived as the best option available to them. If 
the options had been whether they wanted the pit to close or instead stay open for 
the next decade, there would have been little prospect of the Frickley closing at that 
time. Instead, the options, as Paul Symonds points out, 'were "Slow Death" or 
"Quick death" We were asked whether we wanted to keep the pit open or go into 
the review procedure. Miners knew that the review procedure had never saved a 
single pit. It was just more tokenism.'99 Thus, on November 26 1993, the coal 
miners of Frickley Colliery worked their last shift. 100 A decade and more of proud 
resistance had come to an end. 
98 Gary Hinchliffe, interviewed by the author. 
99 Paul Symonds, interviewed by the author. 
100Hemsworth and South Elmsall Express, 2 December 1993; Yorkshire Post, 26 
November 1993. 
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By March 1994, exactly ten years since the start of the great miners' strike of 
1984-85, all but 17 of Britain's pits had closed. The nightmare that many in the 
miners' union had envisaged had at last become reality. In September that year, these 
pits, along with 13 others that had been mothballed, were privati sed. When the coal 
industry had been nationalised in 1947 there had been 700,000 miners. Now there 
were just 7,000. 1 
For some observers the demise of the miners was inevitable. Robert Taylor, for 
instance, has argued that the miners' strike of 1984-85 was <the last, almost primeval 
scream of a dying proletariat.' Though Taylor acknowledges that there was 
widespread support for the miners in the 1992-93 coal crisis, he says, 'this could not, 
however, alter the economic logic for a declining industry.,2 But was this really so? 
Did miners have no option but to become a relic of the past in the way of the 
hand-loom weavers? Is it the case, as one mining historian has put it, that 'these 
characters who earned their living working in dirty and primitive conditions 
underground, relying on their muscles and their wlts, will soon seem to belong to 
another species,?3 
Certainly the Conservative government persistently presented the decline of coal 
as being the inevitable consequence of market forces4. And without doubt there was 
a decline in the fortunes of the coal industry in other developed countries as well. In 
the decade from 1981 the number of people employed in mining and quarrying in 
France fell from 136,000 to 81,000; in Spain from 94,000 to 76,000, in Canada from 
208,000 to 174,000, and in the USA from 1,118,000 to 733,000. From 1984 to 
1991, employment in the same industrial sector in Germany fell from 232,000 to 
182,000, and fell from ]02,000 to 93,000 in Australia between ]986 and 1991.5 
But the decline of coal in these countries was of nothing in comparison to what 
was witnessed in Britain. A rational energy policy would have involved a sustained 
programme of energy efficiency and conservation, the introduction of clean-coal 
technology and the use of renewable resources. Under the Conservative government, 
however, energy policy was what NUM leaders often referred to as 'a conspiracy 
against coal.' But they would have been more correct to have said there was a 
conspiracy against the miners. Seamus Milne has argued that the destruction of the 
coal industry in Britain had much to do wlth the Conservative Party's desire to o' 
avenge their humiliations at the hands of the miners in the early 1970s. The 1972 and 
1974 strikes, he says,' 'laid the ground for what became a twenty-year vendetta 
against the miners: a single-minded and ruthless drive to destroy the NUM and, if 
necessary, the bulk of the British coal industry in the process.,6 Milne has exposed a .,. 
1 The Guardian,S March and 31 September 1994. 
2 R. Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics, p.298. 
3 1. Threlkeld, Pits: A Pictorial Record of Mining, (Barnsley, 1994), p. 7. 
4 See D. Helm, 'Energy policy and market doctrine', Political Quarterly, Vo1.64, 
No.4, OctoberlDecember 1993. 
5 Richards, Miners On Strike, p.15. 
6 Milne, The Enemy Within, p.S. 
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huge spying operation and a dirty-tricks campaign against the NOM leadersrup by 
the British state as part of that drive to destroy the union. 
Nor is this view solely limited to left-wing journalists. Mike Parker, for many 
years the chief economist at British Coal, has co-written of how: 'It had been clear 
for some time that the government's objectives for coal had strong political elements 
including exposing the industry to market forces, permanently to break the power of 
the NUM and to privatise what was left of the industry.,7 
As we have already noted in this study, aware that the miners' strength lay in their 
impact on the electricity supply industry, the government had first tried to supersede 
NUM-produced coal with both nuclear energy and increased coal imports. Nigel 
Lawson admitted the real intention much later: 'The need for "diversification" of 
energy _ resources, the argument I used to justifY the PWR [pressurised-
water-reactor] programme, was code for freedom from NOM blackmail.,8 When 
these proved far too costly and insufficient, 'NUM blackmail' was finally threatened 
with the privatisation of the electricity supply industry alongside a market rigged in 
favour of the gas and nuclear power.9 In his memoirs, Cecil Parkinson, the Energy 
Secretary who had proudly announced the future privatisation of coal at the 1988 
Conservative Party conference, was forthright about the government's intentions in 
privatising electricity supply and the coal industry. Ending these monopolies, he 
argued, would 'curtail the power of the miners. ' 10 
The NUM's argument against the government's policy was a powerful one and 
accepted widely. 'The truth is that there are no economic reasons to justify closures,' 
wrote Arthur Scargill as the final closure programme was about to be unleashed: 
TorylBritish Coal claims about 'economic' and 'uneconomic' pits have been 
exposed. Britain produces, at an average cost of £40 per tonne, the cheapest 
deep-mined coal in the world. Australian coal, often referred to as the 'cheapest', 
receives subsidies - in the form of a 150 per cent tax rebate - on all research and 
development costs; South Mrican coal - produced by virtual slave labour -
receives a 10-15 per cent subsidy: German coal - which has average production 
costs of £110 per tonne - receives massive state subsidies; but British coal 
receives nothing! 
The British nuclear industry, on the other hand - producing electricity 350 per 
cent more expensively than coal - receives a £1.3 billion per year subsidy. The " 
development of gas-fired power stations is 30 per cent more expensive than the 
use of Britain's coal. Coal imports, if we compare like with like, are 30 per cent 
more expensive than our own coal, and disastrously worsen Britain's balance of 
payments. The subsidies given to nuclear power and gas, together with the cost of ., 
unnecessary coal imports, is equal to a £ 1 00 subsidy for every tonne of British 
7 M. Parker and J. Surrey, 'The October 1992 coal crisis and UK energy policy', 
The Political Quarterly, Vo1.64, No.4, OctoberlDecember 1993, p.402. 
8 N. Lawson, The View From No.1J, (London, 1992), p.l68. 
9 Milne, op. cit. p.8. 
10 C. Parkinson, Right at the Centre, (London, ] 992), p.280. 
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coal produced. If only one-tenth of that, i.e. a £10 per tonne subsidy, was given 
to our coal industry, it would expand rather than contract. No pits would close. 11 
But arguments alone were not enough to stop the government. The fact was that 
the end of the miners and the NUM was inevitable if the union did not mount an 
effective challenge to the Tories and the vagaries of the capitalist system they 
worshipped. 
'Inevitablism' actually played an important role for those who espoused new 
realism by diverting attention from the inadequacies of their stratehY The new 
realists were so mesmerised with the successes of Margaret Thatcher's governments 
that they took up much of Tory thinking. 'Thatcherism', it was claimed, was 
symboliC;; of a society that had changed beyond recognition, towards a 'postmodem', 
'post-industrial' order. There was now growing prosperity, marked by a declining 
working class and a growing white-collar middle class, with a shift away from old 
collectivist attitudes towards a new individualistic consumerism. 12 
Now it cannot be denied that the working class has changed since the Second 
World War, especially with the shift away from manufacturing towards the service 
sector. But the reality is that the working class has constantly changed since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution. 13 Indeed, the popular image of miners as the 
'archetypal proletarians', still living in close-knit communities made up of row upon 
row of grubby terraced houses where back doors were always open, with an 
enthusiasm for racing pigeons and brass band music, was as false for miners as it was 
for most other working people by the latter decades of the twentieth century. It was 
no longer the case, as the authors of Coal is Our Life had noted of Featherstone in 
the 1950s, that 'The pollution of the air is such as to reduce clothes, houses, and 
streets to a drab uniformity.' 14 Coalminers resident in South Elmsall or South 
Kirkby were just as likely to live in semi-detached houses or bungalows as in a 
terraced street. More than that, miners experienced all the cosmopolitan trappings of 
life under modem capitalism. Among other things, they drove cars, went on foreign 
holidays, listened to rock music, watched world events on colour television and 
wrote their agitational leaflets using personal computers. Young miners on the picket 
lines, in their T -shirts, trainers and jeans, looked no different from their 
contemporaries anywhere on the planet. 
These features were already much in evidence prior to the 1984-85 strike, indeed " 
were often said to be bringing an end to class consciousness and struggle in the pits, 
shown by the three ballots opposing action. The following is how Andrew Taylor 
summed up the miners' standing at that time: 
In the last ten years the workforce has become younger and substantial numbers 
of miners have no direct experience of the struggles of the early 1970s . . . The 
ecol~gy of the mining communities has been disrupted: for example, pit closures 
11 A. Scargill, 'Resist pit closures', The Miner, October 1992. 
12 C. Leadbeater, 'How have-nots can share in working class triumphaIism', New 
Statesman, 21 August 1987. 
13 L. German, A Question o/Class, (London, 1996), pp.22-28. 
14 Dennis et aI, Coal is Our Life, p.12 .. 
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mean that many miners travel considerable distances to work, technological 
change at the point of production has weakened or broken up the cohesive 
work-teams, and the erosion of the coalfields' relative geographical and social 
isolation has weakened the reinforcing cycle of pit, community and union. The 
miners have been subject to those forces which have eroded the traditional basis 
of working class politics and culture. I5 
And these doubts about the miners' willingness to fight, we need to remember, were 
expressed on the eve of the longest mass-strike in British history! 
Now if all the theorising about a post-industrial society had been limited to an 
academic debate it would probably have had little impact on events. But because 
many in the trade union bureaucracy were influenced by such views, new realism 
often paralysed trade union effectiveness. Firstly, as with Andrew Taylor above, they 
argued that workers were not willing to fight any more, that industrial confrontation 
and conflict were things of the past. It was emphasised that the new role of unions 
should be to provide members with services such as credit cards, personal pensions, 
insurance, mortgages, legal advice and skill training. 16 And secondly, when workers 
did actually fight back they were told that the forces stacked against them were so 
great they could not win, that the way forward was to attain influence through 
winning public opinion and do nothing that would upset potential supporters. 
Behind this strategy lay the belief that Britain is a democratic society, that the 
government and the employers are obliged to bow to the will of the people. But this 
is an illusion. The reality is that as with every other capitalist country, real power is 
concentrated in the hands of big business and the state machine. These institutions 
are not in the least democratic, and have proven time and again that they will defY 
widespread public support for industrial disputes. Failure to recognise this meant 
that when disputes arose, by not adopting the tried and tested methods of combating 
their employers, by being passive, by not mobilising people for action, unions did not 
win. Of course, by not winning workers then frequently accepted the argument that 
defeat was inevitable in the face of 'market forces'. And this was as true for other 
'industrial dinosaurs' such as the printworkers and the dockers as it was the miners. 
But by the time of the final pit-closure programme, all the theorising about the 
strengths of Thatcherism that had plagued the labour movement for so long were 
being stretched to absurdity. The demise of Thatcher belied the myth that her •. 
governments had the majority support of the people of Britain, indeed the rise of 
John Major to the leadership of the Conservative Party owed everything to how he 
was able to present himself as being a 'caring' alternative to Margaret Thatcher. 17 In ., 
late 1992 Major's government was weak and divided. And so deep was the mood 
that emerged against the Tories over their plans for the miners that, though Major's 
administration would cling to office for the rest of its term, they would be obliterated 
at th~ polls in the general election of May 1997. But the greatest tragedy for the 
15 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.290. 
16 P. Bassett, 'All together now', Marxism Today, January 1989; W. McCarthy, 
'Trade unionism in the nineties', in Towards 2000, TUC discussion document, 
1991. 
17 Jones, Politics UK, p.397. 
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miners is that but for the restraint of the new realists, the tide of anger against the 
Tories could have swept the government aside much earlier and thus saved the coal 
industry. The utter feebleness and defeatism of new realism was so entrenched that 
it could be taken to astonishing lengths. When, after almost six months of inaction 
against the closure programme, the NUM leadership finally decided to initiate token 
one-day strikes in April 1993, even then this was too much for the Scottish NUM 
vice-president. 'The days of bringing down governments are gone, but Arthur's 
about 20 years behind the times,' he complained. 18 
But the advent of new realism has only been part of the Frickley story. What this 
study has shown is that new realist ideas did not go unchallenged; further, we had a 
glimpse of what can happen when rank-and-file workers take the initiative. The 
experience of the Big Strike had transformed the lives of a generation of young 
miners. A minority, as at Frickley, had been radicalised by their involvement and 
continued their fight on a scale barely imaginable after such a crushing defeat. Above 
all else, it was their defiance that stopped the onslaught on terms and conditions 
from becoming a rout. It was over five years after the 1984-85 strike before the coal 
bosses could begin to get the upper hand at Frickley. But it was a resistance with 
which the leadership of the NUM, both national and Area, never identified, and 
certainly never encouraged, as a means to recover lost ground. Even Arthur Scargill, 
who for much of the time was one of new realism's fiercest critics, concentrated his 
efforts solely on initiatives from above within the organisation, on unpopular 
set-piece confrontations, rather than backing the resistance at pit level. Only when 
we take this into account can we fully understand the widespread demoralisation that 
existed amongst the union's pit-level activists, and their subsequent inability to 
mount a sustained challenge against a weak and divided government during the final 
coal crisis. 
And yet while the demise of mining marked the end of an era in British trade 
union history, the methods that militant miners made popular have not come to an 
end. The miners actions only seemed like the last scream of a dying proletariat if a 
narrow view of what constitutes the working class is held. Despite Britain losing its 
manufacturing base, there are still as many as 8 million trade unionists in the country. 
And despite the lowest levels of industrial unrest on record, the late 1980s into the 
1990s witnessed confrontations involving such groups as teachers, health workers, 
college lecturers, bank: staff and civil servants. As the following extract from a study 
of banking and finance workers shows, walkouts and flying pickets remain far from 
exclusive to coal mining: 
Barclays BIFU computer workers took industrial action for 7 weeks in 1991 after 
a large vote for action over pay, and attempts to split up national pay negotiations 
and introduce performance related pay (PRP). This involved no overtime work, 
n~ .on-call work, selected walkouts and picketing. The dispute escalated when 
management suspended some workers for carrying out a work to rule. Some 500 
computer workers walked out from Nantwich and Northampton, sending flying 
pickets to three centres closing down the Manchester computer centre. 19 
18 Cited in Richards, op. cit., p.214. . 
19 G. Gall, 'Industrial relations in UK clearing banks', New Technology, Work and 
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Such workers have the potential to become the miners of the future, being able to 
inflict massive losses on their employers when they strike. Future historians may well 
collect their oral testimonies. These groups may reside in suburban districts and 
perceive themselves as 'middle class', but the nature of the capitalist system and its 
drive for profits has meant that conditions they had taken for granted in the past 
have come under attack, and they too have had to combat speed-ups, job cuts and 
difficulties over pay. Service sector workers may not get their hands dirty in the 
manner of traditional manual workers, but often their work is distinctly manual, 
repetitive and unpleasant.20 These factors will help to ensure the continuation of a 
combative tradition within the trade union movement, a tradition added to and 
exemplified by the miners at Frickley Colliery, and which the present study has 
hopefully gone some way to illuminate. Major confrontations lie ahead, but the 
conclusions nllght be different next time around. 
Employment, Vol.8, No.1, 1993, p.68. 
20 H. Beynon, 'The end of the industrial worker?', in N. Abercrombie and A. 
Warde (eds), Social Change in Contemporary Britain, (Cambridge, 1992), p.180; 
c. Harman, 'The working class after the recession', in A. Callinicos and C. 
Harman, The Changing Working Class, (London, 1987). 
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APPENDIX: THE FRICKLEY ACTIVISTS INTERVIEWED 
VIC FRANCE was born on 2 May 1945. He worked at Frickley Colliery from 1970 
until 1989 as an electrician. He was a Labour Party and NUM activist. The interview 
was held in South Elmsall on 8 November 1996. 
STEVE GANT was born on 2 October 1955. He started work at Frickley ColJjery 
in October 1972 and worked at the pit until January 1993. He was on the NUM 
branch committee as the Cudworth seam representative from 1985 onwards. The 
interview was held in South Elmsall on 20 and 26 September 1996. 
LAWRENCE GERTIG was born on 7 April 1954. He worked at Frickley Colliery 
from the mid-1970s until just before the pit closed in 1993. He was an underground 
fitter. He was elected as the craftsmen's representative on the colliery's consultative 
committee after the 1984-85 strike. The interview was held in South Elmsall on 7 
December 1995. 
JEFF JOHNSON was born on 4 March 1956. He started work at Askem Colliery 
in 1974, moved to Frickley Colliery in 1975 and worked at the pit until its closure. 
He was on the Frickley NUM branch committee from 1987 onwards. The interview 
was held in South Kirkby on 5 September 1995. 
GARY HlNCHLIFFE was born on 22 February 1958. He started work at Frickley 
Colliery in February 1979 and finished when the pit closed. He was a NUM branch 
committee member from the late 1980s onwards. The interview was held in South 
Elmsall and South Kirkby on 11, 17,26 November and 3 December 1995. 
-GARY HURST was born on 22 October 1958. He worked at FrickJey Colliery 
from March 1975 until the pit closed. He was the NUM craftsmen's representative 
at Frickley from 1987 onwards. The interview was held in South Elmsall on 10 and 
17 October 1995. 
GARY nUTSBY was born on 5 July 1966. He started work at Frickley Colliery in 
January 1982 and worked there until the pit closed. The interview was held in South 
Elmsall on 20 and 21 November, and 18 December 1996. 
ROBERT KING was born in September 1958. He started working at Frickley 
Colliery in 1988 and worked there as an electrician until the pit closed. He had 
previously worked at South Kirkby Colliery, and briefly at Askern. The interview 
was held in Moorthorpe on 13 December ] 996. 
IAN OXLEY was born on 20 March 1945. He started work at Frickley Colliery in 
September 1962 and worked at the pit until it closed. He was a branch committee 
member for a short period in the early 1980s and elected again after the 1984-85 
strike, and held the post until the pit closed. The interview was held in South Elmsall 
on 6, 10, 11, 13 and 17 October 1995. 
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JOHN 'CHICK' PICKEN was born on 9 January 1941. He started work at 
Frickley Colliery on his 15th birthday and worked at the pit until its closure. He was 
an NUM committee man from June 1982 until 1987 when he was elected Fricldey 
NOM branch president. The interview was held in South Elmsall on 28 and 29 
September 1995. 
RAY RILEY was born on 11 November 1958. He started work at Frickley Colliery 
in November 1979 and finished at the pit in August 1989. The interview was held in 
South Elmsall on 21 September and 3 October 1995. 
TONY SHORT was born on 6 August 1961. He started work at Frickley Colliery 
in June -1979 and worked at the pit until November 1992. He was an NUM branch 
committee member from 1985 onwards. The interview was held in South Kirkby on 
16 and 17 October 1996. 
JOHNNY STONES was born on 28 July 1937. He started work at Frickley 
Colliery on 28 August 1954 and worked at the pit until its closure. He was Frickley 
NUM branch delegate from 1964 onwards. The interview was held in South Elmsall 
on 12, 13 and 14 September 1995. 
PAUL 'JIP' SYMONDS was born on 30 June 1955. He started work at Frickley 
Colliery in December 1974 and worked there until the pit closed. He was an NUM 
branch committee member after the strike. The interview was held in South ElmsaU 
and Sheffield on 31 March and 25 November 1996, and 2 February 1997. 
ROBERT 'DOPPER' WALKER, was born on 13 February 1961. He worked as a 
collier at Frickley Colliery from 1977 to 1993. The interview was held in South 
Elmsall on 2i November 1995. 
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